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CHRISTINA SHUTTLEWORTH KRAUS (ED.)

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GENRE AND NARRATIVE IN ANCIENT HISTORICAL TEXTS

EDITED BY

CHRISTINA SHUTTLEWORTH KRAUS

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David Schaberg was trained at Stanford and Harvard, where he received his doctorate in Comparative Literature in 1996. His dissertation, *Foundations of Chinese Historiography: Literary Representation in Zuo zhuan and Guoyu*, examined the intellectual implications of rhetorical and narrative habits in China's earliest histories. He has written articles on the practice of remonstrance, on the historical writing of Sima Qian, on ideologies of song, and on imperial models of circulation in early China and fifth-century Athens. He teaches in the Department of East Asian Languages & Cultures at the University of California, Los Angeles.

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EDITOR'S PREFACE

This collection brings together new papers on ancient historical texts from a variety of periods and geographical areas, concentrating on the related issues of genre and narrative technique. It is intended in some ways as a successor to I. J. F. de Jong and J. P. Sullivan, *Modern Critical Theory and Classical Literature* (Leiden, 1994), in that all of the scholars whose work is included here were invited to make explicit the literary or historiographical theory that informs their reading of their chosen texts. The authors are particularly interested in the intersection between history and related genres such as philosophy, antiquarian writing, geography, and biography; some of the papers consider the role of rhetorical composition and theory in shaping the ancient historian's interpretation of his material, while others consider the broader question of genre itself, and whether it is appropriate to analyze literature by means of categories which may be potentially restricting or anachronistic. The result is a set of wide-ranging essays which integrate theory and practice, offering readers an opportunity to explore many different possible approaches to ancient historiography.

The papers are arranged geographically, moving from China through Mesopotamia, Persia, and Israel, to Greece and Rome. The various strands are drawn together by a classicist in the Epilogue, which also suggests some further ways of reading these modern readings of ancient texts. Undated references to modern authors are to papers in this volume; other bibliographical references may be found in the lists of Works Cited at the end of each essay. Abbreviations of periodicals and of ancient works are those in standard use; all quotations from the primary texts are translated.

The editors at Brill, Julian Deahl and Job Lisman, have been particularly helpful; I would also like to thank Gera van Bedaf, the Desk Editor, and Irene de Jong, who is (I believe) ultimately responsible for initiating it. I am grateful to Diane Edelman, Amélie Kuhrt, Fergus Millar, Stephen Owen, Christopher Pelling, Tony Woodman, and Judith Zeitlin for advice; I owe a special debt of gratitude to John Marincola for help with reading the proofs at a difficult time.

SOCIAL PLEASURES IN EARLY CHINESE HISTORIOGRAPHY AND PHILOSOPHY*

David Schaberg

Despite their length and the abundance of philosophical argumentation they contain, two of China's oldest works of historiography have gotten less than their share of attention from recent students of early Chinese philosophy. The *Zuo Tradition*[1] and the *Legends of the States*,[2] both of uncertain authorship and both compiled near the end of the fourth century,[3] contain detailed narratives of events in and among the feudatory states of Zhou Dynasty China during the Spring and Autumn Period (722–479).[4] Particularly in the numerous deliberative speeches they purport to record, they represent a vast effort to show how traditional ideals were at all times relevant to political

* Earlier versions of this paper were presented at Harvard University and the University of Pennsylvania in December 1995, and at UCLA in January 1996. I am grateful to the scholars who attended the talks, and most especially to Stephen Owen, Peter Bol, Michael Puett, Li Wai-yee, Matt Sommers, Benjamin Elman, Haun Saussy, and Lothar von Falkenhausen, all of whom offered criticism and encouragement.

[1] The *Zuo Tradition* (*Zuozhuan*) is now preserved as a commentary on the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, an extremely terse chronicle of events in and involving the state of Lu in the years from 722 to 479 BCE. Years in the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, and thus also in the *Zuo Tradition*, are numbered according to the name of the Lu duke in power at any given time. All references to *Zuo Tradition* give name of duke, year of his reign, and paragraph or section within that year (as designated in Yang Bojun): thus 'Zhao 13.2' is the second section of narration under the thirteenth year of Duke Zhao of Lu (r. 541–510). For convenience I also give the equivalent BCE date and page numbers in available translations. See Yang (1990); Legge (1985); and Watson (1989). A useful study, and one which has influenced the present article, is Egan (1977).

[2] The *Legends of the States* (*Guoyu*) preserves many of the same narratives and speeches as the *Zuo*, though always in slightly variant versions. It is organized not as an annalistic history, but geographically; events are ordered first according to the state in which they occurred, and then chronologically. References to *Guoyu* give name of state, followed by section and subsection, as divided in the 1978 Shanghai edition. For a partial translation, see d'Hormon and Mathieu (1985).

[3] All dates are BCE unless otherwise noted. For dating, I follow Kamata Tadashi (1963) 342–61.

[4] Works which might have a claim to the status of 'earliest historiography' in China include the *Book of Documents* (*Shang shu*), the *Lost Books of Zhou* (*Yi Zhou shu*),

affairs. Yet scholars of Confucianism, the school of thought most closely involved with the production of these histories, have not explained how the writing of the two works made sense in its own time as an intellectual act.[5]

This neglect is partly the result of a generic anachronism. In China's later four-fold classification of books, the 'philosophers' are clearly distinguished from the 'historians,' and narration not undertaken for expressly polemical purposes is categorized as history. The ideal historian also has an ax to grind, but he submerges his critiques of the powerful and the depraved in accurate (though stylistically inflected) accounts of events. Still, the histories are hardly Thucydidean in their attitude toward implausible material. They no doubt preserve elements of truth in almost all of their narrations: such details as the dates and sites of events and the names of people involved are in most cases impossible to corroborate, but they do not ring false; battles, diplomatic encounters, and court debates may well have taken place much as the narrators said they did. But at least one great source of doubt attends the whole project. The typical account of an event in these histories turns on a key speech, often quite lengthy, in which one or more speakers make policy recommendations and predictions based on observations and interpretations in accordance with traditional standards. The technical problems which would have attended the stenographic recording of unique prose utterances have generally not been acknowledged in the case of early China, and within a few centuries of the compilation of these works Chinese scholars were writing of special scribes who had attended kings and dukes (and, one is forced to imagine, anyone else whose speech is recorded), busily noting all their actions and transcribing all their words. A greater problem still is the nature of the speeches. The deliberative speeches are uncannily prescient and the predictions incredibly accurate. Only a character otherwise marked as unwise

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and the *Bamboo Annals* (*Zhushu jinian*); for descriptions, see Loewe (1993). All fall short of the *Zuo* and the *Legends* in attention to chronology and narrative detail.

[5] The intellectual and moral implications of the writing of *Spring and Autumn Annals* have long been a focus of attention for readers and scholars, but similar questions were relatively rarely asked about the *Zuo Tradition* and the *Legends*. Important histories of early Chinese philosophy by Fung Yu-lan, Benjamin Schwartz, A. C. Graham, and Chad Hansen all but ignore the speeches and narratives of historiography.

is capable of speaking at any length and not finding vindication in ensuing events. But most characters who speak are not morally disqualified, and their unerring foresight stretches days, decades, and even centuries into the future.

This state of affairs has left historians of early Chinese thought in a bind. The *Zuo Tradition* and the *Legends of the States* are by far the most comprehensive sources for the history of the Spring and Autumn Period. One can hardly speak of the period without reference to them. Yet those parts of the works in which something resembling philosophical reasoning takes place—the speeches—are marred by unreliability. So historians regularly cite the *Zuo Tradition*, and to a lesser extent the *Legends*, as authoritative and reliable sources for events, while dodging the question of the historical status of the speeches. The intellectual labor captured in the speeches (whether as spoken or as later scripted) goes to waste.

The loss can be made good in light of the recognition that all history-writing is an intellectual activity undertaken under particular historical circumstances. It did not take the last three decades' work on historiographical narrative to make this recognition possible, though the writings of Louis O. Mink, Hayden White, Dominic LaCapra, Paul Ricoeur, and others have allowed an increasingly precise characterization of the historian's work. A very old understanding of the *Spring and Autumn Annals* holds that it is the result of Confucius' (551–479) editing of an earlier chronicle, and that the sage has written his judgment of events into every word.[6] But this conception was rarely extended to the longer narratives of the *Zuo Tradition*; if the chronicle was to be read for its subtleties of tone and diction, then the commentary would have to be treated as a clear, unsubtle, and accurate record of the historical facts.[7]

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[6] Much of the exegetical tradition on the *Chunqiu*, including the *Gongyang* and *Guliang* (regularly classed with the *Zuo Tradition* as the 'Three Commentaries'), consists of explanation of Confucius' word-choices and their juridical significance. The *Zuo* differs from the other two in that it is predominantly narrative and was apparently edited and recast as a commentary to the *Spring and Autumn Annals* sometime after its composition.

[7] It would be misleading to imply that the *Zuo* has never been treated as the result of intellectual labor. Certain late Qing Dynasty critics, most prominently Kang Youwei (CE 1858–1927), considered the work an ingenious forgery by the Han *literatus* Liu Xin (?–CE 23); defense of and opposition to this position has dominated scholarship on the *Zuo* for much of this century. See, e.g., Tsuda (1958).

The *Zuo Tradition* and the *Legends of the States* are narrative histories. More precisely, they are well-organized compilations of historical narratives of a particular kind, i.e., anecdotes. Not only the suspect speeches, with their impeccable rhetorical symmetries and infallible prognostications, but the narratives themselves are the results of literary and intellectual labor. The available evidence allows us to date this labor, very approximately, to the end of the fourth century; even when accounts had their inception as early as the eighth century, they may have continued to develop and change, both in oral and written traditions, during the next generations. This development could only have taken place in a Confucian milieu. Confucius is frequently cited as an authority in the *Zuo*, and the philosophical arguments advanced in the two works are, with some exceptions, closely related to tenets defended in the *Analects* and other basic texts of Confucianism.[8] Much of the substance of early Confucian thought is embodied in the way the teacher and his students retold stories of the past. The histories become sources for intellectual history when we look beyond the events narrated to the act of narration itself.

A reading of the two histories and other more direct expressions of Confucian thought against each other leads to a series of observations which will be elaborated in the following pages. First, narratives in the *Zuo Tradition* and the *Legends of the States* share a set of fundamental assumptions. The world and its events are intelligible to the observer who is equipped with the necessary hermeneutic skills and standards. An anecdote, the basic unit of narrative in these works, is most often organized around an act and its interpretation, often with attending prediction. Actions taken in the world, especially by men in positions of power, are important because they are always assumed to take place in full publicity. That is, they are always subject to observation and interpretation by nobles and com-

[8] I use the term 'Confucianism' and the latinizations 'Confucius' (for Kong Fuzi, 'Master' Kong) and 'Mencius' (for Mengzi, Meng Ke) with some reservations. 'Confucianism' translates no single Chinese word; the closest equivalent, *rujia*, 'Ru scholarly-lineage' is a doubly problematic term. The Ru, specialists in traditional techniques and texts, did not originate as followers of Confucius; and as a 'scholarly-lineage' the group is vast, poorly understood, and heterogeneous even throughout the Han period. As histories the *Zuo* and the *Legends* have been cited for traces of pre-Confucian varieties of thought, including a proto-Legalism inimical to the followers of Confucius. Nonetheless, the narratives everywhere show their affinities with Confucian historical discourse, and many make sense only as enactments of Confucian ideals, notably the importance of *li*, 'ritual propriety.'

moners alike. Because of the narrative atmosphere, in which almost anything that can be perceived is susceptible to interpretation by characters, actions and objects which I term 'aesthetic' take on special importance. Under the best circumstances, these function in socially useful displays, while in accounts of crises they are made to account for disasters suffered by members of the ruling class. Larger series of anecdotes are constructed in such a way as to vindicate Confucian values through displays of hermeneutic skill: observation, judgment, prediction, and retrospective comment show that ritual impropriety, lack of good faith, and similar errors do account for historical failures, and that success is the consequence of obedience to inherited values.

The construction of hundreds of narratives on the basis of these assumptions left its mark on Chinese thought. Texts as diverse as the *Analects*, the *Mozi*,[9] and the *Xunzi*[10] show a tacit dependence on these modes of story-telling. And one work in particular, the sayings attributed to Mencius (fl. late fourth century), develops as the centerpiece of its philosophical program a value which lies at the heart of *Zuo* storytelling: the conviction that a sanctioned aesthetic pleasure is an end and justification of the Confucian political and philosophical program.

The fundamentals of historiographical practice are evident in the first full-fledged narrative in the *Zuo Tradition*. It is the tale of how Duke Zhuang of the state of Zheng (r. 743–701),[11] having suppressed a coup attempt by his younger brother, disavowed his mother (who had supported the rebel) and was then reconciled with her. The anecdote is exemplary as an ingenious and in some ways typical celebration of hermeneutic perspicacity.[12]

> So he lodged [his mother] Lady Jiang at Chengying and made a vow: 'Until we reach the yellow springs [of the underworld], I will not see her.' Afterward he regretted it.

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[9] See Mei (1934) and Watson (1964).

[10] See Knoblock (1988–94).

[11] While dates for many rulers in the Spring and Autumn Period are undisputed, those for earlier rulers, including Zhou kings, are less certain. I have followed traditional dates, most of them given in Sima Qian's (?145–?86) *Shiji* (1959) 14.509–15.758; for translations of this work, China's first universal history, see Watson (1971); Nienhauser (1994); and Chavannes (1967).

[12] *Zuo* Yin 1.4 (722; Yang [1990] 10–6; Legge [1985] 5–6; Watson [1989] 1–4). All translations from the *Zuo* and from other Chinese works are my own.

> Kaoshu of Ying was the ruler at Yinggu.[13] He heard of [the affair] and came to pay tribute to the duke. The duke invited him to dine.
> As [Kaoshu] ate he put aside the meat, and the duke asked about it. He replied, 'My mother is still alive, and she gets a taste of everything I eat. She has never tasted the lord's stew: I would like to give some to her.'
> The duke said, 'You have a mother to give it to, and I do not!'
> Kaoshu of Ying said, 'May I ask what you mean?'
> The duke explained the matter and even told him that he regretted it. [Kaoshu] replied, 'Why worry about this? If you dig down in the earth until you reach water, then make a tunnel and meet her there, who will be able to claim that you have not done what you said?'
> The duke followed his advice. Entering the tunnel, the duke chanted, 'Inside the great tunnel: Joy is concentrated.' Exiting the tunnel, Lady Jiang chanted, 'Outside the great tunnel: Joy is spread abroad.'
> Then they were mother and son, as at the beginning.

Consider first the climate of publicity. It is an unspoken truth in this anecdote and in most others that the ruler's actions are always public. The nobles and people of the state know what he is doing and respond to it. There is a figurative theater in place at all times. The court is a stage both for the performances that are ritually prescribed and for every other word and action of the duke and his aides. The duke's most immediate audience is of course his ministerial staff; but surrounding them is a more extended audience, which comprises both the common people they govern and the nobility of other states. The *Zuo Tradition* assumes without remark that a rather minor local official knew the exact terms of Duke Zhuang's vow. Such a principle of publicity means that the people of a state can always react to the moral excellence or perversion of their ruler; internationally, it also means that ministers in one state regularly enjoy an extraordinary knowledge of events in other states. Publicity is one ingredient that *Zuo Tradition* and *Legends* narrators need as they tell their stories.

Publicity provides an abundance of material for observation, interpretation, and hermeneutic manipulation. When Kaoshu hears of the duke's vow and his regret, he conceives a brief theater piece which he can act out for the duke's benefit on the stage of court. He and the duke meet on the terms of ritual: the ruler rewards his

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[13] A region in Zheng, possibly near Chengying.

servant with a meal. But Kaoshu departs, if only slightly, from the ritually prescribed course of actions by setting aside a portion of meat. Duke Zhuang, who is himself endowed with enough observational talent to notice this variation, asks about the meat and learns that it is for Kaoshu's mother. This question was the motivation for Kaoshu's little performance; once the duke has expressed his regret ('You have a mother to give it to, and I do not!'), Kaoshu can pretend not to know of the vow, ask for details, and finally offer his solution to the problem.

Kaoshu's plan depends upon a very familiar sort of word-play. The duke said, 'Until we reach the yellow springs, I will not see her.' He meant that he would not meet with his mother again during the remaining years of their lives; the 'yellow springs' are the underworld. But as often happens in these texts, words become an object of interpretation and reinterpretation. For the duke's original meaning, Kaoshu substitutes a rigorously literal rereading of the vow. The duke and his mother need not be dead to 'reach the yellow springs.' He will have kept his vow as long as he arranges to hold his next audience with her in an underground passage where the 'yellow springs'—the groundwaters—seep in. As Kaoshu says, 'Who will be able to claim that you have not done what you said?' The guarantors of this vow are not supernatural forces, but the duke's public constituency, the people who observe him continually through the principle of publicity and who will lose faith in him if he goes back on his word.

The conclusion of the anecdote exemplifies the aesthetic assumption that underlies many historiographical narratives. In the course of their reconciliation, the duke and his mother recite rhyming couplets describing the joy or pleasure (*le*) they feel. The duke recites within the tunnel, where the natural pleasure of reunion with his mother is sheltered and contained by the walls that surround them; his mother, on the other hand, emerges from the tunnel and speaks of the pleasure as it spreads abroad. The pleasure produced when propriety is restored is a pleasure available for public consumption. After this public demonstration, the two are 'mother and son, as at the beginning': the outcome is as it should be, and is entirely the result of Kaoshu's attentive interpretation and skilled use of publicity.

The recognition of certain assumptions as 'aesthetic' exposes an important link between history-writing and other forms of fourth-century intellectual expression. Historiographical narrative and early

philosophy work to tie together many of the things which, as it happens, are covered by the Greek term *aisthesis*, a term which first denotes sense perception. As is apparent in some of the passages discussed below, Confucian discourse regularly relates the functioning of the senses to the more familiar terrain of aesthetics. The senses are properly used, we are told, in the consumption of traditionally sanctioned objects of delight: proper food and drink, proper music, properly decorated buildings, proper sexual partners, and so forth. Beyond immediate responses to these objects, there is a larger emotional and moral dimension. Proper *aisthesis* produces a proper pleasure. Violation of inherited sumptuary standards may fill the consumers with a wicked delight, but it will inspire a justifiable fear in observers, especially those who are spokesmen for Confucian values. Ultimately this fear affects the self-indulgent character, who is almost always shown to pay a price for his excesses.

The narrators of the *Zuo Tradition* and *Legends of the States* tend to appeal to this pleasurable and fearful complex of aesthetic notions as they construct their stories. Many anecdotes and larger narratives end in scenes of aesthetic display, as did the reunion of Duke Zhuang and his mother: actors express themselves to one another through song (most often from the *Classic of Poetry*[14]) in the context of a banquet, itself a type of aesthetic or synaesthetic occasion, where flavor and architecture and clothing and sound all come together. Perhaps more importantly, when narrators look for the causes of disasters, they prefer aesthetic reasons. Why was the state of Wei overrun by Di barbarians? Because Duke Yi loved cranes and rode them around in special chariots; when he asked his people to fight for him, they told him to send the cranes.[15] Why did Ziyu of Chu lose the battle of Chengpu to Duke Wen of Jin? There were many reasons, and Duke Wen's own flawless use of moral publicity was one of them, but bad *aisthesis* played a part as well: Ziyu, the Chu general, had made an exquisite jeweled caparison for his chariot horses, and he refused to relinquish it when the God of the Yellow River asked for it in a dream. The anecdote assures us that Ziyu was not defeated by supernatural forces. His greedy devotion to this peculiar aesthetic object was a dangerous display, and ruined the morale of his army.[16]

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[14] *Shijing*. For a translation, see Waley (1987).
[15] *Zuo* Min 2.5 (660; Yang [1990] 265–6; Legge [1985] 129).
[16] *Zuo* Xi 28.4 (632; Yang [1990] 467–8; Legge [1985] 210; Watson [1989] 63–4).

Publicity, hermeneutic skill, and the fundamental aesthetic work together in many different types of narratives; they form a habit of storytelling, and guide these narrators in their presentation of past events. Duke Zhuang's reconciliation is a relatively simple example in that it is fairly brief, and is played out within the space of a single year. But not all events can be narrated in an anecdote or two. Some unfold over a period of years, involving several different states and numerous separate actions. Such events are narrated in series of anecdotes, which have their own special literary characteristics.

Because the *Zuo Tradition* is an annalistic history, major events involving several states over a number of years have to be narrated in bits and pieces. The historiographers create narrative unity by arranging anecdotes around a single culminating moment, most often a military or diplomatic triumph or catastrophe, which often involves aesthetic displays of various sorts, e.g., poetry recitation during diplomatic entertainments, exchanges of gifts, or banquets with music and dance. Such entertainments, when carried out correctly, are a utopian image of how display is meant to work. They allow ministers of different states to perform, for each other and for the population at large, a righteous devotion to Zhou standards, to the poetry they share, to the prescriptions of ritual propriety, and to peace.[17] Utopian visions of this sort are extremely important to the Warring States Confucian philosophers. In some anecdote series, however, dystopic visions are the key: the aesthetic display of the culmination is a display of prodigal indulgence. In the culmination of the story we are about to consider, unsanctioned and dangerous aesthetic behavior is made to account for personal and political disaster.

The concluding moment of culmination in any story is balanced by initial moments of foresight: skilled observers, hermeneutic geniuses, are able to see what is coming. The early anecdotes in a series are thus overwhelmingly devoted to instances of observation and prediction. So, for instance, long before Prince Wei of Chu kills his king and takes the throne, ministers from other states who observe him during diplomatic missions are given magnificent speeches in

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[17] On more than a dozen occasions ministers recite sections of the *Classic of Poetry* (above, n. 14) for each other under circumstances of diplomatic ritual; see, e.g., *Zuo* Xi 23.6 (637; Yang [1990] 410; Legge [1985] 187; Watson [1989] 44). For some examples of ritual solidarity invoked across the lines of battle, see *Zuo* Cheng 16.5 (575; Yang [1990] 887–9; Legge [1985] 397–8; Watson [1989] 133–4).

which they predict his imminent rise and fall. After the prince has become king of Chu (he will be known as King Ling and will reign from 540 to 529), the predictions continue: he will wish to call the leaders of the other states together for a meeting, and will preside over the treaty, displacing even the state of Jin from its customary precedence. But his power will be temporary, the makers of these predictions assure us.[18] His arrogance and his disregard for Confucian standards of administration, publicity, and morality will bring him down. Of course these predictions are proven correct; the narration is, after all, undertaken with the certainty of hindsight.

After the culminating event in an anecdote series, there are often passages of *analepsis*, or flashback, usually introduced by the word *chu*, 'previously' or 'in the beginning.' One striking instance comes after King Ling has been deposed by his brother and has committed suicide in the home of one of his retainers. As in other cases, the effect of display passes through the people and not through the spirits:[19]

> Previously, King Ling divined, saying, 'Let me win all under Heaven!' [The response] was not auspicious. He threw down the tortoise-shell and cursed Heaven, shouting, 'Such a paltry thing and still you will not give it to me! I will take it myself!' The people fretted over the king's insatiability, and it was thus that they so readily took to rebellion.

Such *analepses*, like predictions, surround a major historical event with intelligibility: we come to understand how a man like King Ling could have come to an evil end. As in other elements of the narratives, this intelligibility is of a specifically Confucian kind.

A final formal feature of the anecdote or anecdote series is the judgment. Anecdotes and anecdote series often include moments of explicit judgment, which may be uttered by participants in events or attributed to an anonymous 'gentleman' (*junzi*), whose remarks have the detachment of third-person omniscience. The narrators almost never offer judgments of events in their own voice, but use this anonymous commentator to represent some sort of civilized con-

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[18] Eighteen predictions of King Ling's rise and/or fall are scattered from *Zuo* Xiang 29 (544) to Zhao 13 (529), where two appear in *analepsis* (see below). See Yang (1990) 1155–1353, and Legge (1985) 548–650.

[19] *Zuo* Zhao 13.2 (529); Yang [1990] 1350; Legge [1985] 649; Watson [1989] 168–74).

sensus about the meaning of past events. Especially in the later sections of the *Zuo Tradition*, Confucius often takes the place of the unnamed gentleman. In the judgment appended to King Ling's story, Confucius cites a maxim, 'to control oneself and to restore the rites is humanity,' which appears in the *Analects* as his own aphorism. Explicit judgments, whether they are attributed to the 'gentleman' or to the sage, tend to underline the Confucian moral of the story, guiding our reading of history and ensuring that we see how foregrounded terms and values explain events.

These basic features of early Chinese historiographical narrative are exemplified in the *Zuo Tradition*'s account of the fall of King Ling of Chu, where the use of aesthetic conceptions in the vindication of Confucian doctrine achieves an extraordinary intensity and beauty. King Ling must have posed a special problem for the historiographers. One of their tasks was to show that traditional virtues are the key to political success, but here was a man who murdered his own ruler and then led his barbarous or semi-barbarous state for 13 successful years. During that time he presided over two international meetings,[20] largely overshadowing the northern state of Jin as an international power. He also got Jin to send a daughter of Duke Ping (r. 557–532) to Chu to be his wife[21] and forced Duke Zhao of Lu (r. 541–510) to visit him in Chu and help him celebrate the completion of an extravagant architectural project, the Zhanghua pavilion.[22] The historiographers have to explain how a character so violent, so acquisitive, and so careless of inherited virtues could flourish and strengthen his state for such a long time. It helps that he was finally deposed by his brother. But the historiographers deploy all of the narrative techniques at their disposal to transform King Ling's story into a Confucian parable. Predictions, *analepses*, and moments of explicit judgment have their place in this transformation: the ubiquitous themes of publicity and interpretability make it possible for many qualified observers within the text to predict the king's fall long in advance. His great power is thus rendered somehow unreal and temporary. It does not matter that he dominated the central states for more than ten years; the real power and the last laugh belong to the Confucian narrators, to their kind of knowledge, and to the

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[20] *Zuo* Zhao 4.3 (538; Yang [1990] 1250–2; Legge [1985] 597), 9.1 (533; Yang [1990] 1306–7; Legge [1985] 625).

[21] *Zuo* Zhao 5.4 (537; Yang [1990] 1266–70; Legge [1985] 605).

[22] *Zuo* Zhao 7.3, 7.6 (535; Yang [1990] 1285–7, 1289; Legge [1985] 615–17).

observers and prediction-makers who advance Confucian arguments in the text.

As with the repentance of Duke Zhuang, the historiographers seize upon aesthetic devices in the construction of the narrative. Though King Ling's actual demise comes in 529,[23] when his younger brother leads a rebellion against him, the historiographers strategically place the climax of his story in the previous year. The king has gone to the eastern frontiers of Chu on the winter hunt, setting up camp at the eastern outpost of Ganxi and taking advantage of the opportunity to harass the rival state of Wu. Here he suffers a devastating epiphany which depends entirely on aesthetic and hermeneutic assumptions:[24]

> There was a snow storm, and the king dressed in a leather cap, a feathered coat from Qin, a kingfisher-blue cape, and leopard-skin boots, and went out holding a whip, accompanied by his attendant Xifu. Zige, the Minister of the Right, waited upon the king in the evening. When the king saw him, he removed his cap and cape and put down his whip to chat with him.
>
> He said, 'In times past our former king Xiong Yi, together with Lü Ji [of Qi], Wangsun Mou [of Wei], Xie Fu [of Jin], and Qin Fu [of Lu], served King Kang [of Zhou].[25] The other four states all got their portions [of reward]; we alone did not. If we now send someone to Zhou to ask for the cauldron that is our portion, will the king give it to us?'
>
> [Zige] answered, 'He will give it to you, your Highness! In times past our former king Xiong Yi was off in the wilds of Mount Jin. Riding in a cart of sticks and dressed in humble clothing, he lived in the grasses of the plain. He crossed mountains and rivers to serve the Son of Heaven, and all he had was a bow of peach wood and arrows of thorn to present as tribute to the royal court.
>
> 'The Qi [founder] was an uncle to King [Cheng of Zhou]; Jin, Lu, and Wei were full brothers of the king. It was thus that Chu was without a portion, while the others all had theirs. Now Zhou and those four states all serve you, your Highness, obeying only your command. How could they begrudge you your cauldron?'
>
> The king said, 'In times past my ancestral uncle Kunwu dwelt in the old territory of Xu. Now Zheng greedily exploits his fields and

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[23] *Zuo* Zhao 13.2 (Yang [1990] 1344–53; Legge [1985] 648–50; Watson [1989] 168–74).

[24] *Zuo* Zhao 12.11 (530; Yang [1990] 1338–41; Legge [1985] 640–1; Watson [1989] 164–7).

[25] All are relatives or associates of founding Zhou kings enfeoffed as local rulers. King Kang's traditional dates are 1078–1053.

will not give them to us. If I ask for them, will [Zheng] give them to us?'

[Zige] said, 'They will give them to you, your Highness! If Zhou will not begrudge a cauldron, how can Zheng begrudge these fields?'

The king said, 'In times past the allies thought of us as remote, while fearing Jin. But now we have built great walls in Chen, Cai, and the [two areas of] Bugeng and gotten a thousand chariots from each—you yourself had a part in this accomplishment. Certainly the allies will fear us now!'

[Zige] said, 'They will fear you, your Highness! With these four states plus Chu, how could they not fear your Highness?'

The director of artisans Lu then presented a request, saying, 'Your Highness has ordered that a jade tablet be carved for the decoration of an ax handle; I beg permission to seek orders from you.' The king went inside [the inner court] to look at [the ax].

[The personal attendant] Xifu said to Zige, 'You, sir, are the great hope of the state of Chu. Now that you speak to the king like his own echo, what is the state to do?'

Zige said, 'I am ground sharp in preparation. When the king emerges, my blade will cut him down.'

The king emerged, and they conversed again. The Scribe of the Left Yixiang hurried across the court, and the king said, 'This is a good scribe—look well upon him. He is able to recite the "Three Barrows," the "Five Canons," the "Eight Guidelines," and the "Nine Mounds." '

[Zige] replied, 'I once asked him a question. In times past King Mu wanted to give free rein to the desires of his heart and travel everywhere under Heaven, so that every place would show the tracks of his carriages and the hoofprints of his horses. The Zhai duke Moufu composed the poem "Seeking" to still the king's heart, and it was thus that the king managed to die in the Zhi Palace. I asked [the Scribe of the Left] about this poem, and he did not know it. If you ask him something at all obscure, how can he possibly know it?'

The king said, 'Can you recite it?'

[Zige] replied, 'I can. The poem says:

"Sonorous is the 'Seeking,'
Showing forth the sound of virtue.
Think on our king's good order—
Like jade,
Like bronze.
He completes the strength of the people
And has no heart for drunken satiety." '

The king saluted him and went in. He could neither eat nor sleep, and for several days he could not gain control of himself. And thus he came to grief.

Confucius said, 'There is a maxim from times long past: "To control oneself and to restore the rites is benevolence." Fine indeed! If

> King Ling of Chu had been able to do this, how could he ever have been shamed at Ganxi?'

The whole scene is played out in the midst of carefully foregrounded aesthetic choices, both good and bad. The king's own choices are bad in that they are unusual, unsanctioned, and aimed at pleasure for pleasure's sake. The details of his extravagant outfit—the leather cap, the imported coat of feathers, the cape, the boots—contrast markedly with the simple accouterments of his ancestors, which are recalled in the conversation with Zige. The jade ax handle is another sign of aesthetic excess, as is the fact that the artisan is permitted to interrupt the king during an audience with his ministers. Finally, King Ling's winter travels, his wish to overthrow the precedents of history, and his global ambitions are themselves a kind of excess, as is clear from the comparison with King Mu of Zhou (r. 1001–946), whose wanderings to the edges of the world became legendary.

Zige represents the claims of a good and proper *aisthesis* which opposes King Ling's frivolity and greed. As an upholder of moderation and an obstacle to the king's ambitions, Zige represents the interests of the Confucian narrator, reader, and commentator. But the reader has to wonder at first: the king greets Zige courteously enough, and Zige indulges the king's current desires with apparent solicitude. Will the Zhou give Chu equal recognition now that King Ling has exercised international power? Will the state of Zheng return the disputed lands of Xu? Will the feudal lords now fear Chu instead of the old overlords of Jin? In each of the questions, the king seeks public, visible representations of Chu's new-won power. Zige answers with assurances whose irony is apparent only in retrospect.

A certain theatrical mentality behind the narrative becomes apparent when the jade-artisan enters and requests instructions from the king, causing him to exit momentarily. The personal attendant Xifu is a judging audience, and is appalled (as a later Confucian audience must have been) at the answers Zige has given. But Zige's duty as a minister in the Confucian mold, if not as a minister loyal to Chu's interests, is to restrain this king's ambitions and to protect the fortunes of the Zhou dynastic order. He makes his promise to Xifu in terms suggested by the apparently accidental detail of the jade ax: by indulging the king's desires thus far, he has only ground himself sharp in preparation, and Xifu and the reader are to watch as he cuts the king down.

In what follows, Zige turns the king's acquisitiveness against him. He coveted cauldrons, recognition, territory, and fear. Now, when Yixiang crosses the court, the king boasts about the scribe's knowledge as if it were another of his own sumptuous possessions. Here is where Zige strikes: there is one text the historian does not possess, a poem composed to stop King Mu of Zhou from roaming. As innocuous as it looks, this poem is the blade of Zige's ax. Its potency as a weapon is its representation of proper, socially effective publicity and *aisthesis*. The good king is an object for his people's contemplation and edification, a paragon of virtue, and as solid as jade or bronze, the materials from which the equipment of ritual display is made; as a model for his people he must not dissipate his own strength in drunken excess. Just when he expected to add historical knowledge and even historians themselves to his hoard, these precious possessions turn out to be booby-trapped. The rightness they embody, the historian suggests, makes it impossible for someone like him to possess them.

The results of Zige's remonstrance are narrated with a succinctness for which the *Zuo Tradition* is famous. In twenty characters we are assured that Zige's performance devastated the king and was the immediate cause of his fall in the following year. How exactly this causality might have worked is not clear, but the terse final sentence does assert a connection between the largely aesthetic events of this anecdote and the catastrophe which the king was to suffer. This is how Confucian historians preferred to tell stories.

Confucius' final pronouncement on the fall of the king represents in miniature the link between historiography and early philosophical writing. The aphorism on benevolence that Confucius here cites as an ancient saying is reported as his own remark in the *Analects*,[26] where he is responding to a disciple's request for a definition of benevolence. The coincidence epitomizes Confucian learning in the fourth century. On the one hand there was a flourishing historical discourse, a practice of recalling and remarking upon events and personages of the past. The telling and retelling of historical stories among adherents of the nascent Confucian school may well have been the milieu in which the anecdotes of the *Zuo Tradition* and *Legends of the States* were perfected. Preserved with the anecdotes of

[26] See Confucius (1979) 112.

history were normative judgments of events, including some judgments attributed to Confucius himself. On the other hand there was a discourse which shared many of the interests of the historiographers, but was more tightly organized around the Master and his teachings. This discourse, from which the various early versions of the *Analects* would have issued, also preserved numerous instances of the Master's historical judgments; but it went much further than the *Zuo Tradition* did to abstract his arguments from historical particulars. In passages like the definition of benevolence, the questioner asks about the topic in some absolute sense; though the Master gives disciples different answers under different circumstances, he still claims to be speaking about essential meanings of the term, separate from any particular historical accident. In the judgment of King Ling, however, Confucius' use of an old definition of benevolence follows a rhetorical pattern found in scores of historiographical speeches: the event at hand (the demise of the king) is judged under the aspect of an inherited text, usually a citation from China's earliest canonical poetry collection, the *Classic of Poetry*, but often enough, as here, an aphorism or common saying. The point is not benevolence itself, but the judgment of this event. Confucius, like other speakers in historiography, seeks to explain observed particulars by means of inherited knowledge, and the ordinary way to do this is by delivering a speech which matches citation with events.

The *Mencius* and certain other philosophical texts of the fourth century belong to the second sort of discourse, the discourse devoted to a thinker and his system.[27] The philosophers differ from the writers of historiography in their objectives: despite all the rhetorical features which philosophical writings share with historiographical speeches, and despite the massive use of historical examples in philosophy, the task of philosophical writers is not to explain history but to develop a system which could be defended in argument with opponents. In early China such arguments most often concerned the correct way to run a successful state. History was reduced to evidence.

But in their effort to make their arguments transcend historical particulars, philosophers of the Warring States period, including

[27] See Lau (1970). A good deal of philosophical writing in the fourth century and after continues to present thinkers' views not in essay form but in speeches with historicizing narrative frames; the convention is perhaps a trace of the genre's formal origins in historiography.

Mencius, could not do away with the narrative habits we have been discussing. The dating of the *Zuo Tradition* and the *Legends of the States* indicates that these narratives were still developing during the fourth century, when Mencius was alive and thinking, and when the tradition that would become the book *Mencius* was getting its start. What does the one tradition have to do with the other? What exactly can a reading of Confucian historical discourse teach us about reading the *Mencius*?

Thorough comparison of the thought of Mencius and of the historiographers would require a book-length study. The works have more in common than the aesthetic assumptions I focus on here. Still, these ideas about pleasure and fear have the virtue of being central both to historiography's self-definition and to Mencius' proposals for statecraft. The *Mencius* develops a concept of pleasure which is dependent on the habits and types of narrative we just considered. Mencius' notion of socially useful aesthetic experience is an indispensable component of the philosopher's total system, and it allows him to tie together his ideas on personal cultivation and his prescriptions for political stability and power. The concept is perhaps more fundamental than Mencius' famous thesis that humans are endowed by nature with a capacity for good. The theory of human goodness is in some ways dependent on the ideal of sanctioned pleasure.[28]

Appeals to pleasure (*le*) are to be found everywhere in the *Mencius*, serving every sort of polemical and rhetorical purpose. In the background is a commonplace Confucian justification of musical pleasure, which is commonly expressed with the help of a graphic and verbal play: *yue* (music) is good because it is *le* (pleasure); the two words are written with the same character. By Mencius' time, the Mohists, critics of the excessive expenditure that ritual display entailed, had attacked Confucian musical practices, arguing that such luxurious entertainments can only have a bad effect (through publicity) on state morale. By the fourth century the Mohists may also have fashioned their handy dismissal of the Confucian justification: justifying *yue* by *le* is no different from claiming that one builds a house for

[28] Mencius' arguments on human nature have been the focus of intense scholarly investigation. For two recent discussions, see Shun (1997), esp. 180–231, and Ivanhoe (1993) 23–34. The latter (at 30–1) draws attention to the 'joy of moral action.'

the sake of building a house.[29] But in Mencius' treatment of the *topos*, the vision of musical pleasure and utility is still powerful. Mencius has heard that the king likes music, and asks him about it. The king confesses that he likes only the new music, not the music of former kings. That does not matter, says Mencius: the new music is derived from the old. The king wants to learn more.[30]

> 'Which is the greater pleasure: enjoying music alone or enjoying it with other people?'
>
> [The king] said, 'With other people.'
>
> 'Which is the greater pleasure: enjoying music with a few people or enjoying music with a great many?'
>
> [The king] said, 'With a great many.'
>
> 'Let me tell you about music. Say you were having music played here now, and all the common people who heard the sounds of your bells and drums and the tones of your pipes and flutes were to say to each other, with aching heads and crinkled-up noses, "How is it that our king's fondness for playing music has brought us to this extreme? Fathers and sons do not see each other, and brothers and wives and children are scattered." Or say that you were hunting here now, and all the common people who heard the noise of your horses and chariots and saw the beauty of your feather-adorned flags were to say to each other, with aching heads and crinkled-up noses, "How is it that our king's fondness for hunting has brought us to this extreme? Fathers and sons do not see each other, and brothers and wives and children are scattered." There would be no other reason for this but that you had not shared your pleasure with the people.
>
> 'But say you were having music played here now, and all the common people who heard the sounds of your bells and drums and the tones of your pipes and flutes were to say to each other, with delight and a happy look, "Our king must not be suffering any illness, or he would not be able to have music played." Or say that you were hunting here now, and all the common people who heard the noise of your horses and chariots and saw the beauty of your feather-adorned flags were to say to each other, with delight and a happy look, "Our king must not be suffering any illness, or he would not be able to hunt." There would be no other reason for this but that you had shared your pleasure with the people.
>
> 'If you share your pleasure with the people, then you will be a True King.'

This is Mencius' political aesthetic in miniature. The king is to take his pleasure and to enjoy it, but always with the proviso that the

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[29] Sun (1954) 4. 277.
[30] Lau (1970) 60-1.

people must be able to take pleasure in his pleasure. Because the principle of publicity is still vigorously in effect here, the people are certain to hear the sounds of his pleasure, whether he is enjoying music or hunting. And their response will be determined by their own circumstances, which in turn depend upon the king's government. If the government is exploitative, and impoverishes the people and breaks up families, the king will be taking his pleasure alone. But if the government follows the sort of moderate economic policies that Mencius and other Confucians recommend, then the people will not fail to take joy in the king's pleasures. This generally diffused joy will guarantee the stability and power of the state and will make the king a True King. Music, though it cannot itself bring about utopian ends, can serve to manifest and confirm them.

This line of argument has near parallels in historiography, where certain speeches make very similar points. In the *Legends of the States*, when King Jing of Zhou (r. 544–520) decides to cast a ritually unsanctioned bell, a court musician includes an extended normative description of music in his remonstrance.[31] Duke Dao of Jin (r. 572–558) wishes to reward his chief minister, Wei Jiang, for making peace with barbarian tribes and reasserting Jin's dominance over the other feudal lords: 'It has been like the harmony of music [*yue*], with nothing that is not concordant: I invite you to take pleasure [*le*] in it with me.' Wei Jiang virtuously declines, but quotes and glosses a passage from the *Classic of Poetry* to confirm the political importance of musical pleasure: 'By taking comfort with virtue through pleasure [or music]; by residing in it with righteousness; by performing it with ritual; by protecting it with good faith; by encouraging it with benevolence: only thus can one "support the states" and "share the blessings and rewards" and bring people from afar. That is what we call pleasure [or music].' At the duke's insistence, Wei Jiang finally accepts the gift. His upright protestations may have been important for the historiographers in that this sort of music was the prerogative of rulers, not ministers. Though the writers deem Wei's acceptance ritually proper, and do their utmost in this scene to demonstrate his qualifications, the gift begins the objectionable and ritually disruptive process by which the Wei line will put itself at the head of a

[31] *Legends* Zhou 3.6–3.7 (CE 122–42; d'Hormon and Mathieu [1985] 311–31).

state after participating in the tripartite division of Jin.[32] Wei Jiang's understanding of music is perhaps to be understood as a factor in his descendants' triumph.

The *topos* of music and pleasure is only a fragment of Mencius' political aesthetic. He returns again and again to the pleasure humans take in contemplating and consuming aesthetically designed objects and performances; and he emphasizes in many different contexts the crucial role of that pleasure in maintaining social harmony. Discussing a garden with King Hui of Liang (r. 370–335), for instance, Mencius cites the *Classic of Poetry* and explains how King Wen, an eleventh-century founder of the Zhou, was able to share pleasure with his people as they built a pavilion for him.[33] The same story comes up in two separate conversations with King Xuan of Qi (r. 342–324).[34] The common people come to the ruler in whom they take pleasure;[35] the king who wishes, like King Wen of Zhou, to attract the people has to do it by making a display, an opportunity for the people to take pleasure in his moral excellence. Even Mencius' recommendations on taxation and fiscal policy are regularly elaborated in connection with the early kings, especially King Wen, and in connection with the promise of pleasure by which these kings attracted the people.[36] The all-important concept of *renzheng*, 'government in accordance with benevolence,' is explained in several places as a matter of aesthetics.[37] A ruler like King Xuan of Qi has the basic desires of his senses satisfied by his staff: he has food for his sense of taste, clothing for the comfort of his body, and sights and sounds to please his eyes and ears. But he nonetheless labors under a greater desire, his ambition for more land and power. To win gratification of this desire he must not use violent means, since he cannot defeat the rest of the states; instead, he must practice a government of benevolence, which will inspire in everyone—officials, farmers, and merchants—a positive desire to live under his rule.[38] Mencius assures us that this desire is irresistible.[39]

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[32] *Zuo* Xiang 11.5 (562; Yang [1990] 993–4; Legge [1985] 453).
[33] Lau (1970) 49–50.
[34] Lau (1970) 61–2, 63–5.
[35] Lau (1970) 113–15, 127, 184.
[36] Lau (1970) 65–6, 82, 97–100, 179.
[37] Lau (1970) 54–9, 74–6, 80, 97–100.
[38] Lau (1970) 54–9.
[39] Lau (1970) 74–6.

If pleasure and proper aesthetic display are keys to successful public policy, they are also guides to the self-cultivation of individuals, whether kings or scholars. The utilitarian value of aesthetics in the political realm is founded upon the fundamentally aesthetic capacity of humans as Mencius describes them. Mencius presents this description most forcefully when he draws a parallel between various forms of *aisthesis* and moral taste. Human beings, he says, have the same preferences in flavors (discovered by the chef-hero Yi Ya), in sounds (formulated by the musician-hero Shi Kuang), and in beauty (exemplified by the handsome Zidu):[40]

> 'Thus I say that palates agree in the flavors they prefer; ears agree in the sounds that they will listen to; eyes agree in the appearances that they find beautiful. Could it be that only minds are without things that they agree upon in affirming?
>
> 'What minds agree upon in affirming is principle and rightness. The sages were the first to discover what our minds agree upon in affirming. Thus the way principle and rightness please our hearts is the same as the way grain-fed flesh pleases our palate.'

For Mencius, moral taste is a natural feature of human awareness, as fundamental and as physical as the sense pleasures of the mouth, the ears, and the eyes. The examples he cites from the other senses are not simple experiences, but aestheticized experiences. In the matter of flavor, the question is not one of edible and inedible, but of more or less flavorful. The same holds true with sounds and sights: he is not interested in the physical limits of the sense organs or the experiences that would cause pain; proper sensation is, as if automatically, a matter of perception in accordance with inherited standards of beauty like Yi Ya's recipes, Shi Kuang's musical practices, and Zidu's good looks.

Mencius' program for a useful pleasure refines and elaborates on the assumptions that the historiographers of the *Zuo Tradition* and *Legends* rely upon in the construction of their narratives. When they seek to explain the most significant historical trend of the late Spring and Autumn Period, that is, the sharp decline in the power of various old Zhou feudal houses, they automatically appeal to the political aesthetic. The rulers of states have given themselves over to perverse pleasures; the people, affected through publicity, shift their

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[40] Lau (1970) 164.

loyalties to other houses, which then take over the states.[41] The only possible remedy to this shift is *li* (ritual propriety), as the famous Yan Ying of Qi suggests at one point;[42] but the duke Yan Ying is addressing admits that he is not capable of adhering to ritual propriety, and his peers in the other states are the same. So historical change rolls on. This is a coup for the historiographers: from the ravages of time they pluck a vision of timeless values, Confucian tenets which do not themselves change, but which explain all kinds of change in the world.

Mencius' arguments make sense because the historiographers' stories of decline and fall are already established. Without innumerable anecdotes documenting the dangers of aesthetic indulgence and the benefits of proper aesthetic display, Mencius' contentions would seem quirky and unprecedented. As it is, however, his notion of pleasure becomes the basis of his version of Confucian values; it informs his presentation of Confucius' thought and justifies his arguments for political reform and personal cultivation. Even his understanding of human nature draws support from aesthetic assumptions: the basic goodness of human beings consists not in their inevitable goodness, but in their consistent preference for and desire for and attraction to benevolence, rightness, ritual propriety, and wisdom. To prove this assertion during the crucial debate with Gaozi on human nature, Mencius cites the opening lines of a *Classic of Poetry* text which speaks of the people's 'liking' for virtue.[43] Both Mencius' citational style of argumentation and the content of his argument echo historiography.

Attention to the role played by pleasure in the speeches and narratives of historiography suggests new ways of reading philosophers other than Mencius. The Mohists, for instance, in constructing their attack on ritual display, assumed certain commonplaces, especially about publicity, while rejecting arguments for the social utility of aesthetic behavior. Xunzi (ca. 335–ca. 238), famous for his rejection of Mencius' claim about human nature, emphasized ritual propriety and formal control in society with the full support of the numerous historiographical passages in which ritual is shown to be the best and safest guide to public life. The history of the Spring and Autumn

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[41] These usurping families are the Chen or Tian family in the state of Qi; the Han, Zhao, and Wei families in Jin; and the Jisun, Mengsun, and Shusun families in Lu.

[42] *Zuo* Zhao 26.11 (516; Yang [1990] 1480–1; Legge [1985] 718–19).

[43] Lau (1970) 162–3.

Period was a fund of examples and proofs for the philosophers of the Warring States period, but it also provided them with some of their most persuasive ways of explaining facts and telling stories.

One problem which is peripheral in historiography but central in the *Mencius* is the problem of personal cultivation: how is a person to become good? The answer has something to do with aesthetics, inasmuch as our goodness is to be explained as the result of a moral *sensus communis*, a natural human attraction to Confucian standards. But it is not enough, apparently, that humans share this taste. They must become aware of it; if that were not the case, then there would be no need for Mencius to engage in debate, which he claims not to love for its own sake.[44] So what is it that starts humans on the course of self-investigation and leads them to goodness?

The starting point is again pleasure, but a specifically intellectual pleasure. The scholar and the gentleman take pleasure in the Way and in teaching talented students.[45] Mencius elevates this delight to new and almost mystical heights when he says: 'The ten thousand things are complete in me. To reflect on myself and to find myself sincere is a pleasure than which there can be none greater.'[46] This pleasure is accessible to everyone everywhere, as is apparent in a virtuoso derivation of the virtues:[47]

> Mencius said, 'The substance of humaneness is service to one's parents. The substance of rightness is obedience to one's elder brother. The substance of wisdom is knowing these two things and never departing from them. The substance of ritual propriety is ordering and adorning these two things. The substance of music is taking pleasure in these two things. Thus pleasure is born, and when it is born, how can it be brought to an end? Since it cannot be brought to an end, one begins, all unknowing, to dance it with one's feet and one's hands.'

These last lines are most familiar from their later use in the 'Great Preface' to the *Classic of Poetry*, where they explain how poetry first came to be composed.[48] Here, however, the irrepressible joy that

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[44] Lau (1970) 113–15.

[45] Lau (1970) 183, 185. Throughout the *Analects*, and notably in the very first passage, Confucius emphasizes the pleasures of learning and teaching.

[46] Lau (1970) 182.

[47] Lau (1970) 127.

[48] For translation and discussion see Owen (1992) 37–49; Saussy (1993) 75–105; and Van Zoeren (1991) 80–115.

leads one to dance is the result of a discovery of Confucian truths within oneself. The whole derivation is held together by the pleasure which is its endpoint.

To return finally to historiography, what place does such a promise of intellectual pleasure have there? Surely it functions in many stories, as for instance when the joy of intellectual possession makes King Ling brag about his historian, then take Zige's bait. In dozens of anecdotes, the ruler's response to a good speech (that is, a Confucian speech) is pleasure: the common phrase is *gong yue*, 'the duke was pleased.' The word *yue* is one which Mencius uses along with *le* to describe pleasure of all sorts. Often the immediate justification for a ruler's decision to follow the Way is the refined intellectual and moral pleasure it brings him; even if it is the logic of a speech that convinces him, his response is presented as a form of pleasure. This sort of pleasure is crucial to the preservation of social stability and state power.

But intellectual pleasure has an even more basic function in historiography. This pleasure is never addressed more explicitly than in a somewhat later text, the closing lines of the second-century *Gongyang* commentary on the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, where historical study itself is justified with reference to the same 'gentleman' character who in the *Zuo Tradition* comments on events:

> 'Why does the gentleman work on the *Chunqiu*? For bringing order to a chaotic time and returning it to correctness, nothing is better than the *Chunqiu*. But one does not know if this is the reason, or if gentlemen take pleasure in speaking of the Way of Yao and Shun.
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> 'In the end is it not a pleasure how Yao and Shun understood the gentleman? We confirm the meanings of the *Chunqiu* and await the sage of later times. In what gentlemen do, they are taking pleasure in this [activity].'[49]

The *Gongyang* is very different from the *Zuo Tradition* and *Legends of the States*. Still, those earlier texts of historiography carry traces of the pleasure by which the historiographers themselves justified their activities. As *Mencius* and numerous other sources tell us, the *Chunqiu* was a product of the fear Confucius felt when he reflected on the patricides and regicides of his age.[50] In the account of the great Han dynasty historian Sima Qian, this type of fearfulness is used also to

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[49] Ruan Yuan (1982) 2354. Cf. Malmqvist (1971) 219.
[50] Lau (1970) 113-6.

account for the composition of the *Zuo Tradition* itself. But the antidote to this fear is an intellectual pleasure which the scholar of history is best equipped to enjoy and to teach. Twice the anonymous 'gentleman' character of the *Zuo* delivers encomiastic assessments of *Annals* style. In the second of these passages, a place is left for the historian: 'Thus it is said that the *Annals*' notations are subtle yet radiantly clear and that they express indirectly yet with discrimination. The superior man can make them shine forth brightly so that the good are encouraged and the decadent are fearful. This is why the gentleman values [the *Annals*].'[51]

'The superior man can make them shine forth brightly.' The superior man in question is the historian; his activity is explaining the beautifully cryptic notations of the *Annals*; and the materials he uses in his explanations are the traditions preserved in such works as the *Zuo Tradition* and the *Legends of the States*. These are works of intellectual delight, and the nature of the historians' pleasure is written into the very texture of narratives. All those habits of storytelling are to be understood as instruments of a special sort of intellectual and literary pleasure: the delight that one can take in retelling instances of hermeneutic brilliance, in producing vindications of one's own creed, and in reading itself, in all the senses of that word. The fear which drove Confucius to his historical work is finally transformed into the contented devotion of his successors. This pleasure is not innocent: it does serve polemical and political purposes, and the Confucians' near-monopoly of early historiography was one of the reasons their philosophy could later win canonical status.

The distribution of a literature into genres, or of generations of thinkers into schools, is the result of self-conscious labor. The results of this labor are necessarily projected backward. When history and philosophy part company, the themes and motivations they share become elusive. The aesthetic assumptions that operate in philosophy, in the construction of historiographical narratives, and in the justification of the historian's craft belong to a moment when the disciplines were just beginning to grow apart. In retrospect, as always, it is an idyllic moment, where narration and rhetoric are potentially as gratifying as beauty, and beauty as compelling as political force.

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[51] *Zuo* Zhao 31.5 (511; Yang [1990] 1512–13; Legge [1985] 738). Cf. Cheng 14.4 (577; Yang [1990] 870; Legge [1985] 385).

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KNOWLEDGE AND SKEPTICISM IN ANCIENT CHINESE HISTORIOGRAPHY

Wai-yee Li

Historical thought begins when the record of events within a chronological frame embodies principles of interpretation whereby the past becomes readable or the readability of the past emerges as a self-conscious question. Such self-consciousness in turn brings forth the following partly overlapping issues: the sense that the past is textual, the possibilities and limits of historical knowledge, the definition of grounds of interpretation, the scope and meaning of skepticism, the representation of the interpretive act, the evolution and disintegration of interpretive structures. I shall explore these questions through a discussion of canonical Chinese historical writings, namely, the *Zuozhuan* (*Zuo Commentary Tradition*, ca. fifth-fourth century)[1] and the *Shiji* (*Records of the Historian*, ca. second-first century).[2] These works represent key moments in the evolving relationship between narrative and interpretation, when the past is understood and used in new and significant ways.

In the Chinese tradition, narrative, the concern with remembrance, and the need to find meaning in history first come together in the *Zuozhuan*, a heterogeneous and layered text that takes shape over a long period of accretion. The *Zuozhuan* has been presented (at the latest by about the third century) as the exegetical commentary to the *Chunqiu* (*Spring and Autumn Annals*),[3] which is made up of bare, concise entries on events such as the ascensions, marriages, deaths,

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[1] For a complete English translation see Legge (1872); for a more recent translation, see Watson (1989); a new complete translation is being prepared by Stephen Durrant, Wai-yee Li, and David Schaberg for the series 'Chinese Classics in Translation,' to be published by Yale University Press. All dates are BCE unless otherwise indicated.

[2] For English translations see Watson (1971); Yang and Yang (1979); Nienhauser (1994).

[3] Liu Xin (50–CE 23) seems to have been the first to 'use the text of the *Zuo Commentary Tradition* to interpret the *Classic* [i.e., *Chunqiu*]': see *HS* 36.1970. It is almost certain that the *Zuozhuan* and the *Chunqiu* began as separate texts, and that the decision of Du Yu, the great third-century CE *Zuozhuan* scholar and

and funerals of the Zhou kings and the feudal lords, battles, sacrifices, astronomical movements, and natural anomalies or calamities. The received text of the *Chunqiu* spans 242 years (722–481). It is now generally accepted as a Lu annal compiled by Lu scribes who recorded events as they happened or shortly thereafter. By about the fourth century, Confucius came to be associated with the text as editor or author.[4]

The *Zuozhuan* obviously differs from exegetical traditions such as the *Gongyang* and the *Guliang*,[5] whose clear filiation to the *Chunqiu* is apparent in the effort to treat every word in the annal as significant and expressive of the sage's moral judgment and rhetorical intention. However, it is conceivable that *Zuozhuan* narratives also arise from exegetical elaborations of concise, cryptic notations in the *Chunqiu* and other annalistic accounts in that style. Such projects of 'making sense,' of establishing causality, of defining exemplars, of deriving lessons, might have been related to oral traditions of exegesis, pedagogy, and remonstrance.[6] We know from the *Guoyu* (*Discourses of the States*, ca. fifth-fourth century), which overlaps significantly with the *Zuozhuan*, that elaboration of the moral meaning of *Chunqiu*-style records constitutes an essential component of the prince's education.[7] This enterprise has often been associated with a Confucian perspective defending and defining early Zhou political-moral order. But we can also imagine exegetical, pedagogical, or remonstrative contexts whereby scribes, teachers, or counselors of different persuasions use annalistic records to elaborate narratives offering divergent lessons.

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commentator, to collate the two texts resulted in *Zuozhuan* narratives interrupted by the text of the *Chunqiu*. However, the presence of *Chunqiu*-style notations in the *Zuozhuan* (some of which do not appear in *Chunqiu* itself) and the intrinsic logic of the chronological arrangement attest to a significant connection between the *Zuozhuan* and *Chunqiu* or annalistic accounts in that style. It seems the *Zuozhuan* that Sima Qian read and used was already chronological: see Durrant (1992) 295–301.

[4] See *ZZ* Xi 28.9; Mencius (1927) 3B.9; Zhuangzi (1985) 1.83, 4.1067; Zhang Yiren (1990) 1–60.

[5] When Emperor Wu (r. 140–87) established the imperial academy, the *Gongyang Tradition* was the accepted exegesis on the *Chunqiu*; the *Guliang Tradition* was included during the reign of Emperor Xuan (r. 73–49). The *Gongyang* and the *Guliang* probably date back to ca. fourth-third century, but might not have been written down until the early Han.

[6] Schaberg (1996) gives the most convincing account of the role of orality in the creation and transmission of the *Zuozhuan* and the *Guoyu*; see especially his Introduction and Chapters 2 and 3.

[7] See *GY* Jin 7.9, Chu A.1. Commentators suggest that these may be Jin annals or Zhou records: see Dong Zengling (1985) j.13.14b, j.17.2b–3a.

In this sense, the *Zuozhuan* is a kind of contesting ground for different conceptions of understanding and using the past, of language and rhetoric, and, most urgently, of solutions to the crisis of instability and disintegration as represented by the events of those 255 years (722–468).[8]

The range of interpretive modes in the *Zuozhuan*, from explicit to implied judgment, from intimations of limits of comprehension to broad explanatory models, are further developed and self-consciously explored in Sima Qian's *Shiji*. The *Shiji* purports to be a universal history of the entire known past of the known world.[9] Its 130 chapters are divided into five categories: 12 basic annals of rulers, ten tables, eight treatises, 30 accounts of hereditary families, 70 biographies. Sima Qian derives from the *Zuozhuan* the belief in the realization of moral precepts through narrative and the wealth of associations surrounding the depiction of the scribe-historian (*shi*).[10] The transition of China from the Warring States era to the unified Han empire, accompanied by modes of cultural synthesis,[11] gives impetus to system-building in historical inquiry. It is thus not surprising that Sima Qian attempts to build an all-encompassing system and devises new categories of significance for understanding the past.

The desire for totalizing knowledge is counter-balanced by new perspectives on skepticism. Sima Qian uses uncertainties to demonstrate his circumspection, interrogate his sources, veil his criticism of his times, and, most importantly, reflect on how and why the past is knowable. As we shall see, the shift of focus from rhetoric to epistemology in the *Shiji* is very much a function of Sima Qian's presentation of himself as reader of the tradition. His sustained reflection on the nature, transmission, and evaluation of historical knowledge

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[8] The fact that the *Zuozhuan* continues for another thirteen years after the capture of the *lin* in 481, the event with which the *Chunqiu* comes to an end in the *Gongyang* and *Guliang* traditions (in the *Zuozhuan* the annalistic record lasts for two more years), has been adduced as 'proof' that the *Zuozhuan* was not compiled as a commentary tradition of the *Chunqiu*.

[9] See Watson (1958) 3–4. By 'universal history' I do not intend to include certain common associations of the term such as directionality and teleology.

[10] For a discussion of the various roles of the *shi* in the *Zuozhuan*, see Xu Fuguan (1985–9) 3. 236–46.

[11] Qin-Han attempts to totalize and systematize knowledge include *Lushi chunqiu* (*Spring and Autumn Traditions of Master Lu*, ca. third century) and *Huainan zi* (ca. second century). Durrant (1995) 4–6 suggests that the essay by Sima Tan (Sima Qian's father), 'Main Points of the Six Schools' (included in the final chapter of the *Shiji*), should be considered in the light of such modes of cultural synthesis.

is also tied to newly emergent conceptions of authorship and the historian's authority. For the first time in the Chinese tradition, the dimensions of historical inquiry are transformed through association with a personality, a voice, and a distinctive vision.

Reading of Signs in the Zuozhuan

The received text of the *Zuozhuan* violates some of our common habits of reading. Materials are presented year by year, in a strictly chronological order. Episodes that belong to different narrative sequences are juxtaposed, and to follow how an event unfolds (for example, the rise and fall of a state, a rebellion, a war) the reader has constantly to refer to other sections or be already familiar with the text, either through past readings or through knowledge of the stories from other sources.[12] The *Zuozhuan*'s commitment to chronology forces on the reader a certain sense of totality, fluidity, and contingency, a feeling that multifarious events have no definite beginnings and endings, that everything is indeed connected to everything else.

What saves the mind from having to cope with raw juxtapositions are emergent acts of interpretation that define the boundaries of historical events by abstracting patterns and meanings from the chronological flow. The *Zuozhuan* is filled with retrospective and prospective comments, judgment, or advice built into or appended to the unfolding events. These comments, as well as interpretive intentions implied in the demarcation of narrative units, are often based on a ubiquitous phenomenon in the *Zuozhuan*: the reading of signs. Prescient characters inside and outside the event interpret divinatory statements, riddles, dreams, manifestations of and encounters with gods, spirits, and ghosts, astronomical phenomena, natural anomalies, or observed details of a person's attire, speech, behavior, gestures, and movements in rituals. The sign and its fulfillment or betrayal, interpretation, and manipulation, structure events, define narrative units,

[12] There are exceptions, of course, the most notable being the more or less self-contained narrative sequence describing Chong'er's (later Duke Wen of Jin) exile and trials between Xi 5 (655) and Xi 23 (632), which are told together in Xi 23, when he was on the point of returning to Jin. The narrative is structured spatially and geographically as well as temporally. Wang (1977) 7 rightly notes that this is the only journey narrative in the *Zuozhuan*.

and assert or question the readability of the past, thereby defining causality, human agency, and possible 'reason in history' (be that a moral scheme rewarding good and punishing evil, or a certain vision of order or teleology). To foreground significatory and interpretive processes is to try to impose order on the flux of events; this is especially obvious when retrospective judgments are introduced, through temporal reversal, as predictions or prophecies based on prior signs. If the unraveling of signs augments the readability of the world, then opaque or equivocal signs and the misreading, incomprehension, or cynical manipulation of signs seem to indicate skepticism regarding moral laws, the meaning of history, the constancy or existence of the gods and of socio-political-moral order.

The reading of signs is related to the chronological form in two ways, via conjunction and disjunction. First, it answers the need to identify causes at a *point* in time, that is, to recapture in a condensed form the events leading up to a state of affairs at a certain moment. A typical pattern is the summation of a person's life at the point of his death or of his clan's demise, with retrospective references to clues and omens heralded by the word *chu* ('in the beginning'). Second, the placement of prophecy at a great chronological distance from the events that fulfill this prophecy, at a moment when the opposite trend is evident, demonstrates the difficulty of pinning down the meaning or direction of a historical development. For example, fleeing disorder in Chen, Chen Wan seeks refuge with Duke Huan of Qi in 672. We are told divination results predicting the future greatness of the Chen clan in Qi (*ZZ* Zhuang 22.1). The Chen clan eventually displaces the Qi rulers, and Chen Heng assassinates Duke Jian of Qi in 481 (*ZZ* Ai 14.5). The prophecies in 672 in effect insert the sign for the future decline and fall of Qi into the account of Duke Huan of Qi's rise to hegemonic status.

Signs are readable because causality is realized through a recurrent pattern: a small, apparently inconsequential gesture, action, or event leads to momentous consequences. This is sometimes translated into a justification for constant caution and moral self-examination. We recall oft-quoted lines from the *Classic of Poetry*: 'Fearful and vigilant,/As if coming close to a deep abyss;/As if treading on thin ice.'[13] The discernment of beginnings is crucial because causality is

[13] 'Xiaomin' (*Classic of Poetry* 195), quoted in *ZZ* Xi 22.7 and Zhao 1.1. See also 'Xiaowan' (*Classic of Poetry* 196). This idea is also developed in Confucian classics

gradual yet irrevocable (*jian*). It is scarcely surprising, therefore, that the symbolic quotient of the 'small action' in the *Zuozhuan* is sometimes obvious. One ruler's predilection for cranes leads to unmitigated disasters: 'The Di people invaded Wei. Duke Yi of Wei was fond of cranes, there were cranes which rode in carriages.[14] When battle was about to begin, the people[15] who had received armor all said, "Send the cranes! The cranes indeed have the official salary and position, how can we engage in battle?"' (*ZZ* Min 2.5/660). Wei is duly defeated and Duke Yi killed. This belongs to a genre of stories on the dangerous frivolity of the ruler in the *Zuozhuan*, in which a seemingly harmless diversion becomes symptomatic of misgovernment and finally undermines political order.

Sometimes the 'small beginning' has no clearly articulated meaning yet nevertheless sets in motion similarly relentless forces. We may consider the events leading to the Qi invasion of Chu:

> The Lord [Duke Huan] of Qi and Lady Cai were aboard a boat in the ducal enclosure. Lady Cai rocked the boat. The duke was fearful, changed color, and forbade her to do so. She refused to listen. Angered, the duke sent her back [to Cai], but did not yet break off relations. The Cai people married her off. In the spring of the fourth year the Lord of Qi led the forces of the feudal lords to invade Cai. Cai collapsed, Qi thereupon [*sui*] attacked Chu.
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> (*ZZ* Xi 3.5–4.1/657–656)[16]

The whim of a court lady inadvertently leads to the first important confrontation between a major northern state, Qi, and a rising southern power, Chu. The word *sui* ('thereupon') suggests both temporal sequence and logical connection. Commentators differ on whether the attack on Chu is premeditated, that is, whether the punitive

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from the Warring States era, such as the *Zhongyong* (*The Golden Mean*) and the *Xici* Commentary to the *Yi* (*Book of Changes*).

[14] According to Wang Zhong (CE 1745–94), 'riding in carriages' (*chengxuan*) should not be taken literally, but is merely a metaphor for the privileges and paraphernalia of the official (quoted in *ZZ* 265).

[15] 'People' (*guoren*) probably refers to the inhabitants of the cities and the contiguous rural areas. Tong Shuye (1980) suggests that in most cases *guoren* included knights (*shi*), artisans, and merchants, with *shi* acting as leaders. The *guoren* is represented as a group capable of effective political action: see Tong Shuye (1980) 132–45.

[16] Yang Bojun suggests that the account is broken up by the need to correspond to the chronology of the *Chunqiu* (*ZZ* 286).

expedition against Cai is but an excuse.[17] The reticent narrative suggests either direct though contingent causal connection, or causation manipulated by Duke Huan of Qi. Lady Cai's action is remembered only for the events it sets in motion—its moral meaning as such is not deliberated.

These examples define poles of condensation of symbolic meaning and of lateral contiguity (or, one may say, metaphorical and metonymical connection). Whereas the former justifies constant moral vigilance and emphasizes human responsibility, the latter suggests contingency. Both invite the question as to what constitutes a sufficient cause.[18] Both share structural similarities with the representation of divination, portents, and dreams, which also combines determinism with apparent randomness. As such they exemplify two parallel concerns in the *Zuozhuan*: moral action, which is predicated on the human capacity to choose, and pan-signification, whereby every human or non-human sign and action leads to consequences which may exceed human comprehension and control and become knowable only through divination. There are tensions between these two concerns but both presume analogical thinking: moral action determines and is determined by socio-political, ritual, and cosmic order; pan-signification implies mysterious, universal correspondences. Human signs, such as gestures that betray destinies, belong to the first category. Signs from the numinous realm—dreams, divination, and portents—are in the domain of the second. While the first kind of analogical thinking affirms moral, rational explanations and implies a vision of the world as intricate ordering systems poised in delicate balance, the second kind combines skepticism with the perceived

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[17] For example, Takezoe Teruo (1986) j.5.10–11 and Han Xichou (1940) 179 believe that the attack on Chu had been planned since the meeting of feudal states at Yanggu. In the accounts in *Hanfei zi* and *Shiji* (62.2133), Duke Huan of Qi is bent on a war of vengeance against Cai, but Guan Zhong skilfully masks it as an expedition punishing Chu for failing to respond the Zhou royal house.

[18] Even when the symbolic meaning of a 'cause' is supposedly unproblematic, there may still be unease with its ramifications. Thus in the account of Duke Yi of Wei's downfall, the sparse language renders the causal connection precipitous and creates a sense of incommensurateness of cause and consequence, so much so that some later commentators feel compelled to trace the 'deeper' causes of Wei's destruction. Since Duke Yi's only recorded mistake seems to be his fondness for cranes, they look to his father Duke Hui's complicity in the murder of his own brothers, the licentiousness of his grandfather Duke Xuan, and the misjudgment of his great-grandfather Duke Zhuang for seeds of Wei's moral degeneration. See Gao Shiqi (1979) 3. 564–65; Ma Su (1993) j.43.8b–10b.

need to explain everything. Pan-signification simultaneously expands and undermines human capacity to impose order on the flux of events, and is thus both seductive and threatening.

The debates in the *Zuozhuan* over the efficacy of divination, the meanings of portents and anomalies, and the legitimacy of inquiring into such meanings testify to the unease with the idea of pan-signification, as evident in the following example.

> In the spring of the sixteenth year, five stones fell from the sky in Song; they were meteorites. Six *yi* birds flew in a reverse direction past the Song capital; that was because of the winds. The Zhou inner court scribe Shuxing was envoy in Song, and Duke Xiang of Song asked him: 'What do these portend? Where will the auspicious and inauspicious consequences be borne out?' He replied, 'This year Lu will have important funerals, next year there will be disorder in Qi, your honor will receive the support of other feudal lords but not end well.' He retired and said to other people, 'The ruler asked about the wrong things. These are matters of yin and yang, not that from which auspicious and inauspicious consequences arise. Auspicious and inauspicious consequences are determined by humans. I answered because I dared not go against the ruler.' (*ZZ* Xi 16.1/644)

The sentences about meteorites and the winds are supplied as 'natural' explanations of what appear in the *Chunqiu* as records of natural anomalies: 'Sixteenth year, spring, first month of the king, *moushen* day, first day of the moon, five stones [fell from the sky] at Song. That month, six *yi* birds flew in the reverse direction past the Song capital' (*ZZ Chunqiu* Xi 16.1). These immediate 'causes,' which probably belong to a later, more explicitly exegetical, stratum of the text, theoretically dispense with the need for further explanation.

The passage is equivocal: it affirms that portents can be read (Scribe Shuxing's predictions are all duly fulfilled), but denies the legitimacy of such inquiry. In other words, correspondences exist on all levels but should be left alone when they have no direct causal connection with human actions. Natural anomalies in this sense do not portend or determine future events; they are emblems manifesting the co-presence of past, present, and future. Unlike these signs, however, Duke Xiang is caught in temporal flux and should look to the possibilities and limits of human actions rather than how they are determined. The focus of the narrative shifts from the meaning of the portents to the propriety of interpretation and the balance between pan-signification and human responsibility. Duke Xiang's

downfall, his abortive attempt to become hegemon (*ba*) of the feudal lords, may be encapsulated more in his overreaching question than in the unfolding meaning of the anomalies.

The margins of human agency become problematic when signs are equivocal and the source of their authority dubious. Ambivalent signs represent both hermeneutic limits and the need to explain. Thus Shusun Bao, a Lu dignitary, is betrayed by his dream. 'He dreamed of being crushed by heaven. Failing to hold out, he turned around and saw a person, dark and hunched, with deep-set eyes and a sow-like mouth. He cried out, "Niu [= Bovine], help me!" Thereupon he held out [and won]' (*ZZ* Zhao 4.8/538). Later, a woman with whom he had a casual liaison presents him with a son, whom Shusun Bao identifies as the dream figure. 'Before asking his name, he called him "Niu." He said, "Yes"' (*ZZ* Zhao 4.8). Niu subsequently destroys Shusun Bao. Yet even here the misleading dream establishes a new causality. Told in the year of his death with the retrospective word *chu*, the dream is an attempt to explain the downfall of a man known elsewhere in the *Zuozhuan* for his moral integrity and perspicacious judgment.[19] Here the explanation turns a flaw of character (lack of judgment) into something explained by an external cause (the dream) which may in turn be justified by a moral scheme (as punishment for a licentious liaison), albeit an inconsistent one (the dream is framed by references to his much more immoral brother who remains unpunished[20]). After Niu is defeated and order is restored, the word *chu* is used again to introduce prophecies about Shusun Bao told at the time of his birth, divinations based on the *Zhouyi* which are all borne out by later events (*ZZ* Zhao 5.1/537). Even as Shusun Bao tries to control the meaning of his dream by seeking out and naming 'Niu,' the divination shows that the word itself is but part of a sign determining his fate at the moment of birth.[21]

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[19] See, for example, *ZZ* Xiang 4.3, 7.7, 11.1, 14.3, 16.5, 24.1, 24.11, 31.1; Zhao 1.4, 1.6. Cf. *GY* Lu 2.1, 2.2, 2.6, 2.7.

[20] The transgressions of Shusun Qiaoru, Shusun Bao's brother, are told in *ZZ* Cheng 13.2, 16.5, 16.11; cf. *GY* Zhou 2.9.

[21] When Shusun Bao is born, his father obtains '*mingyi zhi qian*' in divination (i.e., the last line of the *mingyi* hexagram, which, if broken instead of whole, would have changed *mingyi* into *qian*). The diviner's interpretation enlarges on the images of drooping wings, starvation, and slander in the line statement of the last line of the *mingyi* hexagram. The *mingyi* hexagram is a combination of the *kun* and *li* trigrams, which are both associated with the sign of the bovine. For the translation of *zhi* as possessive, see Shaughnessy (1983) 84–92; Smith (1989) 425–6.

Equivocal signs suggest inconstant gods. In the *Zuozhuan* the gods, often localized and particularized,[22] can be partial and faithless: they betray their promises, issue contradictory commands, and ignore the conduct of the supplicant.[23] Jin, the state that figures most prominently in the *Zuozhuan*, rises to power because the guileful Duke Xian of Jin is aided by duplicitous gods who confuse Jin's victims, Yu and Guo, with misleading signs and favors (*ZZ* Zhuang 32.3/661, Xi 2.5/658, 5.8/655). Ruthless and undiscerning, Duke Xian is far from being a virtuous ruler. The account of his annexation of Yu and Guo seems to celebrate the efficacy of human and divine duplicity.

By pointing to mysterious correspondences withheld from human understanding, misleading signs and faithless gods suggest an arbitrary determinism, wherein humans are mere playthings of forces beyond their control. Paradoxically, by inviting or allowing different decoding the equivocal sign also demonstrates how causality, signification, and interpretation can be humanly manipulated. It thus sustains two extremes in the conception of human agency. Deceit and the desire for power acquire moral justification, especially in the hegemonic enterprise (i.e., the struggle for supremacy among various states in pre-imperial China), which depends on the ability to exploit problematic signification and to create new correspondences.

In one notable example, before the Battle of Chengpu between Jin and Chu, Duke Wen of Jin dreams that the Chu ruler had forced him to the ground and was sucking out his brain matter. The dream terrifies him, but his minister Hu Yan offers a favorable interpretation: 'Auspicious! Our side received heaven, while Chu bent face down as if receiving punishment. We have, in addition, softened him!' (*ZZ* Xi 28.3/632). Commentators cite early medical texts which define brain matter as *yin* substance with softening properties.[24] The 'softening' of the Chu ruler's teeth by Duke Wen's brain matter thus signifies the triumph of guile over brute strength. Moreover, the pre-

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[22] Ning Wuzi claims that 'gods and spirits not of the same kin or kind cannot partake of sacrificial offerings' (*ZZ* Xiang 31.5). Similar arguments are made in *ZZ* Xi 10.3. Elsewhere in the *Zuozhuan* people speak of becoming hungry ghosts when their progeny is eliminated (*ZZ* Xuan 4.3) or when they refuse to attend to sacrifices offered by their descendants (*ZZ* Xiang 20.7).

[23] Examples include *ZZ* Cheng 5.1, Xiang 31.5.

[24] See comments by Zhao Xun and Du Yu in *ZZ* 459. Takezoe Teruo (1986) j.7.20–21 cites medical texts which claim that animal brains can cause paralysis and refers to the 'Neize' chapter of the *Liji*, which stipulates that pig brains be

dator, by facing the ground, seems to be punished for some crime, whereas the victim, facing heaven, appears to be receiving its favor.[25] Hence a dream that apparently portends disaster is interpreted as boding success. Jin finally defeats Chu: it is not clear whether the dream actually portends Jin victory or that Hu Yan's interpretation emboldens Duke Wen and influences the outcome of battle. The discrepancy between surface and meaning here defines human agency in history. Told before the battle, the dream's bearing on subsequent events implies determinism. Yet its conflicting interpretations surreptitiously restore choice and the sense of open possibilities.

Duke Wen and his coterie manipulate the double lives of words and signs to facilitate opportune actions and create moral justifications.[26] Whereas Duke Wen is in fact fighting a former benefactor, his dream is made to mean not merely Jin victory but also his moral superiority.[27] The hegemonic enterprise thus depends on the power to manipulate and control significatory processes, to turn contingent words and events into omens. The hegemon poses urgent questions for historical interpretation: he purports to define a political power based on ritual propriety, but the power by which he does so also undermines that order.

The *Zuozhuan* thus sustains two parallel perspectives on Duke

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removed (Zheng Xuan's second-century CE annotation points out its harmful effects: Zheng Yuan [1981]).

25 Yang Bojun observes that at the Banpo archeological site, bodies on their back were buried with accompanying items which indicate a higher status, while bodies facing downwards had no such burial items (*ZZ* 459).

26 Hu Yan, who declares the dream auspicious against all odds, had always been past master of equivocation (see *ZZ* Xi 23.6, 24.1, 28.3). Zhao Cui, another follower of Chong'er, deftly turns Duke Mu of Qin's polite compliment (a quotation from the *Classic of Poetry*) into an omen of Chong'er's future greatness (*ZZ* Xi 27.6). Chong'er himself tries to appropriate an auspicious omen intended for the Zhou king (*ZZ* Xi 25.2).

27 The sequence in the text suggests a proto-psychological explanation for the dream: the dream is preceded by a riddle (in the form of a popular rhyme) which fills Duke Wen with doubt, 'Fields in fallow, lush and abundant,/Discarding the old and planning the new' (*ZZ* Xi 28.3). The riddle is not interpreted in the text, but it may be taken to mean that Jin is turning against old allies (Duke Wen was granted refuge in Chu during his exile) and reveling in its new power. Hence Duke Wen's question: 'What about Chu's beneficience?' To which Luan Zhi, a Jin minister, replies, 'All the kingdoms with the surname of Ji north of the Han River have been eliminated by Chu. This is to think back on small beneficience and forget great shame—we had better engage in battle!' (*ZZ* Xi 28.3). Coming on the wake of such discussions, Duke Wen's dream points to the moral ambiguity of the confrontation.

Wen—one depicts the hegemonic ideal (*zunwang rangyi*, 'honor the Zhou king and fend off the barbarians'),[28] the other unravels the nuances and intricacies of its realization.[29] The former is the discourse of ritual propriety, where signification is determined and contained to create coherence and order; the latter is the discourse of power, which manipulates the discourse of ritual propriety to create a new *modus operandi*. In other words, the story supports both a traditionalist perspective that urges return to early Zhou ritual-political order and a proto-legalist perspective (if I may risk such anachronistic usage) that emphasizes practical and strategic uses of ritual discourse.[30] By showing how omens of legitimation and victory are constructed and manipulated instead of simply received, accounts of hegemons lead us to explore the space between cosmic order and random determinism, the 'Way of Heaven' (whatever higher destiny that unfolds) and human endeavor.

In the accounts of hegemons, the burden of interpretation is to reconcile ritual propriety and desire for power. The anxiety of interpretation is heightened with the decline of the hegemonic ideal. A good example is King Ling of Chu, whose flagrant disregard for symbols of ritual authority and boundless, overreaching ego threaten political and even cosmic order. His downfall is almost overdetermined: a steady, insistent stream of prophecies and judgments accompany his career, invoking both his excesses and a random, mechanical determinism to explain his transgressions and ultimate destruction (Xiang 29/544 through Zhao 12/530).

The problem of containing disorder, of imposing form and meaning on narratives of proliferating evil, violence, and disintegration, becomes increasingly difficult in the latter half of the book. At the end of a tale of sound and fury, usually consisting of multiple adultery, intrigues, and murders, the reader may well lose sight of the 'message.' The conspiracies of Cui Shu and Qing Feng of Qi form one such story. Duke Zhuang of Qi commits adultery with Cui Shu's wife and is murdered by Cui Shu, who then, with Qing Feng's sup-

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[28] See *ZZ* Xi 27.4, 28.3.

[29] See *ZZ* Xi 25.2, 27.4.

[30] Liu Xiang's account (77–76) of *Zuozhuan* transmission mentions Wu Qi, a Warring States strategist-statesman known for his legalist and military thought; see fragments of *Bielu* in Yan Kejun (1965) 24. Yao Nai (CE 1731–1815) enlarges on this point: see Qian Mu (1990) 177–8. See also Tong Shuye (1980) 288, 351–2.

port, installs Duke Jing as ruler. Qing Feng perceives Cui as a rival and destroys his clan by playing one faction of the family against another. Qing Feng's clan is in turn destroyed by former supporters of the murdered Duke Zhuang. But Qing Feng himself escapes, and enjoys new success in Wu, until Duke Ling of Chu invades Wu and kills him.

The most famous passage from this tangled narrative describes the fearless integrity of the Qi scribes who record the regicide.

> The Grand Scribe wrote: 'Cui Shu murdered his ruler.' Cui Shu killed him. His brothers continued writing, and there were two [more] dead persons. His other brother wrote again, thereupon Cui Shu let him be. The Scribe of the South heard that the grand scribes had all died, he thus carried bamboo strips and went there. Hearing that the deed had already been written down, he thereupon returned.
>
> (*ZZ* Xiang 25.2/548)

But the line which the Qi scribes defend with their lives does not resolve the moral confusion. They imply that regicide is the greatest transgression of morality and its honest recording safeguards the kernel of meaning. Yet the murdered Duke Zhuang is no innocent victim. He became ruler through a series of intrigues and murders (*ZZ* Xiang 19.5/554) and is guilty of adultery with Cui Shu's wife. The Qi minister Yan Ying sees ubiquitous evil and defends self-preservation through disengagement (*ZZ* Xiang 25.2, 28.9/545, Zhao 10.2/532). The logic of guilt and innocence, crime and punishment, can hardly govern this increasingly shapeless narrative.

There is also a growing sense that the interpretation of the past is open to debate and manipulation. It is uncertain which past one should invoke to explain the present or justify one's actions. Whereas traditionalists use visions of decline to turn an idealized early Zhou order into the repository of governmental principles and the criterion for judging later developments, reformers emphasize inevitable changes and appeal to a more recent past to justify present policies. Competing pasts are juxtaposed with increasing frequency in diplomatic missions and military confrontations.[31] Rules of reading may also change. The classics of *Changes*, *Poetry*, and *Documents* are regularly adduced as sources of authority in judgments of historical events in the *Zuozhuan*. In the latter half of the text, however, we

[31] See, for example, *ZZ* Zhao 15.7, 26.9, 32.3, Ding 1.1.

see self-conscjous discussions of the problematic application of received wisdom to the situation at hand.[32]

Divergent visions of political order define the parameters of interpretation. One conception of ideal feudal order maintains that ties of clan responsibility and fealty keep the polity one and indivisible. Prescient characters in the *Zuozhuan* often warn of the dangers of having more than one locus of authority in the polity. Thus the Zhou minister Xin Bo remonstrates with Hejian, Duke of Zhou, when King Huan entrusts his younger son Prince Ke to the care of Hejian: '"Equal consorts, paired heirs, two in charge of government, coupled capitals are the sources of disorder." The Duke of Zhou did not follow the advice, that is why he met with disaster' (*ZZ* Huan 18.3/694).[33] However, there is a parallel argument that defends plural *loci* of authority. To quote Scribe Muo: 'Things are born in twos, threes, fives, with concomitants and auxiliaries . . . The altars of soil and millet have no constant masters of sacrifice, rulers and ministers have no constant positions, it has been so from ancient times' (*ZZ* Zhao 32.4/510). There is basically no immutable and undivided political authority—all natural (astronomical, biological, topographical) phenomena testify to this multiplicity. To recognize such multiplicity is to enter into the intricacies of each turn of events. The rule of plural *loci* of authority responds to a world in flux and creates new uncertainties.

Perhaps in response to these uncertainties, the *Zuozhuan* contains moments of reflection on its own judgments and construction of meaning. The following well-known example indicates the nuances and tensions defining historical knowledge.

> On the *yichou* day, Zhao Chuan murdered Duke Ling at Taoyuan. Xuanzi returned before leaving the mountains of Jin. The scribe wrote, 'Zhao Dun [Xuanzi] murdered his ruler' and showed the record at court. Xuanzi said, 'This is not true.' He replied, 'You are the first minister. Yet fleeing you did not cross the state boundary, upon returning you did not bring the culprit to justice. If not you, who is responsible?' Xuanzi said, 'Alas! The *Poetry* says, "My longing is such,/That

[32] See *ZZ* Xiang 9.3, Zhao 12.10, 1.4.

[33] Again and again we come across stories of how 'the big branch must break, the big tail cannot shake' (*ZZ* Zhao 11.10): the ruler's favored sons who are not appointed heirs, lateral branches of the ruling clan, and powerful ministerial families all undermine the legitimate ruler's authority (see, for example, *ZZ* Yin 1.4, Min 2.7, Xiang 29.3, Zhao 11.10).

I bring sorrow upon myself." That describes me indeed!' Kongzi [Confucius] said,[34] 'Dong Hu was the good scribe-historian of ancient times, he did not conceal anything in his manner of writing. Xuanzi was the good minister of ancient times, he received a bad name because of the law. What a pity, had he crossed the state border he would have been absolved.' (*ZZ* Xuan 2.3/607)

'Kongzi' praises Dong Hu as a good scribe-historian (*liangshi*) because he is concerned with intentions and motivations in apportioning responsibility. But moral judgment is difficult even if the culpability of Zhao Dun may be ascertained. The misdeeds of Duke Ling of Jin are enumerated earlier to build up the image of a stereotypical evil ruler who may be deposed with impunity. The account begins with a categorical denunciation: 'Duke Ling of Jin is no ruler [*bujun*].'[35] The final statement is ambiguous. Can 'Kongzi' possibly mean that a technical detail of location would have absolved Zhao Dun even if he were guilty? Or does he mean that had Zhao Dun crossed the border it would have proved that he was actually not party to the regicide? One would assume the latter: 'Kongzi' wishes this 'good minister of ancient times' had not been responsible. 'Kongzi' balances sympathy and judgment, and proceeds from surface to meaning as he evaluates evidence and circumstantial contexts and ponders the margins of intention and execution. The issue of whether regicide may be permissible in the case of unworthy rulers remains open. This may well be an account elaborated by someone connected to the Zhao clan: it seems designed to retain sympathy for Zhao Dun despite his indictment. Even so, it remains a remarkable self-reflexive moment showing how historical knowledge and judgment may be established.

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[34] The comments attributed to 'Kongzi' or 'Zhongni' in the *Zuozhuan* do not necessarily coincide with the views of the historical Confucius or even with Warring States' conceptions of Confucius. For an appendix of the twenty-five comments by 'Zhongni' or 'Kongzi' in the *Zuozhuan*, see Zhang Suqing (1991) 289–92; see further Schaberg (this volume).

[35] The enumeration of Duke Ling's evils is somewhat perfunctory and leads some traditional commentators to suspect the historian's subtle intention in summarily denouncing those guilty of regicide. See comments by Wu Kaisheng and Han Xichou in Han Xichou (1940) 1.297–301.

Signs of Reading in the Shiji

Historical inquiry becomes much more self-conscious in Sima Qian's *Shiji*. For the first time in the Chinese tradition, history-writing is linked to a life, a voice, and a personality. This association is quite different from that construed between Confucius and the *Chunqiu*. By early Han, exegetical traditions of the *Chunqiu* regard it as a repository of immutable principles and turn Confucius into an almost impersonal conduit of heavenly will.[36] Sima Qian obviously hopes to emulate the moral authority of the *Chunqiu*, but he links the critical intent and moral urgency of that text to its specific historical situation, and emphasizes how suffering and adversities led Confucius to create the *Chunqiu*. Indeed, it is by developing a new understanding of authorship and the historian's authority that Sima Qian writes against the anti-historical tendency of his times.[37] The abstraction of recurrent patterns and correspondences as the mode of apprehending history[38] fails to accommodate singular events and linear developments, and the transformation of the *Chunqiu* into Confucius' moral-legal-political program, which is supposedly partially fulfilled in the Han system,[39] negates real historical changes: both testify to this anti-historical bent in Han thought.

The idea of authority in the *Shiji* is inseparable from personal statement and distinctive vision, but Sima Qian also reflects on the embodiment of the past in texts and on his role as reader of the tradition. In the most detailed statements of Sima Qian's intentions and aspirations, the autobiographical final chapter of the *Shiji* and

[36] This is obvious in the Han developments of the *Gongyang* and *Guliang* traditions; see also *Chunqiu fanlu* (*The Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn Annals*) attributed to Dong Zhongshu (179–104). Dong's authorship of the *Chunqiu fanlu* has been debated, but most scholars agree that the exegetical chapters on the *Annals* are authentic. See Xu Fuguan (1985–9) 306–15; Queen (1997) Part 1.

[37] See Li (1994) 353–77.

[38] The *Chunqiu fanlu* traces patterns of alternation in the changes of calendar systems in the Xia, Shang, and Zhou dynasties (*sanzheng*), in their turn connected to heaven, earth, and man (*santong*), and the colors red, white, and black; periods of cultural refinement (*wen*) and of simplicity and substance (*zhi*) are also supposed to alternate. See Su Yu (1992) Chapters 2, 12, 23.

[39] Some Han *Gongyang* scholars assert that the *Chunqiu* defines the underlying principles of the Han political system (*Chunqiu wei Han zhifa*). The idea was to reach its height one or two centuries after Sima Qian. See, for example, Ban Gu's 'Dian Yin,' in Xiao Tong (1990) 48.682; Zhi Yun's letter to Wang Mang, in Fan Ye (1973) 29.1025; Su Qing's letter to Liu Gong, in Fan Ye (1973) 30A.1043; He Xiu's second-century CE commentary on the *Gongyang* tradition for the year Ai 14.

his letter to Ren An, two conceptions of his work emerge: one draws attention to his role as transmitter and anthologizer of texts, the other emphasizes the lyric imperative, the expression of frustrations and anguish (*fafen*) that shapes his historical interpretation. The two stated aspects of Sima Qian's self-understanding as historian, apparently divergent, also converge in some ways. He claims to 'synchronize and sort out the various traditions of the Six Classics, combine and systematize the miscellaneous words of the Hundred Schools' (*SJ* 130.3319–20). His purported goal of system-building lies at the crossroads of the collective and the personal, when the authorial voice is formed through the transmission and anthology of texts. In partly overlapping passages from *SJ* 130 and his letter to Ren An, he describes the humiliating punishment of castration[40] as impetus for his writing and enumerates a genealogy of precedents, authors who write because 'their will is bent, constrained, and lacks ways of expression' (*SJ* 130.3300).

> As for the like of Zuo Qiu who lost his sight, and Sunzi whose kneecaps were removed, action was finally denied them. So they withdrew and turned inward, writing to vent their frustrations and anguish, in the hope of handing down mere words,[41] so that they could reveal their intent [*zixian*]. Secretly immodest, I have of late entrusted myself to useless phrases, capturing in a net all the scattered, lost, old accounts under heaven, investigating therein past events, tracing and connecting beginnings and endings, examining the principles behind successes and failures, rise and decline .... I also wish thereby to explore the boundary between the realm of heaven and the realm of men, to comprehend the process of changes in time past and present, and to establish a tradition of my own. (*HS* 62.2735)

Here Sima Qian is making an unprecedented claim for writing, which is defined as the substitute for successful service and active participation in the polity, and as the completion of an unfulfilled life or a mutilated body. The markers of negativity—*kongyan* ('mere,' or literally, 'empty' words), *wuneng zhi ci* ('useless phrases')—actually signify legitimation and elevation. Writing bears the burden of cultural continuity: the authors enumerated 'told of events past, thinking of the ages to come.' Authors are often also readers in the *Shiji*:

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[40] Sima Qian angered the emperor by defending Li Ling, a general defeated in battles against the Xiongnu. The details of this well-known story are related in his letter to Ren An (*HS* 62.2725–36).

[41] So Owen (1996) translates *kongyan*.

writing is decipherment of the past and transmission of inherited traditions. In addition, there is no perceived conflict between the lyric imperative and impartial judgment. Emotional intensity is inseparable from the moral urgency of truth-telling.

The *Shiji* is the first work in the Chinese historiographical tradition to raise the question of how history is actually knowable. The reader is made keenly aware how Sima Qian's intentions and experience—the injustice he suffers, his anguish and unfulfilment—shape his monumental historiographical system. Even as we hear Sima Qian's voice, we are drawn into the process of historical inquiry, as he explains how he reads his sources, draws upon his experiences, avows his intentions and sympathies, defines his categories, balances and juxtaposes different versions or sources of, or perspectives on, the same events.

To posit the historian as reader would return us to the question of how Sima Qian assimilates and transforms his source texts, especially the *Zuozhuan*, *Guoyu*, and *Zhanguo ce* (*Stratagems of the Warring States*), so that the voice in the *Shiji* balances between the collective and the personal.[42] Source texts are transformed into components of *Shiji*'s system in two major ways: first, through editorial labor and stylistic nuances that amend, pare down, or rearrange the source text; second, through Sima Qian's use of organizational categories as heuristic tool, whereby the choice of materials, the setting of terms and themes, the naming of a type (especially in the more unexpected cases such as the collected biographies of assassin-retainers, knights-errant, or court jesters), pairings of historical figures or their sequence of presentation, turn transmission of texts into historical inquiry and personal expression. Many scholars have noted both aspects. Here I will concentrate simply on the moments of difference, when the disjunctions among Sima Qian's sources or the gap between his understanding and that enjoined by earlier authoritative texts becomes the occasion to reflect on the nature, transmission, and evaluation of historical knowledge.

'The Biography of Boyi' is probably the best known example of how Sima Qian confronts one text with another, questions canonical authority, and explores the meaning and scope of skepticism and

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[42] For a general discussion of sources available to Sima Qian, see Jin Dejian (1963). For a discussion of *Zuozhuan* passages quoted in the *Shiji*, see Gu Lisan (1981), Kalgren (1926) 24–30, Durrant (1992) 295–301.

empathy. The chapter begins by considering the proposition that history is the transmission of tradition. 'Men of learning deal with an extremely vast number of texts, still they turn to the Six Arts as criteria of credibility' (*SJ* 61.2121). Canonical Confucian classics preserve the stories of how rulership was passed from Yao to Shun, and from Shun to Yu, in the spirit of judicious choice and disinterestedness regarding power.[43] There are also accounts of the transference of mandate from Xia to Shang, and from Shang to Zhou dynasties, when tyrannical last kings were replaced by righteous sage rulers. Here we have an implicit parallel between textual transmission and the transmission of legitimate political authority.

Sima Qian then ponders the hazards of transmission and the multiplicity of traditions as he turns to Daoist recluses who disdain power: figures such as Xu You, Bian Sui, and Wu Guang who are mentioned only in the *Zhuangzi* (ca. fourth-third century). The historian cannot resolve his doubts through empirical investigation: 'I climbed the Ji Mountain, and that is where Xu You's grave is said to be located' (*SJ* 61.2121). Sima Qian visits the site where the Daoist says Xu You is supposed to have been buried but is no closer to ascertaining his existence. Having thus set up Confucian and Daoist models of political disinterestedness, Sima Qian proceeds to map the story of Boyi and Shuqi against them. Their story is told in greatest detail in largely overlapping accounts in the chapter 'Yielding Rulership' ('Rangwang') in the *Zhuangzi* and the chapter 'Sincerity and Integrity' ('Chenglian') in the *Lushi chunqiu*. In these sources, Boyi and Shuqi are knights (*shi*) looking for the ideal political order. Finding Zhou rule falling short of this ideal, they starve themselves to death to preserve their purity rather than be associated with Zhou. In spirit they are Daoist sages who spurn wealth and power and who pronounce the world unworthy of them. Sima Qian's account departs from these sources by using Boyi and Shuqi to question the dominant myths on the basis of political authority—yielding rulership to the worthy (*shanrang*) and righteous military expedition against an evil (last) ruler (*zhengfa*).

[43] For the sources of the Yao, Shun, and Yu lore in the canonical classics, see Cui Shu (1983) 51–106. Gu Jiegang (1993) 7C:30–106 argues that the ideal of yielding rulership to the worthy (*shanrang*) begins with the Mohists. For a good summary of the various formulations of the *shanrang* idea, see Wang Jianwen (1987) 1–56.

The rhetorical structure of 'The Biography of Boyi' is premised on the incongruities that emerge from the juxtapositions of various texts and divergent conceptions of textual authority: canonical classics versus alternative traditions; Confucius' discussion of Boyi and Shuqi in the *Analects* versus the song attributed to them. According to the *Analects*, Boyi and Shuqi epitomize Confucian virtues of disinterestedness regarding power and equanimity in face of adversity: 'Boyi and Shuqi thought nothing of old wrongs; they suffered and harbored little rancor'; 'They sought humanity and found it. Why should they harbor rancor?'[44] But Sima Qian casts doubt on this idea: 'I am moved to empathetic grief by Boyi's will, and, upon reading his song, which is not included in the *Poetry*, find cause to wonder' (*SJ* 61.2122).

He then tells the story of Boyi and Shuqi, either quoting accounts no longer extant, or modifying their lore to give his own interpretation. Boyi and Shuqi are princes of Guzhu who vie with each other to give up rulership of the Guzhu kingdom. Boyi escapes in order to honor his father's wish to pass the throne to Shuqi, and Shuqi leaves, presumably out of fraternal feelings for Boyi. Their renunciation deviates from both Confucian and Daoist models. Unlike Confucian sages, they are not explicitly concerned with the welfare of the polity, and they have too much anxiety over filial and fraternal obligations to be transcendent Daoists.

Boyi and Shuqi then go west to seek Chang, Lord of the West (later honored as King Wen of Zhou). By the time they arrive, Chang had died, and his son King Wu is about to launch a military expedition against the evil last ruler of Shang. Boyi and Shuqi 'clutched at [King Wu's] reins and remonstrated with him: "To wage a war when your father is dead and not yet buried, can this be called filial piety? For a subject to kill his ruler, can this be called humanity?"' After the Zhou conquest of Shang,

> [Boyi and Shuqi] abided by righteousness and did not eat the grains of Zhou, became recluses in Shouyang Mountain, and picked ferns for food. When they were starving and on the point of death, they composed this song, 'We climbed the Western Mountain/To gather ferns./They used violence to replace violence,/Not knowing where they erred./Emperor Shennong and Yuxia, had all finally vanished./How shall we find rest and home?/Alas! Death! Such is our fate.' (*SJ* 61.2123)

[44] Confucius (1927) 3.22, 4.14.

Although King Wu is portrayed in dominant traditions as a sage king waging a just war against a tyrant, Sima Qian uses the protest of Boyi and Shuqi to show that even the most justified cause may have darker sides. Violence seems inseparable from the inception of political order. Truth is not one and undivided. There is something in the human spirit not accommodated even by an ideal political order (as represented by King Wu and the Zhou dynasty). Sage kings (indeed, all forms of political order) are often disparaged in the *Zhuangzi* from the perspective of anarchic iconoclasm or supreme detachment. The sense of moral urgency, nostalgia, and displacement set Boyi and Shuqi apart from Daoist precedents.

After quoting their final song, Sima Qian asks: 'Judging from this song, is it rancor? Or is it not?' The song through which Sima Qian understands and empathizes with Boyi and Shuqi is not included in the *Classic of Poetry*. This is a song, presumably remembered through oral transmission,[45] that embodies a challenge to the idea of their serene moral conviction preserved in Confucian and Daoist traditions. Had Sima Qian followed his own initial proposition that 'the test of credibility' should be sought in the Six Classics and Confucius, then his own account here is not admissible, since it is drawn from non-canonical sources. More generally, Boyi and Shuqi question the legitimacy of early Zhou rule, which is celebrated in the Confucian classics as the ideal political order.

Scholars have noted the doubtful historical authenticity of Boyi and Shuqi.[46] The discursive character of this chapter, as well as its placement at the beginning of the 'biographies' section of the *Shiji*, gives it a prefatory significance. Sima Qian seems to be self-consciously reflecting on the possibilities and limits of historical knowledge and judgment, as he brings together incommensurate judgments and gives an account of individual rancor that cannot be contained by inherited philosophical systems and ethical categories. While in general he regards the Confucian classics as more authoritative than other texts, he does not present historical interpretation as canon-determined. The contingencies of transmission and the all-too-human

[45] Schaberg (1997) has a perceptive discussion of the relationship between songs and historical memory in early China.

[46] See Liang Yusheng's (ca. eighteenth century CE) comments in Takigawa Kametaro (1990) 61.3–5. Takigawa points out that Liang is summarizing the views of Wang Anshi, Ye Shi, Wang Zhi, and Wang Wei.

sense of unresolvable contradictions do not make for one uniform view of the past. As instances of unrewarded just men in history, Boyi and Shuqi finally bring us to the ultimate question: 'I am quite confused. The so-called Way of Heaven, does it exist? Or does it not?' Both their rancor and the skepticism they inspire challenge the claim of Confucianism and Daoism to overcome negativity.

The question of the hypothetical existence of the Way of Heaven creates a break in the text: there is a shift from seeking the meaning of Boyi's and Shuqi's lives through their place in larger schemes of possible cosmic justice to establishing it in terms of their own will (*zhi*) and how this will be appreciated and transmitted by another. With the emphasis on inwardness and communion with or recognition by another, we have a kind of lyrical affirmation whereby 'each follows his own will' (*gecong qizhi*) and establishes the value he lives by. The public dimension of a private 'will' or 'intent' is established through true affinity and recognition by one such as Confucius or Sima Qian.

Accepting that remembrance is potentially fortuitous and judgment may be arbitrary, Sima Qian strives to define the grounds of interpretation. Hence his concern with categories of knowledge, multiple perspectives, and the balance between empathy and critical distance. The co-presence and mediation of different perspectives is sometimes realized through the separation of narrative and commentary, which is usually placed at the end of a chapter and introduced with the phrase, 'the Grand Historian said' (*Taishi gong yue*). Sometimes the finality of the commentary is deceptive. For example, the characters who flourished under Han dynastic rule are often praised for their Confucian or Taoist virtues, but the perversion of such values as conformism and opportunism is exposed in the narrative. Conversely, Sima Qian sometimes offers negative judgments of the victims of empire-building, but also questions the criteria by which they are considered villains or failures.

Ironic disjunctions operate on another level, with the so-called 'principle of mutual illumination' (*hujian fa*) whereby an event or character is presented from different perspectives in different parts of the book. By apportioning materials to different sections of the *Shiji*, Sima Qian seems to define a kind of aesthetic unity for the respective narrative units. For example, 'The Biography of Wu Zixu' focuses on Wu's vengeance against King Ping of Chu, who wrongfully put Wu's father and brother to death. The overarching theme is Wu Zixu's

unbridled will, his desire to pursue his vision of justice at all costs. Wu Zixu's role as prescient minister, insofar as it concerns the fortunes of the kingdoms of Wu and Yue, unfolds mainly in 'The Hereditary Family of Wu Taibuo.' In some cases, political discretion disguises critical intention by diffusing it in different chapters. Unsavory episodes regarding Han emperors are often found not in the 'basic annals' of rulers but in the chapters devoted to their ministers, concubines, and male favorites.

There are also instances of deeper ambiguities where Sima Qian is proposing the viability, even necessity, of multiple perspectives for understanding history empathetically and judiciously. The story centered around a historical figure functions as an anchor of perspective, and 'mutual illumination' defines a higher vision through an interplay of perspectives. This approach is rooted in Sima Qian's impartiality and in his appreciation of the plurality of human existence. Thus the consecutive accounts of the contenders for empire during the Qin-Han transition, Xiang Yu and Liu Bang (the first Han emperor), contain parallel moments—such as declarations of intent at the beginning of their careers and self-definitions at fateful moments[47]—which allow Sima Qian to ruminate on 'the boundary between the realm of heaven and the realm of men.' The comments in the two accounts ironically invalidate each other: if Liu Bang becomes emperor because of dynastic cycles, then Xiang Yu may rightly blame heaven; if Xiang Yu is totally responsible for his own downfall, then Liu Bang may not invoke imperial destiny.[48] Both the emphasis on human responsibility in the Xiang Yu account and the focus on historical cycles in the Liu Bang account are partial: when read against each other, however, they encompass the ambiguities and contradictions of these two narratives.

With pre-Han materials and with accounts of the founding of the Han dynasty in the *Shiji*,[49] historical knowledge and judgment are often a matter of adjudicating inherited textual traditions. Contemporary history poses a special challenge: it is difficult, albeit imperative, to rise above one's historical situation. Sima Qian ponders the functions of types, repetitions, and models of interpretation in understanding

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[47] See *SJ* 7.296, 8.344; 7.333, 8.389.

[48] See *SJ* 7.338–9, 8.393–4.

[49] Sima Qian mentions the *Chu Han chunqiu* (*Spring and Autumn of the Chu and Han*) which is now no longer extant.

his own times, which he perceives as an age without heroes. He represents ruptures in the conceptions of meaningful, effective actions and words. Hence the displacement of certain Warring States character types under the Han: the knight-errant is suppressed, the itinerant rhetor is transformed into the more self-abnegating court poet, the unrecognized Confucian scholar becomes the harshly legalistic or fearfully cautious official.[50]

In some ways, the treatises and group biographies in the *Shiji* link the heuristic functions of models and repetitions to the process of historicization. An obvious example is 'The Treatise on Feng and Shan Sacrifices.' Theoretically Sima Qian believes in the ideal of Feng and Shan sacrifices (directed to heaven and earth and performed at Mount Tai), but he begins the chapter with a series of conditional negatives:

> From ancient times there were rulers and kings who received the mandate of heaven: one cannot say that they did not perform the Feng and Shan sacrifices. But then there were those who, lacking the corresponding signs, nevertheless undertook to perform such sacrifices. There has not been any ruler who, upon seeing the auspicious signs, fails to hasten to Mount Tai. However, even when a ruler receives the mandate, his merit may not suffice; even if his merit suffices, his virtue may not affect many; even if his virtue affects many, he may not be able to spare the time. That is why the rites have been rarely performed... For every age at its height of glory, the Feng and Shan sacrifices are fitting; upon decline they are no longer performed. Their performance took place as far back as a thousand years ago or more, or more recently, several hundred years ago. That is why their ceremonies have sunk into oblivion, and it is said their details cannot be known or recorded. (*SJ* 28.1355)

Sima Qian turns the Feng and Shan sacrifices into an absent signified and an unattainable ideal, and fills the treatise with irrelevant, inadequate, and pernicious substitutes. Most examples in the treatise bear out the beginning discussion of why the Feng and Shan sacrifices cannot be known or should not be performed. Sima Qian demystifies the various accretions of Feng and Shan sacrifices in his time by historicizing them: he identifies the historical and geographical origins of shamans (*SJ* 28.1356), strange spirits (*fangguai*, *SJ* 28.1364), the idea of auspicious and inauspicious signs (*SJ* 28.1361, 1365), the theory of the cycle of the five virtues (*SJ* 28.1368–9), the cult of

[50] See *SJ* 117, 119, 120, 121, 122, 124.

immortality and *fangshi* magicians (*SJ* 28.1369–70), thus showing how deceit, fatuous vanity, arbitrary decisions, and accidental circumstances account for these developments.

More specifically, Sima Qian questions the meaning of Emperor Wu's version of these sacrifices by tracing its historical origins to the fantastic legends of the north-east and the far west of China. The Feng and Shan sacrifices come to be mixed with the quest for immortality and the frauds of the *fangshi* under the First Emperor of Qin, who is covertly compared to Emperor Wu. The fact that 'the Qin dynasty was destroyed twelve years after the First Emperor of Qin performed the Feng and Shan sacrifices' (*SJ* 28.1371) casts into sharp relief Emperor Wu's misguided delusions. The question pertaining to the First Emperor, 'is not this what is called lacking the virtue and yet performing the sacrifices' (*SJ* 28.1371), is intended as dire warning for Emperor Wu should he choose to heed it.

The rhetorical stance of uncertainty regarding the secrets of immortality propounded by the *fangshi* magicians conceals a pointed criticism of the gullibility of Emperor Wu. As many have noted, words like *yun* ('it is said'), *huoyue* ('or it is said'), *roran* ('as if'), *royou* ('seems to be'), *yiwei* ('regarded as'), and 'empty words' (*xuzi*) such as *yi*, *ye* ('perhaps'), or *yan* are copiously employed to describe the claims and exploits of the *fangshi*. The result is an ironic distance between the historian and the events described. The guise of an epistemological problem is important: Sima Qian thereby emphasizes how he is trying to understand something opaque and almost incomprehensible, while in the process the question of how these sacrifices are knowable is transformed into the problem of how they are misunderstood and misused. The tone of uncertainty in this chapter thus functions on three levels. First, it creates an aura of mystery around the Feng and Shan sacrifices as an unfulfilled and perhaps unknowable ideal. Second, through a liberal use of subjunctives it captures the mood of the megalomaniac delusions supplanting reality for characters such as the First Emperor of Qin and Emperor Wu of Han. Third, it allows Sima Qian to veil his disbelief and fashion a more forceful critique of the yawning gap between 'the inside and outside of events' (*biaoli*) for those 'attending to gods and spirits since ancient times' (*SJ* 28.1404).

The obverse side of Sima Qian's skepticism is his concern with the dimensions of historical knowledge. Perspectives, models, and repetitions may have been systematized and totalized if Sima Qian

subscribed to Han conceptions of patterns and meanings in history. While such ideas are intermittently invoked, he in fact historicizes them and undermines their extravagant claims. He shows how Zou Yan's system (ca. third century), which purports to encompass all historical changes, is itself a historical event, an invention designed to curry favor with rulers by promising power through correspondences (*SJ* 26.1259, 28.1368–9, 74.2344–6). While he probably does believe in the ideal correspondence of government with the procreative forces of the universe, it is doubtful whether for him this translates into heavenly mandate and historical explanation. With both Qin and Han, he displays too much insight into how the mandate of rulership and symbolic legitimation are created to accept them as inevitable and immutable.[51] The fact that Han was variously associated with the virtue of fire, water, and earth, and that the correspondences are a matter of public debate, fraud, and manipulation (*SJ* 8.347, 10.429–30, 26.1259–60, 28.1378–82, 84.2492, 96.2681) also suggests that Sima Qian is ambivalent about the absolute validity of such cycles as historical explanation.

Despite intermittent references to dynastic, astronomical, and calendrical cycles (*SJ* 8.393–4, 26.1258, 27.1344), and alternations of periods of refinement and of simplicity or substance (*SJ* 30.1442), the *Shiji* as a whole does not suggest that the meaning of history is to be divined through patterns or the purposeful working of a rational heaven. Sima Qian is too keenly aware of the ironic, even tragic disharmony between the perspective of heaven and that of men, and determinism also leaves no room for considering human responsibility which is at the basis of moral judgment. He uses terms like 'heaven,' 'fate,' or 'mandate of heaven' with a mixture of awe,

[51] In the preface to 'The Tables of the Three Dynasties,' Sima Qian talks about 'beginnings and endings of the five virtues' as recorded in 'genealogies' (*dieji*). Dates since the Yellow Emperor are given in these works, but he chooses not to adopt them, following Confucius' supposed editorial caution in the *Documents* (*SJ* 13.488). In 'The Basic Annals of the Five Emperors' we are told that the Yellow Emperor 'had the auspicious virtue of the earth, hence the title Yellow Emperor' (*SJ* 1.6, see also *Lushi chunqiu*, 'Yingtong,' quoted in *SJ* 28.1366 with the phrase 'or it is said' [*huoyue*]). Yin 'corrected the calendar and changed the color system' (*SJ* 3.98, 109). Zhou 'changed the rules and established the calendar,' and its association with the virtue of fire is tentatively mentioned (with the word *yun*, 'it is said,' *SJ* 4.120). In sum, Sima Qian refers to the symbolic legitimation derived from correspondences with the five virtues, but his tone is skeptical and critical when he describes the realization of this process in Qin and Han.

bafflement, and resignation to mark the limits of human understanding when faced with what is infinite and inaccessible. Even if the will of heaven exists, it often escapes human understanding, and overly particularized accounts of it mock its mystery (*SJ* 27.1343–4, 28.1364, 49.1967, 130.3306). It is precisely Sima Qian's skepticism on this matter that defines the compass of historical knowledge, which is rooted in his desire to 'explore the boundary between the realm of heaven and the realm of men, to comprehend the process of changes in time past and present, and to establish a tradition of my own' ('Letter to Ren An,' *HS* 62.2735).

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GY *Guoyu* [*Discourses of the States*]. 1988. With commentaries by Wei Zhao. Shanghai.
HS Ban Gu (CE 32–92). 1983, orig. published 1962. *Han shu* [*History of Han*]. 12 vols. Beijing.
SJ Sima Qian (145?–90?). 1959. *Shiji*. With annotations by Sima Zhen, Pei Yin, Zhang Shoujie. 10 vols. Beijing.
ZZ *Chunqiu Zuozhuan zhu* [*Annotations and Commentaries on the Spring and Autumn Annals and the Zuozhuan*]. 1981. Ed. Yang Bojun. 4 vols. Beijing.

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LOCAL VERSUS GENERAL HISTORY IN OLD HITTITE HISTORIOGRAPHY

Alexander Uchitel

Several definitions of 'historiography' are currently in use. According to a minimalist approach, only followers of the Greek concept of *historia*, that is, a rational historical research, are credited with this title. A maximalist definition, on the contrary, includes any narrative dealing with past events, regardless of its original purpose. A compromise view which treats as 'historiography' proper only those compositions whose purpose is purely historical, without any indication of some other more practical aim, will be adopted in the present study.

Hittites are often credited as those who 'invented' the genre of historiography in this last sense.[1] Indeed, the earliest known composition bearing a title 'Tablet of Manly Deeds' (DUB LÚ-*na-an-na-aš*)[2] was written already during the reign of Hattusili I, one of the early kings of the Hittite Old Kingdom period, in the 17th century. In contrast to the later Assyrian royal annals which preserved their original connection to royal building inscriptions in the form of the so-called *Baubericht* (an account of royal building activity, written as a postscript), this Hittite genre of 'manly deeds' (*pesnatar*), conventionally also called 'royal annals,' shows no signs of any purpose other than recording the past events. The realization that the Hittite version of the annals of Hattusili I was originally inscribed upon the king's golden statue dedicated to the Sun-goddess of Arinna[3] did not transform this text into a 'votive inscription,' thereby revealing its true purpose. Royal annals or their parts could be inscribed upon statues later without any change in identification of their genre, such as the annals of Tuthaliya IV (13th century), which were also originally inscribed upon the king's statue.[4]

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[1] Güterbock (1983) 21–35.

[2] *CTH* 4. Critical edition with Italian translation: Imparati and Saporetti (1965) 40–85; English translation: Kuhrt (1995) 241–2; Russian: Ivanov (1977) 66–70; Hebrew: Kempinski (1980) 13–20.

[3] See Otten (1968) 111.

[4] Güterbock (1967) 139–56. All dates are BCE.

The origins of this genre are disputed. On the one hand, an earlier historical inscription of Anitta[5] was proposed as a possible prototype of Hittite royal annals; on the other hand, the existence of an Akkadian version of the annals of Hattusili I seems to point towards some Mesopotamian prototype. Both views are problematic. Anitta's text is clearly a building inscription, as is evident from the text itself: 'These words [I put] on my gate with a tablet' (I. 33). Although no genuine Hittite monumental inscription written in a cuneiform script has ever been found, this genre of real or fictitious building inscriptions continued to exist during the Old Hittite period alongside the genre of royal annals, being represented by such texts as an account of the campaigns of Mursili I (including the famous sack of Babylon) written by his successor, Hantili I.[6] Like Anitta's text, this is a clay tablet bearing clearly recognizable signs of a building inscription, i.e., an account of royal building activity and a curse against erasing the inscription (II. 12–15).

Several Old Assyrian and Syrian historical texts proposed by H. Tadmor as possible alternative prototypes of Hattusili I's annals are building inscriptions as well.[7] Some of them could serve as a prototype of Anitta's inscription, especially an inscription of Zimri-Lim, king of Mari,[8] a clay tablet claiming to be a monumental inscription. However, as Güterbock has pointed out,[9] it is irrelevant for the problem of the genre's origin whether Hattusili's scribes were inspired by these inscriptions or by Anitta's text, because in either case the radical break with the building inscriptions' tradition should be assumed as taking place during Hattusili's reign.

This assumption, however, faces another difficulty: if the 'invention' of a new genre of 'manly deeds' is attributed to Hattusili I, it should also be assumed that it was 'invented' simultaneously in two languages, Hittite and Akkadian. The most disturbing consequence of this presumption is the use of two different expressions, which cannot be regarded as exact translations of each other, for the intro-

[5] *CTH* 1. Critical edition with German translation: Neu (1974); English: Güterbock (1983) 23–4; Russian: Ivanov (1977) 37–9; Hebrew: Kempinski (1980) 4–6.
[6] *CTH* 11. Transliteration with a partial German translation: Forrer (1926) II. 20, 10; Hebrew: Kempinski (1980) 45–6.
[7] Tadmor (1977) 213.
[8] Dossin (1971) 1–6.
[9] Güterbock (1983) 26.

duction of annual entries in two versions of the text. Annual entries are introduced in the Akkadian version by the expression *ana balaṭ* (I. 6, 10, 23, 29, 31)—'in the following year'—while the Hittite version uses for the same purpose a Sumerogram MU.IM.MA, whose Akkadian equivalent is *šaddagda*, 'in the last year.'[10] In the Hittite, however, this logogram stands for the word *witantanni*, used in the opposite sense (i.e., 'in the next year'),[11] and serving as a Hittite equivalent of the Akkadian *ana balaṭ*. Though this Hittite word is found, written phonetically, in Anitta's text (II. 20), the Hittite version of Hattusili's annals does not follow its formulation, because the earlier text uses this expression in the sense, 'in the same year.' *Ana balaṭ* formula is not attested in historical narratives for the purpose of a text's division into annual entries anywhere outside the annals of Hattusili I, being used during this period otherwise only in economic documents from Alalakh written in peripheral Akkadian dialect.[12] It seems hardly possible that two different systems of textual division were 'invented' simultaneously by the same group of bilingual scribes working at the court of Hattusili I. Therefore, it is much more likely that the genre of 'manly deeds' together with the formulation of its Akkadian version was adopted by the Hittites from some unknown peripheral Akkadian prototype. As long as the state archives of Washuggani, capital of Hanigalbat (later Mitanni), remain unearthed, this prototype seems unlikely to be identified.

The general outlook of the Hittite royal annals is military, contemporary, and Hattusa-centric. Neither royal hunts nor building activity, which play so important role in Anitta's text, are mentioned. The only apparently non-military matters which appear in Hattusili I's annals are accounts of donations to the gods made out of the booty taken in various campaigns; they are thus an integral part of military history as well. The only ancient event mentioned in these annals is the famous reference to Sargon the Great, king of Akkad (Hittite version: III. 29–36; Akkadian version: II. 19–22), which appears not out of any antiquarian interest, but as a historical precedent of a Euphrates crossing before Hattusili I himself, emphasizing

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[10] *CAD Š*/I 38.
[11] See Imparati and Saporetti (1965) 61.
[12] *CAD* B 51.

the greatness of the contemporary event. No digressions concerning the local history of various countries and cities conquered by Hattusili I are ever made. The Hittite text is divided into five annual entries, the Akkadian one into six, the single campaign against the city of Alha, which belongs in the Hittite version to the fourth year, being separated as a fifth annual entry. The last entry (fifth in the Hittite version, sixth in the Akkadian) is by far the largest, occupying more than one half of the text (57% and 59%, respectively). The geographical and chronological range of Hattusili's annals is represented in the following chart.

Geographical and Chronological Framework of Hattusili I's Annals [Toponyms and numbers of annual entries according to the Akkadian version in square brackets]

Year	*Campaign Against*	*Direction From Hattusa*
1	Sanawitta [Šaḫuitta]	
	Zalpa	North
2	Alalha [Alḫalḫa]	South
	Warsuwa [Uršu]	South
	Ikakali	
	Tashiniya [Tišḫiniya]	
3	Arzawa	South-West
	Ninassa	South
	Ulma [Ullumma]	South
	Sallahsuwa	
4	Sanahhuitta [Šanaḫut]	
	Appaya	
	Ummaya	
	Parmanna	
[5]	Alha [Alaḫḫa]	
5 [6]	Zaruna [Zarunti]	
	Hassuwa [Ḫaššu]	South
	Zippasna	
	Hahha	East

According to his annals, Hattusili's offensive campaigns ranged from Arzawa (Caria) in the West to Hahha on the left bank of the upper Euphrates in the East, and from Zalpa on the Black Sea shore in the North to Alalakh (Alalha) in the South. One defensive campaign

is also mentioned, when the Hurrians of Hanigalbat attacked Hattusa during the third year (Hittite version: I. 24; Akkadian version: I. 11), taking advantage of Hattusili's absence in far distant Arzawa, in south-western Anatolia.

Three episodes mentioned in the annals of Hattusili I also became the subjects of separate literary compositions: the conquest of Zalpa, the siege of Urshu, and the war against Hassuwa; the campaign against Hahha is also mentioned in a recently published letter of Hattusili I.[13] An account of the Hassuwan campaign, written probably during Mursili I's reign, includes speeches of protagonists and quotations from their correspondence, while great attention is paid to the assistance given by Halpa (Aleppo) to Hassuwa, barely mentioned in Hattusili's annals (Hittite version: II. 13–16; Akkadian version: I. 32–33). In fact, Yarim-lim, king of Aleppo, and his general Zukrashi are the most prominent heroes of the story. This particular interest in the local history of Aleppo was probably promoted during the rule of Hattusili's successor, Mursili I, who conquered this city. Unfortunately, the text is very fragmentary, and it is difficult to determine its genre.[14]

The fate of Zalpa under the rule of Hattusili I, on the other hand, constitutes part of a larger composition which deserves special attention. This, written for a purely historical purpose during the Old Hittite period, is the so-called 'Story of Zalpa.'[15] The story begins with the famous foundation myth concerning the queen of Kanish and her thirty sons who, after being put into boxes and cast down the river by their mother, were carried by the river to the land of Zalpuwa at the sea-shore. Later, when the boys grew up, they decided to come back to Kanish, where they found their thirty sisters whom they wanted to marry. It is not clear whether the incestuous marriages took place, since the text is broken at this point. The missing part of the text probably described the foundation of the city of

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[13] Critical edition with Italian translation: Salvini (1995) 61–80; English: Salvini (1996) 107–16.

[14] *CTH* 14 and 15. Partial translations: German, Otten (1953) 60–1; Russian, Ivanov (1977) 87; Hebrew, Kempinski (1980) 24. Critical edition of additional fragments with German translation: Kühne (1972) 242–9.

[15] *CTH* 3. Critical edition with German translation: Otten (1973); English (foundation myth only): Güterbock (1983) 27–8; Hoffner (1990) 62–3; Russian: Ivanov (1977) 35–6, 88–9; Hebrew: Kempinski (1980) 11–12.

Zalpa by the brothers after their return to the sea-shore from Kanish, and the early history of the city. After the lacuna, the text proceeds to an account of relations between Zalpa and the Hittite kingdom during the successive reigns of the two latest Hittite kings; it is written from the perspective of the reign of Mursili I who is referred to as 'the king,' while his predecessors are called 'grandfather of the king,' and 'the old king.' None of these rulers is explicitly named; only two sons of two successive Hittite kings, Hakkarpili and Happi (who both served as viceroys of Zalpa), are mentioned. Hakkarpili's story constitutes a single narrative, while the account of Happi's revolt against his father is divided into three annual entries, in a way similar to royal annals, but using a different technique, by which the years are numbered: *I-NA* MU 3^{KAM}, 'in the third year' (A II. 10'; B II. 27'). The historical background of the latter episode is provided by the so-called 'Political Testament of Hattusili I,'[16] who proclaimed therein a change of succession: the former heir apparent, his nephew Labarna, was dismissed, and Mursili was appointed in his place. From the Story of Zalpa we learn that the dismissed crown-prince Labarna found refuge at Zalpa during the rebellion of his cousin Happi, and that his extradition was demanded by the 'old king' (A II. 11'–12'; B II. 28'), who should be identified, therefore, as Hattusili I. The identification of the previous king (Hakkarpili's father) is more complicated since the 'father of the old king' and the 'grandfather of the king' are two different persons, the former being appointed by the latter as a viceroy of Hurma (B I. 19'–20').[17] The two parts of the text are often treated as two different literary compositions, one of a mythological and another of a historical character.[18] There is no doubt, however, that the Story of Zalpa is a coherent local history telling the story of this city from its foundation to the most recent events of the previous reign.

Though the combination of mythological and historical elements in the same literary composition is not unusual, the genre of local history is unknown anywhere in the ancient Near East, being attested

[16] *CTH* 5. Critical edition with German translation: Sommer and Falkenstein (1938); Russian: Ivanov (1977), 71–7; Hebrew: Kempinski (1980) 25–32.

[17] See Klinger (1996) 118.

[18] For example: Ivanov (1977) 35–6, where the mythological and historical parts of the text are translated separately under two different titles.

only in much later Greek local histories, starting from the fifth-century Atthidographer, Hellanicus. The only Akkadian text (also written during the Old Hittite period) which is sometimes used as a parallel is the third episode found in the annals of Hattusili I and specially told as the 'Siege of Urshu.'[19] This is not a story of Urshu, however, but an account of a single and recent event—a siege of Urshu by Hattisili I. Even more important is that the purpose of the text is not historical at all, but satirical: it is an account of a real-life siege, and hence very different from the boastful royal inscriptions so familiar in the ancient Near East. It vividly illustrates 'Murphy's Law': the battering-ram is broken, the new one is brought to the wrong place, the city besieged by eight armies is visited freely by enemy envoys, and so on and so forth. I cannot agree with Hoffner's claim that the main purpose of this text was 'to paint a portrait of the wise, courageous, and forceful king, impatient with his incompetent subordinates.'[20] The figure of the king, who gives very complicated instructions which are always executed by his subordinates in the worst possible way, while he himself is repeatedly 'pleased' with their optimistic answers, is no less ridiculous than the portrayal of his unfortunate generals. As a piece of political satire, the 'Siege of Urshu' is much closer to the so-called 'Palace Chronicle,'[21] a collection of anecdotes about the court life at Hattusa, than to the 'Story of Zalpa.' Both compositions are more or less contemporary, and they even share one of their 'heroes'—the general Santa, whose punishment for his misconduct during the siege of Urshu is mentioned in the 'Palace Chronicle' (I. 24–5). These two texts are written, however, in different languages, the 'Siege of Urshu' in Akkadian, the 'Palace Chronicle' in Hittite. Though the Old Hittite political satire is unique in the ancient Near East, the very use of Akkadian probably points, as in the case of Hittite royal annals, towards some unknown peripheral Akkadian model.

Yet at least one Old Hittite text belonging to the same genre as the 'Story of Zalpa' does exist. This is the so-called story of Anumhirbi and Zalpa, which survives in a single damaged copy written

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[19] *CTH* 7. Critical editions: Güterbock (1938) 114–39 (with German translation); Beckman (1995) 23–34 (with English translation); English: Gurney (1976) 178–9; Russian: Ivanov (1977) 90–3; Hebrew: Kempinski (1980) 21–3.

[20] Hoffner (1980) 299.

[21] *CTH* 8, 9. Partial English translation: Gurney (1976) 172–3; Russian, Ivanov (1977) 80–2; Hebrew, Kempinski (1980) 37–41.

in Old Hittite dialect, but using the late form of the cuneiform script.[22] As with the 'Story of Zalpa,' the two parts of this text are usually treated as two separate literary compositions, one dealing with a boy abandoned in a field and fed by animals (the 'Son of the Field' story), the other with the siege of Zalpa by Anum-hirbi (Hittite Anum-herwa), prince of Mama. However, following the realization that the surviving portion of the text is an obverse and not a reverse of an original tablet,[23] the consequence of which is that the order of columns should be reversed, so that the story of 'Son of the Field' *precedes* the tale of Anum-hirbi, there is no reason whatsoever to separate what are two parts of a single narrative.

Reinterpreted as a coherent composition, KBo 12.3 should therefore be seen as a story of the birth and death of Anum-hirbi's son. Born to a slave girl, he was exposed in the field, fed by cattle, and found by a shepherd who brought him to Zalpa, where he grew up; he was later killed by the Zalpans during the siege of this city by his father, Anum-hirbi. Though the transfer of Anum-hirbi's son from Mama to Zalpa is lost in the break, it is otherwise impossible to explain his presence at Zalpa during the siege of the city.

Since only partial translations of Kbo 12.3 are available[24] it seems useful to give here a full transliteration and translation:

I. 2' [ ] x x [ ] GEMÉ-aš kat-ta
3' [še]-eš-ta nu DUMU.NITA mi-ya-ti
4' [šu-up-pa-i] pí-di
5' [ ] x-aš pí-eš-še-ir

6' [m]a-aš-ša-an ú-e-ša-i
7' [š]u-up-pa-i pí-e-di ar-nu-uz-zi
8' [ ]ti-an-zi ta šu-up-pa-i pí-di
9' [ ]-an ti-it-ti-ya-an-zi
10' [šu-u]p-pa-la-aš-ša a-ap-pa ka-ya
11' [h]a-aš-ši-kat-ta še-e-ir-wa ma!-wa-a
12' [Ú-UL k]u-it-ki ha-az-zi-zi

13' [^{kuš}]A.KÁN.LÁ-an IN.NU.DA-it

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[22] KBo 12.3 (*CTH* 2). Partial translations: German, Neu (1968) 51 n. 1; Otten (1973) 65; Russian, Ivanov (1977) 89; Hebrew, Kempinski (1980) 3.

[23] Otten (1973) 65.

[24] Above, n. 22.

14' [š]a-an-ni-iš-ta ša-an UDU-aš
15' [ ] ma-a-an šu-up-pa-la-aš
16' [-z]i UDU$^{hi.a}$-uš nam-ma
17' [p]a-a-ir nu DUMU.NITA-an
18' [gi-i]m-ra-a-ma ú-e-ir
19' [ ]-za SIPA-ša
20' [ ]-it DUMU.NITA-an
21' [gi]-im-ri-li-iš-ša da-a-iš

22' [pa-ra-]a u-un-ni-iš
II. 2' [h]ur-ni hu-u[
3' [ ] a-pa-a-aš-ša-an na[m-ma
4' a-pa-a-aš-ša nam-ma e-ša-ti a-pa-a-aš[
5' har-ni-ik-ta 3-*ŠU* har-ni-ik-ta k[u-
6' tu-pí-iz-zi wa-at-ta-ru-i tu-u[
7' ERÍN^{meš}-*ŠU* *Ù* GIŠ.GIGIR^{meš}-*ŠU* ^{uru}Za-al-[pa

8' ^{m}A-nu-um-hé-ir-wa$_{a}$-aš-ša DINGIR^{meš} hé-in-[ka-at-ta
9' pa-id-du-wa ERÍN^{meš} *Ù* GIŠ.GIGIR h[u-ul-la-id-du
10' e-eš-[ta] a-ni-ya-ir ERÍN^{meš}-*ŠU* *Ù* [GIŠ.GIGIR^{meš}-*ŠU*
11' ^{uru}[Za-al]-pí hu-ul-li-e-ir [
12' ap-pa-an an-da-pát *IṢ-BAT* ^{m}A-nu-um-[hé-ir-wa$_{a}$-aš
13' 5 pí-e-eš-zi nu har-ša-a[n
14' nu GUŠKIN-aš ha-lu-wa-na-a[š
15' šu-un-na-aš an-da-an-na[
16' ta-at e-ku-ut-ta [

17' *Ù* E[RÍN^{m}]^{eš} ^{uru}Za-al-pa [
18' ^{giš}[iš-p]a-na-aš na-[
19' nu SAG.DU-*SU* x[
20' nu-uš ta-ma-a-i[š
21' ma-a-an-ma-w[a
22' šu-uš TÚL[
23' wa-an-n[u-um-mi-ya-aš

(I)[Anum-hirbi] slept with a slave-girl and a boy was born. [His servants brought him to a pure] place, and abandoned [him there]. [. . .], but in a pasture [. . .], to a pure place he moves him. [Animals] enter [the pasture], and in a pure place [. . .] they join him. [. . .] and cattle [*suppalas*, singular] fed him there, while he [does not] realize anything.

[A shepherd filled] a sack with straw, and hid himself [inside]. Him a sheep [. . .]. When cattle [. . .], the sheep went, and a boy [. . .], but they came to a field. [. . .] a shepherd [. . .] a boy. [. . .] and Son of Field [*gimrilis*] put.

[A shepherd] drove out [the cattle].

Here, presumably, a shepherd brought a boy to Zalpa where he grew up. Meanwhile, Anum-hirbi attacked Zalpa.

(II) . . .] he him [. . .], and he sat down. He [. . .] destroyed, three times he destroyed [. . .] to the . . . spring . . . [. . .]. His soldiers and his chariots to Zalpa [. . .]

Anum-hirbi knelt in front of the gods, [and the gods said] 'let him go, let him defeat soldiers and chariotry.' [. . .] was. They caused his soldiers and [his chariots] to defeat [the enemy] at Zalpa, [and] he surrounded [the city]. Anum-[hirbi] presses five times. [He saw his son's severed] head.[25] He filled gold rhyta[26] [with poison], and drank it [. . .].

And soldiers of Zalpa [. . .] on the spears[. . .]. And his head [. . .]. And them the other [. . .] . . . [. . .]. And them to the spring [. . .]. Childless [he died].

Chronologically, this story fits a lacuna between the foundation myth and recent historical events in the 'Story of Zalpa.' Anum-hirbi, whose genuine letter to Warshama, prince of Kanish, survives in the Kül-tepe Old Assyrian archives,[27] was probably a contemporary of Pithana, Anitta's father (about two centuries before Hattusili I). Theoretically, at least, therefore, KBo 12.3 could be an integral part of the 'Story of Zalpa.' Even if it is a separate literary composition, it belongs to the same genre of local history, sharing with the 'Story of Zalpa' the following points: (1) a combination of mythological motives with historical narrative; (2) interest in ancient history, since by the time of its composition Anum-hirbi was already an ancient king; (3) a purely provincial outlook from the Hittite point of view, being a story of relations between Mama and Zalpa, without any reference to contemporary rulers of Kussara (the future Hittite kings).

In summarizing our discussion of Old Hittite historiography, the following points should be emphasized:

1. Four historical genres developed quite independently during the Old Hittite period: royal building inscriptions (real or 'pseudo-epigraphic'), royal annals ('manly deeds'), political satire, and local history.

2. Three of these genres were probably of foreign origin: building inscriptions, royal annals, and political satire. Among them only building inscriptions can be attributed with some certainty to a well attested

[25] For this restoration, see Ivanov (1977) 89.

[26] For this translation, see Puhvel (1991) 3.51–2.

[27] Critical edition with English translation: Balkan (1957); French, Garelli (1963) 210–11; Hebrew, Kempinski (1980) 1–2.

and long Mesopotamian tradition, while possible foreign prototypes of Hittite royal annals and political satire remain unknown, the use of Akkadian being the only indication of their foreign origin. Local history, however, probably belongs to a local Anatolian (though not necessarily Hittite-Nesitic) historical tradition.

3. Only two of these genres belong to historiography proper, being composed for the purpose of commemorating past events with no more practical aim, i.e., royal annals and local history. The two differ sharply, however, in their general outlook and chronological scope. Royal annals deal with the contemporary events of the present reign and their outlook is generally Hittite, whereas local history concentrates upon individual Anatolian cities and is equally interested in ancient as well as recent history.

The development of these four Old Hittite historical genres is shown in the following chart where the literary compositions discussed above are arranged chronologically in vertical columns, and categorized horizontally by their subject matter.

Development of the Old Hittite historical genres [the language of writing is indicated by capital letters: A = Akkadian, H = Hittite]

Reign	*Building Inscriptions*	*Royal Annals*	*Political Satire*	*Local History*
Anitta	Anitta's text [H]			Anum-hirbi and Zalpa [H][28]
Hattusili I		Manly Deeds of Hattusili I [H and A]	Siege of Urshu [A], Palace Chronicle [H][29]	
Mursili I				Story of Zalpa [H]
Hantili I	Deeds of Mursili I [H]			

[28] The position of this text in the chart indicates the approximate time of the events described, not the time of its composition, which is unknown.

[29] Both satirical compositions attributed here to the reign of Hattusili I could equally well have been written during the reign of Mursili I.

The fates of these literary genres were very different. The tradition of royal annals continued to the end of the Hittite state, reaching the peak of its development during the reign of Mursili II in the late 14th century when no fewer than three series of annals were composed.[30] The quality of their writing also reached such heights as the dating by 'summers and winters,' preceding Thucydides by little short of a millennium, and even incorporated some elements of archival research.[31] Some traces of this tradition can be also perceived in post-Hittite Luwian and Lycian epigraphy.[32] Monumental building inscriptions, now written in the Luwian hieroglyphic script, reappeared by the very end of the Hittite empire.[33] However, neither local history nor political satire survived the Old Hittite period. The only element of the local historical tradition which possibly survived is found in the so-called historical preambles to vassal treaties concluded during the Empire period, which survey the history of relations between individual vassal states and the Hittite Empire.[34]

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CAD	*The Assyrian Dictionary of the Oriental Institute of Chicago.* Chicago.
CTH	E. Laroche. 1971. *Catalogue des textes hittites.* Paris.
KBo	Keilschrifttexte aus Boghazköi, Leipzig.
StBoT	Studien zu den Bogazköy Texten, Wiesbaden.

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[30] *CTH* 40: see Güterbock (1956) 41–68, 73–130. *CTH* 61: see Götze (1933); Grélois (1988) 17–145.

[31] I mean here the so-called 'Kurushtamma treaty' concluded by Suppiluliuma I with Egypt, whose original copy was discovered after a search in the state archives by Mursili II (see Güterbock [1956] 98).

[32] See Uchitel (1989/90).

[33] Hawkins (1995).

[34] See Beckman (1996).

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COMMEMORATION, WRITING, AND GENRE IN ANCIENT MESOPOTAMIA*

Piotr Michalowski

My brief is to write about ancient Mesopotamia, about literary genre, and about historiography. A reasonable person might think this a straightforward task; upon reflection the horizons darken and the project seems to fall apart, as obvious definitional obstacles rise to obscure the path. Mesopotamian 'civilization' is an impossible construct, a shorthand for a multitude of cultural complexes that span thousands of years of archaeological record, including three millennia of writing, and are documented in hundreds of thousands of clay tablets inscribed in many languages. Genre and historiography are western concepts that have yet to be satisfactorily defined within the sphere of this civilization. Both these notions descend from Greek thinkers such as Aristotle, Herodotus, or Thucydides, and any attempt to project them back into the past risks the creation of multiple anachronisms. There are competing narratives of the histories of these concepts; ideas that became part of a self-conscious western tradition in which readings, misreadings, rejection, avoidance, and appropriation have all had a share. To inquire if a given civilization had a concept of literary genre, of history, or even of cannibalism for that matter, is usually an invitation to delimit an idealized native category that would conform with one that the observer already has in mind. At issue here is not so much whether Mesopotamians, Hittites, or ancient Egyptians recognized 'genres,' or 'historiography,' but how one would go about establishing such facts. For some

* I must thank Christina Kraus for kindly inviting me to contribute to this volume, and Simo Parpola, Matthew Stolper, Norman Yoffee, and especially Peter Machinist for advice. The assignment forced me to reconsider many prior assumptions, with results too lengthy and too complex to fit into the space allotted to each of us here. I have therefore only summarized certain aspects of the matter here, and kept notes to a minimum; this essay should be considered a synopsis of a larger work that will appear elsewhere. For convenience the dates follow those listed in Brinkman (1977); all are BCE.

philologists the answer to this question would be fairly straightforward: one would establish whether any of the ancient languages had a word for such terms. As far as I can ascertain, there were no lexical equivalents for 'history,' 'historiography,' or 'genre' in any of the languages of the ancient Near East.[1] Whatever we may conclude from this, it will not help us in our search, for if cultures were merely collections of labels we would have little trouble understanding each other. The eternal discussions about language and culture as well as languages and cultures themselves bear witness to the complexity of the matter.

One of the more interesting episodes in the debates about language and culture has come from the pen of the anthropologist Gary Witherspoon.[2] I refer to this work for the simple reason that it is unique, for Witherspoon has managed to demonstrate the delicate interlacing of knowledge, world view, and language, catching in practice what others have often debated only in the abstract. In Navajo the equivalent of the English sentence 'the horse kicked the boy' is not simply ungrammatical, it is metaphysically wrong; or, rather, it is grammatically incorrect because it is metaphysically impossible. In the Navajo universe, action can be instigated only by intelligent and willful beings; horses are not such creatures and hence 'horse' is a lower status noun than 'boy,' and cannot act on its own against the higher category. As Witherspoon demonstrates, the correct way of stating the action in question is roughly equivalent to the English passive construction and would be translated as 'the boy had himself kicked by means of the horse.' It is interesting to note that previous students of the language had misunderstood this construction because they interpreted it solely on the basis of formal linguistic criteria. If we cannot, on first acquaintance, understand that Navajo horses cannot kick us, how can we hope to recover the semantic range of a concept such as 'historiography' from the minds of the literate inhabitants of a civilization that has been mute for two millennia? This equestrian tale cannot solve all our problems, but it can remind the philologist that cultural categories and modes of thought may be found outside the dictionary.

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[1] Many think that this may not hold for ancient Hebrew traditions. As Peter Machinist reminds me, many would consider *tôledôt*, literally 'genealogies,' and *diwrê hāyyāmîm*, 'words of those days,' as equivalent to our 'history.'

[2] Witherspoon (1980). An earlier version can be found in Witherspoon (1977).

If we turn out attention to historiography and history, we immediately face similar problems. The issue is not so much lexical, as it is semantic. In the West—and I use this dubious concept for polemical shorthand only—history is intimately linked with visions of national and ethnic identities. One need hardly point out that the Biblical texts are filled with the authority of history, and that western notions of history inevitably seek their roots in antiquity. After the collapse of the Roman Empire, the sanction of antiquity was often invoked to legitimate both old ethnic groups and new political entities. Peoples and nations were derived from Biblical or Homeric characters: for example, the Franks were descended from Priam, or the Goths from Magog.[3] Such ideological associations of history remain with us to this day and are part and parcel of any search for similar concepts in other cultures. It comes as no surprise that Assyriologists have fared no better in their encounter with ancient societies. The old civilizations have received modern labels that reflect contemporary notions of nationality, ethnicity, and of historical sanction: we have peopled the past with Sumerians and Babylonians and, by extension, defined Sumerian or Babylonian architecture, poetry, agriculture, glassmaking, and historiography.

These terms were applied to ancient near-eastern cultures in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and remain as relics of those times. The discovery of ancient Mesopotamia and the decipherment of ancient languages such as Akkadian (Babylonian and Assyrian) as well as Sumerian in the last century, provided the opportunity for societies that prided themselves on their Judeo-Christian heritage to confront something other and yet seemingly related. Mesopotamia may have been eastern, old, pagan, and different, but it was also part of 'Biblical Civilization,' and thus acceptably familiar. It is easy to simplify the complex attitudes of nineteenth-century Europeans to this 'Cradle of Civilization.' Religious and antiquarian interests predominated, but as Mogens Larsen put it, commenting on a poem by Dante Gabriel Rosetti, 'the Assyrians, surely, were related to these self-confident, placid Londoners who were living at the center of the Empire "where the Sun never sets".'[4] It was also discovered that these Assyrians kept historical 'annals' and king lists, and thus one could confidently speak not only of their history, but of their 'sense

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[3] These issues have been studied in Pomian (1968).

[4] Larsen (1992) 115.

of history' as well, albeit one that never reached the poetic achievements of the Hebrews or the narrative heights scaled by the Greeks. It was history, nevertheless, and hence could serve as an object of scholarly analysis.

With some notable exceptions, the Assyriological approach to this history has been relatively straightforward. As a first step one tries to catalog, classify, and edit all texts that mention the names of kings. Then one paraphrases these texts to produce a linear narrative of events. The fall and rebirth of narrative history in our times went unnoticed; the field held on to its old clothes and never noticed any changes in fashion. There have been interesting attempts at steering the discussion into more speculative realms, most noticeably by Mario Liverani and his students. These Italian scholars have been prominent in their semiotic approach toward an understanding of these ancient discourses: Liverani's 1973 manifesto, 'On the Approach to Historiographic Texts' and the collaborative *Dictionary of Historical Terms* have provided new ways of understanding Assyrian 'historical' texts.[5] The understanding of the language of expression is, to my mind, critical for the penetration of ancient thought and ancient writing. It is one thing to state banalities about 'the Other,' or about the inapplicability of western concepts to non-western modes of thought (as I have done above); it is something quite different actually to step outside one's frame of reference and attempt a proper analysis.

The problems encountered in the search for a Mesopotamian 'sense of history' hold equally well for the other category that we have been asked to address: the matter of genre. This has also been primarily an object of the philological enterprise, with its lexicographical orientation and its need for consistent labeling. Thus, the main purpose of most generic studies has been to identify and translate ancient words that might be construed as generic markers, without, however, trying to recover any generic system as such. Many of these labels may, in fact, be nothing more than indications of the manner of performance, or designations of the type of musical instrument that should be used for accompaniment. The few attempts to confront modern generic theories with the data of ancient writings have not yet had strong effect on the field.[6]

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[5] Liverani (1973).

[6] But see Vanstiphout (1986) and Longman (1991), and (for Greek and Latin) Marincola in this volume.

The labeling approach, intrinsic problems aside, does not get to the heart of the matter. Genre to us has more than classificatory significance. It tells us how to write as well as how to read, and in a literary tradition that values innovation, it provides norms that need to be transgressed. Generic concepts can also acquire metaphorical meanings that resonate beyond classificatory and normative issues. The complex associations of terms such as 'epic' and 'romance' in western literary history, particularly relevant for the Middle Ages, provide a good example of the importance of generic identity within specific cultures. The dichotomy between these two genres has occupied many, as noted recently by Stephen Nichols, who has demonstrated how the epic and romance models were manipulated by medieval authors to create new texts and new genres.[7]

Another example from the same province will do well to illustrate the problem at hand. In a fascinating study of late medieval and early Renaissance textuality, William Ryding analyzed the manner in which the very structure of narrative changed between the twelfth and sixteenth centuries and how our basic notions of the well-made text were conditioned by these changes.[8] When Tasso criticized earlier writers such as Ariosto for the way in which they organized their narratives, he was doing nothing less than following the precepts enshrined in Aristotle's *Poetics*, which had not been well known in Europe during medieval times. Armed with a new Latin translation of the full text published in 1548, Tasso and others now insisted that texts have a beginning, middle, and end, that they should be of a proper length, and that the action proceed in a logical manner. This was to be completely different from earlier European narratives, which were often based on a bipolar structure with flashbacks and other devices that negated the strictly linear emplotment postulated by Aristotle.

Cases such as this exemplify the power of prescriptive poetics, and hence of the role of generic matrixes in the production as well as in the reception of texts. Of course, *we* have always had Aristotle, and much of our debate about genre has to do not only with analysis but also with arguments about how one should write. But how are we to evaluate texts in a culture in which there are no explicit rules, no explicit prescriptions, and no explicit literary debates? This

[7] Nichols (1986).
[8] Ryding (1971); see also the review by Altman (1974).

is exactly what one finds in the cuneiform tablets from ancient Mesopotamia. There are 'commentaries,' but these are but esoteric explanations of words and phrases. The historian would search in vain for anything even remotely resembling the Greek authors' explicit motivations for their works, or for a text such as Lucian's *How to Write History*. One must assume that in Mesopotamia some polemics took place on the oral level, but also that interpretation was built into the very fabric of textuality: meaning was produced in many different ways and not only on the level of narrative itself. If this was the case, and I believe that it was, then external textual relationships, as well as internal restructuring produced meaning in the same way that critical metadiscourse would in other traditions. I deliberately avoid the term intertextuality, often used in such contexts. The term has been bandied around in so many ways that it has almost lost its meaning: some use it to refer to any kind of citation, while others would claim that all literature, or even all discourse, is by its very nature intertextual.[9] Perhaps more to the point is the distinction made by Gérard Genette, who views intertextuality, limited to quotations, allusions and the like, as but one form of a broader category of transtextual phenomena.[10]

I will attempt to demonstrate below how meaning was produced in Mesopotamian written discourse through the very act of reshaping texts and linking them with one another, that is, through transtextual processes, to use Genette's broadest term. In this perspective literary history and the synchronic variations of individual texts can be seen as part of a larger set of cultural changes and adaptations to cultural practices. At the same time these changes were themselves a form of cultural practice and had their own resonance beyond the confines of the written word.

Let us assume, for the sake of the argument, that generic issues have a role to play in the study of ancient Mesopotamian writings, and therefore can be linked to the expression of historiographic thinking. Indeed, attempts have been made to identify a genre that may have been the focal point of Mesopotamian historiography. I am thinking of Jacob J. Finkelstein's provocative essay in which he asserted

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[9] Kristeva (1984) 60 herself abandoned the term, replacing it with 'transposition,' since intertextuality 'has often been understood in the banal sense of "study of sources."'

[10] Genette (1992) 81.

that the true expression of the Mesopotamian sense of the past was to be found not in the obvious places—annals or king lists—but in omens.[11] Finkelstein recognized the immense problems of conceptual incongruity between cultures and refused to locate a convenient equivalent to western history writing. Rather, he insisted that 'what we must seek is that form or genre in which the Mesopotamian thinker confronted his experience of the past, with detachment as well as involvement, with the sense of urgency of immediacy as well as with the spirit of an objective quest; in short, in precisely those attitudes that we expect of any inquiry in the western world that would claim the dignity of serious historiography.'[12] His identification of omen texts as the one form that most closely measured up to his criteria was not well received, and as a result this quirky essay is rarely cited today. And yet it remains the one intellectually inspired piece on historiography in the field. One may find many points of disagreement with Finkelstein: his idealized notions of 'the West,' and, more precisely, of a singular 'western historiography,' are decidedly suspect, and his claim that omens 'lie at the very root of all of Mesopotamian historiography, and that as a historical genre they take precedence both in time and in reliability over any other genre of Mesopotamian writing' can be easily taken apart and falsified. Nevertheless, there is much to what he says, and this particular piece retains its importance in the debate on these issues.

Finkelstein's idea that omens constituted a privileged realm of historicity was based on the idea that Mesopotamians had a cyclical notion of history, one in which the recurrence of an event was linked to the recurrence of associated ominous phenomena. This was simply not the case: there is nothing to suggest that they viewed history in recurrent fashion.[13] Omens have to be viewed in semiotic terms, as a form of communication with the divine.[14] The Mesopotamian gods knew the future, and they inscribed it in the world for those powerful specialists who knew how to read the signs. Indeed, omens were ubiquitous in Mesopotamian culture, and by the first millennium omen texts constituted a significant part of the written tradition. Practically everything in the observable universe could be

[11] Finkelstein (1963).
[12] Finkelstein (1963) 462.
[13] Lambert (1976).
[14] See, in general, Bottéro (1974) and Jeyes (1993).

interpreted as ominous: the livers of sheep, unnatural births, celestial phenomena, and even human appearance or behavior. Such a cultural phenomenon would seem to have little relevance for the subject at hand were it not for the occasional occurrence of examples such as these:[15]

> If there is a 'well-being' groove [on the sheep's liver] that is like the squatting of a young bull, it is the omen of Gilgamesh, who had no rival.
> If the gall bladder is shaped like a lizard, it is the mark of Sargon.
> If the heart is like a testicle, it is the omen of Rimush, whom his servants killed with their cylinder seals.
> If the fetus is like a lion, it is an omen of Naram-Sin, who subdued the world.
> If the fetus is compact, it is an omen of Ibbi-Sin: disaster.

Gilgamesh was a legendary third-millennium ruler of the Sumerian city of Uruk who is supposed to have ruled the city after Enmerkar and Lugalbanda. The other four kings are well known from the epigraphic record, and their historical role, as far as we know it, seems to correspond well to the laconic designations of the omens. The gods knew whereof they spoke. Sargon (2334–2279) and his grandson Naram-Sin (2254–2218) were among the grandest early Mesopotamian rulers; they were remembered not only through copies of their own inscriptions, but also through fictitious texts that had their own millennium and a half of tradition. Sargon's son, Rimush, was less prominent in later memory. Ibbi-Sin (2028–2004), the last king of the next dynasty, lost his kingdom and died far away in captivity. These vignettes of the past may be interesting, but they are mere anecdotes lost in a vast ominous landscape. Of the thousands of such omens known to us today, slightly over 60 are 'historical,' and these acquire a special status only when they are decontextualized and seriated into modern collections of historiographic data. Omens were an extremely important part of the culture, but they were hardly the privileged repositories of historical knowledge.

Finkelstein's main idea may have been fatally flawed, but the essay was extremely important in that it was the first major attempt to analyze historiography 'from the native point of view,' rather than as a reflex of modern intuitive concepts. Finkelstein was searching for a sense of the past; he was not interested in whether something

[15] See, in general, Goetze (1947).

had actually happened, in the colloquial sense, but rather in the way in which earlier events, real or imaginary, were portrayed. In this way he almost succeeded in separating himself from earlier studies on history writing, which always seemed to return to the point of origin, searching for the original kernel of truth that simply 'must' lie hidden behind the textual distortions of history. I say almost, for Finkelstein too, in the end, wanted to find a genre that had a privileged empirical connection with historical reality. I think that one can salvage a certain portion of Finkelstein's vision, asserting the general import of generic categories, without giving credence to any one particular form, be it omens, chronicles, or annals. In other words, is it possible to link generic issues, broadly perceived, to the ways in which Mesopotamians expressed their interest in the past and its effect on the present?

To investigate one possible approach to such problems I shall focus here on a handful of well-known Mesopotamian literary texts, beginning with the text that is commonly referred to as the Gilgamesh Epic. The modern title might be considered hopelessly anachronistic for one could argue that the broad category of 'epic' is very much a part of the western critical tradition and that it should not be in any way applied to texts that have no relationship to it.[16] It is also possible, however, to take a different tack and argue, as Earl Miner has done, that epics, although different in form, exist in non-western literary cultures. Using the example of China, he writes: 'If the function of epic includes explaining the human situation through great action in the past, if the function of an epic includes impressing us with the awesomeness that is not in our own lives, and if the function of an epic includes definition of what is important to a people, then some Chinese prose historical narrative is epic. . . . A definition of epic that includes Vergil, Lucan, and Sir Richard Blackmore but leaves out Ssu-ma Ch'ien can have little to recommend it.'[17] In such a context, the definition would have to encompass the Gilgamesh tale as well.

The first major written traditions about Gilgamesh date from the middle of the Old Babylonian period, roughly around 1700, written in the Akkadian (Babylonian) as well as in Sumerian languages. The Sumerian compositions consist of five discreet, self-contained narratives

[16] See already Michalowski (1996).
[17] Miner (1986) 27–8.

about Gilgamesh and his servant Enkidu. The hero had different genealogies, but in these stories he was the offspring of a union between a legendary king of Uruk by the name of Lugalbanda and the goddess Ninsun (Ninusumuna). A significant portion of this Sumerian language material must be dated back to the time when the Third Dynasty of Ur (2112–2004) rose to hegemony over Sumer and Babylonia. The new ruling family came from Uruk, and as part of their reconstitution of the notion of charismatic rule, the second king of the dynasty proclaimed himself divine. This was but part of a complex ideological makeover of the very notion of kingship, brought about by a crisis of confidence resulting from the death of the king's father Ur-Namma on the field of battle. Such an unusual event could be interpreted only as a manifestation of divine abandonment of the fragile new dynasty, and this required a powerful response to keep the state intact. The Gilgamesh stories about a heroic royal ancestor, mortal although divine, were part of the new foundation myth of the state. Although the five Sumerian tales are known to us mostly in copies from Old Babylonian schools, a few surviving earlier Ur III manuscripts provide us with the evidence to push back the date of composition at least that far. Contemporary with these Old Babylonian period Sumerian tales, we find isolated Akkadian language stories that include earlier versions of episodes known from the first-millennium canonical Gilgamesh Epic, a long, complex literary work that was standardized in a twelve-tablet recension of slightly over 3000 lines. There has been much debate on whether the Akkadian language Old Babylonian materials that we have, which come from different cities and clearly represent parts of differing redactions, added up to a unified narrative much like the later version, or if they (like the Sumerian stories) were parts of separate compositions. The consensus today favors the unified theory.[18] Although these early Akkadian versions are presently known only in part, there is enough there to make fruitful comparisons with the later 'canonical' text. In fact, for our purposes it is a missing element that is the most revealing.

The element that is absent is the opening section of the Old Babylonian Gilgamesh. The second tablet exists, and provides us with a very important clue: the *incipit* of Tablet 1. As a rule, Mesopotamian

[18] Tigay (1982).

texts had no titles and were cited by the opening line; in this case a catch-line at the end of the second tablet reads: 'tablet 2 of "He is Supreme Among Kings".' Thus, although the first line of the Old Babylonian tale has not yet been recovered, it can be securely reconstructed from that final entry in Tablet 2. The opening passage of the later version was likewise incomplete until 1975, when D. J. Wiseman published a new manuscript that allowed him to restore much of this section of the work.[19] It immediately became clear that the first line of the older version was what is now known as line 29 of the later text, providing evidence of the innovative nature of the opening passage. Here are the opening 13 lines of the poem in the first-millennium redaction:[20]

> He who saw all, who was the foundation of the land,
> Who knew . . . was wise in all matters,
> Gilgamesh, who saw all, who was the foundation of the land,
> Who knew (. . .), was wise in all matters!
> He explored throughout the regions,
> He grasped all wisdom from his [search] of the universe,
> He learned secrets and uncovered the hidden,
> He brought back a tale from before the flood,
> He undertook a distant journey, then tired and exhausted,
> He engraved all his hardships on a stone monument,
> He built the walls of Sheepfold Uruk,
> And as for [the temple complex] of sanctified Eana, the pure storehouse,
> Look at its walls, whose frieze is like a copper band.

Jumping ahead to line 24 we read:

> Find the tablet-box of copper,
> Release its lock of bronze,
> Open the secret door,
> Then take out the lapis lazuli tablet and read it:
> How he, Gilgamesh, underwent all manner of suffering,
> He is supreme among kings, illustrious, lordly in stature.

Gilgamesh and his sidekick Enkidu take part in many adventures, seeking immortal fame, the only kind of immortality for which great

[19] Wiseman (1975).

[20] My translation is based on the cuneiform text established by Parpola (1997) with the addition of the first two lines, which come from a new piece published in Kwasman (1998) and properly placed by George (1998). For ease of reading, restorations are not indicated.

kings can hope. Their exuberant, excessive, and ultimately sacrilegious deeds inevitably lead to divine retribution, and Enkidu is fated to die. The despondent Gilgamesh, who in terrifying grief perceives the emptiness of the metaphor of fame and remembrance, rejects the trope and seeks literal immortality. To this end he must journey beyond the ends of the earth, where he encounters the only survivors of the primordial flood. The story narrated by Utanapishtim, the sole male survivor, serves to teach him that history does not repeat itself: one can never again hope for the divine gift of eternal youth. This story within a story points to nothing else but narrative: the flood survivor and his wife live in separation from the rest of humanity and their only reality is their own story. History, remembrance, and story are, after all, the only forms of immortality.[21] After one last botched attempt to find the flower of youth, Gilgamesh must return to his city. As he approaches his abode, he describes the walls of the city, walls that he himself had built, and repeats the words of the poet from the opening lines of the composition. This, of course, brings the text full circle, but at the same time it points the reader to the full implications of a seemingly structural and aesthetic device. For now one realizes the full implications of the lapis lazuli tablet hidden at the bottom of the walls, that is, underneath the major earthly commemorative sign of the life of Gilgamesh. The tablet-box contains a stone text of the very 'epic' itself; it is a foundation deposit and thus an autobiography of the hero, an autobiography that mimics the one told to Gilgamesh by Utanapishtim. This works on two levels, for Gilgamesh not only immortalizes his own deeds through writing, but also those of the flood survivor as well, which until now had existed only in oral form. This transforms the whole narrative, in which the solution to the complex problem of life and death, remembrance and forgetting, as well as the very nature of royal deeds, now finds solution in the very existence of the text one is reading, and not just in the more obvious monument of the city walls. These walls, built in very ancient history, were traditionally thought to be the work of Gilgamesh, but now they become a semiotic construct, a trope, a sign that hides another sign within. This accent on the textual nature of history, commemoration and tradition, is very much a function of the intellectual climate of the late

[21] For a fuller discussion of this theme see Michalowski (1996).

second millennium and beyond, a period in which increasingly more ideological weight was invested in textual polemics. Political, national, and religious struggles were played out in various contexts; to us they are mainly accessible through the surviving inscriptional record.[22] As already stated, with no recourse to written metalanguage, these polemics are primarily transtextual. These take many forms; for our present concerns we must focus on one such instance, for it provides an example of the ideological consequences of a generic reorientation of a literary text.

The restructuring that I have in mind was conditioned by changes in worldview, and by the powerful influence of still another literary composition, the 'Cuthean Legend of Naram-Sin,' as it is called in modern discussions.[23] The ancients referred to it as *ṭupšenna pitēma*, 'open the tablet-box.' The full opening line reads: '[Open the tablet-box and] read the monument that I, Naram-Sin, descendant of Sargon, have written for all time!' The supposed author of this text was Naram-Sin of Akkad (2254–2218), a great king of the past whose deeds had become legendary, and who was one of the few rulers whose name was preserved in the literature, including the omen corpus.[24] This 'Cuthean Legend' already existed in Old Babylonian times, and although these second-millennium versions are imperfectly preserved, it is clear that they were apparently even longer than the first-millennium recension that has come down to us.[25] Whatever the version, the tenor of the text remained the same. It is a fictitious royal inscription, narrated by the king himself, describing strange and magnificent deeds, piety to the gods, and containing instructions to future rulers to follow in his footsteps. It has been argued that this is but one example of a broad genre of Mesopotamian literary 'pseudo-biographies.'[26] The connections that we are seeking here, however, create a different set of relationships, anchored by the focus on writing itself. At various moments in this particular tale, Naram-Sin emphasizes the fact that he has inscribed his deeds on the very monument that we are reading, intended for future kings to read. I

[22] For other examples of such phenomena see Machinist and Tadmor (1993); Michalowski (1990) and (1996).
[23] Westenholz (1997) 263–368.
[24] For a detailed discussion of the historiographic role of Naram-Sin in Mesopotamian literary traditions see Liverani (1993).
[25] Walker (1981).
[26] Longman (1991).

should stress that Babylonian *ṭupšennu*, 'tablet box,' is the very same word that is used in the introduction of Gilgamesh.[27] The relationship between the 'Cuthean Legend' and the transformed version of the great epic is self-evident.

The accent on the textual nature of commemoration and remembrance is as complex in the Naram-Sin composition as it is in Gilgamesh. The ruler of Akkad cites the negative example of Enmerkar, an ancient king of Uruk and the predecessor of Lugalbanda and Gilgamesh. Writing in first person, Naram-Sin tells us that: 'He [Enmerkar] did not inscribe a monument, and did not leave a record on a statue; [thus] he did not establish his name, and so I did not praise him.' He further informs future rulers: 'I made you a tablet-box and I inscribed a monument for you. I left them for you in [the city of] Cutha, in [the temple] Emeslam. I left them for you in the *cella* of [the god] Nergal. Read this monument and heed the wording of the monument!'[28] Finally, after instructions in piety, the text ends with the words: 'You who have seen the things on my monument and set out your record, [just as] you have blessed me, may a future [ruler] bless you.'

The 'Cuthean Legend' obviously went through many changes, including a reduction in size by nearly a third from its early second-millennium to its first-millennium versions. What seems to be constant is the accent on royal writing on stone as an obligation of kingship. Indeed, writing on stone was a royal prerogative in most periods of Mesopotamian history, and exceptions from this, as when one encounters stone inscriptions of provincial governors, are clearly indicative of weak central state control. The selection of Enmerkar, who (according to this tradition) was guilty of not leaving behind any public written record, is a curious one. One can easily understand why Naram-Sin was chosen for the opposite example, since his stone writings were still standing and were copied in schools many centuries after his death.[29] There were few inscriptions of pre-Sargonic kings around in the Old Babylonian period, but why would one

[27] The rare Akkadian word is a learned loan from Sumerian *dub-šen*, for which see Steinkeller (1981).

[28] The god Nergal was the husband of the queen of the Netherworld, and the Emeslam was his temple residence in his cult city of Cutha, most probably modern Tell Ibrāhīm, north of Babylon.

[29] The 'relationship' between Enmerkar and Naram-Sin has been analyzed in Westenholz (1993).

choose Enmerkar, a literary character who may have never existed, as opposed to the dozens of other real and imaginary rulers of early days? Old Babylonian schoolmasters and their pupils knew this king as the hero of two Sumerian language 'epic' tales: *Enmerkar and the Lord of Aratta* and *Enmerkar and Ensuhkeshdana*, compositions which fell out of use after this time.[30] The first of these contains a unique episode that, at first glance, provides an ironic counterpart to the accusations of the 'Cuthean Legend.' The story line of *Enmerkar and the Lord of Aratta* centers on the conflict between the southern Mesopotamian city of Uruk and the mythical 'other,' the imaginary Iranian city of Aratta. The contest between the two is fought not by force of arms, but by means of a series of riddles that are carried by a messenger, who has to traverse treacherous mountains to deliver the oral messages. By the time that he had to bring the third riddle from Uruk to Aratta, his abilities were taxed to the limit. To ease this burden,

> The king of Kulaba [i.e., Enmerkar] formed the clay and wrote words on it as on [a modern day] tablet,
> At that time the writing of words on tablets did not yet exist
> But now, as the Sun God rose, so it came to pass,
> The king of Kulaba wrote words on it as on [a real] tablet, so it came to pass![31]

And so Enmerkar invented writing on the spot and, as a result, carried the day. The king of Aratta was baffled and frightened by the new invention, which demonstrated the superiority of Mesopotamian civilization. A letter to an illiterate addressee is a perfect metaphor for much of public cuneiform writing, which was directed not so much towards the educated minority as to the large mass of people, at all levels of society, who could neither read nor write.

This incidental anecdote is the one and only surviving Mesopotamian story about the origins of writing. There is no reason to think that this was the standard explanation of the matter; it is merely a version of events that suited the particular narrative situation. Nonetheless, these is something disturbing about the fact that the king who invented writing should be chosen as an example of someone whose sin it was not to leave inscriptions for posterity. One would like to argue

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[30] On these texts see, in general, Alster (1995).

[31] *Enmerkar and the Lord of Aratta*, lines 504–6; on the whole affair see Vanstiphout (1989).

that this was an intentional semantic reversal, one that was perfectly apparent to early second-millennium scribes, who would have understood the ironic undermining of the story of the invention of writing. The composition that includes this episode, *Enmerkar and the Lord of Aratta*, did not survive the drastic changes that the scribal curriculum went through in the middle of the second millennium and was thus unknown to later generations of *literati*.[32] This is but one example of the fascinating cycles of creation, allusion, and forgetting that is so much a part of the more than three millennia of Mesopotamian literary traditions.

The generic, or perhaps better, transtextual relationships between the Gilgamesh and Naram-Sin compositions have a broader context. Perhaps nothing illustrates better the cultural meaning of such relationships than a third text. This unusual composition, apparently a parody, which was made available only a decade ago, is found on an incomplete tablet from the late Assyrian libraries from Nineveh that date from the time of king Assurbanipal (668–627).[33] The badly preserved beginning reads as follows:

> Open the tablet-box and read the monument... like a dog, Bel-eṭir, son of Iba: When Ṣalla had not yet gone to his fate, he, lowly...—the king did not know him—a slave waiting on Shamash-ibni, the son of a lowly fisherman, not suit[able for king]ship, the shit bucket of Zeru-kinu, an empty talker, a raped comrade of Nummurya... said: 'In Assyria and Babylonia there is no one equal to me!'

Farther on in the text we find the statement: 'This is the stele that the prostitute erected for the son of Iba, the farter, and left for the future.'

The specific language used here has wider resonance on a number of levels. The expression 'left for the future' is otherwise attested only in royal inscriptions, primarily, although not exclusively, in reference to stone monuments. More interesting is the writing of the name of the main protagonist. The name is written logographically, that is with Sumerian word signs that were read aloud in Akkadian. In transliteration this is rendered as ^{md}EN.KAR. The first two raised

[32] One should point out, however, that although the Sumerian tales appear to have disappeared from the literary horizon, Enmerkar was not completely forgotten. He was mentioned here and there and appears in a fragmentary Akkadian composition that has no apparent link with the earlier stories (Picchioni [1981] 102–9).

[33] Livingstone (1989) 64–6.

consonants conventionally render two unpronounced classifiers: the first denotes a male personal name, the second indicates that what follows is a divine name. EN is the Sumerian reading of the sign that was read in Akkadian as *Bel*, a secondary name of Marduk, the chief god of Babylonia, and KAR was a Sumerian writing of the Akkadian verb *eṭēru*, 'to save.' One does not have to know cuneiform to notice the obvious connection between Enmerkar and ^{md}EN.KAR. This could be pure coincidence, but one suspects that this kind of language game was a partial motivation for the literary creation. The text is clearly a parody of the 'Cuthean Legend' and similar texts. Bel-eṭir reappears in another composition that was found in the libraries of Assurbanipal and which also has generic import, being a parody of an incantation.[34] Sad to say, we have no idea who this Bel-eṭir was. The personal name is hardly unique, but the other people who occur in these two parodies help us narrow down the time of Bel-eṭir's activities. Shamash-bani was the head of Bit-Dakkuri, the most powerful Chaldean tribe in Southern Babylonia during the reign of Esarhaddon (680–669), Assurbanipal's predecessor on the throne of Assyria. The chieftain challenged the Assyrians, lost, and was apparently brought to Nineveh and executed in Esarhaddon's third year, that is in 678. Such happenings were hardly unique in the time of the Assyrian monarchy, but this particular killing must have resonated for more than a generation. Slightly more than 50 years later, the Assyrians returned Shamash-ibni's remains, as we know from a unique inscription that begins with the lines:[35] 'This is the tomb of Shamash-ibni, the Dakkurean, upon whom Assur-etel-ilani, king of Assyria, had pity, brought from Assyria to Bit-Dakkuri, his own country, and laid to rest in a tomb inside his home of Duru-sha-ladinu.'

Bel-eṭir was somehow strongly connected with this very important tribal leader, who was called 'the son of a lowly fisherman' in the first parody, which also mentions a woman by the name of Hulalitu. The incantation, in turn, calls him the 'slave of Balihitu.' A letter addressed to Assurbanipal informs us that Hulalitu and Balihitu were the granddaughter and daughter, respectively, of Shamash-ibni, and that they were apparently alive when Bit-Iba, now headed by a

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[34] Livingstone (1989) 66.
[35] Frame (1995) 267.1–3.

different leader, was once again causing trouble for the Assyrians.[36] The mention of two generations of Shamash-ibni's descendants suggests that his execution must have become a symbolic milestone in the history of the Bit-Dakkuri, or at least among his extended family. It is difficult to ascertain whether Bel-eṭir was active against the Assyrians in the time of Shamash-bani, or later, since he reappears in the letter from the time of Assurbanipal.[37]

All of this is rather uncertain, but the association of Bel-eṭir with Iba may be of importance to us here. Throughout the seventh century Babylonia resisted the occupying Assyrians and sporadic revolts erupted in the land. In the year 648 Assyrian armies attacked the south and sacked Bit-Iba, taking back to Nineveh literary texts as part of the plunder—an unusual event, to say the least.[38] Assyrian kings were hardly reticent about war booty, but literature is rarely the subject of their attentions. When it is, it has very strong ideological import. A ruler of Assyria by the name of Tukulti-Ninurta I (1243–1207) had conquered Babylon and commissioned a long poem to justify as well as glorify his deeds. Among the plundered goods are lists of literary tablets that were taken from the old city, symbolizing the custodial transfer of the Sumerian and Babylonian intellectual legacy from Babylonia to Assyria.[39] The wooden writing boards from Bit-Iba inscribed with omen texts are listed in one of the 'acquisition records' from the Nineveh libraries. The Assyrians confiscated large numbers of literary materials from other Babylonian cities in the wake of the fall of the local insurrection, but in these records the original owners are listed by name, and thus Bit-Iba is unique. We cannot even be certain if this really is a toponym, a tribal designation, or both. The proper name for the toponym was Iba, but in this period tribal units were designated by appellatives that included the element *bītum*, 'house.' The historical circumstances of this whole affair are still murky, but one cannot help but wonder if the political attacks on Bel-eṭir took the form of learned literary parodies

[36] Harper (1900) 485.

[37] Dietrich (1979) no. 490, line 15 r (hand copy). Part of this letter appears to deal with issues surrounding Assurbanipal's wars in Iran; see Stolper (1990). Note that Ṣalla, who is also mentioned in the first parody cited above, was another rebel against Esarhaddon (Frame [1992] 80). I am preparing a separate study of the whole Bel-eṭir affair.

[38] Parpola (1983) 20–1, Frame (1992) 174–5.

[39] See Machinist (1976).

because of his own intellectual achievements. It is possible that he was a priest with a private library, but it is also possible that his oppositionist activities against the Assyrians somehow involved the ideological use of Babylonian literary traditions. For the time being, all this must remain in the realm of speculation.

I have had to proceed quickly through certain complex issues, but the main point remains clear. When the author of the late version of the Gilgamesh tale encircled the text with a description of the walls of Uruk and added the archaeological metaphor of the tablet-box under the brickwork, he transformed the historiographic focus of the text, aligning it with the 'Cuthean Legend.' In modern scholarship this, and some related compositions, have been given the somewhat awkward label of '*narû* literature,' that is a literature of spurious monuments. The word *narû* is often translated as 'stele,' but it actually has a wider range of meanings and can refer to stone inscriptions of any size, from large obelisks to small tablets. By the first millennium many of the moral and ideological themes that had accrued in the long history of the various Gilgamesh narratives were obsolete, divine kingship in particular. The author of the late redaction, traditionally remembered as one Sin-liqi-unnini, performed a remarkable feat by realigning the generic ascription of the composition, and thereby brought to the fore two contemporary concerns: writing and commemorative history. Neither of these issues was new to Mesopotamian intellectuals, but in the later centuries of the life of this civilization they became increasingly important.[40] This retextualization created an unmistakable link with the 'Cuthean Legend' and related texts, thus altering them all and providing but one more element of a closed circle of literary creations that were defining of Mesopotamian civilization, while at the same time asserting certain political and cultural claims. Some of these were part of a complex cultural tension, some would even say warfare, between first-millennium Assyrian and Babylonian rulers and thinkers, while others were internal, communicating complex scribal notions that constituted the common heritage of a powerful literate minority. In such a system changes in the interaction between texts forced internal changes within works of verbal art, as best seen in the Gilgamesh case described here. Witherspoon's Navajo analysis, cited above, provides

[40] Michalowski (1996).

the perfect metaphor for this kind of cultural phenomenon, in that meaning lies as much in syntax and semantics as it does in lexicography. In the Mesopotamian case, we have found that historical meaning resided neither in generic labels nor in any specific textual mode, but rather in the interstices between texts, and in the manner in which texts were synchronically manipulated. Intertextual meaning was produced not only by the composition of new texts, but in the creation of new relationships between existing works. Their cultural importance involved not only the invention of new ideas, but also the forgetting of old ones, as we have seen in the case of the Enmerkar episode analyzed above. Cultural amnesia was as creative as remembrance. Hence the complex restructuring of the relationships between texts that ostensibly dealt with the past—in this case the Naram-Sin and Gilgamesh narratives—in turn provided the pretext for one dealing with contemporary events—the scurrilous Bel-eṭir composition. All of this is but a small part of a series of radical reorderings of the very function of the written tradition that took place in Mesopotamian states of the first millennium.[41] Some of this re-ordering engaged generic categories that had a bearing on historiographic concepts, providing sanction for the present as well as a general view of the past.

This attitude towards the past, as well as towards something that we may wish to call tradition, was not all sanction and appropriation. Writers did not simply add to the lot, creating new additions to the canon and replacing others; they merged into a flow of works that lived and breathed in the present as well as in the past, in a past infused with the 'presence of the now,' to use Walter Benjamin's famous phrase. Even when the wording remained the same, the texts changed and copying was just as much a creative act as composition. The manner in which these meanings changed, and in which the relationships between texts were altered brings us back to the initial questions that initiated these ruminations. Is it proper to discuss genre and history in a culture that seemed to have no words for such things and lacked any overt theoretical discussions of the matter? Should we be obliged to speak of the 'so-called "literatures" of Sumer, Babylon and Assyria,' as one well-known author would have it?[42] I should like to think that some of the arguments presented here

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[41] See the studies cited above, n. 16.
[42] Havelock (1986) 9.

might serve, in part at least, to answer these questions. For if my analysis has any validity, one must deduce from this that generic qualities were essential properties of Mesopotamian written discourse, qualities that surfaced in the way in which texts spoke to each other, in the way in which they were transformed, and in the way in which they lived out their existence in the flow of literary traditions. And like history, story, and tradition, they found their expression not in external labels and *taxa*, but in the poetics of a complex written world.

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THE PERSIAN KINGS AND HISTORY

Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg

Darius, the son of Hystaspes, was the first Persian king who had his *faits et gestes* recorded in an inscription in Iran. As a 'writing king,' he was long thought to have been preceded by Cyrus the Great, on whose palaces at Pasargadae a couple of short inscriptions were found,[1] but it now is doubted whether the Persian texts on the reliefs were indeed carved during Cyrus' reign.[2] The only document in the name of Cyrus, the famous Cyrus-cylinder which reports on the conquest of Babylon,[3] is a text that falls completely within the Mesopotamian tradition and never had much impact in Cyrus' homeland.

Cyrus' successor Cambyses (530–522), who in his relatively short reign conquered Egypt, may well have lacked the time to have his royal performance recorded for posterity. In Egyptian documents some of his deeds are recorded and one document contains his pharaonic titles.[4] No texts in his own name are known.

Darius, therefore, was the first Achaemenid to write history in his homeland. At almost inaccessible height—and certainly illegible to visitors at ground level—on the cliff of Behistun, a large inscription in three languages (Elamite, Babylonian, and old-Persian) was carved,

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[1] All Persian inscriptions are referred to according to the *sigla* of Kent (1953): the first capital letter indicates the king in whose name the inscription was made, C for Cyrus, D for Darius, X for Xerxes, A[2] for Artaxerxes the second, etc.; the second capital refers to the site where the inscription was found, M for Pasargadae in the Plain of Murghab, P for Persepolis, N for Naqš-i Rustam, S for Susa, etc. The third letter is a serial indicator. CMa, CMb, and CMc are the three inscriptions classified by Kent (1953) 116 as written by Cyrus. CMb, preserved in very few fragments, turned out to be an inscription by Darius, cf. Borger and Hinz (1959) 117–25. Although Lecoq (1997) 80f. is still in favor of ascribing CMa and CMc to Cyrus, others now are convinced that the texts were produced later, cf. Stronach (1990); Briant (1996) 926. Hence the *sigla* DMa, DMb, DMc are now proposed. Borger (1982) 109 n. 11 gives a useful overview of the discussion.

[2] Cf. Nylander (1967) 135–78 and Stronach (1990) 195–204.

[3] Kuhrt (1995) 601f.; *TUAT* I. 407–10.

[4] The most important document is the inscription on a naophoric statue of Udjahorresnet, published by Posener (1936) 1–29. For comments see Lloyd (1982) and Briant (1996) 68ff. All dates are BCE unless otherwise indicated.

underneath and around a relief which portrayed Darius as victor over nine 'liar-kings,' the most important of them, Gaumata, lying trampled under the king's foot. The versions in the three languages are not literal translations, but differ in some minor and some more important details.[5] Copies of the text in Aramaic have been found in Elephantine and in Babylon.[6] The text is articulated in paragraphs, each of which begins with: 'Darius the king says . . .,' although this formula is missing from a number of paragraphs of the Elamite and Babylonian versions.[7]

Darius mentioned in paragraph 70 of the inscription that this was the *dipīmaiy* that he had made,[8] and that it was in Aryan (= Iranian) and was composed on clay tablets and on parchment. The word *dipīmaiy* has been the subject of much controversy. It may indicate either the inscription, or a totally new script. In the Elamite version was added: 'in a different way, in Iranian [Aryan], that did not exist before,' which makes it most likely that the script is intended.[9] The Babylonian version stopped at the end of the preceding paragraph 69 (as did the original Elamite text: paragraph 70 in Elamite is a later addition) and offers therefore no help in the translation of this problematic passage. Most, however, now seem to agree that Darius referred to the script and had given orders to create a new type of writing for his own language.[10] Old-Persian script is different from Elamite and Babylonian cuneiform: it is halfway between a syllabic and an alphabetic script. Which script stood as model for the invention is still an unsolved problem, but the result is remarkably elegant and well fitted to serve ornamental purposes. Darius' first attempt at writing history in Iran was a majestic one.

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[5] Schmitt (1980). For an illustration of the relief, with bibliography, see Boardman (1988) 15–19.

[6] Seidl (1976); Greenfield and Porten (1982); see also Schmitt (1990).

[7] Cf. Schmitt (1980) 107 with a list of places where it is omitted.

[8] I have retained here Kent's restoration, since it is the most consulted edition of the old-Persian (= oP) inscriptions. Schmitt (1991) 73 proposed *dipiciçam*, meaning 'form of writing.'

[9] But cf. Lecoq (1997) 212, who translates *dipīmaiy* as 'texte.' This is consistent with the fact that in DB IV 91–2 the word *dipi-* is used for the item sent around to the peoples of the empire. There is no evidence whatsoever that old-Persian writing ever traveled in any other form but on seals. Its use is limited to Iran itself, unless one believes in the authenticity of the clay-tablet discovered in Gherla, Roumania. Cf. Lecoq (1997) 128; Briant (1996) 931.

[10] Schmitt (1990) 302.

The Behistun inscription is the longest text produced by a Persian king. It is unique not only for its length: it also is the only text in old-Persian that is usually understood as a historiographical text. In five columns Darius reported the events that took place in the first three years of his reign. The first four columns reported on what happened in the first turbulent year; column five told, much more succinctly, about two 'revolts' in Elam and Scythia in years two and three. The king explained how and why he had become king, and how much resistance he had encountered in the form of peoples revolting under the leadership of various pretenders. He quoted names of the pretenders, as well as those of the generals sent out to quench the resistance; he mentioned some of the places where important battles took place; he reported on the punishment meted out to the rebels; and in the Babylonian version (but not in the Elamite and oP texts) he listed the exact number of casualties fallen in the battles between his armies and the troops of the rebels. All these accomplishments he had been able to perform, so we are ensured repeatedly, through the benevolent attitude of Ahuramazda, who protected the king and blessed his kingship. We may be disinclined to believe that the great Iranian god was the cause of Darius' successes and rather regard Darius' political and military talents as the main reason for the restoration of peace and order after a year; but the inscription definitely looks like a historiographical account which gives causes, motives, events, names of people involved, places and times when and where things happened, as well as the final situation resulting from the one year of turmoil. Events are linked in a causal chain, which serves as an explanation. I am not concerned here with assessing whether or not Darius actually spoke the truth and whether things happened as he said they did. Probably not, is the most likely guess.[11] The truth very often is self-evident and does not need such a painstakingly elaborate device to be grafted on people's memory. It is likely that the verbal flux was meant more to conceal than to reveal.

It is an interesting question why this document remained such a unique specimen in the old-Persian corpus. Nowhere else was this 'historiographical attitude' reenacted in a text. The first four columns

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[11] For a recent discussion of the fictitiousness of Darius' claims to a relationship with the prior line of Cyrus and Cambyses, see Stronach (1997) 353f.

of DB are remarkably different from all later old-Persian royal inscriptions, including DB V, which probably was not only inscribed later than the first four columns (since it mentions royal performance in the two years following year one), but also existed only in old-Persian.

DB V is a very short account: six paragraphs and 36 lines were used for reporting on two victories in two years; the preceding four columns, each of over 90 lines, comprised 70 paragraphs in total. Although it is implied that the Elamite 'rebellion' took place in the second year and the Scythian one in the third year, the introductory sentence is the maximum in chronological precision the fifth column has to offer: 'this is what I did in both the second and the third year after I became king.' No days and months, such as are given for each 'rebellion' in the columns I–IV, were mentioned in column V. Nor was it explicitly said that the Elamite conflict took place in year two and the Scythian hostilities in year three: both might have taken place in one year. DB V mentioned the names of the two leaders of the 'rebellions,' Atamaita the Elamite and Skunkha the Scythian. It also named Gobryas as the Persian general who was sent out to crush the Elamite revolt and it reported that Darius himself led his troops beyond the sea against the Scythians and defeated the Scythians, but then remarked: 'another [leader] I took captive; this one was led bound to me, and I slew him. The chief of them, by name Skunkha—him they seized and led to me' (DB V 25–8). The first Scythian chief remained nameless,[12] as did the person whom Darius installed to replace Skunkha. The locations where the events took place were not mentioned. The statement, 'when I arrived at the sea, beyond it then with all my army I crossed' (DB V 23–4) is tantalizingly equivocal and has caused much discussion of whether this is the same expedition as that described by Herodotus in Book IV of the *Histories*.[13] The absence of toponyms, chronological references, and names of all but the chief participants makes column V look rather vague and unspecific.

This vagueness is, however, not due to some sort of oversight or

[12] Lecoq (1997) 214 translates here 'j'en capturai une partie; une autre, enchaînée, fut amenée devant moi et je les tuai. . . .'

[13] Currently most scholars seem convinced that there were two different expeditions, the one mentioned by Darius and the one described by Herodotus, which took place in 513; cf. Briant (1996) 931 for the main issues in the debate and the relevant references.

casualness of the scribes, but—as becomes clear from the evidence of all other royal inscriptions—must have been intentional. The entire corpus is not very large and contains primarily texts by Darius and Xerxes, a few in the names of Artaxerxes I and Darius II, with some more written by Artaxerxes II from Susa and Hamadan (= ancient Ecbatana). The larger part of the factual evidence contained therein—events, persons, locations—is limited to the lists of lands included in DNa, DPe (with an abbreviated version in DPh), and XPh. These lists record peoples or lands as conquered by the kings, who now obey his laws and pay tribute or taxes (*bāji-*).[14] Furthermore, in a text often called the 'Harem-inscription' (as it was discovered in a building thought by the excavators to have been the harem[15]), a brief comment was given on Xerxes' designation as crown-prince, without mentioning the names of other candidates, but simply stating, 'Other sons of Darius there were, [but]—thus unto Ahuramazda was the desire—Darius my father made me the greatest after himself' (XPf 28–32). Not even the name of Xerxes' mother was mentioned, who according to Herodotus (7.2–3) had been an important factor in the election of her son.

Another inscription by Xerxes (XPh; usually referred to as the 'Daiva-inscription') told about a rebellion somewhere, without an indication of the place that revolted. In the following paragraph 'worship of the *daivas*' and the king's disapproval of this cult, again without reference to the whereabouts of these condemned activities, was reported. The next paragraph summed up the preceding two: 'And there was other [business] that had been done ill; that I made good. That which I did, all I did by the favor of Ahuramazda. Ahuramazda bore me aid until I completed the work' (XPh 41–6). To a modern historian, the indefiniteness of the terminology is highly unsatisfactory and maddening. Xerxes was obviously rather pleased with himself, but for what reason? Where did the rebellion occur and which temples did he destroy?

Inscriptions from Susa by Darius documented contributions by

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[14] The groups listed are called *dahyāva*. This may mean either 'peoples' or 'countries' or both at the same time. For the meaning of *dahyu* or *dahyāva* see Cameron (1973); Lecoq (1990); Briant (1996) 1050.

[15] This interpretation was based on the number of small rooms in the building (Root [1979] 101; Briant [1996] 295; Brosius [1996] 31). It is now thought that the building served either as a treasury or a private palace.

various nations to the building of palaces: we are informed that for the construction of his *hadiš* Darius dug a hole for the foundations until he reached bare rock; that the depth of that hole varied between 40 and 20 cubits; that Babylonians constructed the palace with sun-dried bricks: timber was brought from afar, gold and lapis lazuli were transported to Susa by Lydians and Bactrians, etc. It is a panorama of artists available in the empire, but leaves unmentioned when exactly the palace was built, how long it took, what the expenditure had been, who had been the chief architect(s), and other issues which are of interest to us. In Egypt, Darius recorded the digging of a canal from the Nile to 'the sea which goes from Persia' (DZb 9–10), but again there is no clue as to when, by whom the work was done, and how much it had cost.

Most of the remaining texts consist of invocations of Ahuramazda, thankful statements concerning the divine blessing, and prayers that the god may protect the king and his Persian people. Except for DB I–IV all old-Persian inscriptions excel in what we would call 'vagueness.' None repeats the historiographical inclinations of DB I–IV.

Can the Inscriptions be Used as Historical Sources?

One of the most important questions in the study of the Achaemenid empire concerns the usefulness of the inscriptions for reconstructing chronology and events. The lists of lands as presented in the inscriptions of Darius and Xerxes form a good example. Are they merely a verbal display which illustrated the might of the kings, without reliable references to the historical situation in the empire, as has been argued?[16] Or should they be regarded as accurate reports of the state of affairs at a precise moment in time and therefore trustworthy documents concerning the political situation?[17] Did the temporary loss of a part of the empire, such as the Ionian revolt, affect the enumeration of countries the kings counted as theirs? Or were such trivialities ignored in the firm belief that order would at some moment in the future be restored? In at least one case, namely the

[16] Cameron (1975) 86; Sancisi-Weerdenburg (1980) 22ff.; Kuhrt (1995) 649; Briant (1996) 189.

[17] In this debate, Calmeyer argued in many articles in favor of the historical accuracy of the lists (e.g., Calmeyer [1982] with further references).

peoples portrayed on the tomb reliefs of Naqš-i Rustam and Persepolis, it is clear that both the number and the order of the nations did not change over the whole of the Achaemenid period and was therefore, apparently, unaffected by the political situation.[18] Other cases are less clear. It is not very helpful that inscriptions often cannot be dated with more precision than within the reign of the king in whose name they were drafted. The 'Daiva-inscription' is a good example. The only chronological indication in the text is Xerxes' remark: 'When I became king, there is among these countries which are inscribed above [one which] was in commotion' (XPh 29–32). This has been usually regarded as referring to the initial years of Xerxes' reign and, consequently, it has been thought that the lists of lands reflect the situation at or around the time of Xerxes' expedition to Greece. There is, however, no need to read the old-Persian as limiting the time to the years shortly after Xerxes' accession. Both verbs (*abavam* 'I became' and *ayauda* 'were in commotion') are used in the imperfect tense. Unfortunately, imperfect and aorist are used in oP without discrimination: both can refer to action still in progress or action already terminated.[19] Xerxes' statement may be read as: 'shortly after my accession' or as 'at some moment after I had become king, i.e., during my reign.' Furthermore, we have no guarantee that the inscriptions were carved in stone at more or less the same time when the text was drafted. On the contrary, there are clues that the physical production of the inscriptions took place rather late in Xerxes' reign.[20] To sum up: it is uncertain when the events referred to took place, it is unclear when the text was written, it is equally unknown when the decorative inscriptions were fabricated. Vagueness all over. The only way out of these problems is to connect the vague statements with precise indications from the Greek sources. This would be methodologically sound if the inscriptions are what they look like to us: historiography. But are they what they seem to be?

We are accustomed to texts documenting what happened and vague statements such as 'among these peoples there was [a place] where previously false gods (= *daivā*) were worshipped' (XPh 35–41),

[18] All reliefs on the tombs are illustrated in great detail in Schmidt (1970). See esp. figs. 39–52 for illustrations of each of the throne-bearers on every tomb.

[19] Kent (1953) 90; see also Kent (1953) 91: 'The perfect tense is virtually lacking in OP.'

[20] Sancisi-Weerdenburg (1980) 8ff.

only arouse our curiosity and are of little help in reconstructing the past. We want to know where, when, and why. The most debated text in this respect is precisely the 'Daiva-text' (XPh), since it seems to document a turn-around in religious policies not attested anywhere else. The old-Persian texts and non-Iranian evidence have been scrutinized for clues that could enlighten us on history kept in the dark by the opaque formulas. The result was disappointing: consensus could not even be reached on whether rebellion and daiva-worship happened at the same spot or whether two locations were intended. The Dahae, Babylon, Egypt, and Athens have all been candidates for one or both acts of disobedience,[21] although recently most seem convinced that the question should not be framed in these terms.[22] One should add that all data used to supplement Xerxes' vague statements come either from the Babylonian tradition, where precisely dated documents reflected political vicissitudes, or from Greek historiography, which organized the past that Greek states had in common with Persia.

The prevalent attitude in the modern literature, i.e., filling in what look to us like lacunae, or replacing unspecified statements by well-defined data, stems from our own expectations of what historiography should be. If a text tells about the past, we expect that it reports what happened in that past. Events to us are unique phenomena which occurred in precisely identifiable circumstances and with individual actors who performed or participated in the activities. When an author of a historiographical text chooses to coin abstract expressions, we tend to assume that the narrative is nevertheless based on factual material. Confronted with a text without 'facts'—and I use 'facts' as shorthand for the items listed above—our first inclination is to think that they are omitted, but—as we hope or expect—that they should be there, hidden behind sentences of an abstract nature.

The Shape of the Past

Historiography documents the past, orders it, and gives sense to it. Usually it answers the question: 'how did this come to happen?'

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[21] For an overview of the discussion, see Sancisi-Weerdenburg (1980) 6–8; Briant (1996) 991; Lecoq (1997) 104f.

[22] Briant (1986); (1996) 990; Kellens (1987).

Very often, in our views, some *historiē* or 'research,' in its original Herodotean meaning, should be included in this process. Historiography, despite all possible shortcomings of its actual outcome, has a claim to the truth. It deals with facts and is no fiction. It may share all sorts of techniques with fictional genres, but every author of historiographical prose should at least be committed to presenting results that are as truthful as possible. Shortcomings, unavoidable biases, and cultural and personal perceptions are the reason why, despite the sincere intentions and efforts of a given author, the writing of historiography is often blamed for being defective, and new propositions are made. The result is a competitive process in which various ways of ordering and understanding the past are confronted.

Historiography, however, is not the only or the most common way of remembering the past. Although we are so accustomed to the genre, it should not be forgotten that other cultures may cast their ideas about what happened in earlier times in different forms. Historiography, as described here, was born in Greece in the fifth century and was a product of very specific circumstances. Two of these circumstances are worthwhile mentioning: first, the availability of alphabetic writing in fifth-century Greece made it possible for larger groups than scribes in the service of a king to collect and compare data and to participate in a discussion. Second, the unforseeable outcome of the war with Persia had prompted questions about Greek identity and the reason for the Persian defeat. Every answer to those questions should by necessity lead to opinions and debate, for which sheer facts were insufficient.[23]

Yet the precise recording of historical events and its preservation in writing had, by this time, already known a long tradition. In Mesopotamia and in Egypt the activities of kings had been carefully committed to cuneiform. This documentation could be used for further reworking: older chronicles were recycled into new historical documents with a new purpose.[24] This re-use, however, did not affect the type of order imposed on the new document: the framework was still the chronological one, derived from the source, not a causal

[23] A comparable form of writing about history originated, possibly at the same time or even earlier, in Israel: Momigliano (1977).

[24] For an overview of the Babylonian sources for the Persian period, see Kuhrt (1990).

relationship based on selection of evidence and an argumentation for its relevance. It was limited to documentation of the past: one step towards giving sense and meaning to the past, but still not the same.

Another way of remembering the past, found in very many cultures, is the oral narrative tradition.[25] Memorable actions and famous exploits of earlier generations are told and retold. All possible suspicions about the historical accuracy of these tales are not at issue here. What matters is that participants, narrator and audience, believe them to be true tales about earlier times. These tales usually aim at understanding both past and present: if one behaves in such a way, this is what happens and thus the outcome. Examples of actions of heroes may make one think about the conduct of one's own life and may help to draw a mental map of the present world. Whether or not these tales are historically accurate was probably an irrelevant question to the community involved, which lacked all possible means of checking except for, incidentally, comparing some recently heard stories. The question whether oral traditions should be regarded as fiction or 'faction' is our problem, and should not be translated into the attitude of audiences who listened to these tales about the past. To them, they were 'true' if only because no other 'truth' was available.

There may well be scores of ways to deal with the past and to construct a history, but the two briefly outlined thus far are the ones needed to understand how the Achaemenid kings grappled with the problem of history, when in the middle of the sixth century they entered the historical scene and surfaced in the culture and traditions of Mesopotamia.

Earlier Models

The first historical document produced by a Persian king, or at least written on his orders, is the famous Cyrus-cylinder. Cyrus tells in the first person how he has been able to conquer Babylon, after a long introduction in which is outlined how the previous Babylonian king, Nabonidus, sinned in the eyes of Marduk and the god there-

[25] Oral mnemonic traditions would attempt to do the same things as the annalistic Mesopotamian historical tradition that I have sketched above.

fore 'sought a just ruler to suit his heart.'[26] The text is, of course, a victor's report. Babylon and the gods were pleased with this new ruler and therefore he had peacefully entered the city.[27] The gods would, of course, not argue with this version, but there are legitimate doubts about whether all Babylonians equally agreed with the viewpoint of the new ruler.[28] Royal history has by definition a myopic vision. Interestingly, we catch a glimpse of some serious research that apparently preceded the drafting of the text. In a fragment preserved in Yale, a reference is made to the discovery of a text of Ashurbanipal, whose example in behavior towards Babylonian cults and practices Cyrus was apparently following.[29] In Egypt, Cambyses behaved in much the same way: his policy consisted of 'forging links with local elites, installing them in honoured (though not politically powerful) positions, exploiting their familiarity with local conditions in order to make acceptance of his rule as palatable as possible and moulding himself to fit the role an Egyptian king was traditionally expected to fill—honouring the gods, authorising continued offerings, maintaining their sanctuaries in purity, adopting ceremonial Egyptian titles and names.'[30] In Babylon and Egypt, Cyrus and Cambyses could take over local traditions and adapt them to their own purposes. In Persia itself, however, there existed no such written tradition ready to use, especially not if the kings were to talk in their own language.

It has been much discussed whether the old-Persian script was following an earlier type of writing and therefore continuing older scribal traditions.[31] Thus far, no trace of writing has been found in the Median context and the idea that the old-Persian script was created under Darius seems by now generally accepted. Before Behistun, Iranian traditions about the past were cast in oral shape. The only evidence we have for the existence and the contents of this oral (non-religious) tradition comes from the Greek sources. Strabo (15.3.18)

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[26] Trans. Kuhrt (1995) 601.

[27] In reality, the take-over by the Persians was the outcome of bloody battles; see Kuhrt (1987) 48.

[28] Cf. Kuhrt (1995) 602, 659.

[29] Kuhrt (1987) 49–50 with bibliography.

[30] Kuhrt (1995) 663. The unfavorable reputation of Cambyses in the Greek sources seems to be contradicted by most of the Egyptian evidence and has therefore been disregarded by many Egyptologists, although Depuydt (1995) has recently argued that there might be some truth in it.

[31] This view was argued most eloquently by Diakonoff (1970).

mentioned the education of young Persians through tales of 'the famous deeds of men and gods' and emphasized that the young people had to learn these tales by heart. The description given by Strabo makes it obvious that these stories were taught with educational aims. The past was an instructive device for present purposes.

When there was a need to write down Darius' conquest of the throne and his crushing of the successive revolts, there were no examples available other than Mesopotamian models.[32] That much seems rather obvious, but still does not enlighten us on how precisely the prehistory of the DB text was articulated. It is, for instance, unclear and a subject of debate which version of the text was the first one, or the prototype. It would be natural to assume that the Elamite and the Akkadian texts are translations of an original in old-Persian.[33] If indeed a text in oP was the original, it can have existed only in an oral form, even though some still believe in the existence of written oP before Darius. But the carving history of the inscription brings a decisive argument. Analysis of the sequence of work on the rock by German archaeologists has revealed that the old-Persian text was added after the Elamite and the Babylonian texts had already been completed. In fact, the original Elamite text was removed to make room for the old-Persian text. If written oP was available at the moment the monument was planned, it is absolutely inexplicable why the oP version was the last one to be carved on the cliff face. It seems, however, rather natural to assume that a text in which Darius features so prominently as the speaker was first formulated in his own language. The translation by Hinz and Borger, therefore, which takes into account all versions, uses, quite in line with this assumption, the old-Persian as the basic text and lists deviations from it.[34]

The idea that the original text was spoken or dictated by Darius fits well with some features of the text. Almost each paragraph begins with 'Says Darius the king . . .,' and it is not hard to imagine a procedure where the scribes duly wrote down the royal words.[35] The

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[32] Lecoq (1997) 95.

[33] Dandamaev (1976) 78ff. and Wiesehöfer (1979) 38ff. argued that Aramaic and Elamite originated at the same time and were the written renderings of a dictated old-Persian text.

[34] *TUAT* I. 419–50.

[35] Schmitt (1990) 300–1: 'the words were dictated by the king in old-Persian for translation into Elamite by bilingual Elamite scribes in the royal chancellery, where the text was to be preserved as the model for all later versions.'

format of the administrative tablets from Persepolis demonstrates that it is perfectly possible to write down in Elamite messages that were delivered in old-Persian.[36] Some characteristics of the text, as well as the logical but unproved assumption that this important text should come ultimately from the king himself, seem to lead to the conclusion that there existed an oral and old-Persian prototype.

There are, however, remarkably few other characteristics in the text of DB I–IV that point to an oral original, except for the repetition of the clauses 'Says Darius the king...' at the beginning of every section and the prayers which interlace the historiographical episodes. The accurate mentioning of dates and numbers is definitely not typical of oral texts. It is difficult to imagine how Darius could dictate the series of successive battles and victories without consulting written records. Even if Darius himself could read—and there is little reason to think so[37]—there still is very little that points to the existence of such documents. In 1989 Herrenschmidt argued that the first draft of DB was based on Royal Annals (such as the *basilikai diphtherai* mentioned by Ctesias *apud* Diod. Sic. 2.32.4). Despite Ctesias' firm statement, no trace of such Annals in an Iranian context has been found and it is highly doubtful whether they ever existed.[38] Herrenschmidt is right, however, in noticing written features in the text, which are much more prominent than some apparently oral ones.[39] In most respects, it quite resembles a document carefully prepared in the chancellery. If Darius himself had dictated the text, he probably would not have given precise dates, let alone numbers of casualties. He would have had to rely for those matters on his scribes. If, in the administrative offices of the court, they were

[36] Lewis (1994).

[37] Cf. DB IV 70: 'And it was inscribed and was read off before me' (trans. Kent).

[38] Cf. Briant (1982) 497; Sancisi-Weerdenburg (1987) 38–9. Discussions of the existence of such documents has so far concentrated on the Iranian court surroundings. What has been overlooked is the fact that Ctesias may here have meant Babylonian documents. On the whole, the integration of Iranian traditions, royal customs, and Babylonian expertise is a neglected field of study. When Greek writers talk about the Persian empire, they often refer to the empire of their own time, which had been interacting for more than a century with the cultural attainments of Mesopotamia in general and Babylonia in particular. This field merits serious attention. See Sancisi-Weerdenburg (1994a) for Babylonia as a possible source for Herodotus' *Medikos logos*.

[39] As 'oral' features may count the introductory clauses of paragraphs, the prayers, but possibly also some verdicts on rebels; cf. Brandenstein and Mayrhofer (1964) 25f.; Sancisi-Weerdenburg (1980) 108.

on a regular basis keeping the sort of documents that contained such information (such as Ctesias' *basilikai diphtherai*), it is legitimate to wonder why it is that any trace of them is lacking for later periods. If the royal deeds were written down year by year in chronicles, why then were they not used for the drafting of DB V or for XPh or XPf? How can we explain that a document was used only for the reporting of the first year and never later? What type of document are we looking for?

Another preliminary remark should be made. It is usually, but without much argument, assumed that the text of DB was drafted for the inscription and that the text was produced exclusively to be carved on the rock. A distinction, however, should be made between the text and the inscription. The text might well have been originally drafted to serve another purpose. Once in existence, it may have seemed an attractive idea to transfer this huge conglomerate of words to the rock-cliff in order to make the stone speak. In that case its carving represented some sort of secondary use. I will argue that this probably was the case. First, however, I want to make a few remarks on the conspicuous differences between DB I–IV and V.

In comparison with the preceding columns, the fifth column is remarkably different: not only are dates and places lacking, as noted earlier, but the process of rebellion itself is cast in another vocabulary. The rebel in Elam is not presented as an usurper, pretending to be somebody else than he really is or to be connected to a previous royal dynasty, but he is presented as being 'made chief' (*maθištam*) by his people (DB V 6). He is not denounced as a 'liar-follower' who has made *himself* chief, like most pretenders in the preceding four columns.[40] The Elamite rebellion in the second year is defined as *hamiçiyā* or 'fiendish' (DB V 5), the regular word for rebellions in the first year, and as 'faithless' or 'evil' (*arīkā*, DB V 15). *Arīka* is very rare in the first four columns: it is used only for the state of the people at the time of Cambyses' departure for Egypt and the uprising of Gaumata (DB I 33).[41] DPf, an inscription that exists only

[40] The Margian rebel, Frada, is also the only one in the final list of the rebellions (DB IV 2–31) who is not an impostor: he does not give a false name or identity, but—according to Darius—simply said 'I am king in Margiana.' The Sagartian rebel does not give a name either but emphasizes that he is 'of the family of Cyaxares.'

[41] It occurs twice elsewhere, in general statements about how subjects should behave (DB I 22), and on the qualities which make the king fit to be king (IV 63).

in Elamite, demonstrates that *arīka* was a typical Iranian word for which probably no good equivalent existed in Elamite: in DPf, oP *arīka* is transliterated in the Elamite text.[42] What *arīka*, being 'unfaithful' or 'evil,' implied is explained in the same sentence: 'by them Ahuramazda was not worshipped' (DB V 15–16).

The Scythian campaign is summarized in precisely the same terms as the Elamite revolt and described thus: 'these Scythians went from me' (DB V 23). The Elamite chief and the Scythian leader are not called lie-followers, nor is it said that they had been lying. The verb 'to lie' (*duruj-*) is very prominent in the first four columns. Following the lie, being *draujana-*, is heavily condemned in DB IV 36–40: 'Thou who shalt be king hereafter, protect thyself vigorously from the Lie (*drauga*); the man who shall be a Lie-follower, him do thou punish well, if thus thou shalt think, "May my country be secure!"' Iconographically, however, there is no difference between the rebels of the first four columns and Skunkha. On the Behistun-relief he is just one of the nine rebels standing before Darius. We may therefore safely assume that his activities were not regarded as much different from those of the 'liar-followers.' Only the vocabulary used to describe the conflicts is different.

What went on between the carving of DB I–IV and the drafting of DB V? It may be safely assumed that the Elamite rebellion was not very different from what happened in the other countries. But why was Atamaita mentioned as being made chief by the Elamites and why were the other rebellions (Margiana excluded) ascribed to a single instigator, a 'liar-follower'?

Although the Scythian campaign was of a different character—the description in DB V 21–4 makes it very probable that Darius' expedition was directed against new and unconquered territories, and not against the Saka (Scythians) who were given as subjects in the list of lands in DB I 12–17—the terms of the description are not. The two paragraphs concluding the description of the two wars, one inside the empire and one probably beyond its borders, are, however, exactly the same, and it is specified of both peoples that they were 'faithless and by them Ahuramazda was not worshipped' (DB V 14–17, 30–3). This might sound as if a cult of Ahuramazda had

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Lecoq (1997) 189 translates the word as 'félon': he who breaches an agreement. Schmitt (1991) 50 mentions a Vedic parallel *ālīka-*, 'unfaithful, disloyal.'

[42] Lecoq (1997) 229.

been imposed throughout the empire. In none of the lands of the empire, however, have we found traces of a compulsory cult for the chief Persian god, not at the time of Darius, nor in the successive reigns of Persian kings. The difference in terminology and style cannot be ascribed to changing circumstances, but must be due to other factors which influenced the conceptualization of reporting on the state of the empire.

As I have argued elsewhere, DB V lies somewhere halfway between DB I–IV and later royal inscriptions. How did this development occur?

Increasing Iranian Influence

One explanation seems, at least partly, to fit this change of tone and style. It may well be caused by increased adoption of an Iranian vocabulary and concepts.[43] As I mentioned earlier, DB V exists only in old-Persian. Lack of space on the rock might explain the absence of versions in Elamite or Akkadian, but it is equally possible that the draft of the text caused problems to the scribes who had to make a translation. It cannot be a coincidence that the Elamite version of XPh (which was translated into Babylonian and Elamite) is the Elamite text with the largest number of old-Persian loan-words.[44] The available Elamite vocabulary was apparently not adequate to express what the king had to say in Persian.

It is usually assumed that the inscribing of DB V took place immediately after the events, i.e., in the fourth regnal year of Darius.[45] That is hardly a necessary conclusion. More time may have elapsed between the writing of the first four columns and the carving of the last one. Only if careful records about campaigns, battles, enemies, and casualties, such as those hypothesized by Clarisse Herrenschmidt,

[43] See Sancisi-Weerdenburg (1980) 35 and Kellens (1987) 682.

[44] Cameron (1954–9) 471 mentions 20 occurrences of transliterated old-Persian words in barely 50 lines of text.

[45] The main reason for this dating is the assumption that the revolt of Intaphernes, mentioned at Herodotus 3.118, had not yet taken place at the time the work on the inscription was completed. Otherwise, his name would probably have been removed. It should, however, be emphasized that Herodotus does not mention a date, although *autika* implies a reasonably short interval. Nor do we have evidence for the practice of removing names. The only possible conclusion is that work at Behistun cannot be firmly dated.

were produced at court, would the documentation be readily available for drafting a text on the years following year one. The vagueness of column V is, as we have seen, an argument against the existence of such records. Column V in fact creates the impression that the king felt that he should continue the practice of the first year, but at the same time either did not have adequate documentation to insert into the text, or thought he had to cast events in his own terminology, which after all had been made possible by the creation of the old-Persian script. Typologically, DB V as a text can be assigned a place halfway between the adherence to Mesopotamian models of DB I–IV and the application of new and Iranian principles that we find in XPh.

The Model for DB I–IV

Earlier I noted that the question whether indeed the text was drafted to be used exclusively for the inscription is hardly ever raised. The hypothesis that this text was written for some other purpose and was then used to surround the relief (definitely the earliest part of the monument) merits some consideration. It is probably significant here that one of the most characteristic formulas of the old-Persian inscriptions, the beginning of each clause with the statement 'Says X the king . . .,' is a practice known also from Urartian inscriptions and was already regarded by Herzfeld as the example used by the Achaemenid kings.[46] Wilhelm has convincingly argued that this stylistic feature of Urartian inscriptions imitates a typical Assyrian letter-format.[47] This characteristic may give us a clue. It is in the range of royal letters that I would like to look for the document used to compose the text of DB I–IV. Is it possible that a letter written to be sent out over the empire was the prototype for the rock text as we have it now?

The king sending a letter is equal to the king speaking at a distance, as Lewis convincingly demonstrated.[48] Letters were meant to be read aloud, as we learn from the story of Oroites in Herodotus

[46] Herzfeld (1930) 121–2; cf. Seidl (1994) 113.

[47] Wilhelm (1986). Cf. Seidl (1994) 114 for another important feature: Urartian royal inscriptions summarize what was reported with the formula, 'this is what I performed in one and the same year. . . .'

[48] Lewis (1994) 17f.

(3.126–8). We know, not only from DB IV 70, but also from (fragments of) copies discovered in Elephantine and Babylon, that the Behistun inscription was indeed sent out as a letter. It notified people throughout the empire by means of a list of specific examples that Darius had been able to suppress all opposition against him. The implicit message is: 'if so many have tried with no success, you or any other had better keep quiet and do as the king says.'

Aramaic was often used in the Achaemenid empire for the writing of letters. The argument that the original version was in Aramaic[49] makes it even more likely that the scribal document which must be the basis of the *res gestae* of Darius' first year was not the annalistic recording of the king's performances, but a royal communication to the empire to alert the subjects that Darius was the king and had gained full mastery over his realm.[50] This document in Aramaic was translated into Babylonian.[51] The letter was then translated into Elamite[52] in order to be inscribed on the cliff face of Behistun where the relief was already carved. The relief followed practices of earlier Elamite kings, who were accustomed also to add shorter statements to their iconography. Darius must have been charmed by the idea that he now had the power to make a whole rock speak of his great military victories.

Only when the Persian script was ready, was the Persian text inscribed on the rock. According to Luschey, this happened after the Scythian expedition mentioned in DB V: research into the composition of the relief and the short inscriptions which identify the rebels has brought him to the conclusion that the adding of Skunkha to the relief, the inscription of the Babylonian text, the new Elamite

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[49] Borger (1982) 130.

[50] Such a sequence of events seems to be contradicted by Darius' mentioning (DB IV 70) that his message was sent around to the peoples *after* he had made an inscription (or a translation: cf. Lecoq [1997] 212) in old-Persian. However, *pasava* ('afterwards') often indicates a very weak chronological connection: cf. Borger (1982) 113 nn. 14–15.

[51] Borger (1982) 106 bases this conclusion on the fact that only the Aramaic version mentions a nineteenth battle, therefore giving a correct total for the battles. All other versions list eighteen battles, but state that there were nineteen. This argument seems to me conclusive.

[52] It seems illogical to assume that in a translation from Elamite into Babylonian the numbers of victims of Darius' victories were added 'out of the blue.' It is more likely that they were omitted in a translation from Aramaic into Elamite. If they were added from a document, then that document is precisely what we are looking for.

text,[53] and the carving of old-Persian I–V all took place at the same time.[54] Schmitt, however, thinks that the Persian text was produced in two phases: DB V in the same phase as the new Elamite text and after the stages in which 1) the old-Persian DB I–IV was inscribed and 2) the figure of Skunkha was carved.[55]

The most likely explanation for the absence of Elamite and Babylonian versions of DB V seems to be that no document was available any longer. If the main purpose of the original document had been to assure people that peace and order was restored, no such letter was needed in the following years. In fact, it might even have looked slightly odd to notify the whole empire of two isolated victories, which by their uniqueness hardly had exemplary value. These victories made sense only when added to the previous ones, as on the cliff of Behistun. An old-Persian text could, of course, always be translated (or written down) into Elamite, as happened on later occasions. Darius may have felt no need to do so in this case, since he could now speak to eternity in his own tongue. Or the scribes may have thought it odd to produce a document that deviated so much from their regular practices.

The absence of written documents of the king's *faits et gestes* explains partially, but not completely, the 'vagueness' of the inscriptions later than DB V. It seems likely that other factors have played a role as well. As now seems clear, no written tradition existed in Iran, apart from the old Elamite scribal practices that the Achaemenids took over. This must have created an acute conflict between the practices of the existing oral tradition and the new royal habit of eternalizing memories in writing. An oral past is a flexible one which can be adapted at any moment to the needs of the present. It can be explained and paraphrased and the applicability of past events to current circumstances can be spelled out. A past in writing is frozen in time. Its relevance to a later spectator may not be immediately clear. In an oral tradition one person can be substituted for another one performing the same activity (or acting in the same traditional narrative pattern); in a written text, individuals are preserved for ever. How would one know that Atamaita's revolt was not to be

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[53] The old one was partially destroyed by adding Skunkha to the relief: cf. Schmitt (1990).

[54] Luschey (1968) 92.

[55] Schmitt (1990) 301.

imitated if the reader/listener was not named Atamaita and did not live in Elam? Elimination of specific details solved that problem. 'There was one among these countries...' says Xerxes in XPh. There is no need to look for a location: each and any of the countries could be addressed. It should be a concern of all. This Iranian style of dealing with history has nothing to do with documenting the past: that is completely irrelevant. The royal concern is with the present and the future.

This 'timeless attitude' entirely agrees with the iconography of the Persepolis reliefs. Although the iconography looked for inspiration to the Assyrian reliefs (as well as to visual expressions of other near eastern traditions), a comparison between the subject material of Assyrian and Persian reliefs is revealing. Any specific activity is totally absent in Persepolis and elsewhere.[56] No conquered cities, no royal victories, only activities of a ritual type, which by their very nature are repetitive. History, i.e., events, is nowhere recorded but at Behistun, which—along with the accompanying text—is the exception. It should be added that it is highly unlikely even that specific kings were portrayed. All kings on the reliefs look alike and, as has now been demonstrated, are not even distinguishable by individual crowns.[57] The royal figures on the reliefs should not be regarded as either Darius or Xerxes, but merely as 'the king.' All historical references are lacking: the empire on the reliefs and in the cuneiform texts is timeless. This has important consequences for the use we make of Persian texts and images.

[56] Briant (1996) 219.

[57] Henkelman (1995–6) 291 demonstrated that the Persian kings did not wear a distinctive crown, as argued by von Gall (1974).

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HISTORY, HISTORIOGRAPHY, AND THE USE OF THE PAST IN THE HEBREW BIBLE

Thomas M. Bolin

In his lecture, 'The Three Methods of Writing History,' G.W.F. Hegel distinguishes between: 1) 'original history,' which is written by eyewitnesses and eschews the use of myth or folklore; 2) four subtypes of 'reflective history,' i.e., universal, pragmatic (history as pedagogical), critical (the history of historiography), and fragmentary (the history of concepts); 3) the philosophy of history, i.e., the formulation of philosophical thought from historical data.[1] The following analysis of Israelite historiography touches upon each of these categories. It begins with a necessary but by no means comprehensive résumé of scholarship on Israelite historiography. This functions as a prolegomenon to an examination of biblical texts, which will support the contention that the genre designation 'historiography' is inapplicable to the Hebrew Bible (HB), a document which instead represents an example of antiquarian writing.

Israelite Historiography: The Dominant View

Since the rise of modern scholarship, the Israelites have been designated the inventors of history writing by scholars both of the Bible and of history in general, some of whom contrast biblical historiography with the 'poor and thin records of the great empires of the East,' or emphasize its 'distinctive and superior character.'[2] This stress on difference in quality is also expressed as a difference in kind, which anoints biblical historiography with a uniqueness born from its alleged moral and theological superiority to the other cultures of antiquity. Gerhard von Rad typifies this kind of approach in his contention that the Israelites were predisposed to be the first writers of

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[1] Hegel (1953) 3-10.
[2] Shotwell (1939) 1. 107; Maisler (1952) 82.

history because of their 'unique conception of history . . . outstanding talent for narration,' and 'unique religious conceptions' based upon 'the conception of God as active in all things.'[3] This perceived, intimate relationship between Israelite historiography and theology blossomed in the 1950s in what has come to be known as the Biblical Theology Movement, which dominated both exegesis and archaeology in the English-speaking world for a generation.[4] Scholars of this school maintained that the Israelites possessed a unique historical outlook founded upon the belief that their god had intervened in history through a series of mighty acts recounted in the biblical text. From these encounters with their god, the Israelites were vouchsafed a historically based religion[5] and a linear conception of time in contrast to the mythological, cyclic views of their ancient near eastern neighbors. This understanding is illustrated in the remark of Brevard Childs:

> Israel developed a sense of history because of its understanding of Yahweh's relation to the world which broke the primitive pattern. God controls the external world through the dimension of the historical . . . [T]his concept of the significance of the historical event has no parallels in primitive societies.[6]

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[3] Von Rad (1966) 170–1. See also the remarks of Maisler (1952) 82: 'There is certainly nothing like it in the ancient Near Eastern literatures when it comes to the dramatizing of important events in the life of the people, and it has no peer for concise and persuasive expression, for the presentation of a clear picture of historical evolution, and for the evaluation of those personalities who have appeared on the stage of history'; Shotwell (1939) 1.108: 'Judged in the light of its own time, the literature of the Jews is unique in scope as in power'; and E. A. Speiser, who maintains that the HB is 'both a primary and a unique source on the subject of the idea of history' and is 'meant to be history of a very special kind' ([1957] 207).

[4] Among the representative works of this movement are Albright (1940) and (1968); Wright (1952); Cross (1973); and the work of B. Childs discussed below. Substantive critiques of it can be found in Barr (1963) and Lemke (1982). After espousing the goals and methods of the BTM, Childs later disavowed it (1970).

[5] It was claimed that the Israelites understood history only as sacred history, or *Heilsgeschichte*, i.e., the history of Yahweh's mighty deeds. This is first put forward by J. Cocceius (d. 1669), as cited in Hayes and Prussner (1985) 22–3. Modern scholarly use of this concept is typified by the work of Martin Noth, who argues that parts of the HB are intended by their authors to be understood as 'a "history of salvation," that is, the narration of concrete divine action in history . . . and which employs Israel as the instrument of that saving action' ([1981] 237).

[6] (1962) 29–30. Elsewhere in the book Childs refers to 'the redemptive action of God's entrance into history' (59) and categorically states that the 'Old Testament actualization of tradition cannot be identified with a mythical concept' (82).

Childs's conception of the 'unique' Israelite notion of history claims that it enabled the individual who remembered past mighty divine acts to make them real again, and leads Childs to attribute to the ancient Hebrews a subtlety of thought more appropriate to the existentialism of Heidegger and the hermeneutics of Ricoeur and Gadamer: 'The act of remembering serves to actualize the past for a generation removed in time from those former events in order that they themselves can have an intimate encounter with the great acts of redemption. Remembrance equals participation.'[7] This amazing power on the part of the Israelites in effect grants them faculties comparable to that of the Witch of Endor, whose summoning of the dead Samuel up from Sheol is the closest the HB ever comes to the idea of remembrance as actualization understood by Childs. Yet it is not only the collective Israelite memory that is unique; Childs also stresses the special character of the events narrated in the HB themselves. They 'possess a power which continues to meet Israel in her struggle.'[8] How exactly this is accomplished is unclear but, as Thomas L. Thompson points out in his critique of this approach, what it amounts to is 'a theory or philosophy of history, making of biblical historiography not so much a genre as a frame of mind.'[9]

The underlying methodological flaw of this standard view of Israelite historiography lies in its contention that the biblical account is unique in its historical outlook. The observations of Jonathan Z. Smith concerning the so-called uniqueness of early Christianity in relation to Greco-Roman religions are, *mutatis mutandis*, apt here. Smith points out that the claim of uniqueness renders impossible both comparison and, ultimately, any knowledge at all about the thing in question. What appears on the surface to be an historical enterprise has, with the appeal to uniqueness, become a philosophical one: '"Unique" becomes an ontological rather than a taxonomic category; an assertion of radical difference so absolute that it becomes "Wholly Other," and the act of comparison is perceived as both an impossibility and an impiety.'[10] That this shift from history to philosophy is at work

[7] Childs (1962) 56.

[8] Childs (1962) 63.

[9] Thompson (1992a) 3. 207. Another illustration of this blending of history and philosophy is Speiser's remark that Israelite historiography is, in fact, 'historiosophy' ([1957] 202).

[10] Smith (1990) 38. This is also J. J. M. Roberts's critique of HB scholarship whose 'definition confuses a *literary* category (historiography)... with a particular,

in many of the standard works on Israelite historiography is apparent from their repeated characterizations of the biblical material as both unique and superior to any contemporaneous literatures. This bias is due to the fact that the Bible is seen as sacred and normative by the majority of the scholars who study it. In this respect Giovanni Garbini aptly notes:

> It is the confusion of the 'sacred' character of the biblical account (a sacrality which is typologically identical to that of the 'sacred' histories all over the world . . .) with a supposed 'sacrality' of the Hebrew people which has led so many theologians to fantasize over characteristics claimed to be peculiar to Israel, at the very moment when they have been claiming to make 'secular' a history which was thought of and written as 'sacred.'[11]

Historiography and Historicity

This scholary bias concerning the status of the Bible as a sacred text takes concrete form in the many claims and arguments made to support its historical veracity. Throughout its existence, the Bible has been understood to be, among other things, historiography. However, rather than as a genre designation with specific conventions, the term 'historiography' is used in this context to mean that the HB is an accurate portrayal of past events. This claim is necessary given that, for many biblical scholars past and present, the biblical text's validity as a sacred text is bound to the issue of its historicity. Challenging this idea in his influential nineteenth-century work, Julius Wellhausen claimed that the ideological tendentiousness of the HB made it historically unreliable because of the 'uniform stamp impressed on the tradition by men who regarded history exclusively from the point of view of their own principles.'[12] He maintained that the texts yielded

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though not self-evident, *philosophical* concept of history' ([1976] 3). Sustained critique of the alleged uniqueness of the HB vis-à-vis its ancient near eastern neighbors is found in Albrektson (1967).

[11] Garbini (1988) 14; see also his critique (171) of the mythical-cyclic/historical-linear dichotomy. Flawed as it is, however, this understanding of biblical historiography is still widely held, as is witnessed by the recent collection edited by Millard et al. (1994). For discussion of the contemporary ideological assumptions underlying biblical scholarship, see Handy (1991) and Whitelam (1996).

[12] Wellhausen (1885) 293. Wellhausen's famous dictum (318–19) concerning the patriarchal narratives conveys his understanding of Israelite historiography: 'We

historical information only about the time of their composition and the situations of their authors, and nothing about the periods the texts purported to describe. In response to Wellhausen's skepticism concerning the pre-history of biblical texts, Hermann Gunkel, drawing upon the classification of folk-tales by the Grimm brothers, argued for a recoverable oral prehistory to the biblical texts which revealed the social world from which individual stories or tales arose. Gunkel distinguished between tales (*Sagen*) which were originally oral and ahistorical, and history (*Geschichte*) which was written and factual.[13] Just as the tales revealed the social setting (*Sitz im Leben*) of their origins, i.e., the ancient Israelite storyteller, so too did history reveal its original social setting, which for Gunkel necessarily possessed a high degree of civilization and political organization.[14] Later scholars modified Gunkel's emphasis on a recoverable oral background and his identification of *Sitzen im Leben* by claiming that historical texts had an oral (and, in some instances, written) prehistory that rooted them to the events they purported to relate, even though these putative events were centuries removed from the texts themselves. This understanding constituted a direct challenge to Wellhausen's judgment concerning the historical value of the HB. Although Gunkel had no qualms about stressing the folkloristic nature of certain biblical texts, his methods and insights were used by later scholars in an attempt to demonstrate that those same texts were historical. Two prime examples of this kind of approach are the work of Gerhard von Rad and Martin Noth.

In his programmatic 1944 essay, von Rad operates from a very broad understanding of historiography that encompasses a wide range of sub-genres, in particular that of aetiology, a story type often categorized under the larger heading of folklore. While maintaining Gunkel's distinction between *Sage* and *Geschichte*, von Rad claims that the former, while not historiography, still are historical, i.e., they go back to actual events.[15] Historiography presupposes political organization and a high level of cultural development which, according

attain to no historical knowledge of the patriarchs, but only of the time when the stories about them arose in the Israelite people.'

[13] Gunkel (1994) 2; Gunkel (1927) 2. 112–15. He calls those who mistake *Sage* for *Geschichte* 'pious barbarians' ([1994] 7).

[14] Gunkel (1994) 1–2.

[15] Von Rad (1966) 168–9, 171–6.

to von Rad, occur in Israel for the first time during the reign of Solomon. The narratives in 2 Samuel–1 Kings dealing with the reigns of David and Solomon are the 'oldest specimen of ancient Israelite historical writing', which von Rad categorizes as 'secular' history, i.e., devoid of miraculous elements.[16] Solomon's massive building projects and opulent lifestyle portrayed in the Bible led von Rad to assume during this period a high cultural level and the existence of a learned leisure class possessing the intellectual freedom to write 'secular' history. He designates this as 'a period of "enlightenment,"' the result of 'the chill wind of an emancipated spirituality, modernized and freed from the cultus.'[17] Further study has revealed von Rad's Solomonic enlightenment to be a chimera based on a circular argument. He assumed *a priori* the historicity of the narratives of David and Solomon and then used them to construct the *Sitz im Leben* of their origins, which in turn supported their historical veracity. Recent archaeological investigation has shown that Iron Age Palestine (the putative time of David and Solomon) possessed nothing near the requisite amount of cultural development, social organization, and political centralization required for the writing of texts such as 1–2 Samuel, 1–2 Kings, and parts of the Pentateuch.[18]

Martin Noth's enduring contribution to the issue is a 1943 study in which he argued that Deuteronomy–2 Kings comprised a single historiographic work (the 'Deuteronomistic History,' or DtrH) that recounted the history of Israel from the conquest to the fall of

[16] Von Rad (1966) 176, 201–3. This follows Gunkel, for whom the story of Absalom's revolt is 'the most precious jewel of history writing in Israel' because it 'happens in just the way we are accustomed' ([1994] 6–7). Many biblical scholars are in agreement in designating the 'Succession Narrative' or 'Court History' of David and Solomon the apogee of Israelite historiography. Otto Eissfeldt (1965) 276 refers to 'these family and court stories of David, which have rightly been praised as a masterpiece, or even as *the* masterpiece of Israelite historical writing.' Even Wellhausen, whose skepticism concerning the historical nature of the HB is mentioned above, acknowledges that 2 Samuel–1 Kings lies in 'much closer relation to the facts' than other biblical texts ([1885] 277). This opinion obtains also among scholars of history in general. H. E. Barnes (1962) 22 characterizes the David-Solomon narrative as 'far and away the outstanding example' of Israelite historiography. Shotwell concurs, adding the description that it is 'something that will rank with the best the world can offer' ([1939] 1.128).

[17] Von Rad (1966) 203–4; the German term is *Aufklärung*.

[18] See Jamieson-Drake (1991). The same argument from a literary standpoint is advanced by Schmid (1976).

Jerusalem in the light of the theology of the book of Deuteronomy.[19] Noth's argument, based on an adaptation of Gunkel's method of determining oral sources, analyzed and claimed to reconstruct the history of traditions found in Deuteronomy–2 Kings. In a departure from Gunkel, Noth also postulated certain written sources for DtrH: royal lists, annals, and records. He based his conclusions on 1) a perceived similarity in vocabulary and ideology at certain junctures of the text; 2) his own reconstructions of an elaborate textual pre-history; 3) an arbitrary emendation of the existing text, classifying some sections, phrases, and words as glosses.[20] Given that Noth's methods and conclusions were based upon speculation devoid of any outside control, any of his theses must be viewed with extreme skepticism. Among particular weaknesses in Noth's work are the assumption that oral prehistory is recoverable and the repeated appeal to non-extant sources.

The shortcomings of Noth's approach are best exemplified in a study of Israelite historiography which consciously draws upon it. As its title implies, Baruch Halpern's 1988 work, *The First Historians*, continues the standard scholarly understanding of the Israelites as the inventors of historiography based on their fundamental theological superiority to their neighbors.[21] And it is clear that Halpern's ultimate concern is to affirm the historical validity of the biblical texts. He distinguishes between historical and historiographical issues, but in the end uses the latter to support the former. So, even while acknowledging that the author's portrayal of the death of Sisera in Judges 4–5 is erroneous, Halpern maintains that the actual event 'must' have been similar because the author's account is so logical.

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[19] Noth (1981). Biblical scholars distinguish between the Book of Deuteronomy (Deut, Dtr), the Deuteronomistic History (Dtr, DtrH) and a hypothetical Deuteronomistic school with its own theology (Dtr) which is supposedly responsible for the composition of these texts. To avoid confusion with either the book of Deuteronomy or the Deuteronomistic school, I will use DtrH exclusively in this paper to refer to the Deuteronomistic History. Different *sigla* for DtrH in direct quotations will be indicated.

[20] Noth (1981) 75–99.

[21] E.g., Halpern (1988) 235: 'H(Dtr) [Halpern's *siglum* for DtrH] saw a pattern in the transactions of Yhwh with Israel, a pattern more profound than the ones Mesopotamians refined from portents. . . . Because *all* human history, in his view, manifested and certified divine intent, every aspect of history was field for collecting data. This is a start in the development of the genre of history, of antiquarian research, as we know it.'

'All the evidence, thus, comes down on the side of the prose's historical character.'[22] This desire for historicity is necessary for Halpern, for whom the only two classifications that can be made about a text are either that it is reliable history or malicious concoction.[23] These mutually exclusive options force him to go to great lengths in order to keep the biblical author free from the terrible crime of concoction. Halpern's largest methodological error is also his biggest debt to Noth, i.e., the postulating of hypothetical sources[24] for the biblical text. To support his case, Halpern compares sections of the Bible with ancient near eastern documents in order to prove the former are drawn from sources similar to the latter. Yet while the practice of postulating a common source behind two parallel texts within a defined literary corpus is a valid enterprise, to draw analogies from the literature of other cultures and found them upon an argument from silence, as Halpern does, is not. In a paraphrase of Halpern, one might say of this method that the finding of a parallel does not, as he may think, imply a non-existent source.[25] Halpern's use of 'sources'

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[22] Halpern (1988) 96. Note that his conclusion concerns the historical, rather than the historiographical, character of the text. He is not discussing genre but historicity.

[23] Halpern (1988) 12: 'Our judgment as to a historian's intentions, thus, must be passed on individual passages. The principle criterion can only be one: does the work parlay the available evidence (sources) into coherent narrative [*sic*] *about* events susceptible to reconstruction from the sources? In other words, did the narrator depart at will from the sources, concocting freely about matters concerning which he or she had no, or contradictory, evidence?' In a return to Gunkel's approach to historiography, the implication of Halpern's rigid distinction is that verisimilitude is the ultimate criterion of historicity. He remarks concerning the story of Ehud in Judges 3: 'The Ehud account, so bare, so terse, is as close as the ancient world comes to modern historical narrative. What can one add or subtract to convert it into history? Hardly a word' (67). Despite Halpern's claim to judge the author's use of sources, such a luxury does not exist for biblical scholars because there are precious few extant sources. Halpern's inappropriate use of the dichotomy between history and concoction in ancient texts is illustrated by Arnaldo Momigliano's observation concerning Herodotus: 'To us it may perhaps seem odd that the ancients saw nothing incongruous in being at one and the same time the father of history and a liar' ([1985] 127).

[24] Halpern does maintain that the prose account of Judges 4 is based on the poetic version in Judges 5, and is here arguing for a source that does exist. However, his argument rests on the assertion that a poetic account was translated into prose, a phenomenon otherwise unattested in antiquity. See the critique of this assumption in Van Seters (1983) 18–31, esp. 30. Brettler (1995) 20–47 analyzes 1–2 Chronicles' use of 1–2 Kings.

[25] Halpern's original remark is a critique of those who impugn the historicity of the Bible on literary grounds: 'Stylization does not, as one may think, imply concoction' ([1988] 219). Cf. the critique of Halpern in Brettler (1995) 11–12.

in the end functions as an elaborate tautology to support his own exegesis. Where there are lacunae in the biblical narrative, Halpern appeals to the author's own ideological bent. Where there are inconsistencies, Halpern points out how deeply the author revered his sources, even to the point of including contradictory material.[26]

In the last twenty years many of the exegetical and archaeological arguments used to support the fundamental historicity of the biblical texts have been shown to be untenable.[27] Consequently, Israelite historiography is now understood to have some purpose other than the recounting of a real history of events. Newer studies, in a return to Wellhausen, have stressed the ideological motivations underlying the biblical material. Gösta Ahlström asserts: 'Biblical historiography never was meant to give a historically accurate picture about events and religious phenomena. The goal of the biblical writers was to express the divine will, as they understood it.'[28] Thompson maintains that, because the defining criterion of historiography is historicity, the genre designation cannot be applied to any biblical material that has no independently attested historical referent.[29] With the advent of new literary studies of biblical texts the once vaunted gem of Israelite historiography, 2 Samuel–1 Kings, is now understood in terms of plot development, irony, and characterization, i.e., techniques of fiction writing.[30] This new approach represents a major change in the issue, in that von Rad used features of literary excellence as criteria for historiography.[31]

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[26] E.g., Halpern (1988) 230, 234: 'Inconsistency in the text stems from sources, from a reverence toward them that transcends H(Dtr)'s central themes. . . . He [the biblical author] selects his data, taps only some of his resources (the chronicles), and his choices are, in part, ideologically conditioned.' Halpern dates the first edition of DtrH to the reign of Josiah, but then is forced to explain the sparse treatment Josiah is given in this hypothetical Ur-text by simply stating (229) that the author 'must have been conversant' with the king's reign. This harks back to Noth, who maintains that DtrH's sources 'presumably contained a wealth of detailed information' not utilized by DtrH 'because it did not seem essential to the treatment of his general theme' ([1981] 84).

[27] The literature in these areas is voluminous. A good survey is Thompson (1992) 1–126.

[28] Ahlström (1991) 140.

[29] Thompson (1991) 73–5 and (1992a) 3.206–7.

[30] See, e.g., the massive four-volume study of Fokkelman (1981–93).

[31] Von Rad (1966) 189–90: 'In our résumé of this great historical work we were obliged to strip it of all its grandeur. This was the more necessary in order that we might examine in detail the forms of this historical composition, its style, its artistic technique, and above all its power of dramatic presentation. The construction

But a rigid dichotomy between fiction and historiography cannot be strictly maintained. Historiography is recognized to draw upon motifs and strategies of fiction composition. Lionel Gossman stresses the essential 'narrativeness' of events and life itself in highlighting the link between historiography and fiction:

> [T]he historian may propose a variety of configurations and the rules according to which these are engendered may well be the same as the rules by which fictional narratives are engendered. The simplest of events, after all, is a story, the interpretation of which involves a larger story . . . so that history could be envisaged as a complex pattern of stories.[32]

Biblical scholars have also pointed out this link between fictional and historical narrative. Ernst Axel Knauf maintains that past events and fictional events are alike and so fiction and historiography naturally resemble each other: 'what is no longer real because it is past is told in the same mode as that which is not real because it is imagined.'[33] Yet however symbiotic the relationship between fiction and historiography may be, a line is crossed from the latter to the former when the events recounted have no historicity. So Thompson distinguishes between the historical Israel which is discovered through archaeological and ethnographic research and 'the Israel of tradition,' a literary construct which is an expression of a particular Jewish ideology.[34] Philip Davies also makes the distinction between the fictional 'biblical Israel' and an historical Israel, but adds an additional category, 'ancient Israel,' i.e., the fictitious scholarly construct/paraphrase of the biblical text put forward as historical.[35]

Still a further question in this debate has to do with authorial intent. To call a work a piece of historiography is to make a genre

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is altogether masterly. The reader is transported into the most varied surroundings with kaleidoscopic effect: we move from the clamour and tension of public occasions to the quietness of the inner chamber, or to the secrecy of an intimate conversation.' Elsewhere (180–1) von Rad refers to the text's 'outstanding artistry' and asserts that 'it is a neat piece of story-telling.' He is here following Wellhausen, who also maintains the link between historical reliability and narrative style in regards to the David-Solomon texts, commenting on their 'warm . . . lively tone' while also claiming their accuracy ([1885] 277). It should be pointed out, however, that these newer literary approaches do not so much deny the historicity of the texts as avoid discussion of the issue altogether.

[32] Gossman (1974) 31.

[33] Knauf (1991) 48.

[34] Thompson (1991) 67.

[35] Davies (1992) 11–59.

classification, and genres are combinations of literary conventions employed by authors to convey meaning.[36] Did the writer wish to convey events that were considered to have occurred? If this assumption on the writer's part were incorrect, is the work still a piece of historiography? Fundamentally the question comes down to whether genre designation lies in the eye of the author or the reader. It is clear that, if one wishes to work with an outside control, then authorial intent must have pride of place in the search for genre. Although Thompson is correct in stressing that historicity is a criterion for historiography as a genre designation placed on a text by a reader, this criterion cannot be so rigidly maintained when looking at the author's intent. History is a past remembered, and the latter two terms must be stressed equally. An author may intend to write historiography and instead write a partially incomplete and fictitious account for the reason that not everything that happened is remembered and not everything that is remembered happened. Thus, while historicity is a valuable criterion for establishing the validity of ancient historiography, it should not be the only criterion for determining whether a piece of writing belongs in the genre of historiography.[37] Much of the present confusion in both sides of the debate about Israelite historiography is due to the fact that the term 'historiography' is understood not as a genre classification, but rather as a sort of truth claim founded upon the assumption of equivocation between historical fact and truth.

An added difficulty in the search for genre is raised when dealing with writings from antiquity. The urge to label and categorize without any external control is almost irresistible. Biblical scholars are fond of labeling texts as parody, satire, lament, didactic story, etc., but more often than not do so without any evidence that such genre designations existed in antiquity. As I have argued elsewhere,[38] a reasonable control in the search for the genre of an ancient writing

[36] Hirsch (1967).

[37] By this I do not intend to say that ancient authors naively mistook fantasy for reality. Lucian of Samosata's *True Story* is biting testimony to the ability to distinguish between the two in antiquity. Certainly when faced with a highly fantastic ancient text, scholars should investigate many possible genre designations. However, lack of historicity should not be the deciding factor in determining whether an ancient writing was *intended* to be historiography. For a discussion of the relationship between truth and history in antiquity, see Veyne (1988).

[38] Bolin (1997) 46–53; *contra* Brettler (1995) 84–8.

is comparison with other samples from antiquity whose genre is known. This method has been undertaken profitably in the study of the Gospels, and a strong case has been made that they are examples of the well-attested genre of Hellenistic biography (βίος).[39] By far the most extensive utilization of comparative materials to illuminate biblical historiography is the work of John Van Seters. The length and detail of the following treatment of his work is witness to its impact in the study of this topic.

Recent Developments

In three major studies published over the last fifteen years,[40] Van Seters has influenced the lines of discussion in the issue of Israelite historiography by: 1) analysis of large segments of biblical texts long thought to represent the final stage of a lengthy process of composition and redaction; 2) attention to the question of genre; 3) abandonment of the appeal to oral sources; 4) systematic comparative work with Greek historiography.[41] In addition, Van Seters questions the widely held positions of modern biblical scholarship concerning the composition and date of the Pentateuch and DtrH.

In his 1983 work on DtrH, Van Seters takes up the theoretical issues of historiography extensively. Utilizing J. Huizinga's definition of history as 'the intellectual form in which a civilization renders account to itself of its past,' Van Seters characterizes historiography as a specific genre (as opposed to merely a confluence of traditions) that interprets the past with a particular emphasis on causality. It is national/corporate in nature and part of a culture's larger literary

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[39] Burridge (1992).

[40] Van Seters (1983); (1992); (1994). His survey of scholarship on Israelite historiography can be found in Van Seters (1983) 209–48.

[41] It should be noted that Van Seters is not the first writer to make connections between the Bible and Greek historiography. This link is implicit in views of scholars such as von Rad, who argue that the only true historians in antiquity were the Hebrews and the Greeks. Specific, though fleeting comparison between the two traditions are found also in Shotwell, who calls the Yahwist 'the Hebrew Herodotus' ([1939] 1.115); Garbini (1988) 177–8; and Whybray (1987) 225–42. Two recent, lengthy studies comparing Herodotus' *Histories* with Genesis–2 Kings are Mandell and Freedman (1993), which, however, utilizes a literary-critical approach that divorces the author from the text's meaning, and Wesselius (1995) 9–61, which argues for the dependence of the Bible on Herodotus.

tradition.[42] Historiography thus functions as a 'comprehensive identity tradition' for a people, requiring a corporate identity strong enough to take precedence over the individual figure of the ruler.[43] After a detailed survey of historiographic writing by the Greeks, Mesopotamians, Egyptians, Hittites, and Israel's west Semitic neighbors, Van Seters postulates an array of sources underlying DtrH analogous to extant texts from other ancient cultures. For example, 1–2 Kings builds upon no longer extant king lists for Israel and Judah along with lost commemorative royal inscriptions which were culled to create the 'chronicles' of the kings referred to in the biblical text.[44] Like many authors before him, Van Seters concludes his study with the statement that the origins of history writing lie in ancient Israel with the DtrH, the 'first Israelite historian, and the first known historian in Western civilization truly to deserve this designation.'[45]

In his two-volume study of the Yahwistic source of the Pentateuch, Van Seters moves the date of its composition up four hundred years from Solomon's court to the Babylonian exile.[46] He argues that the Yahwist used two major historiographical traditions in Genesis-Numbers, an eastern (Mesopotamian) one consisting of king lists, a flood tradition, creation myths, and biographical narrative of the great leader, and a western (Greek) one containing stories of the founders of culture, geographic texts, genealogies of peoples, and motifs of migration and conquest. In the end Van Seters argues that the Pentateuch postdates DtrH and was composed as a prologue to it, tracing the history of Israel as a people from the origins of civilization and creation itself.[47]

Van Seters's work, in particular his asking questions of genre for larger portions of the Pentateuch than heretofore undertaken and his comparative analysis, has done much to further the discussion in

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[42] Van Seters (1983) 1, 4–5.

[43] Van Seters (1983) 249, 355.

[44] Van Seters (1983) 298–301; so also Noth (1981) 76–7 and Garbini (1988) 174–5. Van Seters also attributes to DtrH a good deal of free composition, although this does not mean, as Halpern ([1988] 31) maintains, that 'Van Seters imagines him [DtrH] a rogue and a fraud.'

[45] Van Seters (1983) 362.

[46] This redating is reminiscent of Baruch Spinoza's claim that the Pentateuch was written in the fifth century BCE ([1951] 128).

[47] So also Garbini (1988) 176.

this area. What is curious, given the scope of his discussion, is his adherence to the heavily critiqued literary and tradition-critical methods of Wellhausen and Noth.[48] Van Seters's assumption of sources leads him to argue circularly in many of his exegetical points, because his method of assigning texts to a source or redactor is based on pre-conceived notions of the style, limits, and content of such a source. The problems of such a method become clear in the following.

> In the same way Dtr [Van Seter's *siglum* for DtrH] makes use of many stories and popular traditions in his work, but he makes each fit his design for the whole. This is so clearly the case for so much of the material that indisputably belongs to him that if a story or episode does not fit, it must be suspected of not belonging to the original Dtr work.[49]

One is at a loss in deciding where to begin to unravel this Gordian knot. The determination of material that 'indisputably' belongs to DtrH is based on an assumption that such a document existed. Building on this assumption are further speculations about criteria of what does and does not fit, which are then used to separate source text from redaction. But, to be clear, *the contention that there is a source text that has been redacted has not been demonstrated, only assumed.* Exegesis based on this assumption then serves to confirm the assumption. This is why Van Seters can write that, '[o]nce the Dtr history is divested of all its later additions, it has a remarkably uniform style and outlook.'[50] Such a result is unavoidable because the criterion for distinguishing DtrH from later additions is uniformity of style and outlook. This continued allegiance to older methods lays Van Seters's argument open to the same critique offered above of Noth and Halpern. Like the latter two authors, Van Seters is forced to ascribe to DtrH both the bold freedom necessary to alter source material coupled with the reverence for sources in order to account for incon-

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[48] Survey of this critique in Whybray (1987) 43–131, 139–85, 215–19.

[49] Van Seters (1983) 358. Granted, 1–2 Kings makes repeated reference to 'the Book of the Annals of the Kings of Israel' and 'the Book of the Annals of the Kings of Judah' (e.g., 1 Kgs 14:19, 15:7, 16:20, 22:39, 2 Kgs 1:18, 8:23, 10:34, 12:29) but, given that these works are no longer extant, any attempt to ascertain their exact content must remain speculative.

[50] Van Seters (1983) 359.

sistencies.[51] This dichotomy does not so much explain the compositional technique of an ancient author as support modern attempts to separate sources from redaction.

Similarly, Van Seters's appeal to hypothetical epigraphic remains from the Israelite kingdoms rest on shaky methodological ground. He maintains that the 'general uniformity of . . . memorial texts in the Levant, especially in the ninth and eighth centuries B.C. from Karatepe in the north to Moab in the southeast, suggests that such texts were probably not unknown in Israel and Judah.'[52] This presumption, based on analogy, seems sound until one remembers that the small geographic area believed to have been occupied by ancient Israel is one of the most excavated and surveyed regions on earth. The combination of detailed and prolonged archaeological excavation with the meager epigraphic results that may be safely attributed to ancient Israel/Judah is sufficient to give pause before engaging in the wholesale postulation of sources. While Van Seters is to be credited for his insistence that any hypothetical sources attributed to the Israelites have contemporaneous analogues from another culture,[53] his biblical sources, in spite of this comparative work, remain equally hypothetical. Correlative to this method are many arguments buttressed by textual observations whose validity is dependent upon the disposition of the reader. Thus, Van Seters deletes Michal's remonstration with David in 2 Samuel 6 from the original DtrH because it 'seriously interrupts the continuity of subject matter and is incongruous with the tone of the chapter that follows.'[54] Elsewhere, he argues that the Court History is a later addition to DtrH, because it contains 'scarcely anything exemplary in David's actions . . . it is therefore inconceivable to me that Dtr would have included such a work . . . in his history when his whole perspective is exactly the opposite.'[55]

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[51] So DtrH's treatment of Saul is occasionally inconsistent because the author 'found these stories in already a fixed written form and felt under some constraint to retain them as they were' (Van Seters [1983] 258), while the sources for David were 'used with complete freedom by the author, making it virtually impossible to distinguish between the received tradition and the elements of his own composition' (268).

[52] Van Seters (1983) 195.

[53] Van Seters (1983) 332.

[54] Van Seters (1983) 281.

[55] Van Seters (1983) 290; note how he dismisses as 'inconceivable' a challenge to his assumption that the text is a later redaction.

Compositional conclusions based on arguments of an ancient author's tone, continuity, and perspective are suspect given the subjective nature of these criteria. This search for sources, additions, and redactions also leads Van Seters to confuse narrative time with real time; or, to put it another way, temporal succession in the narrative with temporal succession in composition. So he concludes that because the plot of 2 Samuel 2–4 depends on the preceding text, it is a secondary addition.[56] This conclusion is supported again by appeals to style, tone, and outlook which ultimately rest on the assumption they are trying to prove. Given his persistent use of standard but faulty methods of tradition-history, i.e., the hypothetical reconstruction of earlier fragments and stories, one is left wondering exactly how Van Seters's investigation into the historiographic traditions of other ancient cultures relates to his exegesis. Apart from describing the characteristics of historiography in these other literary traditions, Van Seters does not engage in comparative analysis of these texts with the Bible. This is particularly evident in his 1983 work, in which the overview of historiography in antiquity functions as a loose connection to his redactional analysis of the biblical texts.[57]

Apart from these peculiarly exegetical issues the equally problematic treatment of larger questions concerning the nature of historiography in antiquity offers good methodological cautions to the debate. First is Van Seters's understanding of both history and historiography. Huizinga's definition of history introduces a confusion of categories, for it designates history as an 'intellectual form' whereas historiography as a genre is a literary form. Van Seters does not maintain a clear separation between the two, nor elaborate how exactly they relate. So he writes: 'I have focused this search on Huizinga's definition of history as an intellectual form of corporate self-understanding because I regard the question of genre as a key issue in the discussion.'[58] On this same page he then refers to 'traditional genres that make use of . . . the past,' 'the particular traditional

[56] Van Seters (1983) 284–5.

[57] There is a similar incongruence in Van Seters's 1992 work. In the concluding remarks to *In Search of History* ([1983] 358) Van Seters makes some comparative observations between DtrH and Herodotus, but one hopes for a more sustained analysis earlier in the text.

[58] Van Seters (1983) 354. Although Van Seters states in the same paragraph that a 'discussion about the "ideas of history," or causation in human affairs, or criti-

form—history writing,' and 'historiographic genres' without discussing how these three very different designations relate either to each other or to the intellectual form of history. This mingling of genre and intellectual capacity is also evident in Van Seters's dual understanding of historiography as both a style of prose and a method of accumulating and arranging information.[59]

Finally, while Van Seters is correct to point out that ancient historiography contains mythical elements, he has overlooked a crucial distinction between historiographic and antiquarian pursuits. Arnaldo Momigliano has explored these two genres in several studies and notes that, among distinguishing elements, historiography is characterized by an emphasis on political history, while antiquarian writing is 'learned research on the past.'[60] Additionally, historiography gives the highest priority to eyewitness accounts and the author's firsthand investigation, while antiquarian writing concerns itself with written material.

> And even at the beginning this antiquarian research was concerned with written sources, with collecting and reporting documents from archives, describing statues and buildings, interpreting foreign languages.... we must emphasize that... the use of primary documents, is in antiquity the custom not of historians but of 'archaeologists,' 'philologists,' 'grammarians,' that is, of antiquarians.[61]

The distinction between historiography and antiquarianism is evident as early as the fifth century BCE, but flourishes after Alexander. Momigliano identifies Thucydides as a key figure in the development of this distinction because the latter's critique of Herodotus emphasizes that true history is 'primarily political history and... confined

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cal and objective reporting of past events, while not without some value, too often misses the mark,' it is altogether unclear how his understanding of history as an intellectual form possessed by a civilization does not necessarily work from unfounded assumptions about a culture's idea of history. Other critiques of Van Seters's use of Huizinga are those of Thompson (1992a) 3.207; Brettler (1995) 11; and Younger (1990) 26–31.

[59] Van Seters (1983) 217. This is all the more disappointing given the fact that Van Seters is really the first person to take part in this discussion with an awareness of the need to focus on genre classification through means of comparative work: 'In this work my approach will be to suggest an understanding of the genre by an association of the Yahwist in Genesis with works from antiquity that have comparable interests and content as well as similar structural and compositional forms and techniques' (Van Seters [1992] 2).

[60] Momigliano (1985) 4.

[61] Momigliano (1985) 217. See further Marincola (this volume).

to contemporary events,' and asserts the priority of oral over written sources.[62] In her analysis of the issue in Roman literature Elizabeth Rawson concurs with Momigliano and notes that the distinction is made among the Romans by Polybius: 'The serious historians . . . were contemporary historians.'[63] Rawson indicates that, while Roman historiography strove for 'literary elegance' and had a moral aim, antiquarian writing was 'a scholarly genre' with 'a lack of literary pretension . . . a bias to religious and political institutions,' and emphasis on 'the giving of causes or origins.'[64]

While the differences between these two types of writing about the past are at times ambiguous,[65] the distinction remains important nonetheless, due mainly to the fact that this difference was acknowledged as such by ancient authors. The question of whether the biblical authors were engaged in antiquarian, rather than historiographical, writing remains both valid and unexplored. Van Seters acknowledges that Greek historiography disdained the use of archival records,[66] but dismisses Momigliano's distinction as 'not easy to maintain.'[67] This disregard of the importance of the distinction leads Van Seters to use the terms 'antiquarian' and 'historiographic' in various combinations which suggest that the two are functionally equivalent.[68] This

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[62] Momigliano (1985) 130. In the preface to his 1629 translation of Thucydides, Thomas Hobbes makes the same observation: 'Thucydides, in the opinion of all men, hath done better than Herodotus: for Herodotus undertook to write of those things of which it is impossible for him to know the truth; and which delight more the ear with fabulous narrations, than satisfy the mind with truth: but Thucydides writeth one war; which, how it was carried from beginning to the end, he was able certainly to inform himself' ([1989] 579). Immanuel Kant is also of this opinion, and in a 1784 work approvingly cites David Hume's maxim: 'the first page of Thucydides is the only beginning of all real history' ([1963] 24 n. 7). Kant's low assessment of Israelite religion and culture led him to contend that the HB is historiography only because the Septuagint translation links its 'isolated narratives' with Greek culture.

[63] Rawson (1985) 218, 221.

[64] Rawson (1985) 233. See also the discussion of the distinction between historiography and antiquarianism in Cancik (1997) 680–1, although he recasts antiquarianism as 'cultural historiography' (681).

[65] Momigliano (1985) 216; Veyne (1988) 5–15. Veyne, Momigliano, and Rawson all acknowledge that ancient historians did use written sources, but make clear that these authors were content not to dialogue with the sources as such in a continuous or systematic fashion. 'An ancient historian does not cite his authorities, for he feels that he is an authority himself' (Veyne [1988] 9).

[66] Van Seters (1983) 4, 299.

[67] Van Seters (1992) 96.

[68] Thus Van Seters will maintain that the Mesopotamian king lists reflect 'anti-

is a serious shortcoming, especially because his aim is to compare biblical texts with similar ancient texts in the hopes of determining a genre for the HB. To dismiss a genre designation *a priori* indicates that Van Seters's aim is more to redefine ancient historiography while still using that term in regard to the HB than to reassess the question whether the HB is any kind of historical writing at all. This lacuna in method is as large a flaw as the rigid dichotomy between myth and history typical of the biblical scholars whom Van Seters rightly critiques.

While not all biblical scholars have eschewed the distinction between antiquarian and historiographic writing,[69] that the Bible is an example of ancient antiquarian writing *distinct from ancient historiography* is an option that has not been investigated,[70] but which demands a fair hearing. It is clear in antiquity that eyewitness accounts and firsthand investigation are to be preferred over consultation of written records by the historiographic writer. This focus on the author's methods of collecting material and possessing firsthand knowledge naturally

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quarian, or "historical," interest,' or exhibit 'antiquarian and historiographic intentions' ([1983] 71, 76). At the outset of his 1992 study he notes that '[t]he bulk of this book will focus on the activity of the Yahwist as an antiquarian historian,' and refers both to the 'earliest antiquarian histories' and the 'genre of antiquarian historiography' (6, 31). In *The Life of Moses*, Van Seters similarly mentions 'ancient antiquarian historiography' ([1994] 457). Similarly, Halpern equates the two categories when he asserts that the biblical authors are both 'those who wrote works recognizably historical' and who 'had authentic antiquarian intentions' ([1988] 3, cf. also 11–12, 67).

[69] Among those who do make the distinction, however, most understand antiquarian writing to be inferior to historiography. Von Rad argues that history presupposes 'a particular form of causational thinking, applied in practice to a broad succession of political events' which he opposes to 'mere antiquarian details' ([1966] 166–7). Similarly Knauf categorically asserts: 'History that does not try to arrive at generalizations (as, e.g., the mechanics of state formation) would not be, in my opinion, history at all, but antiquarianism, which boils down to running an intellectual curiosity shop with no more relevance to society at large than providing entertainment for the idle, the jaded and the doomed' ([1991] 35 n. 1). Thompson avoids any value-laden distinctions, and characterizes historiography as the critical evaulation of the past, distinct from antiquarianism which displays the 'more ecumenically pluralistic motivations of the librarian,' whose aim is 'to preserve what is old' ([1992a] 3.209; cf. also Thompson [1991] 76–7, 86).

[70] Noth inadvertently describes DtrH as an antiquarian when he remarks that '[t]he closest parallels [to DtrH] are those Hellenistic and Roman historians who use older accounts, mostly unacknowledged, to write a history not of their own time but of the more or less distant past. . . . We owe the preservation of valuable old material wholly and solely to this respect for the value of old narratives and historical accounts' ([1981] 11, 84). Thompson's characterization of the biblical authors as 'scholarly bibliophiles' ([1991] 79)—which implies an antiquarian undertaking as

requires a degree of visibility in the narrative on the author's part.[71] Both Herodotus and Thucydides begin their works with prolegomena stating their intentions and methods. Such direct dialogue between the author and reader is barely evident in the HB. It appears nowhere in Genesis–2 Kings. The prophetic books contain much first-person narrative, but it is clear from many of their superscriptions that these texts have been compiled or copied by scribes.[72] The same holds true for Daniel and Ezra-Nehemiah. While Sirach contains a prologue by the Greek translator, the book is not a narrative but a collection of proverbs. The first biblical example we have of a statement of authorial intent is 2 Macc 2:19–32, where the author, sparing no opportunity to emphasize the enormity of the task, designates his work as an abridgment of the now lost five-volume history of the period by Jason of Cyrene.[73] The first extant examples of such prefatory remarks by a Jewish author are those of Josephus in both his *Jewish War* and *Antiquities*.

Josephus' remarks about the biblical authors further demonstrates their difference from classical historiography. In his apologetic work, *Against Apion*, Josephus acknowledges that the Greek historians surpass the authors of the HB in literary skill, but not in veracity. What makes the biblical history valid is the character of its authors, who are prophets inspired by God:

> Naturally then, or rather necessarily, neither are all able to write the records nor is there anything contradictory in them. Rather the prophets alone, learning of both the most remote and ancient things due to divine inspiration, and of the events of their own time, accurately recorded them just as they occurred. (1.37)

The presumption here is clear: true history can be written only by eyewitnesses or based on eyewitness accounts. Josephus appeals to divine assistance as the extraordinary means by which the biblical

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opposed to the detective work of ancient historians—is reminiscent of Burton Mack's description of the origins of the gospel of Mark: 'Mark's gospel . . . was composed at a desk in a scholar's study lined with texts and open to discourse with other intellectuals' ([1988] 322–3).

[71] In the preface to his translation of Herodotus, David Grene notes: 'Probably no Greek writer makes so strong an impression of talking directly to us as Herodotus. . . . Here is the man in front of us . . . to explain that he has checked this but not that' ([1987] 15–16).

[72] Of the prophetic books only Ezekiel lacks such a superscription.

[73] In the NT there are the prologues to Theophilus in both Luke and Acts.

authors (now prophets by virtue of their inspiration) were able to write accurately about the remote past even as they, good historians that they were, wrote truthfully about their own time.[74] This appeal to inspiration is necessary for Josephus' case to his literate Hellenistic audience because the biblical material is clearly not historiography as that genre was understood in the Greco-Roman age by the non-Jewish, non-Christian educated.[75]

In this focus on the connection between the HB and antiquarian writing, the historical context has moved from the milieu of the ancient Near East to that of the Hellenistic Mediterranean. This shift is congruent with other lines of investigation which are beginning to look to the Hellenistic era as the intellectual background to the creation of the HB.[76] It now remains to elaborate on some recurring features in the biblical texts which support the contention that it constitutes an attempt at antiquarian writing rather than historiography, and to examine the lone biblical text which speaks about the HB as a corpus in order to see what light may be shed on this question by what the Bible says about its own composition.

Biblical Examples

Once one is freed from the presupposition that the Bible represents a kind of historiographic writing, the extensive and futile efforts to make sense of some of the text's more peculiar features become unnecessary. These features instead, when seen in the light of the antiquarian pursuit of preservation of anything old, require a different explanation concerning their placement.

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[74] For the origin of designating biblical authors and their books as prophetic, see Barton (1986). On the relative lateness (ca. 150 BCE) of the practice of attributing authorshop of the Pentateuch to Moses, see Blenkinsopp (1992) 1–2.

[75] Consequently, in a following passage Josephus will deride those Greek 'lovers of honor' who dare 'to write of events at which they were not present without having inquired of eyewitnesses' (*Against Apion* 1.45).

[76] See Thompson (1974) 9–16; Garbini (1988); Lemche (1993); Bolin (1995) and (1996). Scholars have long noticed substantial points of contact between the HB and Greek literature and culture, but preconceived ideas about the antiquity of the Bible prohibited them from dating the HB to the Hellenistic period. Even Van Seters, who expends much effort in making the connection between biblical and Hellenistic materials, argues for the Phoenicians as 'a bridge between Israel and the Aegean' in order to preserve his exilic dating of the Bible ([1983] 54).

The first of these features are the well-known doublets, which led scholars to postulate prior continuous sources for the Pentateuch and other biblical texts. Among the more famous doublets are those which tell of Abraham passing his wife Sarah off as his sister while in a foreign country (Genesis 12, 20; see also Isaac's use of this practice in Genesis 26); the dual revelation of the Tetragrammaton to Moses (Exodus 3, 6); the three different ethnicities of Moses' wife (Exodus 3 [Midianite], Numbers 12 [Cushite]; Judges 1 [Kenite]) and father-in-law (Exodus 3 [Jethro], Numbers 10 [Hobab, Reuel]; the remarkably hearty Egyptian livestock which, in spite of being completely destroyed in the plague of pestilence (Exod 9:6), return in order to be struck down in the plague of hail (vv. 21–2) and appear yet again in the killing of the firstborn (Exod 12:29); the sending of manna and quails (Exodus 16, Numbers 10); the slayer of Goliath (1 Samuel 17 [David], 2 Samuel 21 [Elhanan]). This list could be lengthened extensively. The questions of whether these variants demonstrate the existence of sources earlier than the Bible, or of the exact nature of these sources, are irrelevant to the task at hand. What needs to be explained is why all of them were included in the text, despite the fact that they render it incoherent. The only possible explanation is that they were all seen as important and worthy of inclusion because they had something to say about a past, real or imagined. This priority of preservation over coherence is a key indication of antiquarian practice. Thus, those scholars who argue that the rationale behind biblical inconsistencies is respect for sources are partially correct: the motivation is one in which anything which treats of the past is valued.

Closely related to these doublets are those larger texts which contain variant traditions side by side that derail the linear nature of the narrative. Two premier examples are the account of the flood in Genesis 6–9 and that of the giving of the Law in Exodus 19–32. In both contradictions abound. Is the flood 40 or 150 days in length? Must Noah take two of every animal or seven pairs of each of the clean animals and one pair of the unclean? Reading Exodus as a continuous narrative is an exercise in futility; the entire book defies coherent summary.[77] In the account of the giving of the Law, two

[77] Thompson (1994) has emphasized the unreadability of Exodus as a coherent narrative.

different codes come into play in such a way that the story breaks down. In Exodus 19–24 Moses is given a covenant which consists of laws regulating social behavior. He writes these down and reads them to the people (24:4–7). Then a second law code, this one cultic, is given, written on two tablets by God's own hand (24:12–31:18). Moses smashes these tablets in 32:19 upon seeing the Israelites worshiping the golden calf. In chapter 34, God promises to rewrite this cultic code (v. 1) but thereupon gives Moses a second version of the social code, which Moses writes down and which is subsequently called 'the two tablets of the covenant' (v. 29 *wshny lht h'dt*). In Exodus 35 Moses now orders the Israelites from the cultic code broken in 32:19 and never rewritten. The remainder of the Book of Exodus recounts how the non-existent cultic code is carried out by the Israelites to the letter. When Exodus ends, the Israelites are in possession of two copies of their social law code, have no written cultic code, and are fulfilling stipulations from the cultic code Moses destroyed.

As with the doublets, biblical scholars have pointed to these inconsistencies as proof that the HB is composed of pre-existing sources combined by a redactor. However, a major flaw of this approach lies in its silence concerning the rationale behind the method of redaction. Why chop two coherent stories into small pieces and rearrange them so as to create an incoherent whole? Again, a more plausible explanation here is that the text preserves variant tales which are catalogued in the text without any attempt to create a sense of narrative unity, but rather are connected by thematic similarity.[78]

Certain aetiological elements in the HB betray antiquarian rather than historiographic aims, in that these aetiologies offer explanations of minutiae of the authors' daily life. There are tales explaining the origins of common proverbs (Gen 10:9, 22:14, 1 Sam 10:12, with a variant in 19:24); the meaning of place names (Gen 16:14, Exod 15:23, 17:7) and social customs (Gen 2:24, 11:9–1, 32:32).[79] Many

[78] This type of collection is further developed in the Mishnah, which will list opposing rabbinic pronouncements on a question without deciding in favor of any particular statement.

[79] I want to make clear that the texts cited are but a representative fraction of the full number of examples in the HB. Van Seters discusses these aetiological aims in his treatment of the 'western antiquarian tradition' ([1983] 78–193).

of these aetiologies involve etymological speculation, so that a story is used to furnish the basis for a particular etymological theory concerning a proper name. Probably the most well known of these is Exodus 3, where the author attempts to explain the name of the Israelite god Yahweh (*yhwh*) by appeal to the orthographically similar Hebrew verb *hyh* ('to be'). This results in an awkward fit between the enigmatic 'I am who I am' (*'hyh 'shr 'hyh*) and the name 'Yahweh.' Additionally, Yahweh gives Moses *two* names to pass along to the Israelites: 'I am' (*'hyh*) in v. 14 and 'Yahweh' (*yhwh*) in v. 15. These puzzling textual features are best explained not by assuming that the text preserves a tradition of Moses' historical (and mystical) encounter with the god Yahweh, nor by asserting that it reveals the Israelite conception of their deity as necessary existence or metaphysical first cause. Rather, what we have is an author attempting to answer the question, 'What does the name of our God mean?' by means of what he as an author knows: old tales and common theophanic motifs combined with a creative use of Hebrew grammar. This text originates and exists in a purely literary world as a specimen of educated speculation requiring the kind of training normally reserved for scribes, and comprehensible mainly to other, similarly skilled scribes.

Although there are several places in the HB where the text is thought to refer to itself,[80] 2 Maccabees 2 contains the only possible reference in the HB to its own collection. A letter from the Jews of Jerusalem to those in Egypt recounts a legend of the hiding of the ark by the prophet Jeremiah four hundred and fifty years previously and then remarks:

> The same things are reported in the records and in the memoirs of Nehemiah, and also that he founded a library and collected the books about the kings and prophets, and the writings of David and letters of kings about votive offerings. In the same way Judah also collected all the books that had been lost on account of the war that had come upon us and they are in our possession. So if you have need of them, send people to get them for you. (2 Macc 2:13–15)

Several things about this passage deserve notice. First is the analogy at work: Judah Maccabee has re-gathered a lost collection of old

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[80] Some think that the book of the Law referred to in 2 Kings 22 is Deuteronomy, or that Ezra's law in Nehemiah 8–9 is the Pentateuch; cf. the discussion in Mullen (1997) 19–55.

material just as (ὡσαύτως δὲ καί) Nehemiah did roughly three centuries previously. Second is the mixed generic character of Nehemiah's collection: books (annals?) of kings and prophets, writings of David (the Psalter?) and various official and cultic correspondence. In short, Nehemiah's collection appears very similar in content and mixture of generic forms to the HB and, moreover, is based on earlier records. This idea of collecting and preserving works of varying types is the task of antiquarians, and it is fitting that the Jerusalem Jews would boast of the libraries of Nehemiah and Judah to their comrades in Alexandria, home of the most famous library in antiquity. 2 Maccabees 2 is the description of exactly the kind of process at work in the creation of the HB: the search for what is old, lost, and forgotten. The collection and preservation of these fragments of traditions is not primarily for historiographical purposes, but rather because they are understood to be old. Consequently, preserving all of them takes priority even over the coherence of the collection.[81]

It is my contention that the HB does not represent any kind of historiography as that genre was understood in antiquity and that the possibility that it is an example of the equally well-attested literary specimen of antiquarian writing is one worthy of further investigation. Antiquarianism in antiquity was based on the priority of written over oral sources and eyewitness investigation, and focused in part on the seemingly ephemeral details of the distant past rather than on the immediate political or national history of the author, features readily observed in large portions of the biblical text. With this approach to the HB, its apparent anomalies, along with many of its other features, are more easily explained. Repetitions, contradictions and variants, social, geographic, ethnographic, and gnomic aetiologies, and speculative etymologies all show the work to be concerned with the past as past, real or imagined, but somehow germane to conditions contemporaneous with the collectors. The historicity of biblical narratives and whether the HB is written to be historiography are distinct issues. The latter can be addressed only by careful attention to genres as they were understood in antiquity, and apart

[81] Mullen (1997) argues that the function of the Pentateuch is to provide an elaborate ethnic aetiology for Persian-period Jews attempting to establish their identity in Judea. Mullen also explains the inconsistencies in the Pentateuch by arguing that the text was never meant to be read as a whole, but rather from its composition was intended to be excerpted for public reading in a cultic context.

from any doctrinal or philosophical presuppositions on the part of the investigator. That the biblical authors were concerned to preserve anything that smacked of antiquity tells us much about their motivations which, along with cultural and religious concerns, appear to be based on values treasured by scribes for millennia. That the Bible may not be the coherent, systematic portrayal of ancient Israelite history is an assertion that has long been under question. That it was never intended to be such by its authors, however, is a possibility which now requires consideration.

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THUCYDIDES' PERSIAN WARS*

Tim Rood

I. *Herodotus or Thucydides?*

I examine in this paper the influence of Herodotus, the first Greek historian whose work survives intact, on his successor, Thucydides; and the influence of the Persian Wars, the climax of Herodotus' work, on Thucydides' conception of his subject, 'the war of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians.' This influence has often been thought slight: Herodotus and Thucydides have been regarded as 'two men who complement one another, but as opposites';[1] and it is claimed that Thucydides 'showed little inclination to imitate his predecessor.'[2] Indeed, scholars tend to stress how Thucydides reacted against Herodotus by insisting on accuracy, by rejecting the pleasures of story-telling, and by including no gods, few women, and not all that many non-Greeks.[3] Thucydides' reaction against Herodotus is also thought to condition his claim that the Peloponnesian War was greater than the Persian Wars. My aim is to propose a more complex view of the relationship between Herodotus and Thucydides: my method will be to explore first how Thucydides constructs his war in terms of the Persian Wars themselves, and then the links between Thucydides' account of Athens' invasion of Sicily and Herodotus' account of Xerxes' invasion of Greece.

A better understanding of Thucydides' relationship with Herodotus and the Persian Wars is vital for our grasp of the development of Greek historiography. Jacoby argued that it was the experience of Periclean Athens that gave Herodotus a deeper insight into the significance of the Persian Wars and caused him to move from

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* I am grateful to Lynette Mitchell, Simon Hornblower, and the editor for their comments on a draft of this paper. All dates are BCE.

[1] Wilamowitz (1908) 7 (he proposed Theopompus as a synthesis).

[2] Usher (1969) 23.

[3] For a balanced treatment of the differences between Thucydides and Herodotus, see Hornblower (1994) Ch. 2; Crane (1996) illuminates some of these differences statistically.

ethnography to history.[4] Scholars nowadays are less confident that the form of Herodotus' history offers evidence for his development, and less confident in the reductive teleology of Jacoby's story. But there is an increasing tendency to replace one Athenocentric story with another: it is argued that Herodotus was responding to the experience of Greek division in the aftermath of the Persian Wars, and that his goal was to offer a comment on Athenian imperialism, the successor to Persian imperialism.[5] It is all the more pressing to assess Thucydides' response to Herodotus and the Persian Wars in the light of these 'Thucydidean' readings of Herodotus. And his response is equally interesting for its influence on the subsequent development of ancient historiography: 'he set standards of research and accuracy for all time,' but 'ordained that history should henceforth be primarily a matter of war and politics.'[6]

Studying the intertextual links between Herodotus and Thucydides also reveals the origins of the more settled generic awareness which emerged later in the history of historiography. Ancient critics who were looking on historians as possible models tended to concentrate on the stylistic influence of one historian on another. But a theoretical concern with other forms of imitation can also be found: it underlies Lucian's satire of a historian who began with Thucydides' opening sentence, changing only the names; who then transferred the speech of Thucydides' Corcyrean envoy unchanged to Armenia; and who 'inflicted a plague on the people of Nisibis . . . lifting it totally from Thucydides except for the Pelasgicon and the Long Walls' (*De Hist. conscr.* 15). We can get some idea of what Lucian was satirizing not just from the way in which historians imitated Thucydides in practice, but also from Thucydides' imitation of Herodotus. Thucydides' preface was echoed by later historians, but is itself carefully aligned with, and separated from, Herodotus'.[7] And just as Livy's debate between Fabius Maximus and Scipio on the Roman invasion of Africa echoes Thucydides' debate between Nicias and Alcibiades on the Athenian invasion of Sicily,[8] so too Thucydides'

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[4] Jacoby (1913) 352–60.

[5] E.g., Fornara (1971) 40–1; Meyer (1987) 53. Many others see contemporary allusion in Herodotus' work without relating it to his development as a historian.

[6] Hornblower (1994) 30. See esp. Momigliano's essay 'The Place of Herodotus in the History of Historiography' in Momigliano (1966) 127–42.

[7] See, e.g., Moles (1993).

[8] See Rodgers (1986).

debate echoes Herodotus' debate between Mardonius and Artabanus on the Persian invasion of Greece.

The suggestion that Thucydides' narrative has a broader form of intertextual relationship with Herodotus', that it invites its readers to conceive the Peloponnesian War, and in particular the Sicilian expedition, in terms of the Persian Wars, can be supported by many parallels in ancient historiography. Herodotus himself forges links between the wars he describes—above all, between Darius' invasion of Scythia and Xerxes' invasion of Greece;[9] and these links 'are suggestive, pointing the way in which these very different and individual kings . . . fall into the same pattern of activity and failure.'[10] Sometimes, the point may be to illuminate contrasts: Tacitus suggests a 'reversal of values at Rome' when he 'imitates Sallust by describing the war [against Tacfarinas] in terms of the Jugurthine War.'[11] Linking two wars may also be a way of measuring the status of the writer as well as the significance of the events he narrates: in his Plataea elegy, Simonides implicitly compared the Persian and Trojan Wars, and his own role and Homer's.[12] Arrian's application of the same technique to his account of the invasion of Persia by Alexander, the new Achilles, suggests that the pattern of linking different wars is not just a 'literary' device, but also a reflection of the 'literary' way people conceive wars as they experience them—and even of the 'literary' reasons people make war.[13]

Talking of 'intertextual relationships' does not strictly imply anything either about authorial intention or about authorial knowledge. To discuss authorial 'intention' is less helpful than to discuss whether intertextual echoes contribute anything to our reading. But it is important to determine authorial knowledge if we want to know whether a particular echo signifies anything more than (for instance) a shared intellectual climate. The general assumption that Thucydides knew Herodotus' *Histories* has recently been challenged by J. J. Kennelly.[14] It is not my purpose to refute his arguments here;[15]

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[9] See, e.g., Hartog (1988) 35–40.
[10] Pelling (1991) 131.
[11] Martin and Woodman (1998) 155.
[12] See Parsons (1992) 32.
[13] See Moles (1985) esp. 163.
[14] Kennelly (1994).
[15] See the strong criticisms of Hornblower (1991–6) II. 25–38; also II. 137–45 for a list of passages where scholars have suspected some intertextual allusion.

it is enough to note that while he admits that Thucydides could have been exposed to Herodotus after 414, the 'publication' date he proposes for Herodotus, he writes that 'Thucydides manifests no indication that this exposure influenced his own work'[16]—without considering any of the passages where this exposure has often been assumed. We will see in the second half of this paper that the assumption that Thucydides was exposed to Herodotus' work is justified. First, however, we need to put this exposure in context by analyzing the ways in which the allusions to the Persian Wars which Thucydides himself makes as narrator, and which his characters make in the speeches he gives them, set up Thucydides' war as a successor to the war that ends Herodotus' *Histories*.

II. *Thucydides and the Persian Wars*[17]

A narrative of Athens' performance in the Persian Wars is offered by the Athenian speakers at Sparta who in 432 try to discourage Sparta from declaring war by showing 'what sort of a city' Sparta will face (T. 1.73.3), and that they are themselves 'worthy to rule' (T. 1.75.1):

> We say that we alone braved battle against the barbarian at Marathon, and that when he came later, unable to resist by land, we went on board our ships in full force and joined in the sea-battle at Salamis. . . . We showed an eagerness that was by far the most daring: when no one was helping us by land, we thought fit to leave the city, destroy our property . . . and run the risk of going on board our ships.
> (1.73.4, 74.2)

The Athenian ambassadors' story is part of 'the Athenian history of Athens'—the succession of noble deeds that was narrated regularly, and in similar terms, on occasions such as the annual funeral orations for the war-dead.[18] It is no surprise, then, that they precede their story with the claim that they are 'rather tired of continually raising this subject' (T. 1.73.2).

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[16] Hornblower (1991–6) II. 150.

[17] Some of the arguments in this section are drawn from Rood (1998). References to Thucydides are preceded by 'T.,' to Herodotus by 'H.'

[18] See Loraux (1986) Ch. 3. Kierdorf (1966) 96 plausibly argues that this Athenian history was a regular part of political diplomacy.

Elsewhere Thucydides 'probably gave less space in his speeches to traditional themes, especially the Persian Wars, than did the more conventional orators of his own day.'[19] One reason Thucydides' speakers avoid events before the Persian Wars is that they share Thucydides' own methodological qualms about the reliability of ancient history (T. 1.73.2, cf. 1.1.3, 20.1, 21.2). Thucydides' other Athenian speakers find different reasons for avoiding the Persian Wars themselves: Pericles refuses to give a narrative of Athenian deeds in his Funeral Oration to 'those who know them' (T. 2.36.4 ἐν εἰδόσιν); the Athenians at Melos say that they will not defend Athenian imperialism by appeals to the Persian Wars (T. 5.89); and in the Camarina debate Euphemus says that he will justify Athenian imperialism not by Athens' defense at Marathon, but by the presence of Ionians in Xerxes' force (T. 6.82.4–83.2).

Hornblower is 'tempted to wonder whether it is Thucydides, rather than his speakers . . . who finds the Persian Wars a "disagreeable" theme.'[20] But the attitude to the Persian Wars shown by Thucydides' speakers need not be the same as the attitude of Thucydides himself. Within Thucydides' work, the account of the Persian Wars offered by the Athenians at Sparta is enough: by the time of the Funeral Oration, Thucydides' implied audience, as well as Pericles' Athenian audience, are ἐν εἰδόσιν, 'among those who know.' That the Athenian ambassadors at Sparta call it disagreeable to raise the topic at all is tactful.[21] And while the refusal of later speakers to speak of Athenian achievements in the Persian Wars is pointed, it is part of another story: not (as often supposed) a story about the decline of moral appeals in wartime, but a story about how different situations call for different rhetoric.[22]

It is essential for the design of the narrative that the account of the Persian Wars that Thucydides does give is placed where it is. It prepares for Thucydides' account of Athens' rise to power straight after the Persian Wars (the 'Pentecontaetia'), an account that justifies Thucydides' claim that the Peloponnesian War resulted from Spartan

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[19] Hornblower (1991–6) I. 118.

[20] Hornblower (1991–6) I. 118.

[21] Plato, *Menex.* 235d3–5 notes that one has to be a good speaker if one is to praise Athens in front of a Peloponnesian audience.

[22] The use of the Persian Wars in Thucydides' speeches is discussed by Kubo (1971) and by Tzifopoulos (1995). I hope to treat this topic further elsewhere.

fear of growing Athenian power. And that this account starts immediately after the Persian Wars itself suggests that the Persian Wars are central to the origin of the Peloponnesian War—a suggestion reinforced by its focus on how the Athenians built on their naval advances during the Persian Wars.

Thucydides' telling of the 'Pentecontaetia' also suggests that it is important for his narrative effect that the account of the Persian Wars is spoken by Athenians. The Athenian speech is echoed in the speech Themistocles makes at Sparta in 479/8 in which he asserts the Athenians' right to re-build their walls by appealing to the Persian Wars: 'When it was resolved that it was better to leave the city and go on board the ships, they formed that daring resolution without the Spartans; and in all their deliberations with the Spartans, they had appeared second to none in judgment' (T. 1.91.5). The echoes imply that the spirit shown by the Athenians in resisting Spartan demands before the start of the Peloponnesian War was the same as that shown by Themistocles in resisting Spartan demands straight after the Persian Wars. And that appeal is made in both cases to Athens' performance in the Persian Wars suggests that this spirit was born of those wars.

It is also telling that the terms used in the Athenian narrative recur in the 'Pentecontaetia.' When the Athenians re-build their walls, the Spartans, though secretly angry, are still friendly to Athens because of their 'eagerness' (T. 1.92 προθυμίαν)[23] against Persia, but their allies are already 'afraid of their daring in the Persian Wars' (T. 1.90.1 τόλμαν).[24] The same Athenian qualities lead to the 'first open dispute' between Athens and Sparta: when Athenian troops summoned by Sparta do not manage to break the resistance of rebel helots besieged at Ithome, 'the Spartans feared the daring and the innovativeness of the Athenians' (τὸ τολμηρὸν καὶ τὴν νεωτεροποιίαν) and 'sent them away alone of the allies [μόνους τῶν συμμάχων], not revealing their suspicion [that the Athenians might help the helots]' (T. 1.102.3). The qualities shown by the Athenians during the Persian Wars explain not just why they are feared by the Spartans, but also why they resent the step the Spartans take to rid themselves of their fear: 'they did not think they deserved to suffer this at the hands

[23] Cf. T. 1.74.1, 2, 75.1.
[24] Cf. T. 1.74.2, 4.

of the Spartans' (T. 1.102.4 οὐκ ἀξιώσαντες ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων τοῦτο παθεῖν). We recall the insistent claims made by the Athenians in 432 that they were 'worthy' (ἄξιοι) of empire,[25] and that one of the achievements against Persia on which they based that claim was the old lie that they 'alone' fought at Marathon (T. 1.73.4 μόνοι). These echoes ensure that the Persian Wars form a vital part of the causal analysis of the 'Pentecontaetia' without any need for a direct reference.

The 'Pentecontaetia' suggests not just a continuity in Athenian spirit between the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars, but also a continuity in Athenian strategy. Pericles' policy of abandoning Attica and relying on naval power is made possible by Themistocles' strategic foresight in completing the Piraeus walls just after the Persian Wars:

> Themistocles thought that the Athenians, having taken to the sea, were advancing greatly towards acquiring power . . . He wanted by the size and thickness of the wall to keep off the schemes of the enemy: a small number of the most useless men would suffice to guard it, while the rest would go on board the ships [ἐς τὰς ναῦς ἐσβήσεσθαι] . . . He thought the Piraeus was more useful than the upper city, and he often would advise the Athenians, if ever they were hard pressed by land, to go down to the Piraeus and withstand everyone with their ships.
> (T. 1.93.3–7)

Themistocles' strategic vision is also significant because 'going on board ship' was one of the great Persian Wars deeds on which the Athenians prided themselves: a symbol of their willingness to stay and fight for Greece despite the loss of Attica.[26] It is, therefore, not just a continuity in strategy, but also a continuity in spirit, that Thucydides suggests when he picks up the term later in the *History*. In 427, the Peloponnesians, thinking that the Athenians had been weakened by war and plague, planned an attack by sea as well as by land: 'the Athenians manned 100 ships, going on board [ἐσβάντες] themselves except the *hippeis* and *pentakosiomedimnoi*, and the metics' (T. 3.16.1), ravaged the Peloponnese, and prevented the planned

[25] T. 1.75.1, 76.2–3; cf. also ἠξιώσαμεν, 'we thought fit,' at 74.2.

[26] Cf. εσβάντες / ἐσβῆναι ἐς τὰς ναῦς at T. 1.18.2, 73.4, 74.2, 74.4, 91.5; and elsewhere, e.g., Lys. 2.30, 40; Dem. 18.204. Cf. also the terms of the 'Themistocles decree': Meiggs and Lewis 23.13–4; Plut. *Them.* 10.4. At T. 4.25.5, 100.5, however, the phrase is unemphatic.

attack. During the oligarchic coup in 411 they show again that they are the same Athenians as of old: when it is thought that a Spartan fleet is sailing for the Piraeus, 'the Athenians at once went at a run, all together, to the Piraeus . . . and some went on board the ships that were lying ready [ἐς τὰς παρούσας ναῦς ἐσέβαινον], while others began launching additional ships' (T. 8.94.3).

Elsewhere, the memory of the Persian Wars can be used to suggest not just the possibility, but also the desirability, of Pericles' policy. Pericles closes his speech urging the Athenians to resist Spartan demands before the war by appealing to the Athenian abandonment of their city before Salamis:

> It is from the greatest dangers that the greatest honors come to both city and individual. Our fathers at any rate resisted the Persian without even the same resources, but leaving their resources, drove away the barbarian by judgment more than by chance, by daring more than by force. . . . We must not fall behind them, but must resist the enemy in every way and attempt to hand down our resources to our descendants unimpaired. (T. 1.144.3–4)

And in Pericles' Funeral Oration, it is Marathon that underlies his presentation of the Athenians as people who 'eagerly repelled the invading enemy, barbarian or Greek' (T. 2.36.4) and 'do not make the invading enemy resent being harmed by men like them' (2.41.3).

Pericles' attempt to inspire the Athenians to resist also helps to elicit the impracticality of his strategy: he is speaking at a time when the Athenians are confined in their city, not beating off invaders. In the narrative, too, Thucydides calls on the Persian Wars to explain why the Athenians find Pericles' strategy hard to follow: 'When their land was being openly ravaged, a thing which the young men had never seen before and the old only in the Persian Wars, it seemed terrible, as was natural [εἰκός]; it seemed best to all, and especially to the young, to go out and not let it happen' (T. 2.21.2). The reason why they do not tolerate the sight is suggested by Archidamus, leader of the invading force: 'the Athenians think that they deserve to rule others [ἄρχειν . . . τῶν ἄλλων ἀξιοῦσι] and to invade and ravage their neighbors' land rather than to see their own ravaged' (T. 2.11.8); and again the unstated but understood reason why they think that they deserve to rule others is their efforts in the Persian Wars.[27]

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[27] Cf. above, n. 25. That Thucydides supports Archidamus' proposal is suggested by the use of εἰκός, 'natural,' at T. 2.11.8 and 21.2.

Thucydides' account of the ravaging of Attica suggests that the Peloponnesian War does not simply look back to the Persian Wars: it is also in some sense a reliving of it. A sense that the Persian Wars are being relived is also evoked when Thucydides describes how hard it was for the inhabitants of Attica to move to the city and leave estates which 'they had lately restored after the Persian invasions' (2.16.1); and again the effect is to point to difficulties in Pericles' policy. The difference lies in the roots of the emotional engagement with the countryside implied by the two accounts: in the one case it is born of the self-regard of an imperial power, in the other of a deep attachment to a settled mode of life. The emotional—and sympathetic—tone in which Thucydides records the upsetting of that settled mode of life through the reliving of the Persian Wars reappears in his account of the revolt of Chios in 412: 'the Athenians devastated their country, which was beautifully stocked and had remained uninjured to that time since the Persian Wars: for after the Spartans the Chians are the only people I have known who have been at the same time both prosperous and prudent, and they ordered their city the more securely the greater it grew' (T. 8.24.3); the Chians suffered 'in the unexpected turns of human life' (4).

These last two passages show that the Peloponnesian War could be conceived as a return to the destruction of the Persian Wars: other passages will show that it could be conceived as a perversion of the Persian Wars. In the 'Archaeology' of Book 1, Thucydides does not simply argue that the Peloponnesian War was greater than earlier wars; he suggests a contrast between Greek unity during the Persian Wars and Greek division afterwards: 'By a common effort [κοινῇ], they repulsed the barbarian; but not long later they split into two divisions, one under the Athenians, the other under the Spartans . . .' (T. 1.18.2).[28] This division is a precondition of the increase in the power of Athens and Sparta by the time of the Peloponnesian War, and so of the greatness of that war; and the suffering caused by divisions between cities and within cities is another indication of the greatness of Thucydides' war. Whatever we think of that claim, 'it is the argument of a man who regarded war not as an occasion for glory . . . but as an evil':[29] a man who looks back to the Persian

[28] Cf. Erbse (1989) 102, who argues that the 'Archaeology' depicts the difficult progress towards national unity as foil to its collapse in the Peloponnesian War.

[29] Gomme (1937) 120.

Wars as a time when the Athenians and the Spartans 'flowered with their alliance intact' (T. 1.19 ἤνθησαν). The shift away from a common effort is further reflected in Thucydides' description of the battle of Sybota (scene of the first fighting between Athenians and Peloponnesians since the Peace of 446/5) as 'the greatest sea-battle ever fought by Greeks against Greeks ["Ελλησι πρὸς "Ελληνας] in terms of the number of ships engaged' (T. 1.50.2): Salamis is the implied term of comparison.

The perversion of the Persian Wars is not marked just by the move from unity against an invader to disunity: Athens is now conceived by its enemies as the new Persia.[30] The analogy between Athens and Persia is implicit in the Spartans' proclamation that they were liberating Greece (T. 2.8.4), in various speakers' calling Athens a tyrant city (T. 1.122.3, 2.63.2, 3.37.2), and in references in both speeches and narrative to Athens' 'enslavement' of other Greeks (speeches: e.g., T. 1.68.3, 69.1, 121.5, 122.2, 124.3; narrative: 1.98.4). This implicit analogy is particularly striking when made by the Mytilenaeans during the panhellenic festival at Olympia (T. 3.10.3–5). And it is at another charged setting, Plataea, that the analogy is first made explicit:[31] the Thebans use the same terms for past Persian behavior and present Athenian behavior, and counter the Plataeans' claim that they alone of the Boeotians did not medize with the claim that they alone have atticized (T. 3.62.1–2); and they draw an implicit parallel between the liberation from Persia won at Plataea in 479 and the liberation from Athens won at Coronea in 446 (3.62.5, cf. 67.3). All this is in marked contrast to the Athenians' earlier claims: now rather than 'liberators,' they are 'enslavers'; and later, as we have seen, it is Athenians who inflict on Chios the harm previously done by Persians.

The very prominence of the Plataean sections in Thucydides' narrative is another pointer to his conception of his war as a perversion of the Persian Wars. Much more could be said on this topic: the Persian Wars must be central to any attempt to explain why

[30] This conception is found in other texts, too: cf. Tuplin (1996) 142–5 on old comedy; and Henderson (1975) 35, who argues that implied links between the Persian and Athenian empires are part of the undermining of Athens' self-presentation in Plato's *Menexenus*; and note that Miller (1997) argues that a deliberate 'Persizing' was part of the Athenians' self-expression through their material culture (see esp. 218–42 on the Odeion of Pericles).

[31] Cf. Connor (1984) 93.

Thucydides has his war begin with the Thebans' attack on Plataea, why he exploits Plataea's destruction as an occasion for exploring moral issues and the way in which rhetoric deals with moral issues, why he includes so much religious detail in the Plataean debates, and why he makes the Plataeans' self-presentation so close to that of the Athenians'. The Persian Wars would surely also have been prominent in Thucydides' treatment of the fate of Athens at the end of the war.

The Spartans' destruction of Plataea is itself part of Thucydides' story about the tarnishing of their great Persian War achievements in the Peloponnesian War. This story continues when Spartan hoplites are stranded and surrounded on the island of Sphacteria in 425: Thucydides' comment that they 'were caught in the same position as the men on Thermopylae' (4.36.3) points to the contrast between the Spartans' fight to the death at Thermopylae and their eventual surrender at Sphacteria. And this contrast explains why that surrender was 'of all the events of the war the most unexpected for the Greeks' (T. 4.40.1).[32]

A contrast with the Persian Wars is also central to Thucydides' portrayal of the self-destruction of Corcyra as the archetypal illustration of the harm done by disunity within Greek states. During the early stages of the Corcyraean *stasis*, the oligarchs burn all the houses around the agora to prevent the *demos* from attacking, 'sparing neither their own nor others' (T. 3.74.2 φειδόμενοι οὔτε οἰκείας οὔτε ἀλλοτρίας). Just after the Persian Wars, by contrast, Themistocles had instructed the Athenians, 'everyone in the city, all together, men, women, and children,' to build a new wall 'sparing neither private nor public building' (T. 1.90.3 φειδομένους μήτε ἰδίου μήτε δημοσίου οἰκοδομήματος)[33]—a sentence resounding with a feeling of the civic unity that has been shattered at Corcyra. Two of the catch-phrases that emerged from Athens' resistance to Persia are then evoked in Thucydides' account of the later stages of the *stasis* (some of the oligarchs are now suppliants): fearing a Peloponnesian naval attack, the Corcyraean democrats 'entered into discussion with the suppliants

[32] Cf. Connor (1984) 118 n. 19. For other geographical comparisons involving Thermopylae, see Hyp. 6.12; Paus. 10.22.8.

[33] Elsewhere Thucydides uses the phrase 'sparing neither x nor y' only in his emotive account of the massacre at Mycalessus (7.29.4). For its force, cf. Solon F4 West 12–13; H. 9.39.2; Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.46; Diod. Sic. 13.58.2, 14.53.1; Arrian *Anab.* 1.8.8; Caesar *BG* 7.28.4.

and the others as to how the city might be saved [ὅπως σωθήσεται ἡ πόλις], and persuaded some of them to go on board the ships [ἐς τὰς ναῦς ἐσβῆναι]' (T.3.80.1).[34] A dreadful perversion of the spirit of 480 follows when the threat of attack is gone: 'they led off the ships those they had persuaded to go on board and killed them' (3.81.2).

The implicit contrast with the Persian Wars is here a source of horror. Elsewhere Thucydides' evocation of the Persian Wars, whether explicit or implicit, whether from the narrative or from the speeches, has both an analytical and an emotional register: it is central to his presentation of 'the war of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians' as a war of disunity that springs from, and perverts, a war of unity. That his attitude to the Persian Wars was not dismissive will be confirmed by analysis of his narrative of Athens' invasion of Sicily; this analysis will also show that his attitude to Herodotus was not dismissive either.

III. *Thucydides and Herodotus' Persian Wars*

Herodotus' account of Xerxes' invasion of Greece serves as a counterpoint to Thucydides' account of the Sicilian expedition. A surface similarity lies in the fact that Thucydides' Sicilian narrative has the same 'epic' scope as Herodotus' account of the Persian expedition: it includes a debate at Athens at which the decision to send an expedition is discussed, and a debate at Syracuse about how best to respond to the invasion; it has a catalogue that establishes the scale of the invasion; and it describes in detail the progress of the military campaign.

Far greater correspondences have been proposed: F. M. Cornford wrote that Thucydides 'with evident design' emphasized the parallel with Herodotus' account 'by perpetual coincidences of thought and phrase, and by the turn and colour of all this part of his narrative': 'In the debate upon the expedition we shall hear Nikias reiterate the warnings addressed in vain by Artabanus to the infatuate monarch, and Alcibiades echo the eager tones of Mardonios.'[35] An

[34] For going on board ships, see above, n. 26; and for the association of this act with safety cf. T. 1.74.1, 3; H. 7.139.5.

[35] Cornford (1907) 201. In the course of his Chapter 12, Cornford notes many of the echoes I will discuss; see also the references given by Hornblower (1991–6)

example of these coincidences of phrase occurs towards the beginning of the two accounts. Herodotus says that Darius, when he heard news of Marathon, 'was more eager to send an expedition against Greece' (H. 7.1.1 μᾶλλον ὅρμητο στρατεύεσθαι); and that after a revolt in Egypt, 'he was still more eager to send an expedition against both peoples' (H. 7.1.3 καὶ μᾶλλον ὅρμητο στρατεύεσθαι; cf. also 7.4). Thucydides presents an excursus illustrating 'the magnitude of the island which the Athenians were now eager to invade' (T. 6.6.1 στρατεύειν ὥρμηντο); and later a speech by Alcibiades which makes the Athenians 'much more eager than before for the expedition' (T. 6.19.1 πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον ὥρμηντο στρατεύειν), and a response by Nicias which only makes them 'much more eager' (T. 6.24.2 πολὺ ... μᾶλλον ὥρμηντο).

That both accounts stress an increasing urge for an expedition is itself a revealing sign of their similar color: they exploit the gap between the expectations of participants and the reader's knowledge that the expeditions will fail. This cognitive gap also colors their descriptions of how the expeditions' departures serve as vehicles for display: after Xerxes' offer of a prize for the best-equipped Persian (H. 7.8.δ.1), 'everyone was very eager [πᾶς ἀνὴρ ... εἶχε προθυμίην πᾶσαν], each wanting himself to receive the gifts' (H. 7.19.2); at Athens 'the trierarchs, one and all, were particularly eager [προθυμηθέντος ἑνὸς ἑκάστου] for their ships to stand out in appearance and in speed, while the land forces ... contested with each other over their armor and personal equipment' (T. 6.31.3). Thucydides also describes crowds flocking to watch the Athenian fleet depart, and the sailors themselves pouring libations from gold and silver goblets, and holding 'a contest as far as Aegina' (T. 6.32.2 ἅμιλλαν) as they sail out of the Piraeus: we recall with disquiet Herodotus' description of Xerxes 'looking on' at the Persian forces and 'desiring to see a contest of ships' (H. 7.44 τῶν νεῶν ἅμιλλαν), and later pouring a libation from gold goblets (7.54). The brilliant display of the present is overshadowed by the destruction that awaits. And that destruction is captured in mirror-scenes: Herodotus' account of Xerxes' gaze at the more serious contest of Salamis (H. 8.88, 90), Thucydides' accounts of the shifting emotions felt by onlookers during the final sea-battle at Syracuse and of the wretched departure of the Athenian force from Syracuse (T. 7.71, 75).

II. 144. Note also Raaflaub (1987) 236 n. 40, who raises (skeptically) the possibility that it was Herodotus' debate that was echoing a real debate at Athens.

That the debates which Herodotus and Thucydides present in Persia and in Athens are also colored by the future is suggested by the presence of 'wise advisers': Herodotus' Artabanus and Thucydides' Nicias.[36] They are faced by similar opponents: young men who are moved by personal ambition (H. 7.6.1: Mardonius wants to be ruler of Greece; T. 6.15.2: Alcibiades wants personal wealth and fame), and who disparage the strength of the country which is to be invaded. Their response is to abuse their opponents for being self-seeking (H. 7.10.η.1, T. 6.12.2); to give a more accurate assessment of the strength of the enemy (H. 7.10.α-β, T. 6.20–2); and to warn against submitting to chance (H. 7.10.δ, T. 6.23.3).

The coloring provided by these two advisers is best seen in their recourse to traditional notions of the danger of wanting or hoping for more than one has. Herodotus makes Artabanus warn that it is bad 'to desire much' (H. 7.18.2 τὸ πολλῶν ἐπιθυμέειν), and bad too 'to teach the heart to seek always for more than it possesses' (7.16.α.2 πλέον . . . τοῦ παρεόντος); his opponent Mardonius is described as 'desiring new deeds' (7.6.1 νεωτέρων ἔργων ἐπιθυμήτης). Thucydides presents a Nicias who warns against 'a fatal passion for what is absent' (T. 6.13.1 δυσέρωτας εἶναι τῶν ἀπόντων), and is ignored: 'A passion [ἔρως] fell on all alike to sail. . . . Those of military age felt a longing for the sight and spectacle of what was absent [τῆς . . . ἀπούσης πόθῳ ὄψεως καὶ θεωρίας], and were full of hope that they would come home safely. . . . The desire [ἐπιθυμία] of most of them was excessive' (T. 6.24.3–4).[37]

Thucydides did not seize every chance of mirroring Herodotus' account. He could have increased his emphasis on delusory hope by mentioning the oracle-mongers and seers who filled the Athenians with hope that they would capture Sicily: he exploits them only later, to make a different psychological point (T. 8.1.1: after they learned of their defeat, the Athenians were angry with those who had encouraged them to send the expedition). These oracles would have matched the oracles which the Greek exiles at the Persian court thrust before Xerxes, 'omitting anything that promised defeat for the barbarian, and selecting only those which were most fortunate [τὰ εὐτυχέστατα],

[36] Cf. Marinatos (1980) 305–10. Further links emerge from Artabanus' discussion with Xerxes at the Hellespont, where he appeals for longer deliberation about important deeds (H. 7.51.1, cf. T. 6.9.1; note also T. 1.78.1 and 85.1 for the *topos*), and stresses the problem of supplies (H. 7.49.5, cf. T. 6.20.2).

[37] Cf. also T. 6.10.1, 13.1, and 24.2 for references to the Athenian ἐπιθυμία.

saying how it was fated for the Hellespont to be yoked by a Persian' (H. 7.6.3); Plutarch even claims that Alcibiades himself played the same trick before the Sicilian expedition (*Nic.* 13.2).

Those 'most fortunate' oracles suggest another difference between the two accounts: Herodotus foreshadows the Persians' defeat at a supernatural level ('most fortunate' is how the oracles seemed to the exiles—an especially uneasy description when the oracles involve 'yoking').[38] Herodotus also describes portents such as an eclipse of the sun as the Persians leave Sardis: to Xerxes' interpreters, and to Xerxes' joy, this is a sign that 'god foretells to the Greeks an abandonment of their cities' (H. 7.37.3 ἔκλειψιν τῶν πολίων); to the reader, it suggests not the abandonment of various small cities related by Herodotus (8.36.2, 50.2), but the abandonment of Athens (H. 8.41.3 ἐξέλιπον τὴν πόλιν)—the act of self-sacrifice which lingered in Athenian minds as the forerunner of victory at Salamis.

Here too it is the account of the departure of the Sicilian expedition in Plutarch's *Nicias* which mirrors Herodotus: one of the portents he describes at 13.5 (crows pecking at the Persian Wars dedication the Athenians had set up at Delphi) is itself eloquent of how Athens' defeat in Sicily could be conceived as a reversal of Athens' victory over Persia.[39] The only one in Plutarch's list of portents which Thucydides mentions is the mutilation of the Herms: he writes that 'it seemed an omen for the expedition' (T. 6.27.3), but concentrates much more on its perceived political significance than on its perceived religious significance. Yet Thucydides' development of this political strand is itself ominous: accusations against Alcibiades' tyrannical ambition prepare for the destructive effect which Alcibiades' subsequent recall had on the Athenian expedition in Sicily.

Thucydides strikes many of the same notes as Herodotus not just in the dark foreshadowing of the early stages of his narrative, but also in his intellectual analysis of the mechanics of imperialism. Both historians distinguish between immediate and underlying causes by showing how an underlying drive for conquest is stirred by appeals for help arising from divisions within the enemy: Herodotus describes the pressure exerted by Greek exiles at the Persian court who want

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[38] Especially in view of the stress on yoking in Aeschylus' *Persae* (on this link, see Fisher [1992] 368). For the associations of εὐτυχίη in Herodotus, see H. 1.204.2, 207.2, and esp. the Polycrates narrative: 3.39.3, 40 (seven times), 43.1, 44.1, 125.4.

[39] Paus. 10.15.5–6 (= Cleidemus *FGrHist* 323 F 10) specifies that the dedications were for the battle of Eurymedon.

to regain their position at home; Thucydides describes the pressure exerted by an appeal from Egesta for help against Selinous and an appeal from Leontine exiles for help against Syracuse. In their campaign narratives, too, they focus on how local tensions in the invaded country are affected by the threat from abroad: they suggest that the invading army is able to exploit divisions within the enemy (Herodotus famously comments [8.30] that the Phocians would have medized had the Thessalians supported the Greek cause); that those divisions are strengthened by the unwillingness of other states to commit themselves to one side or the other until the outcome is clear (Gelon and Corcyra in Herodotus, various Sicilian cities, above all Camarina, in Thucydides), despite warnings that the invader will attack them in turn (H. 7.157.3, T. 6.78); but also that those divisions can to some extent be overcome by a shared fear (H. 7.138.2, 145.1; T. 7.33.2, cf. 6.21.1, 33.5). As the two sides clash, the middle ground is eroded: Herodotus calls neutrality medism (8.73.3); Thucydides has the Syracusan Hermocrates threaten vengeance if Camarina refuses to help (6.80.4–5).

The underlying drive for conquest is explored in similar terms in the debates at Persia and in Athens. In Herodotus, Mardonius claims that attacking Greece will deter others from attacking Persia (7.5.2); and Xerxes says that 'if we remain quiet, they will not; rather, they will send an expedition against our land' (H. 7.11.2). In Thucydides, Alcibiades explains that they have to help their allies since the function of allies is 'to cause grief to our enemies over there and prevent them coming over here' (T. 6.18.1), and that 'if we do not rule others, there is a danger that we shall be ruled ourselves' (6.18.3). This concept of defensive imperialism was already formulated by the Lydian king Croesus (H. 1.46.1): his attempt to remove his fear of growing Persian power merely hastened Cyrus' conquest of Lydia (H. 1.79.1). As if aware of that precedent, Alcibiades justifies his view that one has to attack to defend by arguing that enemies abroad would themselves take preventative strikes at Athens (T. 6.18.2). The reasoning of Xerxes and Alcibiades leads to a policy of endless expansion. And they do indeed suggest that one conquest is a step towards more conquest—be it conquest of the whole of Greece (Alcibiades at T. 6.18.4) or conquest of the world (Xerxes at H. 7.8.γ).

The urge to expand is fostered not only by the stories people tell about their opponents, but also by the stories people tell about themselves. Xerxes appeals to the custom he has inherited:

> As I understand from the elders, we have never yet remained inactive since we took over the hegemony from the Medes. . . . There is no need to mention among those who know them well the tribes which Cyrus, Cambyses, and my father Darius conquered and added to our possessions [προσεκτήσαντο]; as for myself, ever since I took over this throne, I have been considering how not to fall short of those who have held this position before me and how not to add less power to our possessions [προσκτήσομαι]. (H. 7.8.α)

Similarly Alcibiades counters Nicias' argument that it is dangerous to seek new conquests while already at war by arguing that 'our fathers obtained their empire even though they had the same enemies we have now . . . and the Persians as well' (T. 6.17.7); and he too holds that rest is impossible for an active power: 'if it is inactive, the city, like anything else, will wear itself out' (6.18.6, cf. 3). The difference between them is that Xerxes' will to act is more positive: 'great achievements are done by great risks' (H. 7.50.3). The link Xerxes expresses between risk and glory was traditional, and shared by Pericles (T. 1.144.3): the glory Alcibiades seeks is personal (T. 6.15.2, 16.1).

The need to match the deeds of the fathers which both Xerxes and Alcibiades express is familiar.[40] Thucydides' Pericles ends his first speech with a plea 'to hand down our resources to our descendants unimpaired' (T. 1.144.4); he looks back in his second speech to the preceding generation as one which did hand down more than it received (T. 2.36.2); and appeals in his final speech to the Athenians 'not to seem worse than the fathers' (T. 2.62.3). Herodotus recounts how 'when Croesus and some Persians were sitting by him, Cambyses asked them how they thought he compared with his father Cyrus; they replied that he was better than his father, since he had kept all that Cyrus had and added Egypt and the sea to those possessions [προσεκτῆσθαι]' (H. 3.34.4; Croesus ambivalently added that the one way he was not like his father was that he did not yet have the sort of son Cyrus had left behind). He also recounts how Darius, in bed with Atossa, is rebuked by her for 'sitting still when he has such great power, and not adding any tribes or power to the Persians' possessions [προσκτώμενος]' (H. 3.134.1).

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[40] Cf. also Aesch. *Pers.* 753–6 for the pressure on Xerxes to do better than Darius; and see in general Jost (1936) Ch. 3.

The pressure of inheritance felt by the actors in Herodotus and Thucydides is mapped out in the overall shape of their works. Pericles stresses in the Funeral Oration the achievements described in the Athenian speech at Sparta and in the 'Pentecontaetia'. Herodotus spans the history of Persian expansion back to its founder, Cyrus, who is driven to further expansion not by a story about his fathers' deeds, but by a story about his own deeds (H. 1.204.2): like Pericles' refusal to talk about the ancestors' deeds 'among those who know them' (T. 2.36.4), Xerxes' refusal to talk about the deeds of Cyrus, Cambyses, and Darius 'among those who know them well' is directed at both the historian's and the speaker's audience.

Herodotus and Thucydides also show how Persians and Greeks fail to control the imperialist urge through debate. Both present debates which take place after a decision has already been made and illustrate the difficulty of changing that decision. The end of the speech in which Xerxes sets out to his select council of nobles his plan of attacking Greece is revealing: 'This is what has to be done; but lest I seem to you to impose my own will, I throw the matter open, and bid whoever wants to express his opinion' (H. 7.8.δ.2). The phrase 'whoever wants' (τὸν βουλόμενον) recalls the democratic assembly-formula 'who wants to speak?'—the hallmark of freedom (Eur. *Suppl.* 438–9). Yet for Artabanus to oppose Xerxes is an act of 'daring' (H. 7.10.1) which inspires Xerxes' anger (7.11.1). That he was speaking for the majority, however, is shown by their joy when Xerxes decides to abandon the invasion (H. 7.13.3). But it is then forcefully revealed to Xerxes in a dream that he cannot abandon the invasion anyway. Later, when Xerxes does announce that he is following the majority, the result is the unfortunate decision to fight at Salamis (H. 8.69.2); but that Xerxes' other advisers think that Artemisia will be punished for warning him against fighting shows that their own advice has been guided by a perception of what he wants to hear. A free expression of opinion is also stifled by the Athenian democracy portrayed by Thucydides: Nicias speaks first under the constraints of a correct perception that he will not persuade the Athenians (T. 6.9.3), and secondly under the constraints of a false perception that he might be able to deter them by exaggerating the force required (6.19.2); and the enthusiasm of the many ensures that those opposed to the Sicilian expedition do not make their opposition felt (T. 6.24.4).

The force of the Herodotean parallels drawn by Thucydides is to suggest that the Athenian invasion of Sicily is in some ways a re-run of the Persian invasion of Greece. This suggestion is enhanced by Thucydides' presentation of the defeat of the Athenian fleet at Syracuse as a reversal of its victory over the Persian fleet at Salamis—a presentation that itself recalls his construction of the Spartan surrender on Sphacteria as a reversal of the Spartan resistance at Thermopylae (see above, Section II). It is here, in the final stages of the Sicilian narrative, that the two currents I have explored in this paper—Thucydides' Persian Wars and Thucydides' use of Herodotus' Persian Wars—merge.

IV. *From Salamis to Syracuse*

In the debate which Herodotus presents taking place in the Greek camp before Salamis, Themistocles argues that they should not move from Salamis: 'if you engage by the Isthmus, you will be fighting in the open sea, and that will be not at all to our advantage, with our heavier ships and smaller numbers . . . whereas fighting in a narrow space [ἐν στεινῷ] with a few ships against many, we will come out on top if things turns out as is probable: for fighting in a narrow space [ἐν στεινῷ] favors us, fighting in an open space [ἐν εὐρυχωρίῃ] favors them' (H. 8.60.α-β). Thucydides analyzes the Athenians' defeat at Syracuse in the same terms: their greater skill and their greater numbers are useless in the narrow space of the harbor at Syracuse—where 'the most ships fought in the narrowest space' (T. 7.70.4).

The difference between the accounts is that Thucydides' tactical analysis extends back from the final battle over earlier sea-battles—and not just over the first sea-battles at Syracuse, but also over sea-battles earlier in the *History*: the final battle at Syracuse is seen to reflect the Athenians' enforced regression to the old-fashioned style of Sybota (T. 1.49) from the skillful maneuvering shown at Naupactus (T. 2.83–92).[41] Herodotus, it is true, does develop at some length

[41] On Thucydides' method of analyzing naval strategy, see de Romilly (1956) 140–60; Hunter (1973) 85–94. Note in particular his use of εὐρυχωρία (T. 2.83.2, 86.5, 90.5, 91.1, 7.36.6, 49.2) and στενοχωρία (T. 2.89.8, 7.36.4 *bis*, 49.2, 70.6—cf. 2.86.5, 90.1, 7.62.1 for other στεν- words).

the relation between numbers and space—but only in his Thermopylae narrative, where he describes how the Spartans hold a narrow path though greatly outnumbered by the Persians.[42] In the Salamis narrative, by contrast, the only hint that Themistocles' advice is justified is the confusion in the narrows between retreating and advancing Persian ships (H. 8.89.2):[43] what wins the day for the Greeks is discipline (they fight σὺν κόσμῳ... καὶ κατὰ τάξιν, 8.86). And Themistocles' argument about fighting in a narrow space is itself presented as a replacement: because the allies are present, he cannot now, as earlier, argue that they would disperse if the fleet moved to the Isthmus.

An even greater difference in the two accounts lies in their treatment of the actual fighting at Salamis and Syracuse. But although Thucydides' narrative of the final battle at Syracuse does not greatly resemble Herodotus' narrative of Salamis, it does not act in textual independence: it recalls Aeschylus' narrative of Salamis in the messenger speech of the *Persae*. 'Both describe with gathering emotion the exhortations before the battle,[44] the first successes of the ultimately beaten (VII 70.2; *Pers.* 412), then the coupling of ships in the narrows (VII 70.4; *Pers.* 413) and the supreme agony of conflict, and finally the flight of the defeated with outcry and groaning (VII 71.6, οἰμωγῇ τε καὶ στόνῳ; *Pers.* 426–27, οἰμωγὴ δ' ὁμοῦ | κωκύμασιν).'[45] And Aeschylus' account of the crowding of corpses in the sea and the helplessness of those still alive (*Pers.* 419–26) is recalled in the piling of body upon body in the waters of the Assinarus (T. 7.84–5).

The comparison between Salamis and Syracuse is suggested not just by the way Thucydides evokes Herodotus and Aeschylus, but

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[42] See esp. H. 7.177 and 211.2 for preventing the Persians using their numerical strength; and for the narrow space, H. 7.175.1, 176.2 *bis*, 211.2, 223.2. Homer *Il.* 7.142–4 already demonstrates the tactical implications of a narrow space.

[43] Cf. H. 8.16.2 for the disturbance to their own side caused by the number of Persian ships at Artemisium, another battle fought in a 'narrow space' (H. 7.176.1 *bis*).

[44] Thucydides' comment on Nicias' exhortation (7.69.2 'he added other arguments which men would use at such a crisis... appeals to wives, children, and national gods') is illustrated by Aesch. *Pers.* 403–5: 'free your fatherland, free your children, women, the seats of your paternal gods, and the tombs of your ancestors.' Note that Diodorus has Nicias invoke Salamis in a speech before the final battle at Syracuse (13.15.2).

[45] Finley (1967) 47. Note that the Salamis narrative in Lysias' Funeral Oration (2.37–9) has many elements in common with Thucydides' account of the final battle at Syracuse: as elsewhere in this speech, direct Thucydidean influence seems likely; but it would also be interesting to know how fifth-century funeral orations described Salamis.

also by the way he constructs the Persian Wars himself in this part of his work. He lets Hermocrates draw the comparison towards the start of the Sicilian narrative:

> There have been few large expeditions, Greek or barbarian, that have gone far from home and been successful: they cannot come in greater numbers than the people of the country and their neighbors, all of whom unite in fear; and even if they fail through lack of supplies in a foreign land, they nonetheless leave fame to those against whom their plans were laid. . . . These very Athenians, after the Persians' unexpected defeat, grew in power through the fame of being the object of their attack; and this may well happen with us too.[46]

And at the end Nicias perhaps refers to the Persians when he tries to encourage his troops with the thought that 'men have been saved from dangers even greater than these' (T. 7.77.1).

As before, the memory of the Persian Wars suggests points of contrast as well as points of comparison. The Greeks did not press against the Persians in retreat or cut them off by destroying their bridge at the Hellespont: the Syracusans determine to stop the Athenians escaping, and continue to press them hard until the end. And it is because they persevere and do not let the Athenians sail away that the Syracusans win the fame foreseen by Hermocrates: 'their achievement would seem fine in the eyes of the Greeks: for the rest of the Greeks would either be freed or released from fear . . . and they themselves would be thought responsible for this, and greatly admired by men now and by men to come' (T. 7.56.2). Syracuse emerges as a new Athens: Pericles had called Athens 'a city worthy to be admired' and boasted that 'we will be admired by men now and men to come' (T. 2.39.4, 41.4); and the basis for Athens' reputation was that it had given freedom.

Syracuse also emerges as similar to Athens in the way it achieves its renown.[47] Hermocrates persuades the Syracusans to resist Athens at sea by 'saying that the Athenians' skill at sea was not inherited from their fathers nor a skill forever, but that they were more landsmen than the Syracusans, and had been forced to take to the sea by the Persians [ἀναγκασθέντας . . . ναυτικοὺς γενέσθαι]; and that against men with daring like the Athenians, those who confronted

[46] T. 6.33.5–6; see Connor (1984) 175–6.
[47] Cf. Edmunds (1975) 23, 140.

them with daring seemed most difficult' (T. 7.21.3). This echoes Thucydides' own account of the Persian Wars in the 'Archaeology': 'as the Persians approached the Athenians . . . went on board ship and took to the sea [ναυτικοὶ ἐγένοντο]' (T. 1.18.2).[48] Another parallel with Athens is that the Syracusans 'offered their own city to stand in the fore of the danger' (T. 7.56.3): Athens too had offered its city 'to stand in the fore of the danger' (1.73.4 προκινδυνεῦσαι, the only other occurrence of the word in Thucydides).[49]

To stress that Thucydides presents Athens' invasion of Sicily as a re-run of the Persian invasion of Greece is not to obscure the differences in the accounts. Whereas Herodotus presents Greeks and Persians as being in many ways different,[50] Thucydides suggests that the similarity between the Syracusans and the Athenians is not restricted to their response to invasion: the Athenians come to regret attacking 'cities which were similar in character—democracies, like themselves, and possessing ships, horses, and greatness' (T. 7.55.2, cf. 8.96.5). Indeed, it is because the Syracusans are a democratic naval power that they are able to respond to invasion as they do: contrast the oligarchic Spartans, who were 'very different in character,' and helpful opponents 'especially in the case of a naval power' (T. 8.96.5).

V. *The Way of All Tyrants*

It remains to discuss how the broad similarities between the invasion narratives of Herodotus and Thucydides affect our reading of Thucydides. The close Herodotean links at the start of his narrative reflect a shared feeling of the shape a story should have. And Thucydides' appropriation of Herodotus is itself part of the shape of his story: the link between the Athenians' greatest triumph and their greatest disaster is but one of many reversals which mark Thu-

[48] Cf. H. 7.144.2 on the war between Athens and Aegina shortly before the Persian invasion as what 'saved Greece by forcing the Athenians to become seamen' (ἀναγκάσας θαλασσίους γενέσθαι).

[49] Cf. de Romilly (1953–72) n. *ad loc*: 'Les idées et les expressions évoquent les Athéniens à Salamine.' The word was commonly used of Athens' performance in the Persian Wars, e.g., Dem. 18.208, Lys. 18.27, Isoc. 4.75, Plut. *Them.* 9.2; and this association was doubtless felt when it was applied to past and future events (Isoc. 4.62: helping the Heraclidae; Lyc. *Leoc.* 50: battle of Chaeronea).

[50] But see Pelling (1997) on how Herodotus undermines many perceived differences.

cydides' Sicilian narrative as 'tragic'. The idea that Syracuse reverses Salamis also makes a historical point: Hermocrates learns a strategic lesson from Athens' performance at Salamis, and the Syracusans want to emulate that performance.

The pattern of echoes has also suggested that Thucydides 'turned against Athens the tremendous moral which his countrymen delighted to read in the *Persians* of Aeschylus and the History of Herodotus.'[51] And another Herodotean echo has led some scholars to contend that this 'tremendous moral' is a theological one: they argue that when Thucydides refers to the 'total destruction' of Athens' force in Sicily (7.87.6 πανωλεθρίᾳ), he alludes not just to Herodotus' representation of Troy's 'total destruction' (H. 2.120.5 πανωλεθρίῃ), but also to the explanation Herodotus there gives of Troy's destruction—that 'great wrongs meet with great punishments from the gods.'[52] Nicias' final speech is also cited as evidence of Thucydides' preoccupations: 'if our expedition was offensive to one of the gods, we have been punished enough' (T. 7.77.3). Unlike in Herodotus,[53] however, there is no overt authorial support for a claim of divine involvement; the Herodotean echo, and Nicias' speech, contribute, rather, to the heightened and tragic tone of the end of the Sicilian narrative.

For Cornford, Thucydides' difference from Aeschylus and Herodotus is that his schema is 'non-theological,' though 'mythical'.[54] There is no need here to discuss in detail Cornford's 'mythical' schema—his suggestion that Thucydides presents the Athenians as driven by 'non-human agencies' (Fortune, Delusion, Hope, Eros) in their move from success at Pylos to destruction in Sicily. The specific links between Thucydides and Herodotus do touch on the role of desire and hope, but they touch far more on the imperialist drive from which those passions spring—a drive common to both Persia and Athens.

It is preferable to see Thucydides' implied comparison between Athens and Persia as drawing 'attention to the natural drive towards

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[51] Cornford (1907) 201.

[52] Marinatos Kopff and Rawlings (1978); for good remarks, see Connor (1984) 208 n. 57 and Fisher (1992) 402–8, both of whom think that Thucydides leaves a religious interpretation open.

[53] See H. 7.139.5 and 8.13 for explicit claims; and also, e.g., Xerxes' dream and the prominent idea of transgressing natural sea-boundaries (Nicias' advice that the Athenians keep the same 'boundaries' with Sicily [T. 6.13.1] is the only hint of that idea in Thucydides).

[54] Cornford (1907) 242. Cf. Hunter (1973) 181 n. 7: 'an outlook less religious [than Herodotus'], but no less metaphysical.'

empire which Thucydides sees as so powerful a force in political activity: states as different as Persia and Athens are subject to this ambition and are driven by it beyond their own control'[55]—rather as Persian rulers as different as Darius and Xerxes are subject to the same ambition.[56] And through the speeches Thucydides, like Herodotus before him, analyzes how states are driven beyond their own control: not just how they are driven by fear towards the destruction they fear, but also how they are moved by the stories they tell about themselves—stories of imperial self-worth and stories of the need to expand and do better than those who have gone before.

Thucydides' analysis of the self-defeating will to expand reveals another, deeper, historical point to his implicating Athens' greatest naval triumph in Athens' greatest naval defeat. The Athenian performance during the Persian Wars was not just a lesson for others; it was that performance, and the way it was perceived, that fostered Athenian expansion in the immediate aftermath of the Persian Wars, and Athenian over-expansion in their more distant aftermath.

VI. *Conclusion: Herodotus and Thucydides*

My analysis of Thucydides' Sicilian narrative confirms that he knew Herodotus' work and that he expected his readers to know it; it suggests, too, that his attitude towards his predecessor was far from contemptuous. This suggestion could be strengthened in other ways. We can point to Thucydides' exploitation of Herodotus for factual information in his speeches;[57] and to some profound methodological similarities in their treatment of the past.[58] We can also point to other ways in which they explore human limitations: they use the figure of the wise adviser precisely to suggest the difficulty of giving wise advice,[59] and they explore the paradoxical patterns (self-fulfilling fears, self-destructive successes) that make rational deliberation difficult.

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[55] Rutherford (1994) 61.

[56] See Pelling (1991).

[57] See Hornblower (1991–6) II. 122–37.

[58] See Fowler (1996) 76–7, who notes that Thucydides' 'language and technique [in the 'Archaeologies' of Books 1 and 6] are thoroughly Herodotean,' and questions whether his methodological remarks in Book 1 are directed at Herodotus; his whole article is a valuable reminder that the loss of other historians warps our view of the relationship between Herodotus and Thucydides.

[59] See Pelling (1991) 131.

The suggestion that the traditional view of Thucydides' attitude to Herodotus should be revised would be further strengthened if Thucydides' conception of Athenian expansion as in some sense a successor to Persian expansion were itself derived from Herodotus. As I noted at the start of this paper, Herodotus is now commonly read as offering a comment on Athenian imperialism: such readings are supported by the consciousness of the force of the Persian Wars tradition that Herodotus (like Thucydides) shows. Herodotus presents a debate over who should hold the left wing at Plataea at which the Athenians start by telling of their ancestors' famous (mythical) deeds; then argue that 'there is not much point in mentioning these; for people who were good [χρηστοί] then might be worse now, and people who were bad [φλαῦροι] then might be better now'; and appeal instead to a recent event—the battle of Marathon—to show that they are 'worthy' [ἄξιοι] of the disputed position (H. 9.27). Their speech anticipates the way later Athenian actions could be (and perhaps were) used against such appeals to Marathon: in his account of the congress at Sparta in 432, Thucydides presents the Spartan Sthenelaidas responding to the Athenians' claim that they were 'worthy' of empire because of their actions during the Persian Wars with the same argument (T. 1.86.1 'if they were good [ἀγαθοί] then against the Persians, but are bad [κακοί] now against us, they are worthy [ἄξιοι] of a double punishment, because they have turned from good to bad').[60] Herodotus also hints at the future when his Athenians say that 'in such circumstances it is not proper to dispute [στασιάζειν] over places in the line' (H. 9.27.6): this recalls how the Athenians were earlier said to be aware that if they 'disputed' (στασιάσουσι) over the leadership of the fight against Persia, Greece would be destroyed, 'thinking rightly, for internal strife is worse than united war by as much as war is worse than peace' (H. 8.3.1)—and how Herodotus there looks ahead explicitly to their actual seizure of the hegemony, and implicitly to the 'internal strife' that resulted from this.

This example suggests that, just as it is valid to read Thucydides' Peloponnesian War as in some sense a commentary on the Persian Wars, so too it is valid to read Herodotus' Persian Wars as in some sense a commentary on the Peloponnesian War. It is also valid to

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[60] This point is made independently by Ubsdell (1983) 312–13.

read Herodotus' Persian Wars stories, like Thucydides', as political stories: his argument that the Phocians would have medized if the Thessalians had resisted (H. 8.30) undermines local appeals to performance in the Persian Wars;[61] and he wrote that his claim that the Athenians were the saviors of Greece would be 'resented by most people' (H. 7.139.1). But what is not valid is to make Herodotus' story about Athenian imperialism his overriding message, the basis of his historical thought; that is, to make it central to our own stories about how he came to write history. It is precisely the political and emotive significance of memory and history that is acknowledged by characters within the works of Herodotus and Thucydides, and revealed by those works as a whole, that should make us suspicious about all easy constructions of the origins of history-writing.

This political and emotive significance also suggests that Thucydides' construction of Athens' defeat in Sicily as a reversal of Athens' victory over Persia is not simply a 'literary' device: 'history is something lived through; and part of the experience of the Sicilian expedition must have been the sense of a national downfall and the shock at the undoing of such might and splendour.'[62] So too Thucydides' construction of the Peloponnesian War as a whole suggests that part of the experience of that war—a war between Greeks that was not a war between neighbors, but a war between two extensive powerblocks—must have been the sense of a contrast with the resistance to Persia.

I have stressed a few points of contact between Thucydides and Herodotus; the differences remain great, and important for their influence on the (partial) restriction of (some branches of) historiography to politics and war. But Thucydides' Persian Wars suggest that even the differences that remain are part of a complex story. Perhaps Thucydides' anti-Herodotean reaction reflects not his rejection of Herodotus, but his perception that Herodotean history was not adequate to convey the intensity of the suffering caused by the realization of the tensions Herodotus had so perceptively intimated.

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[61] Osborne (1996) 342 argues that this 'probably reflects a widely used structure of argument.'

[62] Macleod (1983) 146.

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GUIDING METAPHOR AND NARRATIVE POINT OF VIEW IN LIVY'S *AB VRBE CONDITA**

Mary Jaeger

A 'guiding metaphor' is one that helps readers identify patterns latent in a narrative and in so doing shows how the narrative produces its rhetorical effects. Such interpretive tools are particularly useful for studying historiography, because they bring to light distortion—artistic and other—in narratives that claim to report real events. James Davidson, for example, has used the metaphor of the 'gaze' to argue that the apparently simple narrative of Polybius' *Histories* is not simple at all, for in it 'lines of sight form their own structures, linking the protagonists and the readers of the *Histories* together in the act of looking.'[1] Livy himself offers readers a similar hermeneutic tool in a famous passage from the Preface to his *Ab Vrbe Condita* (= *AVC*) 'this, in particular, is the healthful benefit of studying history, that you look upon examples of every kind of human experience set out on a clear record' (Pref. 10).

Livy's inclusion of the context in which one sees *exempla*, 'set out on a clear record [*in inlustri posita monumento*],' suggests that we seek a more complex metaphor for interpreting the *AVC* than the purely visual 'gaze.' The verb *intueri* ('contemplate,' 'look upon') and the noun *monumentum* ('record,' 'reminder,' 'monument') together encourage readers to compare history—both events and the narrative of events—to a physical monument that one can gaze on, walk around,

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[1] Davidson (1981) 11. The fundamental work on narrativity in historiography is that of White: see (1978); (1987) 1–25. On 'distortions' in classical authors, see Wiseman (1979) 27–40. For basic work on Livy see Kraus and Woodman (1997) 51–81 (with further bibliography).

and perhaps even enter.[2] We should, then, look for a metaphor that helps us understand Livy's sense of space. To do so is to grasp one of his important mental traits, for Livy's sense of space influences the organization of the narrative on the large and the small scale, while that of actors in the history contributes to their characterization.[3] Like Polybius' *Histories*, Livy's narrative can be deceptive, its apparent simplicity concealing a network of relationships among vision, space, cognition, and movement. A useful guiding metaphor will help expose these latent features of the text.

One candidate for such a metaphor is the idea of the labyrinth, or maze, a structure that can be defined minimally as 'a complex path of some kind,' or as 'planned chaos.'[4] The idea of the labyrinth includes the enormous and costly monuments reported by historians and geographers; the place of endless wandering and dangerous disorientation preserved in the Cretan legend; and the symbol of order and symmetry represented in ancient mosaics, on coins, and on vases.[5] The labyrinth poses a familiar challenge: to find one's way from the entrance at the edge to the center, and to return from the center to the exit, a task (*labor*) complicated by the maze's meanderings (*errores*), twists and turns (*ambages*), forks in the road (*bivia*), and dead ends, and sometimes, as in the case of the Cretan labyrinth, by the presence of a monster at its center. To find the way, the maze-walker relies on memory, experience, and a guide, like Ariadne's thread.[6]

Narratives can display some of the qualities of the labyrinth, for they too can involve wandering, ambiguities, and dead ends. Characters

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[2] Unless otherwise indicated, translations are my own. On vision in Livy, see Feldherr (1998). On ancient history as a monument, see Immerwahr (1960). On Livy's history as a monument, see Jaeger (1997). On the preface, see Moles (1993), with further bibliography.

[3] On depictions of places in Latin literature, see Horsfall (1985). On Livy and geography, see Girod (1982); Nicolet (1991) 8–9. On his sense of space, see Griffe (1981); Kraus (1994a); Jaeger (1997).

[4] 'Complex path': Matthews (1922) 2; 'planned chaos': Doob (1990) 52. What I say about labyrinths in general relies heavily on Doob's work. She is for the most part concerned with medieval texts, but parts of her discussion are applicable to any complicated narrative. She does not discuss Livy.

[5] Herodotus 2.148; Catullus 64.110–15; Strabo, *Geography* 17.1.37; Pliny, *Natural History* (= *NH*) 36.84–93; Vergil, *Aeneid* 5.553–603, 6.1–105; Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 8.1–262. On the sources, see Doob (1990) 17–63. For illustrations, see Rykwert (1976) plates 119, 120, 124–7.

[6] Doob (1990) 47.

can wander, narratives themselves can meander, leading readers past crossroads, and down blind alleys. A notable example is the *Aeneid*, which tells of its hero's wandering and labors, his painful decisions, and the disorientation that he and other characters experience. The epic 'constantly winds backward and forward in time, not only in narrative chronology but also in the patterns of retold histories, prophecies and fulfillments.'[7] The very act of reading written narratives like the *Aeneid* or the *AVC* is a metaphorical journey through the papyrus roll, the world represented in the text, and the objective world to which the text refers.[8]

In addition, the idea of the labyrinth is a good model for understanding narrative because it incorporates extremes in perspective:

> Maze-treaders, whose vision ahead and behind is severely constricted and fragmented, suffer confusion, whereas maze-viewers who see the pattern whole, from above or in a diagram, are dazzled by its complex artistry. What you see depends on where you stand, and thus at one and the same time, labyrinths are single (there is one physical structure) and double: they simultaneously incorporate order and disorder, clarity and confusion, unity and multiplicity, artistry and chaos. They may be perceived as path (a linear but circuitous passage to a goal) or as pattern (a complete symmetrical design). They are dynamic from a maze-walker's perspective and static from a privileged onlooker's point of view. . . . They may be inextricable (if no one can find the exit) or impenetrable (if no one can find the center). Our perception of labyrinths is thus intrinsically unstable: change your perspective and the labyrinth seems to change.[9]

By considering Livy's history as a labyrinth, readers become aware of their own position, as well as that of the narrator and characters in the text, along a continuum between the narrowly constricted and the omniscient point of view.[10]

Finally, the labyrinth as represented in the literary tradition presents moral challenges: progress through a labyrinth is a metaphor for persistence and correct decision-making. The maze-walker encounters a series of *bivia*, crossroads, like the one at which Hercules made

[7] Doob (1990) 246, with 227 n. 2 for a survey of literature. See also Fitzgerald (1984). On repetition in the *Aeneid* see Quint (1993) 50–96.

[8] Horace, *Satire* 1.5 is the perfect example of an Augustan author consciously uniting all three.

[9] Doob (1990) 1.

[10] On narrative point of view see Genette (1976) and (1980).

his famous choice between pleasure and virtue.[11] This ethical element makes the maze particularly useful for interpreting the *AVC* which, like the *Aeneid*, is concerned with moral choices. Livy's history attempts to influence its audience's behavior by displaying a series of exemplary individuals who behaved well or badly at memorable and critical moments in the past.[12] And this morality is related to perspective. Some actors in history stand at crossroads that are physical, metaphorical, or both, not knowing which way to turn, while others enjoy a perspective on events that allows them to see the present moment in the context of the whole of Roman history. The results of good decisions, bad decisions, and paralyzing indecision all become clear to the author looking at the past with hindsight and to readers sharing the author's privileged point of view. By showing exemplary actors in history adopting particular points of view and the results of their doing so, Livy's narrative encourages readers to adopt or avoid them as well. As a guiding metaphor, then, the idea of the labyrinth helps disclose a network of relationships between several elements of the narrative: the space it represents; the decisions made by actors in Rome's past; the points of view adopted by actors, narrator, and reader; and movement—movement through the text by readers and narrator, through the space represented in the text by actors and narrator. How dynamic this relationship is becomes clear as we use the labyrinth to interpret Livy's text.

What follows, then, uses the metaphor to interpret some paradigmatic passages in the *AVC*—paradigmatic because they establish patterns of behavior for both actors in and readers of the history. Let me be clear: I am not arguing that Livy consciously constructed the *AVC* as a metaphorical labyrinth. He never mentions a labyrinth in the extant books of his history, and there is no evidence that he intended his text to be seen as one. But his comments on the nature of his work and its subject matter, and the history's representation of space given order and meaning by memory, suggest that the text will lend itself well to interpretation with this metaphor.

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[11] The story was told by Prodicus and reported by Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 2.1.21–34. On Hercules see Doob (1990) 49–50, 173–5, 214–17.

[12] On *exempla* see Chaplin (1993), with further bibliography.

The Material City

Written sources for classical labyrinths fall into two categories, the historical-geographical and the mythical-poetical. The former, which describes labyrinths as large, complex, and dazzling, tends to emphasize the effort and expense involved in building them, while the latter tends to emphasize their nature as places of wandering, disorientation, and dangerous if beguiling delay.[13] Either model can help interpret Livy, depending on where we superimpose the idea of the maze: on the description of the city Rome, on the narrative as a journey through metaphorical space, or on other space represented in the text. Let us consider first the labyrinthine nature of the material city, then that of other spaces.

Herodotus says of the Egyptian labyrinth, 'I saw it myself, and it is indeed a wonder past words; for if one were to collect together all the buildings of the Greeks and their most striking works of architecture, they would all clearly be shown to have cost less labor [*ponos*] and money [*dapane*] than this labyrinth' (2.148).[14] When Pliny describes the Italian labyrinth (which, he says, no longer existed in his time), he places emphasis on the expense of the endeavor as well as its vanity. Lars Porsenna built the structure 'for a tomb, but with the result that even the vainglory of foreign kings was surpassed by that of Italians.' A certain reluctance to represent the Italian labyrinth comes across in Pliny's account. He will not describe it in his own words, because its improbability exceeds all bounds (*cum excedat omnia fabulositas*). Instead he will use Varro's:

> He is buried close to the city of Clusium, in a place where he has left a square monument built of squared blocks of stone, each side being 300 feet long and 50 feet high. Inside this square pedestal there is a tangled labyrinth, which no one must enter without a ball of thread if he is to find his way out. On this square pedestal stand five pyramids, four at the corners and one at the center, each of them being 75 feet broad at the base and 150 feet high. They taper in such a manner that on top of the whole group there rests a single bronze disk together with a conical cupola, from which hang bells fastened with chains: when these are set in motion by the wind, their sound carries to a great distance, as was formerly the case at Dodona. On

[13] Doob (1990) 17–38, esp. 18.
[14] Herodotus 2.148. All quotations of this author are from Grene (1987).

> this disk stand four more pyramids, each 100 feet high, and above these on a single platform, five more.[15]

According to Pliny, Varro was ashamed (*puduit*) to give the height of all those pyramids. The Etruscan stories (*fabulae*) consider it a work of raving madness (*vesana dementia*) 'to have sought glory through expense that would profit no one [*quaesisse gloriam inpendio nulli profuturo*]' and 'to have exhausted the resources of the kingdom [*fatigasse regni vires*]' only to produce a final irony, that the unnamed architect received greater glory than the Etruscan king (Pliny, *NH* 36.93).

Size, expense, effort: we might be reminded here of some costly and labor-intensive building projects in Livy, particularly those of Rome's Etruscan kings, Tarquin the First and his descendant, Tarquin the Proud. After ending the war against the Sabines and the Latins, Tarquin the First 'began work on peaceful undertakings [*opera*] with an enthusiasm even greater than the effort with which he had waged war, so that the people were no more at rest at home than they had been in the field':

> For he set about girding [*cingere parat*] the city where it had not been fortified with a stone wall, a task [*operis*] that had been interrupted at its beginning by the Sabine war; and he drained the lowest parts of the city, those around the Forum, and the other valleys between the hills, which were too level to drain easily, using sewers running down toward the Tiber from higher elevations. Finally, foreseeing the splendor which the place would someday possess, he laid foundations for the temple of Jupiter on the Capitol, which he had vowed during the Sabine war. (1.38.5)

Tarquin's projects comprise the essential features of a model labyrinth: the surrounding wall; the center, marked by the site of the temple of Jupiter; the passageways, represented by the sewers.[16] In its stratification (up to the Capitoline, down into the drains) it calls to mind Lars Porsenna's tomb, and the Egyptian labyrinth which, according to Herodotus and Pliny, was multi-storied with underground passages and chambers.[17]

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[15] Pliny, *NH* 36.91–3, trans. D. E. Eichholz (Loeb).

[16] On the significance of wall-building to the narrative structure of Book 1, see Konstan (1986). On the centrality of the Capitoline, see Borgeaud (1987). Gowers (1995) 25 uses the metaphor of the body to describe the city and compares the sewers to Rome's intestines. On abstractions of Roman topography see Cançik (1985).

[17] 'There are double sets of chambers in it, some underground and some above,

The account of Tarquin the Proud's reign joins the expansion of this project to the expansion of territory: the king's plans for the city grew when he acquired booty from Pometia (1.53.3). Then, having captured the town of Gabii, Tarquin turned his attention back to building, especially to the temple of Jupiter, in order 'to leave a reminder of his kingship and his name [*ut . . . monumentum regni sui nominisque relinqueret*]' (1.55.1). This last expression calls to mind the Egyptian kings who, according to Herodotus, 'decided to leave a monument [*mnemosyna*] to themselves' (2.148). As Tarquin's plans became more ambitious, the expense of building exceeded the available booty: 'the king's spirit was roused to greater expenditure [*augebatur ad impensas regis animus*]; and so the booty from Pometia, which had been intended to complete the work [*opus*], barely sufficed for the foundations' (1.55.7).

Increasingly obsessed with his temple, Tarquin summoned workers and pressed the plebeians into action, so that it became both a repository of their *labor* and *opera*, and an *opus*, an artifact of their labor:[18]

> Intent on completing his temple, he sent for workmen from throughout Etruria, and used not only public money for it, but even labor [*operae*] exacted from the plebeians. This work [*labor*] was not trivial in itself, and was added to their military service. All the same the plebeians felt less heavily burdened at having to build with their own hands the temples of the gods than they did later, when they were transferred to other tasks [*opera*] which, while less showy, involved more labor [*laboris*]. That is the construction of rows of seats in the Circus, and the construction underground of the Cloaca Maxima, a repository for all the discharge of the city, two works [*operibus*] which the new splendor of our day [*nova haec magnificentia*] has scarcely been able to equal. (1.56.1–2)

Like the Egyptian labyrinth and Lars Porsenna's tomb, regal Rome is both the monument of a particular king or set of kings, and an artifact of monarchy itself. But it also provides Brutus the Liberator with the reminder by which he rouses the Roman people against the king: 'he made reference to the arrogance of the king himself,

and their number is 3000; there are 1500 of each,' Herodotus 2.148. See also Pliny, *NH* 36.87–8.

[18] In medieval etymology the word 'labyrinth' was derived from *labor intus* 'work inside,' meaning that the labyrinth was work to build, work to traverse, but also that it was the artifact of labor: Doob (1990) 32.

and the tasks [*labores*] imposed on the wretched plebeians sent down to clear out ditches and sewers: Romans, he said, conquerors of the peoples all around [*victores omnium circa populorum*], had been made carpenters and stonecutters' (1.59.3). Brutus reminds the people of their identity. His criticism of the construction projects implies that Romans should expand outward, building empire and subjugating others, not upward and downward, building a city as an act of obedience to a king.

The layering of the city continues at the end of Book 5, after the Gauls have destroyed Rome, when hasty rebuilding causes sewer lines to run haphazardly below public and private buildings: 'that is the reason why the old sewers, sent at first through public right of ways, now run here and there beneath private houses' (5.55.2). The beginning of Book 6 places emphasis on the effort and expense of reconstruction (key words reappear: *opus, labor, opera, inpensa*).[19] The enormous expense threatens to restore the monarchy as Manlius Capitolinus gains a personal power base on account of debt incurred in this work, 'the activity most ruinous even to the rich: building [*re damnosissima etiam divitibus, aedificando*]' (6.11.9). And the report of the Capitoline's new substructure conveys the idea of Rome as a dazzling product of labor: 'that year, so that the city might grow not by private projects [*operis*] alone, the foundations of the Capitoline were laid in square blocks of stone, a work worth seeing even in the city's present magnificence [*opus vel in hac magnificentia urbis conspiciendum*]' (6.4.12).

Thus the first book and the junction of Books 5 and 6 give the old Rome and the rebuilt city several qualities that can be identified as labyrinthine: a surrounding wall, a fixed center, layers of construction, enormity, great effort leading to spectacular results. In turn, the metaphor of the historical-geographical labyrinth adds force to the image of the early city as a fabulous, complex, and labor-intensive *monumentum*, one comparable only to the works that set the current standard for dazzle, the Rome of Livy's day—'this new splendor [*nova haec magnificentia*]' (1.56.1), 'the city's present splendor [*hac magnificentia urbis*]' (6.4.12)—just as Herodotus, writing for the Greeks, measures the Egyptian labyrinth against a standard familiar to them:

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[19] E.g., 6.1.6 *cum civitas in opere ac labore assiduo reficiendae urbis teneretur*; see also 6.4.6, 5.1, 5.5.

'all the buildings of the Greeks and their most striking works of architecture.'

Ideas of expense and effort also characterize Livy's representation of his own undertaking. In his preface he points out that the *res Romana*—both Rome's achievements and the writing of Roman history—requires immeasurable effort (*res est praeterea et inmensi operis*), partly because the historian must trace it back over seven hundred years, and partly because it is so large that it struggles under its own bulk (*magnitudine laboret sua*).[20] Indeed, Livy's first words ask whether he will achieve the price of his labor (Pref. 1 *facturusne operae pretium sim*). He speaks of the one reward that he can count on in terms compatible with the idea of the labyrinth, not the labyrinth seen from the outside as a dazzling architectural accomplishment, but the labyrinth as a place of beguiling delay: 'for my part I will seek this reward for my labor [*laboris praemium*], to turn myself away from the sight of all the evils which our age has seen for so many years, at least as long as I mull over those early matters with all my concentration, free from all care that can trouble the writer, even if it cannot turn his mind from truth' (Pref. 5).

Livy's narrative resembles both his description of the material city and the labyrinth of the historical-geographical tradition also because it constructs a conceptual Rome of many layers, consisting of place-names imposed on the landscape and variant versions of stories imposed on stories already told.[21] In his preface Livy explains that he needs to rely on *fabulae* as evidence for events that are remote and legendary, whereas *monumenta*, from buildings to written records (*monumenta litterarum*), offer visible and more trustworthy evidence for events that are better attested.[22] Herodotus comes to mind again:

> We ourselves saw the aboveground chambers, for we went through them and so can talk of them, but the underground chambers we can speak of only from hearsay. For the Egyptians entirely refused to show

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[20] Pref. 4. Moles (1993) 141–3 observes the slippage in the meaning of *res* between the history being written and the events being written about. Kraus (1994a) 267–70 points out the overlap between the city whose history Livy writes and the text he constructs.

[21] Miles (1995) 35–8 on 7.6.1–6; Kraus (1994a) 285–7.

[22] Pref. 6 *quae ante conditam condendamve urbem poeticis magis decora fabulis quam incorruptis rerum gestarum monumentis traduntur, ea nec adfirmare nec refellere in animo est.* On the *fabula/monumenta* dichotomy see Miles (1995) 8–74.

> us these, saying that there were, in them, the coffins of the kings who had builded the labyrinth at the beginning and also those of the holy crocodiles, so we speak from hearsay of these underground places; but what we saw above ground was certainly greater than all human works. (2.148)

The Egyptian labyrinth's above-ground chambers, known from sight and experience, and the underground ones, known only from hearsay, provide an apt metaphor for the way traces of the more recent past both rest upon and hide the faintly remembered distant past, just as the seen rests upon and hides the unseen.[23]

In Livy's early books, the city, the physical *res* of the Roman people, shares several features of the labyrinth of the historical-geographical tradition, especially its emphasis on effort and expense, and its complex stratification. In converse, the idea of the city as labyrinth brings out the sense of extravagance and excessive—possibly vain—labor involved in the construction of regal Rome, as well as the enormity and daring of Livy's own effort.[24] Moreover, it draws attention to the issue of perspective by suggesting that from the outside, that is, to one considering them as a whole, the *res gestae populi Romani* may appear to be a coherent structure, albeit complicated and enormous like the labyrinths of Herodotus or Pliny, while from the inside, to one working through the massive *res*, by reading, writing, or participating in them, they seem a place of potentially endless wandering.

Errores, Ambages, *and* Bivia

Representations of labyrinths fall into categories according to whether the media that depict them are visual or literary: they are unicursal or multicursal.[25] In the unicursal labyrinth a single path leads from entrance to center, creating the longest possible route between the two points. To reach the center a person must first make the decision to enter the maze, then persevere through the many twists and turns that hamper progress toward the goal. Images, on coins, for example, or in mosaics, represent unicursal mazes. In contrast,

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[23] See also Livy 6.1.1–2, with Kraus (1994) 85–6.

[24] Livy's emphasis on extravagance and effort may hint at the question put more explicitly by Vergil: What price Rome? See Doob (1990) 248.

[25] Doob (1990) 46–51.

literary descriptions, of which the *Aeneid* is the most obvious example, represent multicursal mazes: there are many points where the maze-walker must choose one of two paths, but only one leads to the center, while the others lead to dead ends. While the unicursal maze stresses delay and challenges the maze-walker to persevere, the multicursal stresses confusion and challenges the maze-walker to make correct decisions again and again:

> It does not consist of a single crucial choice, rather, it incorporates an extended series of *bivia*, an array of choices. It embodies frequent testing and repeated confrontations, with no apparent end to the struggle until the goal or the entry is achieved. Hence this type of maze is a perfect symbol of intellectual and moral difficulty as well as aesthetic complexity. The characteristic quality of movement through such a maze is halting, episodic, with each fork or alternative requiring a pause for thought and decision. The direction of movement is constantly shifting, now here, now there, as the wanderer's choices and the maze's paths lead him. . . . In addition, a maze-walker may lose confidence, retrace his (or her) steps, take another path, right or wrong. The essence of the maze experience is confusion, doubt, and frustration as one ambiguity succeeds another.[26]

In his own research and composition Livy was compelled to make decisions about which narrative to follow for a given episode. By expressing confusion, doubt, and frustration about those decisions he sometimes places himself in the maze-walker's subjective position.[27] Yet Livy's research has also gained him a long-range perspective placing him in the privileged position of the viewer on high, like the person in Strabo who stands on top of the Egyptian labyrinth and sees its great extent, or the person who, having traversed the maze, remembers the route and guides others out.[28] For readers faced with any portion of the completed text, be it the book, pentad, decade, or the entire history, the historian has mapped out the multicursal labyrinth and has made it *virtually* unicursal.[29] Readers must simply

[26] Doob (1990) 46.

[27] E.g. 7.6.6, 38.56.1–8. See Miles (1995) 8–74; Jaeger (1997) 132–76. Summarizing the Source-Critics' positions Luce (1977) xxii titles this Livy 'Livy the Wanderer.' According to this portayal 'he had not read ahead very far in the sources before he began his adaptation, but wandered from one to another, uncertain as to exactly what was coming up next or where the narrative would lead.'

[28] Strabo 17.1.37; see Doob (1990) 24.

[29] Doob (1990) 192–221. The space/narrative analogy has parallels in oratory: see Yates (1966) 1–26; Leach (1988) 75–9; Vasaly (1993) 100–2.

persevere through the circuitous narrative that retards their progression toward recent events.

Not that following the author is easy. Livy suggests that his work will take time and effort to read, and that it may occasionally exhaust his reader's patience: those 'hastening toward current events [*festinantibus ad haec nova*]' (Pref. 4) will scurry past him as he proceeds deliberately on his way. At times his readers need a sympathetic remark to remind them they are not alone in their struggles: e.g., of the Samnite wars he asks, 'who would begrudge the length of time spent on writing or reading of wars which did not wear down the men who fought them?'[30]

Readers need persistence to cope with all this delay, and Livy tries to win them over to the benefits of moving slowly. Consider the opening of Book 1, Aeneas' journey from Troy to Latium (1.1–10). We can plot it out as a trip through a multicursal labyrinth with dead ends and *bivia*, but one made unicursal by the historian's guidance. The narrative begins at a sufficiently fixed starting point: 'first of all, it is sufficiently agreed [*iam primum omnium satis constat*],' an entrance for the reader and historian, and gives the preconditions for the history: 'Troy having been captured [*Troia capta*],' an entrance for Aeneas, Antenor, and the other survivors of the Trojan War. From here stories diverge, because of destiny, decisions made by individual characters, and contradictions in the sources. The first fork is the result of a moral crux: Aeneas and Antenor were spared the savagery of the victors because they had always stood behind a policy of giving back Helen. So Trojan fates diverge: 'the Greeks vented their rage on the rest of the Trojans [*in ceteros saevitum esse Troianos*], but refrained from harming two [*Aeneae Antenorique . . . omne ius belli Achivos abstinuisse*], because of long-standing hospitality and because the two had always supported a policy of returning Helen' (1.1). While the narrative reaches a quick dead end for 'the rest,' it continues on with the fates of Aeneas and Antenor. Antenor, his vicissitudes of fortune (*casibus . . . variis*) and his founding of a new Troy in northern Italy, lead to the second dead end—or rather, for Antenor, a way out of his wandering. Aeneas, still seeking a fixed home (*quaerentem sedes*)

[30] 10.21.10. See also 6.12.1, 31.1.1. Livy exploits the time/space analogy; see Kraus (1994a) 267–70 and on this analogy in Latin in general, see Bettini (1991) 113–93.

meanders on to Macedon, Sicily, and then the coast of Italy, landing in a place that, says Livy, was also called Troy.[31]

Aeneas and his men are drained of resources by their 'almost immeasurable wandering [*ab inmenso prope errore*],' an expression that invokes the apparently endless twists and turns of the labyrinth.[32] When necessity forces them to steal, the local king Latinus leads out his army. At this point in the text the reader encounters another fork in the road, one that reflects the fork encountered by the historian moving through his sources: 'from here the story is double [*duplex inde fama est*]' (1.1.6). Gary Miles points out that while Livy offers two versions of Aeneas' and Latinus' encounter, both are designated as *fama*, 'story,' so that the author stands behind the truth of neither.[33] Equally important is the word *duplex*, 'double,' indicating the fork in the road. The author has followed both stories; the reader must now follow one for a while before turning to the other. And initially both look equally promising: 'some say . . . others say [*alii . . . tradunt . . . alii*].'

One reads the violent version first. Short and direct, it relates three actions in chronological order. 'Some say Latinus, vanquished, made peace and joined an alliance [*alii proelio victum Latinum pacem cum Aenea, deinde adfinitatem iunxisse tradunt*].' This version reaches its end in the verb *tradunt*, with story and syntax complete, except that the memory of *duplex* and *alii* keeps readers aware that they are following one of two versions. Encountering the second *alii*, they return via memory back to the original fork. 'Others say . . .': the second account is a lengthy period, typical of Livy.[34] In its alternation between Aeneas and Latinus it calls to mind the characteristic meandering of the labyrinth:

> When the battle lines had been drawn up, before the trumpets could sound, Latinus came forth among his chiefs, and called the leader of the strangers to a parley. Having inquired then who they were, whence

[31] On the murky but fascinating issue of the relationship between Troy, the word meaning 'fortified town,' and the labyrinth that is suggested by the intricate patterns of the 'Troy Game' and the Tragliatella Oinochoe, see Rykwert (1976) 144–8 and Ogilvie (1970) 37.

[32] Cf. Vergil, *Aeneid* Books 1–4, with Doob (1990) 229–34.

[33] Miles (1995) 29–30.

[34] Cf. Herodotus' 'triple roads of story' at 1.95. I would like to thank David Chamberlain for pointing this out to me. On Livy's periodic style, see Chausserie-Laprée (1969) 294–300; Oakley (1997–8) I. 128–39.

they came, under what circumstance they had left home, and with what purpose they had landed on Laurentian territory, after he heard that the multitude were Trojans, and that their leader was Aeneas, son of Anchises and Venus; that with his fatherland destroyed by fire he had set forth from home and was looking for a home and place to found a city; [Latinus], having admired the nobility of his race and a spirit ready for either war or peace, and having given him his right hand, solemnly pledged friendship; then a treaty was struck between the leaders and greetings exchanged between the armies. Aeneas was Latinus' guest; there Latinus, before his household gods, joined a family alliance to a public one, giving his daughter to Aeneas in marriage. (1.1.6–10)

The passage directs attention first to Latins then to Trojans, then back to Latins, and so on, as questions, answers, handshakes, greetings, and finally a daughter are exchanged between them. The contrast between this version of the settlement and the other is striking, for the narrative has changed pace in a way that does not necessarily reflect reality: having represented an entire battle in a few quick strokes, it reports the alternate version in such detail that readers have the impression that they are observing the conversation take place in real time.[35]

The episode ends by returning to the labyrinthine vocabulary with which it began: 'that matter in particular strengthened their hope of putting an end to their wanderings by providing a fixed and secure position [*ea res utique Troianis spem adfirmat tandem stabili certaque sede finiendi erroris*].'[36] While the wanderings of the Trojans seem to be over, those of historian and reader have just begun. At the next doubtful point, the identity of the son who ruled with Lavinia after Aeneas' death, labyrinthine vocabulary surfaces again in the expression 'I would not doubt [*haud ambigam*, 1.3.2].'[37]

Thus, although the historian has made the choice at the *bivium*, the text artificially delays readers in their journey, just as the many twists and turns of the maze artificially slow the maze-walker who is traversing what is really a short distance as the crow flies: from

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[35] Miles (1995) 31 points out that Livy could have elaborated either version. Ogilvie (1970) 38–9 observes that the second version was less embarassing for the Latins and was also adopted by Vergil (*Aeneid* 7.170).

[36] For *error* in a contemporary labyrinth see Vergil's description of the Cretan labyrinth at *Aeneid* 6.27 *hic labor ille domus et inextricabilis error.*

[37] Doob (1990) 24 and 53–4.

entrance to center, from center to exit, from landing to Lavinia. In elaborating the 'Odyssean' version of the story rather than the 'Iliadic' (not only does the description meander, but the questions and answers resemble those typical of host and guests in the *Odyssey*), the narrative suggests that process, the metaphorical journey through the past, will be as important as any goal.[38] The passage draws attention to the act of reading rather than to a 'fact' about the past, and in doing so suggests that reading itself may, indeed, be the ultimate reward of studying history, just as the beguilement of research and writing is Livy's only sure reward.

Delay and the Big Picture

The idea of the labyrinth is most useful for interpreting Livy's narrative because it makes moving through space a matter of character. The exemplary leader in Livy will understand the nature of a place, proceeding through it and representing it to others in ways that lead to Roman success. A case in point is the story of Publius Decius in Book 7.[39]

This is the second of three episodes that relate Rome's first war against the Samnites as it extends its reach into southern central Italy.[40] Decius' story argues for the importance for Romans of suspending judgment and submitting to delay when they are in strange places and dangerous situations, because in so doing they gain advantageous points of view.[41] In order to demonstrate this, the narrative

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[38] Murgia (1993) 96. On the circularity of 'Odyssean' wandering in the *Aeneid*, see Quint (1993) 53–65.

[39] Consul in 340 BCE and famous for his *devotio* in battle against the Latins at Veseris; father of P. Decius Mus, who was consul four times and censor. Other leaders who make advantageous use of space are L. Marcius and the elder Scipio Africanus. See Jaeger (1997) 107–24, 137–43.

[40] On the Samnite Wars see Salmon (1967), esp. 187–213 on the First Samnite War; Cornell (1989) 351–419; Oakley (1993) 9–37 and (1997–8) II. 274–84 and *passim*, with further bibliography (I regret that this volume arrived too late for me to be able to consult it in detail).

[41] Themes of Book 7 include the importance of innovation, timing, and taking the long view. Examples of the first include the introduction of plebeian consuls (7.1.1), patrician, then plebeian praetors and curule aediles (7.1.1), the origins of drama (7.2.1–13), and the first plebeian consul to lead an army in the field. The importance of timing: delay to prevent anything important from being accomplished

repeatedly unites and separates the points of view of actors, reader, and narrator. The idea of the labyrinth—our metaphor for discourse, enforced delay, and repeated decision-making—exposes ways in which a typical account of an ambush survived encourages readers to find a new perspective, to shift from the subjective to the objective, from the tunnel vision of the wanderer in the maze, to the bird's eye view of the person looking down on it from above.

In the middle of Book 7 Livy alerts readers to a transition, offering a synopsis of Roman history that shows us precisely where the next events lead:

> From now on the wars told of will be greater, both because of the might of the enemies and because campaigns were carried out in more remote areas and lasted longer. For in this year an attack was made against the Samnites, a people strong in resources and in arms. After the indecisive Samnite war [*bellum ancipite Marte gestum*] came Pyrrhus as enemy, and after him the Carthaginians. What vast undertakings! How often did we enter into extreme danger, so that we might raise our empire to its present enormity, which can scarcely be sustained! (7.29.1–2)

Readers see 500 years of Rome's past from the author's omniscient point of view. The causal relationship implied here between events in this distant past and the crisis of the narrator's time suggests that the following pages will present paradigms of behavior. Errors and decisions made now, even on matters of detail, will have a wide-reaching influence on Rome's status in later years.

In the episodes that follow, Rome's fortunes fluctuate. After one consul is victorious, disaster nearly strikes the other, who leads his army into an ambush. Decius, a quick-thinking military tribune, saves the Romans by occupying a hill above the enemy position with a small band of men, thus distracting the enemy's attention from the main body of the Roman army until it escapes (7.34.1–37.3). From

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by the first plebeian consul (7.1.4), the danger of haste when the first plebeian consul to lead an army in the field rushes into an ambush (7.6.9), the delaying tactics of Decius in 7.34.1–37.3. The narrative extends the importance of timing and delay to include the reader's task. Book 7 has unusual pacing: the first two thirds (Chapters 1–28) cover twenty-three years, the last third (Chapters 29–42) only two. The shift in pace is striking to readers measuring the progression of the narrative against elapsed consular years. On the structure of Book 7 see Lipovsky (1981) 48–65 (on the struggle of the orders), 89–101 (on military expansion).

the beginning the narrative emphasizes the constriction of the consul's vision in contrast to the broad scope of Decius':

> But this rejoicing was almost marred by a great disaster in Samnium. For the consul Cornelius, setting out from Saticula, rashly led his army into a wood that ran through a hollow ravine [*in saltum cava valle pervium*] and that was surrounded by the enemy [*circaque insessum ab hoste*]. He did not see the threat hanging over him, until it was too late to signal for a safe retreat [*nec prius quam recepi tuto signa non poterant inminentem capiti hostem vidit*]. (7.34.1)

While the Samnites wait for the trapped Roman column to descend to the depths of the valley, Decius notices (*conspicit*) a single hill rising above the defile, looming over the enemy camp (*unum editum in saltu collem, inminentem hostium castris*), one that is difficult of access for an encumbered army but easy for light-armed men (34.3 *arduum inpedito agmini, expeditis haud difficilem*). Livy's readers, now seeing Decius for the first time, also see what Decius sees, the hill and its possibilities, while the Samnites, the Roman consul, and the Roman army do not. The echo of 34.1 *inminentem capiti hostem* in *collem inminentem hostium castris* emphasizes the difference in their vision. Narrator, reader, and Decius share the same perspective, until the narrative shifts into direct speech:

> He said to the terrified consul [*consuli territo animi*], 'A. Cornelius, do you see [*videsne tu*] that peak rising above the enemy [*cacumen illud supra hostem*]? That is the citadel [*arx illa est*] of our hope and safety, if we take action and capture it, since the enemy have neglected it blindly [*caeci*]. Give me only the men in the first and second ranks of one legion, and when I appear on the hilltop with them [*cum quibus ubi evasero in summum*], hurry away from here free from fear, and save yourself and the army [*teque et exercitum serva*]. For the enemy will not be able to move without harm to itself, since it is subject to our weapons. As for us, the fortune of the Roman people or our own courage [*aut fortuna populi Romani aut nostra virtus*] will get us out.' (7.34.6)

Livy's readers see everything that the consul sees, and more. They see that the consul is terrified; but more important, having seen the hill through the narrator's eyes, when Decius did, they can take his measure by considering how he changes the landscape when he presents his plan. For Decius exaggerates the nature of the place: the solitary high hill (*collis editus*), becomes a peak (*cacumen*) and a metaphorical citadel (*arx*). By calling it a citadel, Decius represents the hill to the consul as the strategic center of the place in which the Romans

are enclosed, a reconfiguration of space that makes the Romans' position ambiguous: to the consul they are inside a dangerous trap; to Decius they are outside a 'citadel' of safety.[42] Where they are depends on one's point of view.

Decius makes his way to this 'citadel' with speed and secrecy: 'praised highly by the consul, and taking a detachment of troops, he made his way hidden through the defile. He was not seen by the enemy until he approached his objective [*conlaudatus ab consule accepto praesidio vadit occultus per saltum; nec prius ab hoste est visus quam loco quem petebat appropinquavit*]' (34.7). With all eyes on him (*cum omnium in se vertisset oculos*), Decius gives the signal to the consul to move his army then seizes the summit. Decius' ability to control lines of sight is important here, but so is the way his actions change the shape of space and the manner in which the narrative conveys this. The sentence structure reflects the reversal in Roman and Samnite positions. The first clause presents events in the order in which they occurred: 'praised . . . taking . . . he made his way' [*conlaudatus . . . accepto . . . vadit*], and the second inverts chronology with the negative: 'he was not seen before . . . he approached [*nec prius est visus quam . . . appropinquavit*].' The phrase *nec prius ab hoste est visus* recalls the Roman's initial predicament (34.1 *nec prius . . . hostem vidit*), and shows how neatly tables have turned. Having been surrounded, the Romans now surround their enemy.

The narrative now turns to the Samnites, who find this reconfigured space bewildering. Like the Roman consul, they cannot see their situation from any perspective but that of the maze-walker, which is constricted and subjective. Encountering a fork in the road they cannot act decisively:

> The Samnites moved their standards to and fro, having lost both their opportunities. They could neither follow the consul unless through the ravine where so recently they had him at the mercy of their missiles, nor could they march their troops up the hill which Decius had captured above them. . . . Now they want to surround [*circumdare*] the hill with armed men in order to cut Decius off [*intercludant*] from the consul, now to open a way [*viam patefacere*] in order to attack his men when they descend into the ravine. Night fell upon them while they were still unsure what to do [*incertos quid agerent nox oppressit*].
> (7.34.9–11)

[42] On persuasive representations of space see especially Vasaly (1993), with further bibliography.

Readers see the Samnites' dilemma and its impact on Decius, first through the narrator's eyes, then through those of Decius himself:

> At first Decius was hopeful that from higher ground he would fight attackers coming up from below. Then wonder seized him that they neither entered into battle nor, if the disadvantages of their position prevented them from carrying out that plan, set about surrounding themselves with a rampart and ditch [*opere se valloque circumdarent*]. He summoned his centurions and asked, 'What military ineptitude and sluggishness is this? How did these people achieve victories over the Sidicini and the Campanians? You see how their standards are moving to and fro, first brought together and then led forth; and how no one begins building any fortification [*opus*], although by now we could have a rampart around us [*circumdati*]. Indeed we will be no better than they if we stay here longer than is in our interest.'
>
> (7.34.12–14)

The confused and uncertain Samnites find their antithesis in the nearly omniscient Decius. His lofty point of view, in contrast to the Samnites' position below him, reinforces this antithesis in comprehension. Looking down from above, Decius both sees the Samnites' dilemma and understands how they might escape this 'maze': either attacking uphill or building fortifications that would trap the Romans in yet another 'maze' has a good chance of success. It is in dithering that the Samnites err.

The narrative so far has divided people according to their breadth of vision: the Roman consul and the Samnites fall on one side of the divide, Decius, reader, and narrator on the other. (The men with Decius and the rest of the Roman army have no independent point of view, they simply follow, until Decius speaks to his centurions and asks them if they see [*videtis*]). From here on Decius will communicate his point of view, as he did to the consul, to ever-widening audiences, first to the centurions, then to his men, then to the rest of the Roman army.

For Decius' own labors are not over: he has attained the center of this metaphorical labyrinth safely, but the way in is usually not the problem (we do not hear about Theseus' trek into the Cretan labyrinth; we learn only that he used Ariadne's thread on the way out).[43] To extricate himself and his men, Decius needs both to find the way out of his surrounded position and to persuade his men

[43] E.g., Catullus 64.112–15; Pliny, *NH* 36.85–6, 92. See Borgeaud (1974) 22.

that he can lead them back safely. Decius solves the physical maze first, by disguising himself and exploring his surroundings before it grows too dark to see:

> [Decius said] 'come along with me and, while some light remains, let us seek out the places where they have placed their guards, and a way out from here [*qua pateat hinc exitus*].' Wrapped in a soldier's cloak and with the centurions dressed in the garb of soldiers from the maniples, so that the enemy would not realize that the general was making his way around [*circumire*], he surveyed all these areas [*haec omnia . . . perlustravit*]. (7.34.14–15)

Decius' thorough preparation demonstrates his abilities as a general and places him in sharp contrast with the consul.[44] Yet the narrative describes his exploration only briefly, in order to focus instead on the greater challenge that he faces, i.e., to convey his knowledge to his audience so that it too sees a picture of the whole.

In the middle of the night Decius summons his men and presents them with his plan for escaping from their dangerous position and rejoining the rest of the army (7.35.1–12). Decius asks his men to assemble silently and to remain silent until he has finished speaking. Then they are to make a single decision: to move silently to the right, or not: 'when I have completed delivering my opinion, then you who agree will step silently to the right [*in dextram partem taciti transibitis*]. Our decision will rest with the majority [*eo stabitur consilio*]' (35.2). The same knack for timing with which Decius asked the consul to wait until he reached the top of the hill and only then to move the army, comes into play again. The men are to suspend judgment and defer their decision until they see the big picture, that of the maze solved, just as the consul was to wait until Decius reached its center.

First, Decius shows the men how they came to occupy this space. It is not a result of cowardice or passivity: 'the enemy has here surrounded you who were neither borne away in flight, nor abandoned because you lagged behind [*non fuga delatos, nec inertia relictos, hic vos circumvenit hostis*]' (35.3). Now a motif comes up for the first time: the way out of this place is precisely the same as the way in. The path is *virtus*, and Decius offers them the clue, the memory of their achievement. He reminds the men of their way in: 'you captured this posi-

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[44] Morello (1996) 17–18 notes Livy's emphasis on careful preparation on the part of a general; see also 156–7.

tion with courage, you should escape it by courage [*virtute cepistis locum, virtute hinc oportet evadatis*].' The narrative establishes an analogy between physical space and discourse space by making the rhetorical repetition of words and phrases represent the retracing of steps. Even the Romans' reasons for entering and leaving are the same, to save (*servare*): 'by coming here you saved an exceptional army for the Roman people; by breaking out from here, save yourselves. You are worthy, who few as you were brought help to many, and who yourself needed help from no one [*veniendo huc exercitum egregium populo Romano servastis: erumpendo hinc vosmet ipsos servate. digni estis qui pauci pluribus opem tuleritis, ipsi nullius auxilio egueritis*]' (35.4). The antithetical clauses continue to identify the way out with the way in. Like the maze-walker, the Romans occupy this dangerous place because they made a moral decision to enter. Decius' rhetoric must convince them that they still possess the same character that led them to make that decision.

To bolster his argument he invokes memory of the recent past, pointing out that the army they face is the same one that dithered yesterday, the one that failed to see the hill before the Romans captured it (35.5 *qui . . . tam opportunum collem inminentem capiti suo non ante viderit quam captum a nobis*).[45] The phrase *opportunum collem inminentem capiti suo* echoes both 34.1 *inminentem capiti hostem* and 34.3 *collem inminentem hostium castris*, once again showing how the nature of a place depends on the viewer's perspective. Since this enemy could not keep the Romans from the center, how can it keep them from leaving? Decius then makes his way past a risky crossroad, where his audience might stop to ponder alternatives. Leaving, he says, is not just a good idea, it is not really even a matter of deliberation: 'on the contrary, it is necessary [*immo necesse est*]' (35.6).[46] In fact he is not trying to persuade his men, but to point out the bald truth: 'for our

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[45] Another exemplary tribune, L. Marcius, makes similar use of the recent past in a similar situation at 25.38.9, 11, 20.

[46] Cicero discusses the argument from necessity at *De Oratore* 2.336: 'but what is possible or impossible, and what, moreover, is necessary or not, is to be sought most of all in each case; for all deliberation is cut short immediately if it is understood that a course of action is impossible or if necessity is cited. And the person who demonstrates this to others who do not see it, himself sees most of all.' Citing the passage, Luce (1993) 73 points out that '*necessarium* was the most extreme weapon in the rhetorical arsenal, for it claimed that meaningful deliberation about choices was not possible.'

affairs are in such a situation [*in eo enim loco res sunt nostrae*] that I am more an indicator of what is necessary for you to do [*necessitatis vestrae index*] than the creator of a plan [*consilii auctor*]' (35.7). In this context the phrase *in eo enim loco res sunt nostrae* has both literal and metaphorical meaning.

Hesitating at this crossroads is not even possible, for as far as Decius is concerned, there is no choice: 'whether you stay or leave is not even a choice to make [*neque enim, maneatis an abeatis hinc, deliberari potest*]' (35.8). He and his men are surrounded, with neither food nor water, with nothing, in fact, but weapons and 'the spirit to use them [*animos armorum memores*].' The adjective *memores* again suggests memory as the thread that will guide the Romans to safety. There is, in fact, only one safety (*una . . . salus*), 'to break out from here and go away [*erumpere hinc atque abire*]' (38.9).

But a further decision has to be made, whether to do this by day or by night (*aut interdiu aut nocte*). Once again Decius removes any real choice: 'Look, something that is even less a matter for hesitation [*ecce autem aliud minus dubium*]' (35.10); for, he argues, if the Romans wait until dawn the enemy will have surrounded them completely. The decision to leave by night offers one last choice: to go now or later, an alternative Decius eliminates by using superlatives to pinpoint the present as the uniquely opportune moment: 'and if night is the opportune time to break out, as it is, surely this is the most opportune time of night [*aptissima hora*]. You have assembled at the sign for the second watch, when the hour overwhelms mortal men with the deepest sleep [*somno altissimo*]' (35.10–11).

Decius argues that under such conditions secrecy or fighting will serve the Romans equally well: either they will escape without interference, or they will turn darkness and chaos against the Samnites who are now caught in this place as well: 'you will make your way out among their sleeping bodies, either evading them and keeping them unaware with silence, or, if they perceive you, ready to throw fear into them with a sudden uproar [*per corpora sopita vadetis vel silentio incautos fallentes vel sentientibus clamore subito pavorem iniecturi*].' The men should follow Decius, whom they followed in (*me modo sequimini, quem secuti estis*). He will follow the same *fortuna* that brought him to this place (35.12 *ego eandem quae duxit huc sequar fortunam*).

Decius leads his men through their deliberations as if conducting them through a maze, guiding them past the forks in the road by showing that the alternatives lead to dead ends. He closes by request-

ing them to make a single, all-important decision: 'those who think that this promotes our safety, come, cross over to the right [*quibus haec salutaria videntur, agitedum in dextram partem pedibus transite*].' A traditional manner of voting on motions in the Senate becomes literally the first step on a journey out of a dangerous place. Understanding, decision, and movement unite, as Decius' audience steps silently in one direction and follows him: 'everyone stepped over, and they followed Decius as he made his way through the gaps in the enemy picket-line [*omnes transierunt; vadentemque per intermissa custodiis loca Decium secuti sunt*]' (36.1). (The Romans do not make it out without a fight, but as Decius predicted it is not because they lose their way. The Samnites wake, and in the ensuing confusion, the Romans handily slaughter a good number of them.)

Decius' understanding of delay and space extends even to using them for dramatic effect:

> Some night remained and they now appeared to have reached safety, when Decius said, 'well done, Roman soldiers: all future generations will praise your journey and return [*iter ac reditum*]. But the light of day [*luce ac die*] is necessary for seeing such courage [*ad conspiciendam tantam virtutem*]. You do not deserve to have silence and darkness hide you seeing that you have returned to your camp with such glory. Let us await the light [*lucem*] quietly here.' (7.36.5–6)

In suggesting to his men that they wait until dawn to return to the camp, Decius refers to their feat in a way that calls to mind the successful negotiation of a labyrinth: it will be not just a famous journey, but a famous 'journey and return.' He shows the men how they will appear to future generations, an audience that begins with their waiting comrades, to whom they should reappear as if emerging from darkness into light.

The men return to a grateful welcome from their rejoicing comrades and consul (36.7–9). All eyes upon him, and honored as the consul's equal, Decius proceeds through the camp (*per media castra*) in a triumphal procession (*castrensis triumphus*). He causes delay one last time by interrupting the consul's speech and deferring praise of himself (*consul classico ad contionem convocat orsusque meritas Deci laudes interfante ipso Decio distulit contionem*). He points out that Samnites still wander (*vagari*) around the hill (*circa collem*), stricken and confused (*nocturno pavore attonitos*). His words give the impression that, while the Romans have returned to the light of day—have, as it were, found their way out of the maze—the Samnites are still caught inside. His

insistence on deferring praise wins him greater rewards. After the Romans have killed a great number of Samnites and plundered their camp, he receives 'praise accumulated on account of his new merits [*cumulatas nova virtute laudes*]' (37.1), a golden crown, 100 cattle, one white with gilded horns, and to signify delivery from a siege, two wreaths of grass, one from his detachment, the other from the rest of the army.

To impose familiar order on unfamiliar space is an inherently imperial act, and for Livy, the leadership that causes Roman expansion includes the ability to understand the space in which one finds oneself and to shape space according to one's will—or at least to change other people's impressions of that space. Decius alone speaks in direct discourse in this episode, and his words control the interpretation of events and space. The lone hill becomes both peak and citadel; the Samnites are vincible because they dither; a way out of danger can be found; the present is the only time to escape; the Samnites wander, lost in the darkness that overcame them when they first found themselves surrounded. Decius conveys his sense of space to growing audiences, first the consul, then his own centurions, then all the soldiers who accompanied him on his mission, and finally the entire Roman army. He repeatedly tells others to see (or asks them if they see) and to move in consequence of seeing. He carries this element of control into the Roman camp, when he interrupts and silences the consul who is praising him at consular headquarters (*ad praetorium*) and then drives (*perpulit*) him to take action against the enemy. Indeed what Decius does to the Roman consul is analogous to what he does to the Samnites: he seizes the strategic center of the other's space and expands his sphere of influence from there.

This account of near-catastrophe illustrates the benefits of suspending judgment until one sees a situation as a whole. The consul leads his men into ambush because he fails to reconnoiter, then panics because he does not have a comprehensive picture of the space around him.[47] Limited by the walls of the ravine, his line of sight resembles the tunnel-vision of the wanderer in a maze until it is redirected by Decius' words, whereas Decius' wider range of vision gains him a view of the whole. The idea of the labyrinth exposes

[47] On the importance of directed vision see Morello (1996) 16.

these antitheses. It gives meaning to the darkness and blindness that figure so prominently in the narrative; to the noise and confusion, the bifurcations that force decisions to be made, sometimes blindly;[48] to Decius' relatively uncomplicated dash to the center of the contested space (narrated in a brief and simple fashion) and to the greater challenge of finding the way out (narrated at length and in great detail). It gives due weight to *circa* and verbs compounded with *circum* that appear frequently in this story of Romans and Samnites surrounding each other and being surrounded in turn.[49] Most important of all, the metaphor of the labyrinth discloses the key to success or failure in this first foray into strange territory: the relationship between comprehension, informed decision-making, and movement—both metaphorical and literal—in the right direction.

The idea of the labyrinth has led to more precise understanding of the ways in which Livy uses space and narrative point of view. The images of the Egyptian labyrinth and Lars Porsenna's tomb add emphasis to Livy's insistence on the effort and wealth spent building the city and on the excesses of regal Rome. When we view Livy's writing as a maze, and read it as a guided journey through the fragmentary and often conflicting records of Rome's past, we see the daunting magnitude of the project through the author's eyes and understand better why he encourages perseverance in his reader. The dynamic nature of leadership emerges as exemplary Romans like Decius, who can see the whole, guide others through its twists and turns. Finally, the labyrinth, both monument (*monumentum*, *mnemosyne*) and symbol of the act of remembering, shows the *raison d'être* of history—memory—at work where it is not immediately obvious.

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[48] On the noisiness of the labyrinth see Doob (1990) 21, 25.

[49] 34.1 *Circaque insessum*; 34.11 *circumdare*; 34.12 *circumdarent*; 34.13 *circumdati*; 34.15 *circumire*; 35.3 *circumvenit*; 35.6 *circumdederit*; 36.10 *circa collem.*

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TACITUS' *HISTORIES* AND THE THEORY OF DELIBERATIVE ORATORY*

D. S. Levene

It is a commonplace in the criticism of Roman historiography, as of other ancient genres, to observe that the authors have been strongly influenced by their rhetorical education. Studies along these lines have involved, for example, the identification in historians of particular stylistic devices or rhetorical *topoi* of the sort that are discussed and recommended in the numerous works of rhetorical theory and handbooks for rhetorical education that have survived from antiquity.[1] Other scholars have looked more generally at the generic relationship between historiography and rhetoric;[2] and of course the speeches found in historians have been examined to see how closely they conform to the rules set out in the theorists.[3]

The aim of this paper is different. My object here is to examine the way in which speeches are not merely influenced by rhetorical theory but can themselves, by virtue of being placed in a narrative, act as the vehicles for an implicit statement of the author's own theoretical standpoint: in effect, they become something analogous to works of theory. When a speech is embedded in an historical narrative, the simple act of being placed in that narrative framework means that the speech is not merely delivered by a character, but its nature and effects are reflected upon by the author. The reader sees not only the perspective of the character speaking but also the author's comments, explicit or implicit. The framing narrative may take into account, for example, the character of the speaker and audience, as well as the effectiveness or otherwise of the speech and the role that it plays in a wider historical context. This can provide

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1 E.g., Dangel (1991).

2 Notably Woodman (1988); also Aubrion (1985).

3 Especially Ullmann (1927); also e.g., Walsh (1961) 219–44; Luce (1993a).

a radically different perspective upon the rhetorical techniques that the speaker employs: precisely as in the more overt discussions of effective rhetoric that one finds in the theorist, the historian will be in effect commenting upon the way in which a speech should—or should not—be written.[4]

The overwhelming majority of speeches in ancient historians are, for obvious reasons, deliberative speeches—speeches endorsing or opposing some policy. These are therefore the natural focus of the discussion. Inevitably, for reasons of space, I shall be concentrating on a single work of a single author. Tacitus' rhetorical inclinations are well known, and the *Histories* is his historical work in which speeches play the most prominent role (and indeed have been the subject of a number of recent studies).[5]

I

An especially promising area in which to examine the relationship between the approach to deliberative oratory taken in the rhetorical theorists and that taken by Tacitus is in their respective attitudes towards the role of morality. That Tacitus (like other Roman historians) is strongly interested in moral questions is manifest,[6] and his speeches regularly explore moral issues.[7] Moreover, the proper role of morality in a deliberative speech was an issue that was strongly disputed between ancient rhetorical theorists. It is therefore worth considering the precise nature of the debate on deliberation and morality in the theoretical writers, before going on to analyze the manner in which Tacitus contextualizes his speeches, so as to determine whether he is himself adopting a position in this debate.

Several ancient rhetorical theorists include substantial discussions of deliberative oratory.[8] A characteristic feature of such discussions

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[4] For the underlying theory set out in this paragraph see Sternberg (1982); (1991); cf. Vološinov (1973) 115–23. For an extended discussion of one particular application of this idea, see Levene (1997) 83–99.

[5] Notably by Elizabeth Keitel: Keitel (1987); (1991); (1993). Also Martin (1967); Miller and Jones (1978); Ternes (1990).

[6] See, e.g., Aubrion (1985) 198–268; Mellor (1993) 47–67.

[7] See in particular the discussions and analyses in Aubrion (1985) 491–678.

[8] E.g., Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1358a36–1366a22; *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* 1421b7–1425b35; *Rhetorica ad Herennium* 3.2–9; Cicero, *De Inventione* 2.157–76, *De Oratore* 2.333–40, *Partitiones Oratoriae* 83–97; Quintilian 3.8; Hermogenes, *On Issues* 76–9.

is that they center upon lists of *topoi* appropriate to deliberative speeches. However, most of these theorists go further, arranging the *topoi* under larger headings, and, more importantly for this paper, seeking to determine the precise relationship among these different headings. Moral questions loom large in these discussions: it is regularly asked what the role of moral *topoi* is in a deliberative speech, and how they relate to the more 'pragmatic' *topoi* such as those of advantage.

The issue is originally raised by Aristotle, who argues that the τέλος—the 'end'—of deliberative oratory is advantage (τὸ συμφέρον); moral considerations, such as justice and goodness, according to Aristotle are taken into consideration only in as much as they are held to contribute to advantage.[9] Aristotle's subsequent analysis, it is true, is more intricate and subtle: he associates 'advantage' with *eudaimonia* ('well-being')[10]—something which plays a central role in his moral system.[11] The implication of his argument as he develops it here in the *Rhetoric* would seem to be that ethical considerations can also form the 'end' for the deliberative orator, since they are not subordinate to considerations of advantage, but actually are sometimes constituted by them. It is also true that Aristotle's original claim that 'advantage' is the essential aim of deliberative oratory derives from the highly schematized picture of oratory with which he commences his argument, dividing all oratory into three genres, each with its distinctive aim: it is plausible to argue that the subsequent elaboration of the details of deliberative persuasion provides a philosophically more sophisticated picture, wherein ethics and expediency are more closely intertwined than the initial formulation implied.[12] But, if one looks at this question less in the context of Aristotelian philosophy than from the point of view of actual rhetorical considerations, that initial formulation, treating 'advantage' as the overriding aim of deliberative persuasion, is the one that matters. In practice 'advantage' will frequently conflict with ethical considerations as normally conceived, even if such 'advantage' within

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[9] Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1358b20–25.

[10] See *Rhetoric* 1360b4–18.

[11] E.g., *Nicomachean Ethics* 1097a30–b6. On the relationship between the concept of *eudaimonia* in the *Rhetoric* and that in Aristotle's ethical writings, see Irwin (1996) 150–8.

[12] On this picture of the role of morality in the *Rhetoric* see esp. Halliwell (1994).

certain philosophical systems may have ethical implications of its own.[13]

This provides a picture of a deliberative rhetoric where 'advantage' is the fundamental consideration, and moral (and other) considerations are relevant only in as much as they may be held to contribute to advantage. For a different picture we may look to the pseudo-Aristotelian *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*, which argues that, far from being solely focused on advantage, deliberative rhetoric has numerous possible topics: the orator may show the recommended action as just, legal, expedient, good, pleasant, easy to accomplish, or (when something unpleasant is recommended) possible and necessary.[14] The significant point here is that 'advantage' is given no especial priority over moral and other considerations: all are treated entirely on the same level as appropriate topics for deliberative speeches.

This provides us with two basic approaches to the theory of deliberative oratory; and this controversy continues in the later theorists.[15] The *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (3.3) takes an essentially Aristotelian line, arguing that advantage (*utilitas*) is the fundamental aim of a deliberative speech (*ut omnis . . . ad eam totius orationis ratio conferatur*); a similar approach is adopted by Cicero in *Partitiones Oratoriae.*[16] Conversely, Cicero in *De Inventione* explicitly rejects the Aristotelian theory, and instead follows the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* in arguing that advantage and morality are each topics for deliberative oratory in their own right.[17] This is then followed by Quintilian, who begins his account of deliberative oratory by rejecting the opinion that deliberative speeches are concerned with advantage alone and citing Cicero, *De Oratore* (see below, n. 18) approvingly on the idea that morality is more important than expediency for such speeches, but ultimately

[13] Cf. Rorty (1996a) 7: 'The general conceptual connection between what is just and what is fundamentally beneficial is compatible with the independence of the two sorts of arguments.'

[14] *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* 1421b23–28 τὸν μὲν προτρέποντα χρὴ δεικνύειν ταῦτα ἐφ' ἃ παρακαλεῖ δίκαια ὄντα καὶ νόμιμα καὶ συμφέροντα καὶ καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα καὶ ῥᾴδια πραχθῆναι· εἰ δὲ μή, δυνατά τε δεικτέον, ὅταν ἐπὶ δυσχερῆ παρακαλῇ, καὶ ὡς ἀναγκαῖα ταῦτα ποιεῖν ἐστίν.

[15] Cf. Volkmann (1885) 300–1.

[16] *Partitiones Oratoriae* 83 *est igitur in deliberando finis utilitas* ('in deliberative speeches, advantage is the end').

[17] *De Inventione* 2.156 *in deliberativo autem Aristoteli placet utilitatem, nobis et honestatem et utilitatem* ('in deliberative oratory Aristotle thinks advantage [is the end]; I think both morality and advantage').

concludes that in practice both morality and advantage should form separate topics (3.8.1–2; cf. also 3.4.16). He subsequently sets out in more detail the chief topics of deliberative speeches as morality (*honestum*), advantage (*utile*) and possibility (*possibile*) (3.8.22–5); all other headings, he thinks, may be subsumed under those three (3.8.26–7). Hermogenes, *On Issues* 76.4–5 (Rabe), likewise lists the topics of a deliberative speech in a manner similar—though not identical—to the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*: as in that work, justice (δίκαιον) and legality (νόμιμον) are discussed as things independent of advantage (συμφέρον).[18]

How different in practice are these two positions? It might be expected that the implication of the Aristotelian position, treating advantage as the 'end' of a deliberative speech, would be to reject topics of morality as inappropriate to a speech in that genre.[19] However, this is not so. No one on either side of the debate denies that moral issues may properly be raised: the difference is simply that the 'Aristotelians' regard arguments in deliberative speeches that aim to persuade by appeal to morality as a subset of those aiming to persuade by appeal to advantage. The 'non-Aristotelians,' on the other hand, treat moral arguments and arguments to advantage as

[18] Only Antonius in Cicero's *De Oratore* 2.334–5, who is treating the question more informally, does not conform precisely to either line. He in effect treats the ultimate 'end' of a deliberative speech as *dignitas* alone (which he identifies with morality at 2.335), subordinating questions of advantage entirely to that; advantage is sought only in so far as it is a prerequisite for morality (*De Oratore* 2.334 *in suadendo nihil est optabilius quam dignitas . . . nemo est enim, praesertim in tam clara civitate, quin putet expetendam maxime dignitatem, sed vincit utilitas plerumque, cum subest ille timor ea neglecta ne dignitatem quidem posse retineri* ['in giving advice nothing is more desirable than worth . . . for there is no one, especially in such a famous state, who does not think that worth is the main thing that should be sought; but usually advantage wins out whenever there is an underlying fear that when advantage is abandoned it will be impossible even to keep hold of worth']). However, Antonius' discussion immediately afterwards is not fully consistent with this: he refers to the possibility of an apparent conflict between expediency and morality, and says that under such circumstances the speaker arguing for a moral position should do so on the grounds that it leads to and is linked with advantage (2.335 *utilitatem ex laude nasci defendet semperque eam cum dignitate esse coniunctam*). This points to an essentially Aristotelian standpoint; we may compare 1.141, where the speaker is Crassus, but where the definition of deliberative oratory that is adopted is a straightforwardly Aristotelian one: *deliberationibus, quae omnes ad utilitatem dirigerentur eorum quibus consilium daremus* ('[*topoi*] for deliberations, all of which are to be directed to the advantage of those people to whom we give advice').

[19] This appears, for example, to have been the interpretation of Macleod (1974) 388–9.

substantially independent of one another. It might appear from this that we are simply dealing with a theoretical question of categorization, and that there would be no practical distinction that would separate a speech written according to the 'Aristotelian' theory from one written according to the principles of the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*. This, however, is not necessarily true. In particular, it is reasonable to suggest that speeches written according to the principles of 'non-Aristotelian' theorists would assign an essentially independent value to moral issues, and hence would tend to set a division between such moral issues and considerations of advantage.[20] An 'Aristotelian,' on the other hand, will be inclined to justify moral questions by reference to their general expediency, and hence would be likely to present the topics of morality as shading more into those of advantage.[21]

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[20] It is true that *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* 1422a10 mentions courage, wisdom, and justice as things 'advantageous for the soul.' However, it treats questions of interpersonal morality (as opposed to personal virtue) as things entirely independent of advantage (1421b37–1422a4). More importantly, the author at 1439a19–30 explicitly recommends that topics of justice should be treated entirely separately from topics of advantage, and indeed that the speaker should formally mark them as separate. Note also that 1425a10–17 and 1425a29–35, setting out the arguments to be used in advising/dissuading war, make a solid division between moral topics and those from advantage. In later theorists the distinction is likewise quite firmly maintained. *De Inventione* (2.157–8 and 2.166–8) does suggest that as well as the categories of morality and advantage, there is a third category, including qualities like friendship and glory, that shares in both (cf. *Partitiones Oratoriae* 87, cited below, n. 21). However, it is noticeable that Cicero tries as far as possible to assimilate this category to that of morality, so emphasizing its claim to independent value: moreover, the category of morality proper is kept firmly separate from any considerations of advantage.

[21] Thus Aristotle, in categorizing 'the elements of good and advantage' (*Rhetoric* 1362a20–1 τὰ στοιχεῖα περὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ συμφέροντος), places virtues like courage and magnanimity side by side with health and wealth as ἀγαθά (*Rhetoric* 1362b10–19); he also refers to justice as 'a certain communal advantage' (*Rhetoric* 1362b28 συμφέρον ... τι κοινῇ ἐστιν). *Partitiones Oratoriae* 86 subdivides 'advantage' into necessary goods and non-necessary goods: the latter are then further subdivided into things morally valuable in themselves (87 *propter se honestate ipsa*... *expetuntur*) and things which are valuable because of some profit they bring (*commoditate aliqua*). But in fact moral considerations seep into all categories: thus chastity (*pudicitia*) is treated as a necessary good (86), and some of the class of things sought because of *commoditas* are held to have moral value (87). (The received text of *Partitiones Oratoriae* appears to allow even more seepage between the categories, but it is highly corrupt: I am here following the emendations in the 1960 Budé text of H. Bornecque which, though radical, appear to me to make the best sense of the Latin and of Cicero's argument.) The *Rhetorica ad Herennium* maintains a slightly more rigorous division, subdividing 'advantage' into topics of safety (*tuta*) and morality (*honesta*), the latter into the right (*rectum*) and the admirable (*laudabile*), and the right into a variety of virtues (3.3). But even here overlap occurs: the virtue of wisdom (*prudentia*)

II

We thus can see a clear dispute between the rhetorical theorists who discuss the role of morality in deliberative speeches. The question now before us (cf. above, 197–8) is whether the way in which Tacitus writes—and more importantly contextualizes—speeches in his work reveals a particular standpoint in this debate. Some of the deliberative speeches in the *Histories* concentrate entirely upon questions of expediency, and hence are not relevant to this paper.[22] The majority, however, employ moral topics as well: we must examine how the speakers present the relationship between such moral topics and those of expediency.

It is perhaps to be expected that a substantial proportion of these speeches do indeed shade moral questions and issues of expediency into each other: but, were these speeches self-contained, with no narrative context, we would have no especial reason to relate this shading of topics to the adoption of the 'Aristotelian' theory outlined above. At least in a broad sense speeches in Roman historians tended to mirror the techniques of real speeches, and real speeches, naturally enough, were not bound strictly by theoretical categorizations. A speaker would typically use the *topoi* recommended by theorists not as a rigorous prescription for structuring a speech but as a set of suggestions for arguments that he might employ.[23] While this might sometimes mean that he would treat each topic as a discrete argument in its own right, in many cases such firm divisions would not be appropriate, and it would prove preferable for a single argument to include elements both of morality and of advantage. In such cases, one would not wish to suggest that the speaker is working from the standpoint of 'Aristotelian' theory.[24] Nor indeed would it be the case

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is defined as the ability to choose between *commoda* (3.4), and, more significantly, the actual example that the author gives of the correct use of topics of morality in a deliberative speech involves proving that only morality provides genuine safety (3.9)—in other words, safety is still treated as the primary aim.

[22] E.g., Suetonius Paulinus at 2.32, Antonius Primus at 3.2; on the latter see Ullmann (1927) 212–13. All references without author or title are to Tacitus' *Histories*.

[23] See Luce (1993a) 77–8.

[24] It is worth considering Tacitus' own comment at *Dialogus* 31.2: *in iudiciis fere de aequitate, in deliberationibus <de utilitate, in laudationibus> de honestate disserimus, ita tamen ut plerumque haec ipsa in vicem misceantur* ('in forensic oratory we generally speak on justice, in deliberative on advantage, in panegyric on morality, but in such a way that these generally get mixed up with one another'). Unfortunately, there may be

that a speech which did happen to maintain a firm division between these topics would necessarily be the result of the speaker adopting a 'non-Aristotelian' line. Rather, both strategies could arise because the speaker was attempting to deploy the appropriate *topoi* in the manner that would be most effective in that particular case: the underlying theory that related the different *topoi* in principle to one another would be essentially irrelevant.

But in fact, of course, the speeches in the historians are *not* self-contained units. They appear only as part of a narrative which provides a context of explicit or implicit comment. Where the historian's standpoint may emerge is not simply from the role of morality in the actual content of the speeches, but from the part which the narrator shows the speech playing in the narrative as a whole (above, 197–8), and in particular from the way in which the characters in the work are presented as responding—or failing to respond—to the moral topics in it.

To begin with, I shall examine three speeches in the *Histories* which appear to employ moral themes as discrete arguments and do not simply shade them into themes of expediency.

The simplest instance is Antonius Primus' encouragement to his troops during the second Battle of Bedriacum at 3.24. Although Tacitus introduces the passage by suggesting that Primus encouraged all of the soldiers by offering them hope and promises,[25] the bulk of what he says is addressed separately to different groups of soldiers.

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textual corruption here. According to the received text of the *Dialogus* deliberative speeches are primarily concerned with morality: it is only through Orsini's emendation that advantage is set up as their aim. Though the MSS tradition has been defended (see Aubrion [1985] 626–7), the emended text seems preferable, since the tripartite division of oratorical genres here picks up the tripartite division of topics just before (31.1 *in quibus de bonis ac malis, de honesto et turpi, de iusto et iniusto disputatur*). The text as emended seems to point (contrary to what I shall be arguing below) to Tacitus' basically endorsing the Aristotelian system. However, the last part of the statement seems rather to suggest that a pragmatic flexibility is in practice the rule—the context precisely concerns the difference between theoretical exercises and practical speaking. Moreover, it would be rash to assume that the speaker at this point, Messala, is necessarily presenting Tacitus' own standpoint in the *Dialogus* (cf. Luce [1993]), or, even if he is, that the *Histories* would necessarily be expected to conform to the same system.

[25] Moreover, in the phrase *alios pudore et probris, multos laude et hortatu, omnes spe promissisque accendens* (3.24.1), the implications of *omnes* are less general than might superficially appear. Wellesley (1972) 109 points out that the three types of appeal correspond (in reverse order) to the three groups Antonius is about to address separately: the Pannonians, the Moesians, and the Praetorians. He suggests that the

The Third Legion he encourages by alluding to their past victories (thus implying that they have the advantage in the current battle); the Praetorians he attacks with the argument that, if they are defeated, they will lose everything. The Pannonian legions, on the other hand, are given what is essentially moral encouragement: he reminds them that this is the scene of their previous defeat, and tells them that they now have an opportunity to wipe out their former disgrace. In other words, the independence of arguments of morality from those of expediency is formally marked by Tacitus by having each addressed to a different audience. The effect, however, appears to be a global one: *undique clamor* (3.24.3 'shouts from all sides'): the troops then turn the tide of battle—though this is also the result of the (false) rumor that Mucianus' army had arrived (3.25.1).

A slightly more complex example comes with the speech of Civilis at 4.14, in which he first encourages the Batavians to rebellion. The speech falls clearly into two halves. The second half asserts the practical point that Rome is weak, and hence that independence from her could easily be obtained.[26] But it is preceded by a section that focuses essentially on the moral question of the injustices that the Batavians are suffering under Roman rule: Civilis refers to their past glories (4.14.2 *a laude gloriaque gentis orsus*), which he then contrasts at some length with the injuries that the Romans now inflict upon them. The moral topic here could, obviously enough, have been at the same time presented as a form of advantage (Civilis is clearly suggesting that the Batavians would benefit from casting off their Roman masters); however, Tacitus does not make that conclusion explicit in this part of the argument. Civilis concentrates above all on the immoral side of Roman behavior, and thus the action to remove the Romans appears fundamentally as a moral campaign. And this is reinforced by the context: although Tacitus has hitherto

wording *alios . . . multos . . . omnes* is simply an example of rhetorical variation: this reinforces the point about the fundamental division that Tacitus establishes between the different topics in the speech.

[26] Technically, of course, this is a *topos* of ease (*facile*), not advantage as narrowly defined: those theorists who treat advantage and morality as independent categories sometimes regard ease as a category that is separate from either (e.g., *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* 1422a18–19; Hermogenes, *On Issues* 77.20–1). However, this is not a universal conclusion: the Roman theorists who separate advantage from morality tend to subsume ease (and related issues) under the general heading of advantage (e.g., Cicero, *De Inventione* 2.169; Quintilian 3.8.27).

presented Civilis as deceitful and untrustworthy,[27] he prefaces his account of this speech with a description of Roman oppression that appears designed to give moral support to Civilis' case, pointing explicitly to the viciousness that underlies Roman behavior.[28] Moreover, even before Civilis begins to speak—and hence before any mention of the practical considerations that emerge in the second half of his speech—Tacitus suggests that it is this Roman immorality that will persuade the Batavians to rebellion.[29] The favorable response to Civilis' speech[30]—a speech in which morality plays a strong independent role—is thus likewise understood as an essentially moral response.

Both of the speeches discussed so far have been ones that were successful in their object. The address to Vitellius at 3.66 by his followers seeking to persuade him to maintain his opposition to Vespasian, on the other hand, is a failure. Once again, as with Civilis, the speech falls into two halves, one in terms of practical advantage, the other moral. In this case the structure is prefigured by its opening, where we are told that the speakers 'pointed to the danger and disgrace' (3.66.1 *discrimen ac dedecus ostentantes*); accordingly, the first half of the speech concentrates on the pragmatic issue of the danger to Vitellius if he does not resist, the second half on the disgrace.[31] In the latter, the speakers refer to the glory of Vitellius' family, and urge him to live up to it. Tacitus makes it explicit that what is being argued for here are not considerations of practical advantage: death faces Vitellius either way, and his choice is only whether to die well or badly.[32]

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[27] 4.13.2 *Vespasiani amicitiam studiumque partium praetendit* ('he pretended to be a friend of Vespasian and keen supporter of his party'); 4.14.1 *occultato interim altiore consilio* ('he concealed in the meantime his ultimate design').

[28] 4.14.1 *Batavorum iuventus ad dilectum vocabatur, quem suapte natura gravem onerabant ministri avaritia ac luxu, senes aut invalidos conquirendo, quos pretio dimitterent: rursus impubes et forma conspicui . . . ad stuprum trahebantur* ('The young Batavians were being pressed for service, and this burden was being rendered even more irksome than it need have been by the greed and depravity of the recruiting officers. They took to enrolling elderly men and weaklings so as to get bribes for excusing them; or . . . they would drag off and rape the handsomest boys').

[29] 4.14.2 *hinc invidia, et compositae seditionis auctores perpulere ut dilectum abnuerent* ('this caused bitter feeling: an insurrection was organized, whose originators persuaded the Batavians to refuse service').

[30] 4.15.1 *magno cum adsensu auditus* ('his speech was received with great approval').

[31] Wellesley (1972) 163.

[32] 3.66.4 *id solum referre, novissimum spiritum per ludibrium et contumelias effundant an per virtutem* ('all that mattered was whether one breathed one's last amid mockery and insult or bravely').

Vitellius, however, is not persuaded, and the phrase Tacitus uses points specifically to the second half of the speech as the thing that he rejects: *surdae ad fortia consilia Vitellio aures* (3.67.1 'Vitellius was deaf to courageous counsel')—it was the second half of the speech that directly urged courage upon him. It is not surprising that Tacitus should present such a speech as receiving such a response, as he consistently portrays Vitellius as a coward, whose actions are governed as much by fear as any other consideration.[33] Nevertheless, it is significant that Tacitus, in writing a speech for Vitellius to reject, sets it up in such a way as to make the moral topic clearly separate from the one of advantage.

What these three speeches have in common is not merely that all three employ topics of morality in a manner that clearly distinguishes them from the issue of advantage. It is also the case that, with all three, Tacitus presents the moral issue as something that is (or should be) independently effective. That emerges only by implication in Antonius' speech (the Pannonian legions may be presumed to be responding to the moral appeal, since that forms the specific content of the address to them). With Civilis, however, it is more obvious and directly indicated by a narrative context that points to Roman immorality, to which the Batavians are explicitly said to be responding. Finally, with Vitellius the moral appeal is something to which he is explicitly stated to be *failing* to respond—but the implication of Tacitus' account is that it is something to which a better man (or a better emperor) *would* have responded. In other words, Tacitus' narrative points to the potential effectiveness of a deliberative rhetoric in which morality is not merely subsumed under the general heading of 'advantage,' but becomes an independent theme in itself. To judge from these three speeches, it would not be unreasonable to label Tacitus a 'non-Aristotelian' (to use the terminology above)—not because he writes such speeches, but because he contextualizes them and their effect in such a way as to endorse the basic 'non-Aristotelian' proposition: that morality independent of advantage forms an appropriate and effective topic for deliberative oratory.

At this point it may be objected that the speeches that I have employed in order to support this case are hardly representative of

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[33] Cf. Levene (1997a) 136–47.

speeches in the *Histories* as a whole. For one thing, they are all relatively brief, and cast in indirect speech; I have not discussed any of the major lengthy speeches in the *Histories*, of the sort that have been the central object of study in the past. For another, they form only a small minority of the total speeches in the *Histories*, and, as I said above, the remainder for the most part do *not* clearly separate out morality from advantage but intertwine both into the general argument. Under such circumstances, it might appear perverse to conclude from such slender data that Tacitus is actually endorsing a rhetorical theory that apparently does not conform to his general practice.

In fact, however, even the speeches I have not yet examined, when examined in their context, share a feature that seems consistent with the conclusion that Tacitus is working from a 'non-Aristotelian' theoretical stance. For, with a single exception (below, 210–11), none of them is presented in a context that suggests that the moral arguments in the speech either had any sort of effect or indeed could be expected to have an effect. Arguments from silence are of course awkward things to use. Tacitus may have had—indeed almost certainly did have—other reasons for not referring to the effect of the moral argument in any particular case. Nevertheless, it seems sufficiently striking to be classed as significant when, out of all the speeches in the work where moral arguments are employed, the small minority where those arguments are shown as playing a significant role in the context happen also to be the ones where within the speech they are treated as substantially independent themes. It should be recalled that, even on the Aristotelian theory, morality *is* held to have a proper role in a deliberative speech—it is simply categorized as subordinate to advantage (above, 201–2). But, judging by the lack of notice taken of such arguments in Tacitus when they are intertwined with considerations of expediency, they might as well not have been employed at all.

The space available in this paper does not permit me to demonstrate this point comprehensively (and going systematically through every remaining speech in the *Histories* in order to prove that there is nothing of relevance in their context, even if possible, would make exceptionally dull reading). I shall, however, briefly discuss a few speeches that seem to me to raise particular issues of importance.

I begin with the speech of Piso urging the Praetorian cohort on duty in the palace to support Galba (1.29–30): this is an especially

interesting example because, as much as any major deliberative speech in the *Histories*, it appears to depend essentially upon moral arguments.[34] Moreover, it is even greeted with at least a limited degree of success: Tacitus indicates that some of the soldiers listening were persuaded to offer support for Galba, albeit in a rather desultory and unsystematic fashion.[35] However, the general context does not suggest that this is in any sense a response to Piso's moral arguments. While the bulk of the speech is indeed concerned with moral issues, the last section apparently subordinates the purely moral to considerations of expediency: Piso argues that it would be disadvantageous to the Praetorians to allow those of little worth to create an emperor,[36] and ends with a promise that their loyalty will be rewarded with a donative.[37] This last point picks up a theme that has been dominant throughout the opening section: that it is Galba's parsimonious failure to provide such a donative that has turned the Praetorians against him.[38] When Piso concludes his speech by promising that the soldiers' chief demand will be fulfilled, and this is immediately followed by an indication that his speech achieved a certain measure of success, Tacitus leaves little doubt as to what in Piso's speech has had this effect: the moral content appears irrelevant one way or the other.

The speech of Petillius Cerialis to the Treviri and Lingones (4.73–4), on the other hand, largely concentrates on the question of expediency. Indeed, Tacitus opens it by having Cerialis imply that he regards a moral appeal as inappropriate. He is speaking, he says, because the tribes have shown that words have influence on them: they judge 'good and bad' by what agitators tell them, rather than by how they actually are. His advice, he says, will be 'more advantageous' (4.73.1 *utilius*) to them than to him.[39] On the face of things,

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[34] See Ullmann (1927) 203–4.

[35] 1.31.1 *cetera cohors non aspernata contionantem, ut turbidis rebus evenit, forte . . . et nullo adhuc consilio rapit signa* ('The rest of the cohort paid some heed to his speech. Aimlessly, as happens in moments of confusion, they seized their standards, without as yet any fixed plan'). In his 1989 Teubner edition Wellesley radically emends the passage (see the comments in his *apparatus*), but his text supports the same basic point.

[36] 1.30.2 *vestra . . . interest ne imperatorem pessimi faciant.*

[37] 1.30.3 *proinde a nobis donativum ob fidem quam ab aliis pro facinore accipietis.*

[38] See 1.5.1, 5.2, 1.17.2, 1.18.2–3, 1.24, 1.25; cf. 1.37.5, 1.41.2.

[39] 4.73.1 *quoniam apud vos verba plurimum valent bonaque ac mala non sua natura, sed vocibus seditiosorum aestimantur, statui pauca disserere, quae profligato bello utilius sit vobis audisse quam nos dixisse.*

of course, this is simply stating Cerialis' reason for speaking at all; but the attribution of topics of good and bad to the agitators, and the claim that his own speech will be advantageous, seems to set up an implicit contrast between morality and utility, implying that he will be eschewing moral themes and sticking to topics of advantage. However, this implication is itself, of course, paradoxical, in that the very denial of the appropriateness of a moral appeal is itself a form of moral appeal, seeking to shame the listeners into better behavior. Accordingly, moral arguments are consistently interwoven with those of advantage throughout the speech. Thus, for example, Cerialis contrasts the disinterested motives underlying the Roman conquest of Gaul with the immoral self-seeking of the potential German rulers (4.73.2–3), leading to an assertion that submission to the former is the only way to avoid the injustices of endless tyrannical rule (4.74.1–2).[40] The ultimate aim of the argument is clearly to persuade the Gauls of the advantages of Roman rule, but morality plays a significant, if subordinate role in that persuasion, as Cerialis seeks to urge his audience to separate themselves from the evils represented by Civilis and his German supporters. Once again, however, the response appears to be based on non-moral considerations. The listeners are said to be reassured and encouraged, because they had feared more rigorous measures.[41] The only thought that Tacitus suggests is in their mind is apparently that they have avoided actual punishment. The lack of moral response in this is made especially apparent by the juxtaposition with the defeated Roman troops immediately before, whose feelings when faced with Cerialis are explicitly said to be not so much fear as shame at their disgrace.[42]

The final speech that I want to consider here comes from the debate between Galba's advisers at 1.32–3. When news of Otho's rebellion is announced to Galba, he is faced with two alternative plans. Vinius recommends that Galba blockade himself in the palace (1.32.2), while in response (1.33) Laco and Icelus advise that he go out to challenge the rebels. Their chief argument, as Tacitus reports

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[40] Ullmann (1927) 216 suggests that the first of these sections is based on the topic of safety (by most accounts a species of advantage: cf. above, n. 26), the second on justice. This distinction, however, appears entirely artificial. Both sections use moral language more or less equally, and in both the ultimate argument is directed at persuading the audience of the advantage of submission to Rome.

[41] 4.74.4 *tali oratione graviora metuentes composuit erexitque.*

[42] 4.72.3 *nec proinde periculum aut metus quam pudor ac dedecus obstupefecerat.*

it, is that time will help Otho consolidate his bid for power: in other words, it is an argument based fundamentally upon expediency. However, some of the terms in which the argument is presented are moral ones. The speakers sarcastically refer to the 'noble emperor' and his 'brave friends' blockading themselves in the palace as if to face a siege, and to the 'splendid help' that they can expect from slaves (a reference to Vinius' proposal at 1.32.2 to use slaves against the rebels).[43] Their conclusion is that 'what is inglorious is equally unsafe' (1.33.2 *perinde intuta quae indecora*), which appears to point to morality being justified in terms of advantage.

This is the one occasion mentioned above (208) where, contrary to the general rule in the *Histories*, the morality in an apparently 'Aristotelian' speech is presented as meeting with a response: Galba is persuaded to adopt Laco's and Icelus' plan precisely because it is the one that 'looks better.'[44] However, before we regard this as a true counterexample to the general rule, we should observe the words with which Laco and Icelus end at 1.33.2: *vel si cadere necesse sit, occurrendum discrimini: id Othoni invidiosius et ipsis honestum* ('or if they must fall, let them meet the danger halfway, and cover Otho with disgrace, themselves with honor'). This appears to affirm that morality has a value independent of advantage,[45] and so shifts the speech at its close to something resembling a 'non-Aristotelian' mode, effectively adopting both standpoints in turn. But Galba's moral response is most closely linked with the 'non-Aristotelian' appeal, which formed the climax of the argument. Far from constituting an exception to the general rule, the speech actually confirms it.

III

What this paper has demonstrated is that Tacitus' *Histories* can indeed be seen as engaging systematically with ancient disputes over the

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[43] 1.33.1–2 *egregius imperator cum fortibus amicis ianua ac limine tenus domum cludit, obsidionem nimirum toleraturus. et praeclarum in servis auxilium.*

[44] 1.34.1 *Galba . . . speciosiora suadentibus accessit.* Contrast Plutarch, *Galba* 26.2, where Galba's decision to leave the palace is not the result of Laco's arguments, but is due solely to the false rumor that Otho had been killed (compare 1.34.2 in Tacitus). Moreover, Suetonius, *Galba* 19.1, though not reporting the debate directly, even implies that it was *Vinius'* view that prevailed: *nihil amplius quam continere se statuit et legionariorum firmare praesidiis.* See Chilver (1979) 94–5.

[45] Cf. 3.66.4, discussed above, 206.

nature of deliberative oratory. The speeches within it are set up and contextualized in such a way as to support an underlying 'non-Aristotelian' position, according to which moral themes are not subordinated to topics of advantage, but are treated as independent of them. However, it is not immediately clear that this conclusion is of any real significance. It would seem implausible to suggest that this combination of covert hints and omissions stretching across more than four extant books is the result of a conscious strategy on Tacitus' part merely to endorse a particular rhetorical theory. It might conceivably be thought to tell us something about his rhetorical background or education that caused him automatically to present speeches in such a way that would endorse one theory over another; but, if these conclusions do nothing more than add to the list of speculative ideas about Tacitus' biography, one might be excused for feeling that they are hardly worth making.

However, if we do not merely examine the immediate context of these speeches, but also set them against the wider moral concerns of the work as a whole, it is possible to draw a conclusion that is considerably more striking and more significant. For it is noticeable that, while three of the four speeches which have a moral effect 'work' in the sense that they persuade their audience to the object, in another sense one might suggest that all of them are notable failures. The three successful speeches are all delivered by speakers whose morality is highly problematic, and are aimed at persuading their audience to ends that are at best dubious and at worst disastrous. Tacitus does explicitly say that Rome probably profited from the Flavian victory over Vitellius (3.86.2), but the immediate result of the Flavian commander Antonius' victory at Bedriacum is that his troops are enabled to perpetrate the brutal sack and massacre at Cremona with what appears to be his tacit connivance (3.26–34), and the soldiers' desire for this has already been set out before the battle (3.19). The success of Civilis' speech launches the German revolt against Roman rule, with all the moral problems of viciousness and deception that this involves;[46] while Laco's and Icelus' arguments are said by Tacitus to lead to 'the ruin of their country' (1.33.2 *publicum exitium*). Only the unsuccessful attempt to persuade Vitellius to resistance at 3.66 is not delivered by a person whose own moral

[46] Cf. Keitel (1993) 46–9.

position is clearly problematic, and not only does the speech fail, but the policy of resistance that it recommends, which ultimately is adopted by the Vitellians despite the Emperor's opposition, leads, as Tacitus indicates directly prior to the speech (3.66.1), to the disastrous final act of the civil war, with the burning of the Capitol and bloodshed and brutality on the very streets of Rome (cf. 3.70–2, 3.83, 4.1).

Successful moral persuasion via the 'non-Aristotelian' theory is thus consistently linked by Tacitus to moral disaster.[47] But this is itself strikingly paradoxical in the light of the way in which the 'non-Aristotelian' theory is treated by its Roman proponents. Cicero, *De Inventione* 2.173–5 presents the adoption of the 'non-Aristotelian' theory as in effect a moral choice in its own right: there are separate topics of morality, safety, and advantage, which may conflict with one another, but where the topics are arranged hierarchically. Morality is most important, but security (or advantage) may be allowed to win temporarily: the main thing is that via its treatment as an independent topic, proper (and superior) weight is given to moral considerations. Quintilian has a comparable, though more involved approach. He (like Cicero in *De Oratore*: above, n. 18) regards morality as fundamental to deliberative oratory; and he rejects the 'Aristotelian' theory on the grounds that it can work only in an idealized world where the audience addressed is a philosophical one that recognizes that only morality is truly expedient. In the real world, he argues, where morally inferior audiences have to be persuaded, one is obliged to separate out moral questions from issues of expediency, since that is the way in which most people view things (3.8.1–3). The ultimate result, however, is that one is able to ensure that people do what is right and are not attracted by the apparent expediency of certain immoral courses, such as happened at Numantia and the Caudine Forks (3.8.3); at 3.8.38–40 he argues that in order to persuade good men to a moral policy one should use topics of morality, but in order to keep immoral people on the right path topics of advantage are more appropriate, and moral themes should be eschewed.[48] Once again the division of these topics is part of the

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[47] A dimension missed by Aubrion (1985) 626–7.

[48] Quintilian does also admit at 3.8.30–1 that sometimes the orator will advocate expediency in preference to morality (albeit without admitting directly that he

orator's ability to serve an ultimate moral aim, by giving each audience the type of argument that is most appropriate to it.

The general conclusion in these theorists thus appears to be that employing independent topics of morality in deliberation is itself a morally admirable position. But Tacitus' handling of his speeches systematically challenges that optimistic conclusion. In the *Histories*, 'non-Aristotelian' rhetoric is employed more by villains than heroes, and to persuade audiences to ultimately dreadful policies.

Does this mean that, after everything that has been argued here, Tacitus is in fact a covert 'Aristotelian' after all? The answer is surely no: for it is still the case that 'Aristotelian' speeches fail to have any sort of moral effect at all. Rather, his conclusion appears to be both more complicated and more grim. A speaker can choose the 'Aristotelian' mode of speaking, but this subordinates moral arguments to the point where they become ineffective. The 'non-Aristotelian' mode, on the other hand, allows effective moral argument, but is a tool that will be employed by immoral people for immoral ends.

In the *Dialogus* Tacitus had presented through the mouth of Aper an apparent defense of contemporary rhetoric, but it is a rhetoric whose chief exponents prove to be only the *delatores*—informers like Eprius Marcellus and Vibius Crispus.[49] It is possible that Tacitus even wrote this directly in opposition to Quintilian's defense of a moral rhetoric in the Ciceronian manner.[50] Under the Principate Ciceronian rhetoric could no longer exist, as Messala and Maternus argue (on different grounds) in the *Dialogus*: only the rhetoric of the *delatores* could flourish. While it is extremely difficult—perhaps impossible—to pin down Tacitus' own views amid the multiple perspectives in the *Dialogus*,[51] the mismatch between oratorical success and moral virtue, at least in contemporary Rome, is a theme that repeatedly emerges from the different speakers. The *Histories* likewise challenges the simple moral equation that one finds in Cicero and Quintilian: the equation of moral rhetorical theory with moral effects. But it does so by exposing directly its practical—and horribly para-

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is doing so); however, he recognizes a moral problem in this and other such issues, referring the reader to his extended discussion of morality in oratory in Book 12 (3.8.41).

[49] In particular *Dialogus* 8; also 13.4.

[50] As argued by Winterbottom (1964), esp. 91–2; also Brink (1989), esp. 494–9.

[51] See especially Luce (1993).

doxical—consequences. The choice of rhetorical theory has indeed moral implications: but the only choice is between allowing a moral argument that is effective for immoral ends, and allowing no effective moral argument at all. In the Rome of Galba and Vitellius, in the Germany of Civilis, the notion that rhetoric is primarily an effective tool for the propagation of morality is revealed as mere idealistic optimism.

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JUGURTHINE DISORDER*

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I. *Discordia*

Sallust's second monograph, written probably in the late 40s BCE, tells the story of the war between the North African prince Jugurtha and the Roman state under the command of a series of generals, culminating in the great plebeian consul Gaius Marius. Its preface opens with the antithesis between stability and instability embodied in excellence and chance: 'Mistakenly [*Falso*] the human race complains that its nature, being feeble [*inbecilla*] and short-lived, is ruled by chance [*forte*] rather than by excellence [*uirtute*]' (1.1). Despite the traditional view that *uirtus* and *fortuna* ('luck, chance') could cooperate to ensure success,[1] Sallust builds a contrast between the 'road of *uirtus*' and *fortuna*, the latter presiding over the bent progress of one trapped by desires (1.4 *captus prauis cupidinibus* . . . *perniciosa lubidine*), whose life is unstable in all its aspects (*uires tempus ingenium diffluxere*) and dangerous (1.5 *periculosa* <*ac perniciosa*>). Arrayed against *uirtus*, then, is a complex force with the unpredictability of *fors/fortuna*, the lack of linearity implied in *prauitas*, and the boundary- and convention-disrespecting attributes of *cupido/lubido*, a force akin to that which ancient thought regularly identifies as the antithesis of philosophical, moral, or political stability and truth.[2] It can be characterized, in

* A preliminary sketch of this argument appeared in Kraus (1997) 22, 27–30. The National Endowment for the Humanities funded an early stage of this project, for which I am grateful; I thank Tony Woodman, Katherine Clarke, David Levene, Sitta von Reden, an anonymous referee for *JRS*, and (belatedly) Cynthia Damon for helpful comments. Reynolds' OCT of Sallust has been used throughout; references without book title are to the *Bellum Iugurthinum* (= *BJ*).

[1] So Sallust presents Marius, e.g., as favored alternately by *uirtus* and *fortuna* but rarely by both together (Earl [1961] 78). On *fortuna/uirtus* see Ogilvie (1970) on Livy 5.34.2; Woodman (1977–83) on Vell. Pat. 2.97.4; Wiseman (1971) 109–11. On *noua uirtus*, which often defined itself in opposition to *fortuna*, see Hellegouarc'h (1972) 476–83, esp. 478.

[2] See Rudd (1966) 27 and Padel (1992) 68—a reference for which I thank E. E. Pender, as well as for showing me a copy of Pender (1999). For the 'curved' as a

shorthand, as disorderly conduct, or *discordia*.[3] In Sallust's world this force operates subversively, inverting or replacing traditional labels and values, yet disguises its workings under the mask of those values, making it difficult even to know, much less to talk about, what is real and what false.[4] Like the later Tacitean universe, Sallust's is a wor(l)d where language, our principal access to reality, is itself implicated in the process of corruption and misreading that it seeks to clarify.[5]

As in the *BC*, the *BJ*'s lengthy introduction argues passionately for the disciplined use of intellect, a discipline played off against the dark world of political and social corruption.[6] Yet, also as in the earlier work, the *BJ*'s exaltation of mind over body is baffled by the main narrative, in which Sallust meticulously observes and obsessively catalogues disorderly conduct.[7] *Falso queritur* at the work's opening shows either that humans mistakenly complain about the degree to which they are controlled by outside forces, or perhaps that they deliberately misrepresent it (*falso* has two senses, 'misleadingly' and 'mistakenly,' both potentially operative here). But by the end of the preface, and throughout the narrative, that complaint is shown to be more often true than false—even when the control belongs to the historian himself. The monograph's very form enacts this self-subverting tendency. In the *BC*, Sallust anatomizes Roman corruption by reflecting it off a single individual; his hero's story, with its 'neat dramatic arc,'[8] is bounded by a neat historical narrative with a beginning, middle, and end. The historian's technique in the *BJ* is significantly different. David Levene has argued that Sallust con-

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metaphor for 'wrong' cf. Hor. *Ep.* 2.2.44–5 with Brink (1982) 291; for an illuminating ancient discussion of morality see Sen. *Ep.* 114.

[3] For a brief discussion, with bibliography, of the political associations of *concordia/discordia* see Paul (1984) 46; for one view of discord in the *BJ* see Wiedemann (1993).

[4] Thucydides is the ultimate historiographical source for Sallust's representation of political and social corruption as a corruption of language; see Scanlon (1980) Index s.v. Corcyrean stasis, esp. 142–4; Syme (1964) 245–6 with n. 33; on the same theme in the *Bellum Catilinae* (hereafter *BC*) see Earl (1961) 91–7.

[5] For 'wor(l)ds' see Henderson (1998) 257–300.

[6] Especially 2.4 'since there are so many different intellectual skills [*artes animi*] with which the highest distinction [*summa claritudo*] is gained.'

[7] In *BC* there is the possible exception of the *syncrisis* of Cato and Caesar (on which see Batstone [1988]); balanced characters in *BJ* are fewer and farther between. Metellus comes closest, perhaps (45.1); on Jugurtha's balance see below, 226.

[8] Scanlon (1987) 63.

structed this latter monograph as a 'fragment' whose military and political narratives are incomprehensible without continual reference to both previous and subsequent Roman history. To his arguments about the work's deferred and frustrating closure one can add the odd trick at the beginning. The preface ends with *nunc ad inceptum redeo* (4.9 'now I return to my starting point'), a digression-ending formula (as at 42.5, 79.10, Tac. *Ann.* 4.33.4). Yet at this point there exists no narrative for Sallust to have digressed from—unless we imagine ourselves to have started in the middle, that is, of a narrative of which only this fragment remains.[9] The author's explicit insistence that we look beyond the work at hand comes immediately thereafter with the announcement of his subject:

> I am about to write the war [*bellum*] which the Roman people waged with Jugurtha the king of the Numidians, first because it was great and terrible, with victories on both sides [*magnum et atrox uariaque uictoria*]; next, because this was the first challenge to the arrogance of the nobility. This struggle thoroughly confused all things divine and human [*diuina et humana cuncta permiscuit*] and reached such a state of madness that only war and the devastation of Italy put an end to the civil strife [*ut studiis ciuilibus bellum atque uastitas Italiae finem faceret*]. (5.1–2)

In this blurb the Jugurthine war does not end: it is only shifting, faceted, various. We see *bellum* leading to *studia ciuilia*, which are ended—paradoxically—by (*ciuile*) *bellum*, by which we can understand not only the Marian/Sullan war but also the more recent conflict between Caesar and Pompey.[10] The limit to which Sallust refers with *finem* will come only after the monograph ends, with the devastation

[9] On the 'displacement' see, e.g., Koestermann (1971) on 4.9. Dietsch (1846) *ad loc.* argues that *inceptum* refers to Sallust's plan; this is likely enough, but the conventional use of *ad inceptum redire* suggests that something more is going on here. Wiedemann (1979) shows that Sallust is here imitating the preface to Cato's *De agricultura*; as he says, though, in *BJ* 'the abrupt, archaic formula . . . is . . . quite out of place' (16). For the argument that 4.2–9 do constitute a digression see Earl (1979); on the significance of other such remarks in the *BJ* see Levene (1992) 58–9, and for bibliography on the structure of the *BJ* see Syme (1964) 141 n. 4; Scanlon (1989) 144–6.

[10] Levene (1992) 56, 69; for extended discussion of Sallust's two themes see Steidle (1958). Ancient readers often saw Marius and Sulla prefiguring Caesar and Pompey: cf., for one, Lucan 2.67–233 with Fantham (1992) 91 and for the inexorable repetition encoded in civil war see Jal (1963) 44–5 and Henderson (1998) 165–211 on Lucan's *plus quam ciuilia bella.* Jugurtha's fratricide will also have had contemporary resonance with the conflict between Caesar and Pompey: Bannon (1997) 142–5.

of the future, a projection into the distance mirrored by the important geographical move from Africa (5.1 *Numidarum*) to Italy (5.2).[11]

Yet, though Jugurtha's story is only part of a larger one, Sallust does center his narrative on the life of his 'hero,' starting with his birth (5.7) and ending with his (implied) death in Marius' triumph (114.3); he plays Jugurtha off against others (Metellus, Marius, Sulla) just as he sets Catiline against Cicero, Cato, and Caesar. This essay argues that the prince is the embodiment, cause, and effect of disorder at all levels, political, military, and historiographical; and that Sallust uses him as the focus of this 'thematics of disorder,' a turmoil which ultimately threatens even the historian's project. Though credited with *uirtus* by such reliable sources as Micipsa and Scipio Aemilianus, he is plagued by anger and fear; though a victim of desire, he also successfully exploits it;[12] though able to beat Roman generals in a fixed battle, he prefers to engage them with treachery and evasion. His manipulation of and affinity with money, deceit, motion, and delay enable him for years to defer any final settlement, either diplomatic or military, of the war with Rome.[13] Further, military success in Africa requires the election of the new man Marius to the consulship, a political upheaval with far-reaching, even paradigmatic, consequences. The influence of Jugurthine disorder thus

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[11] It is no accident that a narrative set primarily in Africa should exhibit disorderly conduct: 'l'irrédentisme, la tendence à l'autonomie, c'est-à-dire à la dispersion, découlaient nécessairement de la nature des choses' [i.e., from the terrain] (Benabou [1976] 58). Focusing on the ethnographical digressions and the relation of Numidian geography to character are Wiedemann (1993) and Green (1993); for literary discussion of the 'textual geography' see Scanlon (1989) and for Carthage in *BJ* see Kraus (1997) 27–30. Relevant to the *BJ's* theme of boundary collapse, esp. in Sallust's digression on shifting desert sands and the Syrtes (78.3 ~ 79.6), is Edwards (1993) 147: diatribes against luxury often attack those who collapse the land/sea boundary, an 'archetypally natural distinction.' See further below, 236.

[12] Not discussed here, but cf. 38.10, 44.5, 54.5, 108.3, where *lubido* works to Jugurtha's advantage. It clusters in the accounts of the *quaestio Mamilia* and the *mos partium*, where it fosters the atmosphere in which Jugurtha thrives (below, n. 55); it also works with or is subordinate to Marius (63.2, 84.3, 85.39, 86.2). For the specific association of *lubido/cupido* with crookedness and passionate motion cf. 25.6–8 *conmotus metu atque lubidine diuorsus agitabatur*... *animus cupidine caecus*... *rapiebat. uicit tamen*... *prauom consilium*; on Sallust's preoccupation with passion's disrupting force see Syme (1964) 268–9 and Scanlon (1989) 170–1 nn. 5 and 8.

[13] Finishing one's *inceptum* is a good general's attribute (e.g. Caes. *BG* 8.3.4, 5.4, 19.6 and Vell. Pat. 2.79.1 with Woodman [1977–83] *ad loc.* on *labor*, etc.). Sallust punctuates his narrative with reports of *incepta* thwarted or completed (7.6, 11.9, 25.6, 7, 55.8, 61.1, 93.1); the first threat to any project is (to) his own, at 4.9 (see above, and below, Section V).

extends to, and indeed in Sallust's narrative causes, the historian's political theme; it thereby aggravates the collapse of ordered procedure and social boundaries in Rome itself. As each becomes less typically *nobilis*, the Roman commanders are progressively better able to deal with Jugurtha: so Metellus, who enjoys the first real success against him, has almost none of the standard aristocratic faults (43.1, 45.1, 64.1). Paralleling this movement in the field are the changes in Rome, where increasing political instability progresses from tribunician agitation undercut by bribery (Chh. 30–4), through direct opposition to the aristocracy in the *quaestio Mamilia* (40), to the election of Marius (73.7). Yet the disorder does not stop there: the *nouus homo* almost immediately faces his own replacement, the patrician Sulla.[14]

Three areas of this thematics of disorder stand out: unregulated or illicit exchange, especially involving bribery; delay and its converse, rapid motion; and substitution. Though I begin by treating them separately, it will become clear that they overlap to a considerable extent, one theme flowing into another, as the narrative itself exhibits the flexibility and disorder that it rehearses.

II. *Money Talks*

As befits one who speaks very little of himself (6.1), Sallust's Jugurtha speaks in direct speech only once. On the several occasions in which his words are reported, they are muted, deflected, or alien: wordless responses (only the manner, not the content, is given) at 11.1 and 72.1; in indirect speech at 22.2–4 and 81.1; in indirect speech and in Latin, as part of a deception, at 101.6. Once, on the point of speaking, he is silenced by a corrupt tribune, at a moment at which words would irrevocably commit him to engagement in the Roman legal process (34.1). This repeated refusal and muting of one of the primary markers of presence displays Jugurtha as a figure for absence and deferral.[15] Even his single direct utterance, spoken while

[14] Sulla, who actually captures Jugurtha, represents a throwback to aristocratic command; but in *BJ* he operates only as Marius' subordinate and substitute. He partakes, therefore, of non-aristocratic slipperiness. Cf. Pelling (1993) 81: 'the decline of the Jugurthine War into trickery elicits, in Sulla, the diplomatic trickster who can outsmart the African equivalents.'

[15] I am persuaded by Sternberg (1991) that indirect discourse shares the

leaving Rome with a backward glance echoing Catiline, is laden with obliquity: *sed postquam Roma egressus est, fertur saepe eo tacitus respiciens postremo dixisse: 'urbem uenalem et mature perituram si emptorem inuenerit.'*[16] Jugurtha barely emerges from reported speech,[17] uttering his *bon mot* while looking silently backward. And though Sallust minimizes the self-contradiction of *tacitus respiciens . . . dixisse* by carefully indicating sequence (*postquam . . . saepe . . . postremo*), the present-tense *respiciens*, usually of concomitant action,[18] hints at the paradox 'spoke silently while looking.' Finally, Jugurtha speaks only in a future condition—nothing so direct as a declarative sentence—and a condition, at that, involving a (hypothetical) financial transaction.

Accusations of bribery figure prominently both in the political propaganda of the late Republic and in Sallust's narrative of this war, especially its early stages. The historian has gone further even than the propaganda, demonstrably exaggerating both the scope and effect of bribery during those years.[19] In part, this magnifies the greed of the Roman nobles, recalling in many ways the corrupt Roman soci-

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'universals of quotation' with direct discourse, and that (78) 'there is no way to maintain the bond between direct quotation and literal representation.' Still, given the conventions of ancient narrative, Latin indirect discourse is less flexible in form than in languages which do not use the accusative + infinitive construction. Bearing in mind, then, that '*no* configuration of indirect discourse can silence the reportee's voice altogether' (Sternberg [1991] 90), I think it fair to maintain, at least formally, a distinction between the mimetic form of direct discourse and the diegetic, or narrated, form of indirect (Genette [1980] 172). Given the large blocks of direct discourse in *BJ*, moreover, it is remarkable that in that medium Jugurtha speaks a total of eight words. He is relatively quiet even in indirect speech. The contrast with Catiline is instructive (two prominent direct speeches and a directly quoted letter).

[16] 'But after he left Rome, he is reported finally to have said, while often looking back at it, silent: "a city for sale and ripe for perishing—if it finds a buyer!"' (35.10). The echo of Catiline is from Cic. *Cat.* 2.2 *retorquet oculos profecto saepe ad hanc urbem.*

[17] Appropriately enough, as this is a famous tag (*fertur*); see Paul (1984) 108. The accusative is generally taken as one of exclamation, the future perfect *inuenerit* signaling the direct speech: on the future participle (not short for *perituram esse*) see Koestermann (1971) 151, Kühner and Stegmann (1976) I. 760–1; for *dicere* introducing direct speech see *OLD* 2d. Jugurtha's utterance has been printed as indirect speech, e.g., by Kritz (1828–53) and Capes (1889).

[18] The grammars explain *respiciens* as instrumental/modal, comparing 113.1 *diu uoluens . . . tandem promisit* ('thinking it over for a long time he at last promised'). For *tacitus . . . dixisse* cf. Hor. *Sat.* 1.9.11–13, where the satirist is talking (inaudibly) to himself.

[19] Steidle (1958) 51–4; Paul (1984) 261–3; see further Allen (1938) and von Fritz (1943), esp. 159–65. On the theme of greed in the first section of the *BJ* see Koestermann (1971) on 8.1, 20.1, and Leeman (1957), esp. 207–8. Braund (1984)

ety pictured in the *BC.* Yet the bribery motif is not randomly distributed. All of the financial transactions in the early stages of the war are initiated by or worked through Jugurtha, who has a particular affinity with tokens of exchange.[20] Like money, he goes everywhere and facilitates (potentially) treacherous dealings and changes of position; and, like it also, he can erase the distinctions that keep societies stable. For money not only corrupts, it confuses as well.[21] In its ability to erase meaning, or to replace one meaning with another, it is a fitting tool for someone who is himself polyvalent, shimmering, impossible to pin down.

This polyvalence is seen perhaps most economically at the moment when Metellus enters his new province:

> The general himself, with his army on the alert and hostile, marched into Numidia, where contrary to an appearance of war [*contra belli faciem*] there were huts full of men, flocks and laborers in the fields. The king's officials came out from towns and hamlets to meet them, prepared to provide grain, to carry supplies, and do everything that they demanded. Metellus was not, for this reason, any less careful; but, just as if the enemy were present, he proceeded with an armed column, scouted all round, and believed these signs of surrender to be a sham [*ostentui*] and that a chance for ambush was being tested.
> (46.5–6)

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59 emphasizes that the 'exchange of gifts and favours was at the very heart of friendly relationships in antiquity' (cf. also 81).

[20] Just for instance: as the war heats up, Jugurtha begins to act with more free-spending abandon, *inpensius* (47.3), a word with monetary connotations that Sallust uses only here and at 75.1 (with *diffidens*); for its financial overtones cf. Catullus 72.5–6 'though I burn more lavishly [*inpensius*], still you are much cheaper [*uilior*] in my eyes.' Despite his association with bribery, however, it does not affect him. He thus has something in common with the hero of the literary attack on luxury, in which a figure who resists corruption takes the reader on a tour of it—though Jugurtha provides precisely the reverse of that moral guidance.

[21] As at *BC* 12.2, where the syntax piles up evils: 'as a result of wealth, luxury and greed together with pride invaded the young: they stole, squandered, set small value on their own property while coveting others', for honor and modesty, all things human and divine mixed together [*diuina atque humana promiscua*], they had no value and no respect.' See further Sekora (1977) 24, 51, 145, 242; Berry (1994) 153; and cf. Edwards (1993) 186: the flow of money 'always threatened to subvert [the] illusion of stability.' See also Barthes (1975) 215 on the 'collapse of economies' when boundaries are removed or subverted, and von Reden (1998) 255: 'the confrontation of reciprocity and commodity exchange . . . was a metaphorical confrontation of order and disorder, civic community and its corrosion. Menander's . . . representation of civic symbols as objects which have a price and are transacted arbitrarily . . . suggests that commodity exchange was regarded as the moral opposite of civic exchange and thus in certain circumstances detrimental to the *polis*.'

Landscape and inhabitants alike give the appearance of a peace which may or may not be real (Sallust does not tell us).[22] The narrator explains that Metellus' distrust is motivated by Jugurtha's most dangerous characteristic: *nam in Iugurtha tantus dolus tantaque peritia locorum et militiae erat ut absens an praesens, pacem an bellum gerens perniciosior esset in incerto*[23] *haberetur* (46.8 'For Jugurtha had so much craft and so much experience of the country and of warfare that it was considered uncertain whether he was more dangerous absent or present, when waging peace or war'). Deceit and skill are often viewed as opposing characteristics in traditional Roman military ethics;[24] possessing both, Jugurtha cannot be evaluated, even in such antithetical situations as peace and war, presence or absence. Categories which should be stable, natural opposites are in his case confused and, Sallust may imply, liable to switch places without warning.[25] His ability to elide difference is reflected by (or causes?) Sallust's jolting zeugma, *pacem . . . gerens*.[26] Our evaluation of Jugurtha cannot rely even on the appearance of Sallust's words.

This Jugurtha has emerged only gradually, obliquely, from Sallust's portrait of him.[27] In the early scenes in Africa and in Numantia, the authorial voice describes a talented soldier admired by all, one who sounds very much like a virtuous young Roman:

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[22] In Livy's adaptation of this passage (6.25.6–11) the peace is genuine, and Livy says as much—though Camillus, like Metellus, does not trust it.

[23] *Incertus*, like *inprouisus* ('unexpected'), is a Jugurthine word, though not always in Jugurtha's control: 15x in *BJ*, five in *BC*, nine in *Hist.*; *inprouisus*: 11x in *BJ*, once in *BC*, twice in *Hist.* Tacitus adapts 46.5–8 to describe the impossible-to-interpret Nero (*Ann.* 15.36.4).

[24] Cf. Auct. *Bell. Afr.* 73.2 'those who were accustomed to fight with war-skill [*uirtutem*] not trickery' and see Wheeler (1988), esp. 93–110.

[25] For proverbial *praesens/absens* see Otto (1962) 286. This is a (pejorative) version of the 'unresolved alternative' in panegyric (cf. also 95.4, Livy *per.* 80 on Marius), for which see Vell. Pat. 2.122.2 with Woodman (1977–83). For *uarietas* confusing natural opposites cf. Livy 5.28.5 'they fought in Aequi territory with such varying success [*uarie*] that it was unclear whether they had conquered or been conquered.' It is also a defining characteristic of *luxuria* (Edwards [1993] 145 n. 21). So stylistic *uariatio* problematizes historical narratives and the worlds they describe: on Livy see Kraus (1997) 62–70, on Tacitus, Woodman (1997) 109–12.

[26] It is choice (*TLL* VI.2.10.1943.32–6 lists no earlier, and no other prose, examples) and in a different context can be totalizing, as at Verg. *Aen.* 9.279 (see Hardie [1994] *ad loc.*). Here it dissolves totality, refusing assessment. How can one wage peace?

[27] The gradual emergence of Jugurtha's character is noted by Riposati (1978) 146–7; on the indirect technique see Paul (1984) 29. I quote the portrait at length here, as I will return to it throughout the essay.

When Jugurtha first grew up, as he had strength and good looks, but above all being strong in intellect, he did not allow himself to be corrupted by luxury or idleness but took part in the national pursuits of riding and javelin-throwing, and competed with other young men in running; and though he outshone them all he was dear to everyone. He also devoted much time to hunting.... He performed many feats but spoke very little of himself [*plurumum facere, minumum ipse de se loqui*]. [2]Though Micipsa was at first pleased with this, considering that Jugurtha's excellence [*uirtutem*] would bring glory to his reign, once he realized that Jugurtha was in the prime of life and constantly increasing his prestige, while he himself was old and his children still small, he was violently moved by the situation and considered many things in his mind [*uehementer eo negotio permotus multa cum animo suo uoluebat*]. [3]Human nature, eager for rule and rushing headlong to fill the mind's desire [*praeceps ad explendam animi cupidinem*], terrified him, together with the easy chance offered by his own age and that of his children, an opportunity which drives even average men sideways in the hope of profit [*quae etiam mediocris uiros spe praedae transuorsos agit*]; in addition there was the devotion toward Jugurtha that had been kindled in the Numidians [*studia adcensa*], which, he worried... might result in sedition or war.

Trapped by these difficulties, he saw that such a popular man could not be eliminated either by force or through treacherous attack. Since Jugurtha was energetic and eager for military glory, he decided to expose him to danger and thereby to test his luck. [2]And so, since during the Numantine war Micipsa was aiding the Roman people... he put him in charge of the Numidians whom he was sending to Spain, hoping that he would be killed easily, either by showing off his excellence [*ostentando uirtutem*] or by the enemy's savagery. [3]But the matter came out far differently from the way he had expected [*sed ea res longe aliter ac ratus erat euenit*]. [4]For with his active and keen mind, once Jugurtha understood the nature of the Roman commander, Publius Scipio and the character of the enemy, through much hard work and much care, by modest obedience and by often exposing himself to danger, he soon became so famous [*claritudinem*] that he was exceptionally dear [*uehementer carus*] to our men, and most terrifying to the Numantines. [5]In fact, he was both a tough fighter and a good counselor—something which is extremely difficult, since the one usually produces fear as a product of caution, the other rashness from bold courage. [6]And so the commander conducted almost all difficult tasks through Jugurtha, considered him among his friends, and embraced him more and more each day as one whose judgments and undertakings were never in vain [*neque consilium neque inceptum ullum frustra erat*]. [7]To this was added his generosity of spirit and shrewdness of intellect, by which he joined many of the Romans to himself in close friendship.

(Chh. 6–7)

To some degree this is a conventional picture[28] of a young warrior with brains and brawn, a doer rather than a talker, whose excellence does not attract envy—the last a particularly positive trait, given the normal Roman attitude toward competitive *uirtus*. Yet King Micipsa worries that this illegitimate son of his brother Mastanabal will usurp the legitimate heirs' place. Jugurtha's origins make him both a son and a non-son, and may in the king's mind make him therefore more likely to take what is not his, a fear graphically imaged at 6.3 by the striking metaphorical use of *transuorsum agere*.[29] Micipsa's reading of his nephew leads him to believe that Jugurtha will be tempted to 'show off' (7.2 *ostentando*), an ambiguous word that suggests a possible disjunction between appearance and reality.[30]

At this point, however, nothing suggests that Micipsa is right. And indeed, Jugurtha's behavior under Scipio's command allays any fear that he will disregard proper boundaries. Any doubleness in him manifests itself as a preternaturally stable mix of intellect and strength.[31] The prominent, balanced verbal decoration in 7.5 underscores the fixity of Jugurtha's character, in which neither aspect drifts over to its less desirable version.[32] That his talents enable him to stand in for Scipio himself (7.6) shows Jugurtha able to participate in a legitimate, controlled substitution that seems to gainsay Micipsa's fears for his own sons: if Jugurtha can take over for Scipio without taking over from him, then he might be safely entrusted with other sorts of power. By the end of Chapter 7, then, we have seen two Jugurthas, each an interpretative construction (since he hardly speaks of himself): a frightening one of Micipsa's imagination, and a competent, reassuring one as created by the narrator and perceived by

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[28] For parallels see Paul (1984) 29–30. Green (1993), following Vretska, traces the portrait's origin to Xenophon's Cyrus, thereby mapping the Jugurthine war onto a greater precursor.

[29] *Transuersus* in this figurative, moral sense is rare in Republican literature (Enn. *Scaen.* 229J, Cato *Orat.* 163M = fr. 95a Peter [Sallust's model], *BJ* 6.3, 14.20; cf. Cic. *Brut.* 331 and the expression *de transuerso* 'out of the blue,' as at *Rhet. Her.* 4.10.14).

[30] For *ostentare* of boasting or feigning—the latter found esp. in Livy and Tacitus—see *TLL* IX.2.8.1147.34–1148.37.

[31] Precisely what the historian advocates in the prefaces to both monographs; cf. 7.4 (*inpigro et acre ingenio*) and 7.7 (Jugurtha's *ingeni sollertia*), the same stabilizing intellectual power—however precarious—that Sallust extols (e.g., 1.3, 2.2, 4).

[32] Chiasmus with correlated *et*s and homoioteleuton is followed by two precisely parallel cola in anaphora: *et proelio strenuos erat et bonus consilio, quorum alterum ex prouidentia timorem, alterum ex audacia temeritatem adferre plerumque solet* (translation above, 225).

Scipio and the Romans (7.4 *nostri*). His real character is, therefore, in some doubt—though, as Levene argues, we are surely encouraged to think that Micipsa was wrong.[33]

Or was he? With only the transitional information that Jugurtha made many Roman friends (7.7), Sallust introduces a new way of looking at him, through the filter of Roman corruption and suspicion:

> At that time there were many new and noble men [*conplures noui atque nobiles*] serving in our army to whom riches were more important than what is good and honorable, men who were seditious at home and powerful among the allies, notorious [*clari*] rather than honorable. By their promises they tried to kindle Jugurtha's unaverage spirit [*non mediocrem animum pollicitando adcendebant*]: if Micipsa were dead he would have sole power over Numidia; he had exceptional excellence: at Rome everything was for sale [*in ipso maxumam uirtutem, Romae omnia uenalia esse*]. [2]But when . . . Scipio . . . had rewarded Jugurtha with gifts and praised him lavishly in front of the assembly, leading him into his headquarters he then in seclusion [*secreto*] advised him to cultivate the friendship of the Roman people publicly rather than privately, and not to make a habit of offering them bribes. It was dangerous (he said) to purchase from the few that which belonged to the many. If he were willing to stay firm [*permanere*] in his talents, glory and a kingdom would come to him of their own accord; but if he kept on going too fast, his own money would make him fall headlong [*suamet ipsum pecunia praecipitem casurum*]. [9.1]After saying this, he sent him home with a letter which he was to take to Micipsa. (8.1–9.1)

Narratively, this response to the *claritudo* of Chapter 7 is a disquieting replay of 6.2–3, in which Micipsa responded to Jugurtha's *uirtus* by fearing human greed. Chapter 8 shows Jugurtha as the silent recipient of two communications, first from the bad Romans, *noui atque nobiles* (8.1)—an unholy alliance, or an even unholier hendiadys, destabilizing conventional meaning and prefiguring Marius himself.[34] These are men who wrongly assess value and who themselves embody an undesirable comparison.[35] Their disorder extends to their syntax: *in ipso maxumam uirtutem, Romae omnia uenalia esse.* Logically

[33] Levene (1992) 60.

[34] Following Latte, Koestermann (1971) 50 takes *noui* to mean 'young' (= νέοι), so *noui atque nobiles* = *iuuenes nobiles*. Paul (1984) rightly insists instead on the political sense of *noui* here; but the possibility of taking it as a hendiadys (= *noui nobiles*) should not be eliminated. For the oxymoron see Woodman (1977–83) on Vell. Pat. 2.96.1 *nouitatem suam . . . nobilitauerat*.

[35] *Clari magis quam honesti* significantly contrasts appearance with inner worth; see Hellegouarc'h (1972) 237–8 on *clarus* and 462–3 on *honestus*. The latter may refer

adversative, the tempters' asyndeton in fact causally (and nonsensically) connects *uirtus* and bribery. The fire they (try to) kindle in the prince picks up the *studia . . . adcensa* of the Numidian people (6.3). This, along with other echoes of 6.3 (*seditiosi* ~ *seditio, non mediocrem animum* ~ *etiam mediocris uiros, praecipitem* ~ *praeceps*) is our first confirmation of Micipsa's fears.[36]

Balancing, and (covertly) responding to, this encounter is one with Scipio (8.2). The general's approach is double(d)—first *pro contione*, then *in praetorium . . . secreto*—and ironic: in private he warns against private dealings. A mirror, then—or a double?—of the (internal) doubleness of the *noui atque nobiles*. But Scipio's language is revelatory. On the one hand, he says, Jugurtha can have stability (*permanere*)[37]—and its rewards, glory and a kingdom that come without requiring an exchange (*ultro*). On the other, haste will bring a fall. This is, of course, a well-worn *topos*. But the impelling force is almost always *fortuna* or *uires*, not, as in Jugurtha's case, money.[38] This *topos*, then, has a unconventional (disorderly) twist. As if responding to the tempters who offer Rome for sale, Scipio couches his warning in financial terms. This first appearance of the important theme of bribery coincides with what will appear, in retrospect, as the occasion of Jugurtha's corruption.[39]

But only in retrospect. The letter Scipio sends back to the king could cause alarm: is Scipio sending Jugurtha back with his own

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only to political honor, and hence to externals; but given *bono honestoque* just above (= καλὸν κἀγαθόν, Hellegouarc'h [1972] 462) it should here refer to inner worth. On antithesis expressed with *magis quam* as an attempt to 'uncover true human motives and overturn the apparent ones' see Scanlon (1980) 142; Kraus (1994) 146.

[36] If the ambiguous *adcendebant* is conative, as I believe, Sallust gives no explicit indication of Jugurtha's response either to the tempters or to Scipio. The textual echoes, however, may suggest to the acute reader that Micipsa was right all along.

[37] Scipio is trying to induce Jugurtha to live up to his heritage. Grandfather Masinissa's 'distinguished deeds' (*praeclara facinora*) led to the gift of territory from Rome: 5.5 'therefore Masinissa's friendship with us remained good and honorable' (*bona atque honesta permansit*), the only other use of *permanere* in *BJ* and a clear allusion to its part in the 'official or semi-official phrase' *in amicitia populi Romani permanere*: Powell (1988) 187. On Jugurtha's imitation of his forbears see also Braund (1984) 138–9.

[38] Sallust uses it later of Marius, whose fall lies beyond the scope of the story, but is predicted within it: 63.6 'for afterward his ambition sent him headlong [*praeceps*].' For the financial element cf. Livy 7.25.9 *adeo laboramus in quae sola creuimus, diuitias luxuriamque* with Oakley (1997–8) II. 235; for rich discussion of the *topos*, possibly originating in Latin with Sallust, see Woodman (1988) 131–2 with n. 64.

[39] Levene (1992) 60; but cf. above, n. 36.

death-warrant, as Micipsa sent him to Spain to die?[40] On the contrary. The letter affirms Jugurtha's *uirtus*, his dearness to the Romans (*nobis* . . . *carus*), even his legitimacy: 'you have a man worthy of yourself and of his grandfather Masinissa' (9.2). Understanding the rumors of his nephew's performance to be true (9.3) Micipsa adopts Jugurtha, setting a seal on the nobility that, Marius-like, he has proved through his actions (cf. 85.15–17, 29–30). No gap, then, between reputation and reality; and no suggestion of any hidden problems. Nothing, in fact, either in story or discourse, for years (9.4 *paucos post annos*—in fact, fourteen).[41] Yet the collapse of narrative/narrated time may signal the magnitude of Jugurtha's disturbance. Certainly, in the next scene, as Micipsa lies dying, the deceptive gap between appearance and reality and the theme of illicit exchange come together again. His wish that Jugurtha will grow closer to his stepbrothers suggests that the adoption has not eased any dynastic tensions: *tuaque uirtute nobis Romanos ex amicis amicissumos fecisti* (10.2) . . . *hos qui tibi genere propinqui, beneficio meo fratres sunt, caros habeas neu malis alienos adiungere quam sanguine coniunctos retinere* (10.3) . . . *quis autem amicior quam frater fratri?* (10.5).[42] The polyptotic repetition of *amic-* and *frat-* reflects the stabilizing power of Jugurtha's *uirtus*, which has the potential to bring elements together to create a unity, just as he avoided dangerous character shifts in Numantia; so too does Micipsa's exhortation to avoid unstable antithesis (*neu* . . . *malis* . . . *quam*: above, n. 35). But by the end of the speech Jugurtha's *uirtus* again poses a threat: 'But you, Adherbal and Hiempsal, tend this man and observe him, imitate his excellence [*uirtutem*] and take care that I not seem to have adopted better children than [*meliores* . . . *quam*] I fathered.' (10.8).[43] Micipsa has moved from an image of Jugurtha's *uirtus* as glue to one of Jugurtha's *uirtus* as something that can make the worse seem the

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[40] For the original of this motif, Bellerophon and his fatal letter (Homer, *Il.* 6.168–70), see Powell (1991) 199; for folk-tale elements in the *BJ* see Cipriani (1988); Oniga (1990).

[41] Jugurtha returned in 132 BCE, Micipsa died in 118. *Statim* at 9.3 may itself mask a gap of a dozen years: see Paul (1984) 40–2 for a discussion.

[42] 'By your excellence you have made the Romans, who were already friends, exceptional friends. . . . [I ask you to] hold dear those who are your relatives by birth, your brothers by my favor, and do not prefer to bind strangers to you [as friends] rather than to hold onto those who are bound by blood. . . . What greater friend is there than a brother to a brother?'

[43] The declamatory paradoxes of Micipsa's speech illustrate language at once unruly and under tight control; one might compare Ovid's alleged licence in what

better. The center of the speech, which enables that move, meditates on the mutability of human fortune and the tendency of power to corrupt: 'it is neither armies nor treasuries that protect a kingdom, but friends, whom you can provide for yourself neither with weapons nor with gold; they answer to kindness and loyalty. . . . I leave to you a kingdom that will be stable [*firmum*] if you are good, but, if you are bad, feeble [*inbecillum*].[44] For in concord small things grow, but in discord the greatest fall to pieces' (10.4, 6). Money, instability, and collapse are intimately related. The connection between money (*thesauri, auro*) and the power to make illegitimate exchanges (replacing blood relatives with outsiders, friends with enemies, real sons with adopted) lies at the heart of both subversive behavior in general and Jugurtha's character in particular.

Scipio's warning and Micipsa's fears are suddenly validated as the narrative reveals Jugurtha's duplicity: 'for the moment he responded kindly' (11.1). His power over and kinship with treasuries and the gold they contain is demonstrated not simply through his effective bribery. All significant action in the pre-Metellan narrative reflects this connection, starting with Jugurtha's murder of his stepbrother Hiempsal, a critical step structurally linked to divisiveness and wealth. As he begins the account of the murder Sallust backtracks slightly:

> *primo conuentu, quem ab regulis factum supra memoraui, propter* ***dis****sensionem placuerat* ***di****uidi* <u>*thesauros*</u> *finisque imperi singulis constitui. itaque tempus ad utramque rem* ***de****cernitur, sed maturius ad* <u>*pecuniam*</u> ***dis****tribuendam. reguli interea in loca propinqua* <u>*thesauris*</u> *alius alio concessere* (12.1–2 'At the first conference, which I recalled above was held by the princes, on account of their **dis**agreement they had agreed to **di**vide their <u>treasuries</u> and to establish borders of a kingdom for each of them. And so a time was **de**cided for each matter, but an earlier one for **dis**tributing the <u>money</u>. In the meantime the princes went off into territory adjoining the <u>treasuries</u>, one to one place and one to another.')

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could be described as his most carefully controlled lines (so e.g., Sen. *Contr.* 2.2.12; see Bonner [1949] 143–4).

[44] *Inbecillus*, which in 10.6 describes the potential result of disorderly conduct, occurs in the monograph only here and at 1.1 (above, 217). The echo links the introductory themes with the current political situation in Africa, alerting the reader not only to a potential conflict between Jugurtha's *uirtus* and his (still hypothetical) inner corruption, but also to a characteristic that he shares with troubled human society as a whole (this link was, of course, contradicted at 6.1 *non se luxu neque inertiae conrumpendum dedit*: Paul [1984] 29; Levene [1992] 59).

Though masquerading as incidental background, this passage in fact reports the only important decision made at the conference described in the preceding chapter: that earlier narrative concentrated instead on the kings' jockeying for position (11.2–6). Its chronological displacement, a slight distortion weighted by the obtrusive *quem . . . supra memoraui*, brings it into play at a point of heightened relevance,[45] further underscored by the repeated *thesauros, pecuniam, thesauris*. That heap of money is itself confusingly mixed up with discord, which stymies limit (*dissensionem*), and regulated division, which establishes it (*diuidi, decernitur, distribuendam*). The passage moves from joining (*conuentu*) to separation (*concessere*: see *OLD* 1), opposite meanings identically prefixed. The whole is bound together by *regulis . . . reguli*, separated polyptoton echoed by the juxtaposed but distributive *alius alio*. These elaborately introduced *thesauri* form a significant backdrop to Hiempsal's murder, which is accomplished immediately thereafter (12.3–6) through the bribery and deceit that Micipsa deplored.

Jugurtha's act produces instant and terrifying division, both in Numidia (13.1) and outside, as his other stepbrother, Adherbal, attempts to renew the alliance with Rome. But Jugurtha quickly passes from fear to hope via the symbiotic operators of Roman greed and his own money: 'thinking over his crime in his mind [*cum animo*] he feared the Roman people, nor . . . did he have hope anywhere except in the nobles' avarice and his own money' (13.5). In his subsequent dealings with the Romans his bribery successfully establishes division (e.g., 15.2–3, 16.1), maintaining distance between himself and reprisals for his increasingly aggressive behavior toward Adherbal. When he finally must face Roman armies, he finds the consul Bestia and his companions to be themselves divided, duplicitous, and liable to make disorderly appraisals (15.4, 28.5, 29.2)—ready prey, in short, to Jugurtha's fiscal disorder. Negotiations for a specious surrender[46] are held in a double session reminiscent of Scipio's two communications to Jugurtha (29.5 *praesenti consilio . . . secreta*). Here the narrative

[45] The use of a resumptive phrase after only a small amount of text has intervened is a feature of Caesar's writing and may be studiedly inelegant; cf. its appearance in Claud. Quad. fr. 10.4 Peter (*bis*), where it is generally described as a mark of 'annalistic' style (e.g., by Eden [1962] 80 and n. 1; see also Starr [1981]).

[46] Whatever Bestia's intentions, the *deditio* was not genuine without the presence (= surrender) of Jugurtha's person (Paul [1984] 96–7, 102, 104–5); the prince tries an identical (absent) deal with Metellus, with no success (Paul [1984] 140 on 46.1). For Jugurtha and presence/absence see above, n. 25.

juxtaposes two actions that can be understood as one, corresponding to the deceit wherein one agreement (the formal *deditio*) hides another (the secret understanding). This doubled structure is repeated a few chapters later, when Cassius arrives with orders to bring Jugurtha to Rome. He finds that the specific legal and economic categories set up in the terms of the surrender have been replaced by unrestrained exchange (29.6 ~ 32.3–4). Rather than trying to correct this behavior, as Metellus will do later, Cassius simply removes its primary cause. Like the negotiations for the surrender, his discussions with Jugurtha take place first (presumably) in the open, then in private (32.5 *priuatim praeterea*). In each case, however, Cassius makes an offer of *fides*, the ultimate stabilizing force, to one who has none (32.5 *diffidenti*). The only difference between the two offers is that he presents public *fides* in public (32.1, 5), his own (*suam*) in private. In contrast to Scipio's two communications, then, or to Bestia's negotiations, the content of each message is the same, the slight variation (public ~ private) precisely corresponding to the place in which it is delivered.[47]

The success of this *fides* is strictly limited. After a short but disastrous episode in Rome Jugurtha is back in Africa, where as the war narrative moves into a new phase the prominence of bribery gradually decreases. In its place arise two concepts whose operation resembles that of money. Delay (the gap between an action and its consequence) and motion (the quick passage of one thing into another) are two sides of the same coin; they have roots in the early portrait of Jugurtha, and are introduced into the military narrative as early as the surrender of 111 BCE, which begins as an attempt to purchase *mora belli* (29.3 'delay of the war'). The scenes between that surrender and the defeat of Aulus Albinus (38.10) show Jugurtha still manipulating money where he can; delay and motion, however, come increasingly into their own.

III. *Cuncta Agitare ('All Shook Up')*

Micipsa has a remarkable, and shocking, reaction to his nephew's early talents: *uehementer eo negotio permotus multa cum suo animo uoluebat*

[47] On the rhetorical and thematic stability of sameness see below, Section IV; for the financial connotations of *fides* see *OLD* 5 and cf. 75.1 cited above, n. 20.

(6.2, translated above). *Permouere* is at home in descriptions of sudden panic and fright, especially the panic caused by an approaching army.[48] But in Jugurtha's story it describes only the effect he has on his relatives (at 6.3, 9.3, 20.4). The alarming near-metaphorical diction images a relationship more appropriate between enemies than in a family, while Micipsa's agitation is enhanced by the juxtaposition to *permotus* of *negotio*, suggesting the traditional etymology *nec otium*.[49] *Vehementer*, too, also used of Jugurtha's (positive) effects on the Roman soldiers at Numantia (7.4), hyperbolically qualifies emotions that verge on agitation. Even Micipsa's friendly response to his nephew, after Scipio's letter, is infected by militaristic language: 'he advanced on [*adgressus est*] Jugurtha to conquer him [*uincere*] with kindness' (9.3), while Sallust here deploys *permouere* once again, of the king's reaction to Jugurtha's talent and influence (*quom uirtute tum gratia uiri permotus*). The change of mind that Micipsa then undergoes, though presented as positive, cannot in fact be anything but sinister in the light of the surrounding vocabulary of motion and attack.

Before Metellus, no one manages to control Jugurthine mobility and delay.[50] They are at their most powerful after Adherbal's death at Cirta. Facing the new consul, Jugurtha continually defers engagement:

> *at contra Iugurtha trahere omnia et alias, deinde alias morae causas facere, polliceri deditionem ac deinde metum simulare, cedere instanti et paulo post, ne sui diffiderent, instare: ita belli modo, modo pacis mora consulem ludificare* (36.2 'But on the other hand Jugurtha dragged everything out and produced first some, then other reasons for delay; promised surrender and then simulated fear; yielded as they came on and a little later, lest his men lose heart, attacked; thus now with delay of war, now of peace he mocked the consul.')

War and peace, as at 46.8 (above, Section II), become interchangeable tokens in this game. Sallust's rhetorical ornamentation highlights the *stasis* (in both senses, of standstill and revolution) that Jugurtha's multifarious stratagem paradoxically produces, with chiasmus in three of

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[48] E.g., at *BC* 29.1, 31.1 'the state was profoundly moved [*permota*] by these events and its appearance was changed'; Caes. *BC* 2.14.3 'our men were profoundly moved by the sudden turn of events [*repentina fortuna permoti*],' 26.3 'Curio was profoundly moved by the new situation [*nouitate rei . . . permotus*]'; Nepos, *Milt.* 4.3 'the Athenians were profoundly moved [*permoti*] by this emergency.'

[49] Maltby (1991) 407–8; a favorite play in the *BJ*: elsewhere at 4.4 (programmatic: see below, Section V), 51.1, 76.1.

[50] Jugurtha's mobility is mirrored here, as elsewhere, by the narrative: Kraus (1997) 45 n. 76.

the four clauses, iteration (*alias, deinde alias; modo, modo*), word play (*instanti* . . . *instare*), and careful marking of stages (*deinde, deinde, paulo post, modo, modo*). Each of these may be read dynamically, generating comparison, slippage, even agitated motion; or statically, marking fixed relationships, balance, and stagnation.[51]

As a fitting reflection of the disorder in the field, the Roman state is wracked by sedition whose uncontrolled motion (37.1 *agitabantur*) brings the elections to a standstill (37.3 *ea mora*). Against this oxymoronic background[52] the consul's brother Aulus Albinus decides to capture Jugurtha's treasury (37.3). He could hardly have chosen a worse objective. As before, the *thesauri* can be read metaphorically for the chaotic Jugurtha. The prince simulates retreat; the Romans, following blindly, are ambushed, confused, betrayed by their own centurions and allies. Jugurthine adjectives reappear—rapid motion produces paralysis—opposites collapse into each other:

> He suddenly [*de inprouiso*] surrounded Aulus' camp. . . . The Roman soldiers were struck [*perculsi*] by this unaccustomed [*insolito*] emergency; some seized weapons, some hid themselves, some reassured the frightened—there was fear everywhere. The enemy was in great strength, the sky obscured by night and clouds; whatever they did was dangerous [*periculum anceps*]; finally, they were unsure whether it was safer to flee or to remain [*postremo fugere an manere tutius foret, in incerto erat*]. (38.4–5)

At the last, however, Jugurtha lets the Romans go—for a price. The defeated soldiers pass under the yoke: 'though these conditions were serious and full of humiliation, nevertheless, since they were being given in exchange [*mutabantur*] for the fear of death, peace was agreed according to the king's desire [*sicuti regi lubuerat*]' (38.10). The treasury Aulus sought to control escapes him, while it is the Romans who must give up treasure in order to live. Jugurtha's only undisputed victory is won through simulation and finalized by a trade.

Sallust underscores the particularly Jugurthine quality of this surrender by the playful semantic slippage of *foedus* from the meaning

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[51] So at 74.1–2 Sallust uses telegraphic historic infinitives, short clauses, and balance of opposites to express similar ideas. For the expressive power of a list (*euidentia*, or 'vivid narration' achieved *per partes*) cf. Quint. 8.2.40, quoting an asyndetic passage from Cic. *Ver.* 5.161, and see Roberts (1989) 40–2.

[52] It is, of course, standard political language, but I wish to bring out the contradiction inherent at its heart, which Sallust explores—and exploits—in the person of Jugurtha.

'foul' (38.7 *foeda fuga*) to 'treaty' (38.9, 39.2–3).[53] That slippage is followed by two attempts to reestablish order in the midst of frustrating *mora/motus*: the plebeian-driven Mamilian inquiry (40) and Sallust's digression on the 'nature of political parties and factions' (41–2). In these sections characters and narrator alike attempt to stabilize the growing political disorder—described appropriately with the images of avalanche and earthquake (41.9–10)[54]—which Sallust has set in counterpoint to the Jugurthine madness in the field. Only the digression, however, which applies the intellectual weapons of categorization and rational analysis to that political chaos, vaguely succeeds in reducing it to some sort of (retrospective) order, while both the account of the inquiry and the digression are shot through with images of internal corruption, contradiction, and identity between logical opposites. The success of these ordering devices may be judged from the state of the narrative as the war resumes: the two meanings of *foedus* now sit side by side in a temporary, but threatening, truce which both establishes their separate meanings and parades their (illegitimate) synonymy: *post Auli foedus exercitusque nostri foedam fugam* (43.1).

Meanwhile, the army left in Africa shows all the signs of having been in contact with Jugurthine disorder. Its unregulated commerce and motion produces a linguistic free-for-all in which active and passive states can coexist:

> Indolent, unwarlike, enduring neither danger nor hard work, readier to talk than to fight, plundering their allies and themselves plunder to the enemy [*lingua quam manu promptior, praedator ex sociis et ipsa praeda hostium*] . . . whenever they desired [*lubebat*] the soldiers left their post; camp followers, thoroughly mixed [*permixti*] with soldiers, wandered about day and night. . . . They competed in leading off cattle and slaves as booty and trading them [*mutare*] with merchants for imported wine and other such things; beside, they sold the grain that was provided by the state, and bought bread each day; finally, whatever vice characteristic of cowardice and luxury can be named or imagined, every one was found in that army. (44.1, 5)

[53] See Maltby (1991) 237–8 for the ancient etymological connection.

[54] On the language, itself again conventional, see Jal (1963) 281–4 (cosmic overtones) and 462–73 (perversion and inversion of values, conflict and conflation of good and evil, etc.). Note esp. 41.9 *semet ipsa praecipitauit* ('it caused itself to fall headlong'), of avarice, and cf. above, 228.

It is not only Spurius' absence and his brother's incompetence that, as Wiedemann argues, has caused this reversion to nomadism, the distinguishing characteristic of the African ethnography (Chh. 17–19); the situation in the field and the political disturbances at home reflect and interpenetrate each other. Among other things, Sallust highlights the force—and contagion—of desire.[55]

Metellus combats this disorder with his own form of quintessentially Roman military discipline. Like the young Jugurtha's, his own character is balanced (45.1 *temperantia* . . . *moderatum*), balance which Sallust uses as an explanation (45.2 *namque*) of how he reforms the army. Metellus goes to the heart of Jugurthine disorder: he outlaws commerce, banning the sale of bread, the presence of camp-followers, and the possession of slaves; putting the army through forced marches and disciplined activities, he keeps them in their ranks (*ordines*).[56] Above all, rather than falling victim to it, he can play Jugurtha's game against him, separating words from reality (48.1). Still, he is eventually stymied by the prince's guerrilla tactics. Infectious disorderly conduct concentrates at the river Muthul, in a battle where the Romans are nearly undone no fewer than three times by visual confusion, mirages produced by the synergism between the terrain and Jugurtha's trickery (46.5, 53.1–2, 53.7–8). In the central scene, Jugurthine confusion reigns:

> Some Numidians slaughtered the soldiers at the rear, some harassed them on left and right; enemies appeared and attacked, and everywhere they threw the Roman ranks into confusion [*ordines conturbare*]. And even those who attacked the enemy with relative courage were mocked by the uncertain mode of fighting [*ludificati incerto proelio*]. . . . The cavalry . . . scattered as widely as possible [*alius alio quam maxume*

[55] So at 38.10 *libido* is associated with Jugurtha; also 40.3 *in partibus*, 40.5 the *plebs*, 41.5 the *populus*, 42.4 the *nobilitas*, 44.5 the army: see also above, n. 12.

[56] 45.2 'he moved camp daily by means of cross-country marches [*transuorsis itineribus*]' is particularly interesting, not only because Metellus is substituting controlled regular movement for the previous roaming at will. *Transuorsus* recurs thrice in the next five sections (49.1, the battle site; 49.6, Roman maneuvers; 50.1, Numidian maneuvers). Its only other occurrences in the *BJ* are at 6.3 and 14.20, both describing Jugurtha's potential for corruption, with a rare metaphor (above, n. 29). Its reappearance here at the beginning of a battle of wits and arms adumbrates Metellus' appropriation of Jugurtha's twisting tactics. For Metellus' disciplinary moves see Paul (1984) 139. The other famous example of this method of restoring discipline is Scipio Aemilianus, at Numantia (Livy *per.* 57, Val. Max. 2.7.1–2, Frontin. *S.* 4.1.1–2): does Sallust mean us to see Jugurtha challenging (or challenged by) his old mentor's stratagem? On Numantia see further below, 245.

> *diuorsi*].... The appearance of the whole business was changeable, indecisive [*facies totius negoti uaria, incerta*], foul and pitiable: separated from their comrades, some gave ground, some attacked; they kept neither standards nor ranks [*dispersi a suis pars cedere, alii insequi; neque signa neque ordines obseruare*] ... arms, weapons, horses, men, enemies and citizens were thoroughly mixed together [*permixti*]; nothing was done with plan or command; chance ruled all [*fors omnia regere*]. And so, when much of the day had passed, the outcome was still uncertain [*in incerto*]. (50.4–51.2)

Later, Jugurtha's quickness and ability to keep opposites simultaneously in play, as he 'neither gave battle nor allowed rest,' again frustrate the Roman *inceptum* (55.8). Here too quickness is intimately connected with—and produces—delay. And even when, in the later stages, it infects Jugurtha himself, driving him like a gadfly (72.2, 76.1), *motus* still frustrates the Romans. Speed, a preeminent *uirtus imperatoria* that let great generals like Caesar finish their *incepta* time and time again,[57] turns in Jugurtha's hands into a further manifestation of disorder.

IV. *Playing the Other?*

This section considers a final aspect of this *discordia*, the thematics of substitution, especially in its relation to Sallust's second subject: the opposition to the aristocracy that produced *uastitas Italiae*, in which *bellum* becomes *ciuile bellum* (5.2). This thematic, too, is first found in Sallust's description of the young prince (above, 225–7). The moment he arrives in Spain, events run far contrary to expectations (7.3 *longe aliter ac ratus erat euenit*). Almost the same words recur in Micipsa's death-bed scene, as the king encourages his nephew to do what is right: *te ... ne aliter quid eueniat prouidere decet* (10.7 'you should see to it that nothing different happens'). This is, however, the very thing that Micipsa has already learned can happen when Jugurtha is involved. His reaction—incidentally, the first time we see Jugurtha respond to any communication—also contains the narrator's first unambiguous indication that the prince is not as straightforward as he seems: 'though he understood that the king had spoken lies [*ficta locutum intellegebat*], and he thought far differently in his mind [*longe*

[57] See Vell. Pat. 2.41.2 and 2.129.3 with Woodman (1977–83) *ad loc.*

aliter animo agitabat], still, for the moment, Jugurtha responded kindly [*benigne respondit*]' (11.1). *Aliter* is at last explicitly linked to deception. But what does *ficta* mean? Micipsa's final speech contains no falsehood, comprising as it does only flattering exhortations and wishes. *Ficta locutum* must mean 'had spoken insincerely'—almost 'was playing a part.'[58] Commentators tend to assume, therefore, that Micipsa never really changed his mind, that Jugurtha here perceives that hypocrisy, and that at 11.1 Sallust illustrates the prince's cleverness as well as beginning his descent into villainy.[59] But there has been nothing to indicate that 9.3 *flexit animum suom* was anything but sincere.[60] *Ficta locutum* goes deeper than simple questions of regal insincerity. Jugurtha understands that the verbal edifice of proverbial wisdom and good advice that the dying king has constructed is precisely that: a construct, an invention.[61] His wordlessly pleasant response, devoid of any content but *benigne*, magnifies the emptiness of Micipsa's long direct speech and emphasizes the contrast between word and fact that is implicit throughout this scene.[62]

When shortly thereafter Hiempsal suggests that the adoption be revoked, the threat to his position reveals Jugurtha's unsuspected—and dangerous—depths: 'but this utterance [*uerbum*] sank deeper than anyone had thought into Jugurtha's heart. And so from that time, anxious with anger and fear, he plotted, prepared, and considered with his mind [*cum animo habere*] how Hiempsal might be caught by stealth' (11.7–8). The remarkable personifications of the *uerbum* and of Jugurtha's *animus*, which here seems to operate separately from the rest of him,[63] intensify the sense that he has internalized difference.

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[58] For such a connotation see the examples of *uultus fictus* ('feigned expression') at *TLL* VI.1.774.60–70 and cf. 14.20 (where *simulare* and *fingere* are synonyms: Koestermann [1971] *ad loc.*) and Verg. *A.* 2.107 *ficto pectore* (of the lying Sinon). An ancient glossary gives *fucatum uel coloratum* ('dyed or colored') as equivalents for *fictum* (*TLL* VI.1.779.20–1), highlighting the notion of rhetorical embellishment. On Micipsa's speech see further above, 229–30.

[59] E.g., Scanlon (1980) 141, Jugurtha recognizes 'the falseness of the flattering words'; Paul (1984) 45 on 10.2; extended discussion in Suerbaum (1964), esp. 100–6.

[60] Despite the surrounding military vocabulary, the sincerity is not in doubt; see Koestermann (1971) *ad loc.* and above, 233.

[61] For the proverbial elements see Otto (1962) 13–14 (*alienus*), 20–1 (*amicus*), 89 (*concordia*), 146 (*fraternus*), 176 (*inuidia*). Katherine Clarke perceptively compares *BC* 3.2 *ueluti ficta* [= the historian's narrative] *pro falsis ducit.*

[62] Paul (1984) 38, 45. Jugurtha gives a similar response, in a similar situation, at 72.1.

[63] To do something *cum animo* implies a separation between the parts of a per-

But Jugurtha also recognizes the rhetorical power of 'sameness,' which he twice uses successfully to put off Roman interference while he out-maneuvers, besieges, and eventually murders Adherbal.[64] Being 'the same' implies that he is honest, transparent, no different inside from outside; it also suggests that he is not subject to any sort of (ex)change, neither substituted nor substituting for anyone. In Sallust's world, accepting such a claim involves accepting Jugurtha's language, too, as a transparent mirror of reality (*qualis oratio talis homo*).

But the claim is dishonest. The continuing and frustrating Roman failure to trap Jugurtha stems from his talent for producing seemingly endless difference and deferral between what the Romans perceive and reality, as when Metellus enters Numidia, or in the battle at the Muthul. Throughout the central section of the narrative (43–83) Jugurtha combines delay, simulation, and rapid motion to throw the Roman offensive into disarray. With the appointment of the *nouus homo* Marius, however, Jugurtha quite literally meets his match.

The kinship between Jugurtha and Marius has been much discussed.[65] It produces a curious narrative effect. Sallust chose to introduce Marius at a point when Jugurtha has again stymied the Roman enterprise in Africa (63), thereby suggesting a kinship between Metellus' two opponents. From Marius' assumption of the consulship on, however, the most remarkable feature of the monograph's final section (84–114) is Jugurtha's relative absence from it. Marius has, in effect, replaced him. At several points Sallust briefly records the prince's actions—harassing Roman allies (88.3), sending for the king Bocchus (97.1), camping near Sulla's troops (106.2)—but, though Numidians and their allies have four major encounters (and several minor ones) with Marius' legions, their leader actively participates only in the

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son and is not very common: there are fewer than a dozen examples before the turn of the millennium in the PHI CD texts, three in the comic playwrights (Plaut. *Trin.* 305, *Aul.* 715; Ter. *Adel.* 500) and six in Sallust, all in the *BJ*, all of cases of extreme anxiety (6.2, 11.8, 13.5, 70.5, 93.1, 108.3); it next clusters in the second century CE. Significantly, the oxymoronic new noble Marius is the only Roman to be so described. Tacitus borrows this Jugurthine scene for the cloaked Tiberius: *Ann.* 1.69.3 *id Tiberii animum altius penetrauit.*

[64] At 15.2, for instance, his legates ask the Romans not to believe that he is any different (*alium*) from his Numantine self; the same logic recurs at 22.2 (note also Jugurtha's refusal there of invidious comparison: *sibi neque maius quicquam neque carius auctoritate senatus*).

[65] E.g., Earl (1961) 75 and n. 1; Scanlon (1987) 49; Kraus (1997) 27.

last (101).[66] It is a typically disorderly performance, deploying stratagems of division and deceit:

> So finally on the fourth day . . . [Roman] scouts quickly showed themselves from all quarters at once [*undique simul speculatores citi sese ostendunt*], whence it was understood that the enemy was at hand. But because they were returning, scattered, one from one direction and one from another, and yet all indicated the same thing [*diuorsi redeuntes alius ab alia parte atque omnes idem significabant*], the consul, being unsure [*incertus*] how to draw up the battle line, changed no disposition, but waited in the same place prepared for everything [*nullo ordine conmutato aduorsum omnia paratus ibidem opperitur*]. (101.1–2)

Jugurtha's initial tactic, which successfully collapses difference and sameness, is frustrated by the Roman's response, in which change is rejected in favor of sameness (*ibidem*) and totality (*omnia*). Jugurtha accordingly changes plan and engages. Once the battle begins, he as quickly changes again: 'he secretly turned [*clam . . . conuortit*] . . . toward the infantry. There, in Latin—which he had learned to speak at Numantia—he exclaimed that our men were fighting in vain, since Marius had been killed a little while before by his own hand—at the same time displaying [*ostentans*] a sword smeared with blood which he, fighting bravely enough, had bloodied by killing our infantry' (101.6). Complete with realistic prop, the masquerade concerning Marius is particularly relevant to the theme of substitution, and not simply as an example of Jugurtha playing a role. It forms part of a sequence of deceptions relying on the assumption of a false national identity, the others being Metellus' masking of Roman troops with Numidian cavalry at Vaga (68.4–69.1) and the carrying of Numidian arms by Marius' advance team at the Muluccha (94.1).[67] Each of these is a purely military tactic; Jugurtha's Latin 'identity,' on the other hand, has more substance than at first appears. It looks back to Numantia, where—as Sallust tells us parenthetically—he learned to speak the language.[68] It thereby alludes also to that first, legitimate substitution, where Jugurtha stood in for Scipio (7.6, quoted 225),

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[66] Sallust does not even mention the Numidians after the Muluccha: Paul (1984) 234.

[67] On the latter episode see Brescia (1997).

[68] For Numantia see below, 245; cf. Braund (1984) 20 n. 66 for other examples of foreigners learning Latin while serving in the Roman army.

and the ring thus formed signals one kind of narrative close.[69] For this battle is Jugurtha's final action against the Romans, from whose weapons he escapes entirely alone: *at Iugurtha . . . solus inter tela hostium uitabundus erumpit.*[70]

Instead, the last section of the monograph belongs, at least initially, to Marius, who manifests as much craft and knowledge of the terrain as Jugurtha did before him. His use of masks and surprise is best illustrated by the Sardis-type battle for a *castellum* on the Muluccha, whose capture is in fact brought about by *fors*, but is attributed to Marius' *uirtus*. The build-up starts with Marius' success in the preceding campaign[71] and continues through the capture of the *castellum*, through which 'chance' sounds like a *Leitmotif.*[72] With its last, especially telling occurrence, Marius' slipperiness reveals its fundamental weakness: *sic forte correcta Mari temeritas gloriam ex culpa inuenit* (94.7 'so Marius' rashness, having been put straight by chance, found a source of glory out of a source of blame'). This is paradoxical, civil war language *par excellence.* A disorderly character, who like Jugurtha causes things to be different around him, Marius opens the possibility that he will himself become *alius*: that is, that he will be replaced by someone else. As if on cue, when *culpa* and *uirtus* seem interchangeable, a narrative door opens, and Marius' *alter ego* Sulla strides in.[73]

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[69] Cirta, where this battle takes place, was also the site of Adherbal's death; on the structure see Scanlon (1987) 59; (1989) 144.

[70] His near-invisibility later on, when Volux and Sulla ride through his camp (107.5), is a motif 'frequently associated in ancient literature with supernatural aid' (Paul [1984] 253); it may suggest both Sulla's legendary *felicitas* and Jugurtha's virtual non-corporeality at this point.

[71] 'Once Marius had completed such a great deed . . . his already great and famous reputation became greater and more famous. Every ill-considered action was attributed to his excellence [*in uirtutem trahebantur*]: the soldiers, treated with moderate discipline and enriched at the same time, praised him to the skies; the Numidians feared him as something more than mortal' (92.1–3).

[72] 92.6 'this deed was accomplished by chance [*forte*] rather than by design'; 93.1 'worried . . . Marius considered with his mind [*cum animo suo*] whether to give up what he started [*inceptum*], since it was fruitless, or to wait for good luck [*fortunam*]'; 93.2 'by chance [*forte*] a certain Ligurian'; 93.4 'by chance [*forte*] in that place.' See Brescia (1997) 16–17.

[73] In a disruption so severe that it triggers a narrative digression: 'while this was happening, the quaestor Lucius Sulla arrived in camp. . . . But since the matter has reminded me of this great man, it seems appropriate to say a few words about his nature and behavior' (95.1–2); see Kraus (1997) 26. On Marius' disappearance see Paul (1984) on 101.4, 8, ascribing his remarkable absence from the final battle

Thus after chapter 101—where Jugurtha claims to have killed him—Marius functions primarily to pass people and messages on.[74] And not surprisingly, perhaps, neither enemy leader is present to bring the war to a close. They work instead through substitutes. The absent Jugurtha's part is taken by his Gaetulian ally Bocchus, while Marius yields to Sulla's eloquence (102.4). His patrician speech is less slippery, or perhaps better with kings, than Marius' own effective—and showcased (85)—demagoguery.[75] Bocchus exhibits some of the same tendency to sudden motion as Jugurtha, but in his case it can be easily explained: Sallust reduces Jugurthine disorder to a comforting commonplace, predictable regal unpredictability (113.1 *sed plerumque regiae uoluntates ut uehementes sic mobiles*).[76] Sulla's negotiations with him at first seem endless and familiar, with the same diplomacy frustrated by bribes (102), the same series of parallel meetings, first open, then secret (109, cf. 8.2, 29.5, 32.5); but Bocchus is only a pale imitation, and eventually betrays Jugurtha to Sulla, who hands him over to Marius. Sulla would later have the scene engraved on a seal-ring with himself as victor, (allegedly) fixing its meaning and—incidentally(?)—enraging Marius.[77] In Sallust's narrative, however, their shifting back and forth in the capture of Jugurtha must prefigure their subsequent (civil) disorder in their struggle for the possession of Rome.

V. *History as Text*

Together with Hannibal and Cleopatra, Rome's other two great African enemies, Jugurtha focuses the themes of deceit, illegitimacy, rapid motion, frustrated action, and instability that characterize discord, especially civil strife.[78] The clusters of images and metaphors of exchange, delay, movement, and substitution 'constitute significant

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narrative to Sulla's memoirs, which Sallust may well have used as a source (below, n. 92).

[74] He acts, therefore, like other things which facilitate chance and exchange: above, n. 21.

[75] Kraus (1997) 25.

[76] Paul (1984) 256 notes the similar language used of the Numidians at 46.3. Sallust's formulation at 113.1 tames the Jugurthine adjectives *uehemens* (e.g., 4.7, 6.2, 7.4) and *mobilis* (Section III).

[77] Paul (1984) 253, 256–7 for references.

[78] For Cleopatra see Quint (1993) 28 ('the embodiment of... disorder and violence' on Aeneas' shield), 111–13 (Cleopatra, Hannibal, and Carthage).

patterns'[79] in our reading, as in Sallust's telling, of this text, reinforcing the ways in which the content means. But it goes further than that. There are significant ways in which Jugurtha's disorder has affected Sallust's writing of history.

In the preface to the *BJ*, as in the *BC*, Sallust puts contemporary politics (from which he has withdrawn) in counterpoise to his own writing of history:

> I believe that because I have decided to live my life far from politics, some will give the name 'laziness' to my great and useful labor [*tanto tamque utili labori meo nomen inertiae inponant*]; certainly [those will] for whom the height of energy seems to be greeting the *plebs* and seeking influence through dinner parties. But if they consider both what great men were unable to hold public office at the time when I held my magistracies, and what sort of men have since gotten into the Senate, they will certainly consider that I exchanged my judgment [*iudicium animi mei mutauisse*] worthily rather than from sloth, and that my leisure will do the state a greater service than other men's business [*maiusque commodum ex otio meo quam ex aliorum negotiis rei publicae uenturum*] (4.3–4)

But while in the *BC* he is concerned lest his detractors mistake his motivation, taking criticism as a product of envy and praise as fiction (*BC* 3.2), in the *BJ* the potential confusion goes deeper. Here, he worries that the product will be ignored in favor of the process of history-writing itself, which—in typical disorderly fashion—will be misread/mislabeled as *inertia* rather than *utilis labor*. Sallust counters this with a linguistic trick of his own (flagged by *mutauisse*?[80]): his *otium* will bring greater benefit than others' *negotium*. Yet he frames this defense of his activity and its product with two curiously shadowed passages. Beginning with history's exceptional usefulness (4.1 *in primis magno usui est*), he immediately establishes distance: all such claims to utility should be passed over (*praetereundum*), as many have made them, and as people may think that the individual historian (*memet . . . meum*) is simply glorifying his own project. The *praeteritio*, whose explicit naming foregrounds its rhetorical function,[81] sets the

[79] Konstan (1986) 198; see also Kurke (1991), esp. 11 on imagery as cultural symbols, transmitting the poet's message; she sees 'images as a set of systems constitutive of the poetry's social effect.'

[80] Ahl (1985) 51; for the themes of *otium* and *negotium* in Sallust's programmatic passages see Marincola (1997) 138–40.

[81] Earl (1979) 43.

stage for the equally ostentatious verbal dexterity with which Sallust defends his chosen activity (4.3–4, above). He then repeats and specifies the claim for history's *utilitas*: it inspires imitation of ancient glory (4.6), a claim illustrated (4.5) with the famous comparison of history (*memoria rerum gestarum*) to ancestral portrait masks (*imagines maiorum*). As in the *BC*, a compound of *aequare* marks the moment of exemplary utility: as the *production* of history 'equals' deeds with words, proving its use to the state,[82] so the *use* of history, 'equaling' ancestral *fama atque gloria*, brings benefit to the republic. All of this, however, is immediately shattered by an emphatic, and conclusive, *at contra* (4.7), as Sallust shows how the attention paid to history has vastly diminished in the face of contemporary moral and ethical debasement. He does not return to the special status of the historian, but ends the preface by turning away from the bad *mores* of his own time, in which traditional values are worthless, back to his subject: 'But I have gone too freely and too far out to sea, our national character being loathsome and disgusting to me. Now I return to my starting point' (4.9).[83]

It is not that Sallust believes that history has no power, either ameliorative or commemorative. He must do, as he continues to write it. But the *persona* of the alienated historian is more intensely drawn in the *BJ* than it was in the *BC*. Where Catiline was exciting as well as dangerous (*BC* 4.5), Sallust's Jugurthine topic threatens the historian who has chosen it.[84] The *discordia* which he embodies challenges the utility of history, even as it does other stabilizing elements such as *uirtus*,[85] the intellectual arts, and political concord. The primary task of a historian is to narrate, to finish his *inceptum* by telling the story. His Jugurthine topic compels Sallust's attention, and indeed begins as an *inceptum* which can focus Sallust's energy away

[82] *BC* 3.1; on the expression see Kraus (1994) 214; Oakley (1997–8) I. 560–1.

[83] Above, 219. For the metaphor in *altius* and the causal sense of *dum* see Dietsch (1846) *ad loc.*; Goodyear (1972) on Tac. *Ann.* 1.23.5.

[84] Perhaps by virtue of being the direct 'cause' of the first pair of dynasts, whose actions were so clearly repeated by the second pair. Catiline, though modeled in various ways on a stereotypical *regnum*-seeker, is more unique and hence more containable. On the *persona* of the alienated historian see O'Gorman (1998).

[85] For the association of *uirtus* with stability and related concepts cf. 1.1–5, 7.5 (balance and strength); 4.7, Livy 8.34.10 (direct action); 15.2, 85.31–2 (*uirtus* superior to *dicta*); 7.6, 76.1, 92.1–2 (steadfastness); Caes. *BC* 3.72.4 (*uirtus* excludes the possibility of change); Livy 6.30.6 *stabilis uirtus*. For extended discussion of *uirtus* in Sallust see Earl (1961) 28–40; Tiffou (1974) 119–54; Batstone (1988).

from contemporary decline.[86] But as the cause of that decline, and so as a part of it, Jugurtha's story also resists and problematizes narration. So Sallust must silence Carthage, which will not fit in his narrative economy (19.2),[87] and is disgusted by Sulla.[88] The very length and complexity of the narrative is as much a function of Jugurtha's character as it is a reflection of any action on the ground.[89] The force that Sallust invokes in the preface and that Jugurtha incarnates is most visible at the end, which famously teases us with its lack of closure.[90] In his first work Sallust bounded corruption by the limits of one man's madness. In the *BJ* the process of corruption goes deeper, the historiographical project compromised from the very first word: *falso*.[91] The historian's subject infects his task: disorder and corruption rule at Rome, compromising Sallust's very control over his material, while the military narrative is threatened by political influence and conflicting versions of the story, many of them going back, like Jugurtha himself, to that core experience at Numantia.[92] Sallust would go on to write more extended *annales* in a continuing search for a way to make sense of the civil disorder at the end of the Republic.[93] Like Tacitus, however, he may have found that its causes remained elusive.

[86] Very similar is Livy's turning to ancient history, 'away from the sight of the evils which our age has seen through so many years' (Pref. 5).

[87] On Carthage and its paradoxes see Kraus (1997) 27–30.

[88] 95.4 'for I am not sure [*incertum*] whether I am more ashamed or disgusted [*pudeat an pigeat*] to narrate what he did afterward.' On characters resisting narration cf. the parallel case of Lucan with the discussion of Masters (1992); for the paradox that any epic story must 'consist in delay, obstruction, deferral' see Henderson (1998) 243–4 with n. 69.

[89] On the unimportance of the war see Paul (1984) 19–20, 264–8.

[90] Levene (1992) 54–5; Kraus (1997) 26–7.

[91] I thank Katherine Clarke for pointing this out to me.

[92] Among the historians present in Scipio's entourage were Polybius (possibly), Rutilius Rufus, and Sempronius Asellio; for them as sources for the *BJ* see Syme (1964) 152–5, Paul (1984) 31–2, 34–5. Also present was Lucilius, who wrote about Numantia—through what filter, we cannot tell—in Book XI of his *Satires*; for a full list of those with Scipio see Brizzi (1990) 865 n. 49. Finally, Aemilius Scaurus, a character in the *BJ*, did cavalry service in Spain (Paul (1984) 65); he was a contemporary of Rutilius Rufus, and Paul (1984) 35 suggests that, 'if suspicions of intrigue at Numantia were current, Scaurus may have touched on them in his autobiography, if only to attempt to rebut them.' Another almost certainly recalcitrant source with a mind—and voice—of its own was Sulla's memoir (above, n. 73).

[93] The *BJ* verges on annalistic history (Kraus [1997] 21); on the term 'annales' (with the relevant passages) see Verbrugghe (1989).

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UNIVERSAL PERSPECTIVES IN HISTORIOGRAPHY*

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> Although the profit which history affords its readers lies in its embracing a vast number and variety of circumstances, yet most writers have recorded no more than isolated wars waged by a single nation or a single state, and only a few have undertaken, beginning with the earliest times and coming down to their own day, to record the events connected with all peoples; and of the latter, some have not attached to the various events their own proper dates, and others have passed over the deeds of barbarian peoples; and some have rejected the ancient legends because of the difficulties involved in their treatment, while others have failed to complete the plan which they had undertaken, their lives cut short by fate. (Diodorus Siculus 1.3.2)

The enormity of the task of writing a universal history is thus expressed in one of the few extant examples of the genre from antiquity. In a volume which attempts to assess the range and diversity of historiography, it seems appropriate to include some discussion of boundaries and limits, the hazy areas between history and other types of writing about the world. Universal histories obviously respond to our interest in limits, as the concern of their authors was precisely to extend the scope of their works to the edges of known time and space. This is a type of writing which at times claims to include *everything*, its limits being those of the world itself. The claim to all-encompassing boundaries naturally complicates the relationship between universal history and other genres, as it cannot fail to coincide with the concerns of other types of writing if its claim to universality is really justified. It is thus my purpose to explore the nature of universal writing in order to discover what makes it distinctive as a genre.

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I take my definition of 'universalism' from the most rigorous end of the spectrum of possibilities, that described by Alonso-Núñez, who has worked exhaustively on the genre: 'Universal historians strictly speaking are only those who deal with the history of mankind from the earliest times, and in all parts of the world known to them.'[1] It is commonplace to remark that Herodotus was the first universal historian, his account moving as it does around the major theaters of action from Persia to Egypt, from Scythia to Greece, and covering a variety of different times. However, the *logoi* of Herodotus hardly amount to any kind of systematic attempt to cover all known time and all known space in a single work. Polybius too regularly attracts the universal designation, and understandably so, since his entire project was motivated by the fact that Rome had taken over almost the whole known world. But Polybius set a specific starting-point for his work—the 140th Olympiad (220–216)—thereby clearly not claiming to deal with the whole of known time: he, like Herodotus, will be largely excluded from my discussion.

It might seem hard to understand how any author could possibly aspire to such a strong definition of universalism as I have adopted. However, this extreme stance perfectly describes the claims of a certain group of authors, whom I shall discuss as the most striking examples of the genre. I shall focus simultaneously on the two features of their works, which I think most strongly characterize them as a group distinct from other writers. Firstly, I shall examine their specific assertions of universality in time and space, and consider to what extent and in what ways they are fulfilled, given that the general claim to cover everything must be a conceit. Secondly, I shall look at the narrative strategies employed in order to handle the difficulties inherent in this universal historiography. The problem of οἰκονομία ('economy' or 'organization') naturally faces all authors, but it is particularly severe in the case of these 'strong-style' universalists.

The authors to whom I would attribute at least some measure of methodological uniformity in these two respects belong to a single historical period, namely the mid-to-late first century. The notion that a particular type of universal writing might be characteristic of a specific historical period requires careful consideration. It has been claimed, for example, that in the Middle Ages the universal empire

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[1] Alonso-Núñez (1990) 173. For a discussion of the development of the genre see also Momigliano (1987) 31–57.

of the Christian church meant that *all* history was, in effect, universal: 'What was history [in the twelfth century] if not universal? To deny its universality would have amounted to denying the truth of Christianity.'[2] This claim can be readily countered by citing itinerary descriptions such as the *Bordeaux Itinerary*, the first extant pilgrim record. This work provides an account of the journey from Bordeaux to Jerusalem, and shows that the Christian empire gave rise not only to a universal view of the world, but also to texts in which linear, and hence limited, space was dominant.[3] However, the point still stands that new phases in history may evoke new and distinctive ways of formulating a world-view. By examining the methodological coherence of certain writings from the latter half of the first century, I shall try to show that this was such a period of historiographical innovation, and one within which the universal model was particularly important.

It would, however, clearly make no sense to assert that universal history was the *only* way in which history could be written in this period. Just as counter-examples can be found to the notion that universal history was the *only* way of writing about the medieval world of a Christian empire, the same is true of the period of Rome's expansion and consolidation, as can be evidenced from extant historical works, such as those of Sallust.[4] Even Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Livy fail to meet the strict criteria of universalism. Their voluminous works employ a huge time-scale, beginning with the origins of Rome, but are explicitly represented by their authors as accounts of one nation.[5] This is a marked difference even where they appear to contain some of the same historiographical *topoi* as other, more strictly universal, works. So for Livy, the task of writing his history seems to be as burdensome as it is for Diodorus, but his efforts will only have to grow organically in parallel with the expansion of the one city, Rome: 'My subject is, moreover, one involving immense labor, seeing that it has to be traced back more than 700 years, and,

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[2] Smalley (1974) 95.

[3] It is worth noting, however, that some texts which appear to be extremely localized may nonetheless have been designed to evoke the whole world through the belief that that world could be encapsulated in microcosmic form in descriptions of its various parts. For this theory see Gurevich (1985) 68.

[4] However, Levene (1992) has argued convincingly that even texts which are apparently limited in space and time may evoke a much broader historical range.

[5] See Dion. Hal. 1.3.6 περί τε πόλεως γράφω τῆς περιφανεστάτης.

setting out from small beginnings, has grown to such an extent that it is now weighed down by its own magnitude' (Pref. 4).

Wiseman's identification of three distinct types of historiography produced in this period—recent or contemporary history, history dealing with the distant past, and world history, each of which is exemplified by one of the 'classic' Latin historians of antiquity (Sallust, Livy, and Trogus)—lends further justification to the treatment of universal history as a genre distinct from other contemporary writings, although it may share some common features with them.[6] Mutual exclusivity is not required. Nor, as we shall see, is there no room for variation within the group. Indeed, I shall argue for considerable differences in the organizational and narrative strategies employed in universal projects of the period.

The Authors: Writing the World From the Sidelines

In order to exemplify in some detail the project of universal historiography in its extreme late first-century form, I shall concentrate primarily on one author. Diodorus, originally from Agyrium in Sicily, but later working in Rome, wrote from around 60 to the late 30s an account in Greek of the whole known world from the start of memorable time to his own day.[7] The account, not surprisingly, filled 40 volumes: 'I shall undertake to give a full account of all the events which have been handed down to memory and took place in the known regions of the inhabited world' (D. S. 1.9.1).

A more preposterous aim could scarcely be imagined. Diodorus explicitly defines the scope of his historical work as being spatially

[6] Wiseman (1987) 244–62. The three authors are identified as classics, along with Tacitus, by the *Historia Augusta* (*Aurelian* 2.1, *Probus* 2.7). That Trogus was aware of the works of Livy and Sallust is clear from his criticisms of their treatment of speeches (Pompeius Trogus 38.3.11).

[7] The dates of composition have been deduced from the *Library of History* (hereafter D. S.) 1.44.1 referring to a visit to Egypt between 60–56 and during which he probably gathered material for his work; 16.7.1 on the transformation of Tauromenium into a Roman *colonia*, the latest event to be mentioned in the work and dated to around 36; and finally 1.4.1 where the period of composition is put at 30 years, confirming the previous parameters. However, neither of the 'dates' is explicitly linked in the text with its creation. The *Suda* seems to place Diodorus' literary activity slightly later: γέγονε δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν χρόνων Αὐγούστου Καίσαρος καὶ ἐπάνω. For Rome as Diodorus' research center see D. S. 1.4.2.

the whole of the known world and temporally all memorable events.[8] The well-known source problems associated with this author might appear to make any discussion of his own view of the world tenuous. It is difficult to be certain that what we read does not represent the perspectives of his sources rather than those of Diodorus himself. Such considerations need not, however, be of concern here, since it is Diodorus' own task of organization or οἰκονομία, the way in which he put together the information available to him, which is at issue.

In my discussion of Diodorus' massive undertaking, I shall also consider the works of two authors who wrote a little later, but with significant methodological similarity. Pompeius Trogus, seen in antiquity as the archetypal universal historian, was, like Diodorus, not from Rome. His family originated among the Vocontii, a Gallic tribe who came under Roman sway in 125/4 and were part of the province of Gallia Narbonensis, formed a few years later. His grandfather had gained Roman citizenship from Pompey, under whom he served in the mid-70s. His uncle too served under Pompey, in the war against Mithridates in the mid-60s, and his father held a post under Julius Caesar, being entrusted with his correspondence, his diplomatic missions, and his official seal.[9] Trogus was thus from a provincial family, but one with strong connections to the Roman élite. His literary work, like that of Diodorus, must have been to a large extent motivated by the union of most of the known world under the command of the very Romans with whom his family had contacts, Pompey and Julius Caesar. The peace and stability resulting from this world union would be celebrated throughout the Augustan age during which Trogus wrote. The title of his work, the *Philippic History*, is an issue to which I shall return. However, the overall plan was clearly enough an account of world history from Ninus of Assyria to Augustus, covered in 44 books.[10] All we have of this work is an epitome written by a certain Justinus, about whom we know very little other than that he probably worked during the later second or early third century

[8] On Diodorus see Sacks (1990).

[9] Justinus, *Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus* (hereafter P. T.) 43.5.11–2.

[10] The same chronological scope was included in the most enormous universal history undertaken at this period, the 144-book work of Nicolaus of Damascus. This universal work *par excellence* is, however, difficult to assess in terms of narrative strategies due to its extremely fragmentary state.

CE.[11] The same claims as those of Diodorus, namely for spatial and temporal universality, were made explicitly by Justinus on behalf of Pompeius Trogus at the start of the epitome of his Augustan universal history:

> Since most authors engaged in the history of single rulers or peoples find that even their work demands intense effort, then we must recognise that Pompeius demonstrated an enterprise worthy of Hercules in undertaking a universal history, his books encompassing the annals of every period, king, nation, and people. (P. T. Pref. 2)

We have few explicit statements of methodology by Trogus himself due to the epitomized form of the work, but examples of his practice make clear that he was tackling organizational problems similar to those of Diodorus.

My second 'supporting' author is Strabo, who was both a universal historian and a universal geographer. He too came from outside Rome, from the Greek city of Amaseia in Pontus. Strabo's dates are generally given as ranging from the mid-60s BCE to the mid-20s CE, although the evidence is debatable.[12] Belonging to a family which had enjoyed close connections with the ruling Mithridatic dynasty, Strabo also had access to the Roman élite, accompanying Aelius Gallus on his expedition up the Nile in the mid-20s.[13] Strabo was primarily a historian, and author of a 47-book universal history of which only 19 fragments have survived.[14] Only the *Geography*, a 17-book survey of the entire world known to the Romans, survives in a form which can be analyzed; but, as I shall argue, the concerns of all those who attempted to represent the whole known world in a way which involved its entire history were similar, the major difference between universal geographers and historians being simply one of spatial or temporal emphasis.

Even the briefest introduction to these authors reveals a similarity in the scope of their works, and their diverse, but non-Italian,

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[11] On the relationship between Trogus and Justinus see Steele (1917). The issue is discussed with recent bibliography by Develin in Develin and Yardley (1994) 2–6. In addition to the epitome, we also have for guidance a set of anonymous and undated *prologi*, outlining the contents of each book.

[12] I have discussed the issue at greater length in Clarke (1997), arguing for a slightly later set of dates. In an interesting parallel with Diodorus, the *Suda* supports a later date, describing Strabo as a Tiberian author (*FGrHist* 91 T1).

[13] Strabo, *Geography* 2.5.12, hereafter referred to as Str.

[14] For these see *FGrHist* 91.

provenance further unites them. It is interesting that this extreme spatial and temporal universalism was motivated by Rome's global empire not in its own native inhabitants, perhaps busy writing the history of their own city, but in those who came often from the outer limits of this world and thus gained a more ecumenical viewpoint.[15] But, as I shall show, the methodological unity of the group does not preclude variation within it. Rome's empire did not evoke precisely the same manifestations of the universal in all three authors.

Universal Aims and Narrative Solutions

a. *Temporal Universality*

> Ephorus of Cyme, for example, a pupil of Isocrates, when he undertook to write his universal history, passed over the tales of old mythology and commenced his history with a narration of the events which took place after the return of the Heraclidae. (D. S. 4.1)

By returning to the most distant times and including the mythological period in his work, Diodorus deliberately went beyond the range of his model, the great universal historian Ephorus. However, authors who took on the job of writing an account of world history throughout all memorable time faced an impossible task. Diodorus excuses the inaccuracies of historians who dealt with the distant past by noting that 'the truth of antiquity is hard to discover' (D. S. 13.90). The ancestry of Silenus, the first king of Nysa, remained unknown 'because it was long ago' (D. S. 3.72). Both the obscurity brought by the passage of time and the sheer volume of material involved in recounting the events from the mythological period to the present day presented the universal historian with a mammoth task. But Diodorus had at least two major reasons for nevertheless undertaking the job. Firstly, as I shall argue, he sought a unique position for himself and his project in the history of historiography by claiming both implicitly and explicitly to exceed the boundaries of all preceding works. Secondly, past and present were interrelated in ways which formed a historical continuum and meant that the distant past

[15] The point is made by Fornara (1983) 53: 'the Romans wrote the history of their city and only incidentally that of the world.' Note Str. 3.4.19, complaining that the Romans were not interested in expanding Greek knowledge.

was needed to illuminate all subsequent phases of history up to the present.

The process of using the past to explain the present is found throughout Diodorus' text. His account of early Dionysiac worship provides an aetiology for present practice; the Roman Senate of ca. 170 is seen as a model for all those who will strive for empire in the future (D. S. 4.2–5, 30.8). In describing the exploits of Hercules, Diodorus again gives a sense that past and present are closely linked. The modern landscapes of the Straits of Gibraltar and of Tempe in Thessaly are explained in terms of the narrative that belongs to the period of Hercules, since these were landscapes created by him (D. S. 4.18). The narrative grounded in the heroic period shifts to the present day with apparent ease; then back again for Hercules' foundation of Alesia; back to the present yet again, where Diodorus tells that the city had never been sacked up until his own time (ὁ καθ' ἡμᾶς χρόνος), when Caesar finally captured it. The reader is then taken back once more to the heroic age and the journeying of Hercules around the world.

We can start to understand why the full sweep of time is needed if past and present are so closely linked. However, the passage of time is important, not just as the medium across which customs and landscapes can be seen to have continuity, but also as the bringer of discontinuity and change. As Antigonus encamps near Rhagae during his campaign against Eumenes in 316, Diodorus briefly digresses on the etymology of the place-name, recalling a disaster which occurred there 'in former times' (D. S. 19.44). But the whole point about the extensive comparison between past and present which ensues is that it reveals difference. The violent earthquake meant that, having had the greatest cities in that part of the world, 'the land was altered, and new rivers and marshy lakes appeared in place of old ones.'[16] Such change might, of course, be positive. The fall of Corinth is described as 'the worst calamity to befall Greece in historical memory' (D. S. 32.26). However, Diodorus goes on to tell of how Caesar restored the city to its former glory. So, both continuity and change offered reasons for the historian to have the widest possible temporal scope.

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[16] So too, the Argive destruction of Mycenae meant that 'this city, blessed in antiquity with great men and noteworthy deeds . . . is still uninhabited to this day' (D. S. 11.65).

In Strabo's geographically organized universal account some of the same motivating factors are in play. The past could not be excluded because it formed the basis for his readership's world-view: 'I am comparing things as they are with those told of by Homer because of the fame of the poet and because of our familiarity with him from our childhood' (Str. 8.3.3). However, Homer talked 'not about things as they are now, but of ancient matters, which are mostly obscured by time' (Str. 8.1.1), recalling Diodorus' comments on the destructive effects of time on historiography. For Strabo the changes brought to the world through the passing of time necessitated discussion of the often distant past, even though he repeatedly professes to be excluding the past from his geography (Str. 7.3.11, 9.4.18, 16.2.24). According to Strabo, the world had changed so much that it was often unintelligible, and required his elucidation. The name of the city Plataea derived from the time when it had been situated on a lakeside and was inhabited by rowers (Str. 9.2.17). Now the city had been moved or the lake had receded, making the name inappropriate. Strabo's *Geography* is largely made up of such accounts of the changing fortunes of cities and peoples from their heroic foundations to the present day, linking Homer's world with that of Strabo's readership, and giving the text a prominent and extensive temporal dimension.[17]

The processes of continuity and change through history require some means of indicating time. This is not the moment for a detailed survey of chronological systems used by universal writers, but it is worth briefly noting the range of approaches which appear and their bearing on the task. Given the importance to Diodorus of continuity and discontinuity across time, it is not surprising to find that expressions of relative time are common. Sometimes these amount to no more than pairs such as 'earlier . . . later' and 'then . . . now'; sometimes history is linked to one of the great fixed markers of time such as the Trojan war.[18] Alternatively, the human life-span is often taken as an adequate measure of time. Romulus founded the city of

[17] Note the same sentiments concerning the mutability of fortune in Herodotus 1.5: τὰ γὰρ τὸ πάλαι μεγάλα ἦν, τὰ πολλὰ αὐτῶν σμικρὰ γέγονε, τὰ δὲ ἐπ' ἐμεῦ ἦν μεγάλα, πρότερον ἦν σμικρὰ.

[18] The Lydian Amazons disappeared 'many generations before Trojan times' (D. S. 3.52); Herodotus' work started with the period 'before Trojan times' (D. S. 11.37).

Rome on the site of Hercules' tent 'many generations later' (D. S. 4.21), incidentally providing another example of shifting narrative-time.[19] These, as well as the more obvious unit of the year, are all used in contexts of comparison. Strabo too makes extensive use of relative time indicators. Pairs such as 'in former times . . . now' and 'previously . . . later' occur with great regularity through the *Geography* as Strabo discusses the changes through time which have affected the world.[20] The generation as a chronological unit is also commonly used in the *Geography*, similarities between the practices of Strabo and Diodorus which naturally result from their common interest in representing the effects of the passage of time.[21]

Continuity through time is also measured in similar ways. Diodorus describes the period during which the Sicanians were in charge of the worship of Aphrodite at Eryx as 'several generations' (D. S. 4.83, cf. D. S. 4.79). The unit of the year features more commonly in contexts of duration than those of comparison. I shall discuss later how Diodorus tends to announce at the start of each section of historiographical time the duration in real historical time as measured in years. However, it is interesting to see how he links biographical with annalistic structures in announcing also the length of various reigns in years, creating a chronology of historical personalities. On the death of a monarch we are told not only the length of his own reign, but also that of his successor. The account of 476 begins by noting the deaths of Leotychides of Sparta after 22 years' rule and of Anaxilas of Rhegium and Zancle after a tyranny of 18 years. Their successors were Archidamus, who would reign for 42 years, and Micynthus (D. S. 11.48).[22]

The implications of these interests for Diodorus' universal project become clearer if set alongside his concern with literary history. It is noteworthy that, beyond the first six books, Diodorus mentions

[19] Cf. also D. S. 5.6, 17.38. The device of the generation is most spectacularly used as a means of dividing up the history of the universe itself (D. S. 1.8).

[20] See, for example, Str. 4.1.11, 4.6.10, 6.1.6, 6.2.1. Extensive relative chronologies are built up for the growth of Rome (6.4.2) and the Ionian colonization (13.1.3), to give just two examples.

[21] Str. 8.6.20 on the Cypselids who ruled Corinth 'for three generations'; 10.4.18 on Lycurgus who lived five generations after Althaemenes.

[22] See also D. S. 2.33 (an extreme example); 13.108, 14.37, 14.83, 14.93, 15.23, 15.73, 16.31, 16.90, 20.29, 20.77, 20.100. Eusebius cites Diodorus on successive thalassocracies, giving the length of each in years, and on the length of the whole Argive monarchy as 549 years (D. S. 7.11, 7.14).

other literary figures less frequently as sources for his own work than in order to create a historiographical time-line which runs alongside that of the narrative itself. Many references, of course, are to literary figures who were not historians. Philemon, the comic poet, appears in the fragments of Book 23, mentioned as having written 97 plays in his 99 years (D. S. 23.6). In the account of 406 we are told that Sophocles died, aged 90, as a result of his excitement at winning the prize for the eighteenth time (D. S. 13.103).

But by far the majority of references to other writers are to historians, and come in the form of historiographical footnotes at the end of accounts of individual years. In 424 we are told that Antiochus of Syracuse here ended his history of Sicily, which had started with Cocalus, king of the Sicani; Callisthenes started his history with the peace of 387 and ended with the seizure of the temple at Delphi by Philomelus, covering 30 years in ten books (D. S. 12.71, 14.117). More significant are those instances where Diodorus builds up a sequence of historiographical periods by linking different authors. Where Thucydides ends, Diodorus records that Xenophon and Theopompus picked up the story, treating the next 48 years and 17 years of Greek history respectively (D. S. 13.42). He notes that Ephorus ended his 750-year history of the Greek and barbarian worlds with Philip's siege of Byzantium in 341/0; but then goes on to say that Ephorus' end-point was the starting-point for the second part of the history of Diyllus of Athens, who wrote a connected history of the Greeks and barbarians until the death of Philip (D. S. 16.74). Philistus provides an interesting variation on the theme, being presented as his own literary successor. Diodorus' entry for the year 406 remarks that this was the end of Philistus' first history of Sicily, which had treated over 800 years in seven books. The continuator turns out to be Philistus himself, writing a work in four books starting from the end of his first history (D. S. 13.103).

Just as Diodorus creates a continuum of historical personalities who form a long series, all of which is encompassed by Diodorus' own account, so too does he draw up a historiographical time span, the periods of time continuously covered by different historical accounts.[23] Both historically and historiographically, Diodorus' universal account quite clearly exceeds the scope of all that comes before,

[23] Although, even by Diodorus' time, the continuum of historiography was already

going beyond the temporal boundaries of all other histories put end-to-end. In a sense, Diodorus hints at the assimilation of himself as author to the subject he relates. He is just as universal as history itself.[24] Diodorus' claims to novelty, including his omission of certain expected historiographical *topoi*, spring from the temporal universalism of his account: 'If I were writing history like other historians, I would discourse on certain topics at appropriate length in an introduction to each book. . . . If I were picking out a brief time-span for my history, I would be able to enjoy the fruit of such introductions. But since I have undertaken not only to set forth events, but also to embrace more than 1,100 years, I must forgo long discussion in introductions' (D. S. 13.1).

Diodorus' privileging of time over space necessitates the subjection of all regions to a single chronological framework. I have discussed how the temporal universality of Diodorus' account is brought out by the way in which he encompasses all other histories put together. A similar point may be made about spatial scope, which is emphasized by the use of certain dating systems. He extends the Thucydidean use of 'war-years' to cover not only the Peloponnesian war, but also the war against Syracuse, the Roman siege of Veii, and the Samnite war. Each conflict has its own internal chronology, but Diodorus stresses the great spatial range of his narrative by applying similar chronological schemes to disparate wars.[25] More strikingly, Diodorus imposes over his narrative an all-encompassing temporal framework consisting of an international combination of annual magistracies and Olympiads. The date of Xerxes' expedition to Greece is, for example, described as 'when Calliadas was archon in Athens, and the Romans made Spurius Cassius and Proculus Verginius Tricostus consuls, and the Eleans celebrated the 75th Olympiad, in which Astylus of Syracuse won the stadion' (D. S. 11.1).[26]

Such a subordination of world events to a single chronological system was seen by Justinus as one of Trogus' major achievements: 'Pompeius summarized their [sc. Greek historians'] material within a chronological framework while also pursuing a topic from start to

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wearing thin. He records the starting point of Theopompus' *Philippica*, but notes that of the 58 books, five were already lost (D. S. 16.3).

[24] The point is excellently discussed by Marincola (1997) 117, 242–3.

[25] See D. S. 12.3, 12.81, 14.93, 19.10 for examples.

[26] By identifying years in this way Diodorus forces an obviously false synchronism, as archons and consuls were elected at different times of the year.

finish' (P. T. Pref. 3). In fact, although this may have been a feature of the original work, no explicit chronological structure similar to Diodorus' announcement of the next year of the Olympiad, or the election of new magistrates, has survived in the epitomized version.[27] Indeed, as I shall argue later, the strictly chronological structure of Diodorus' work was not necessarily employed to the same extent by Trogus.

It is noteworthy that Strabo never adopted such a universal chronology, using neither Olympic years, nor dating by magistracies.[28] Instead he indicates time either in relative terms which suit his interests in change, or through fixed temporal markers. A glance at these fixed points in time which Strabo uses to structure the past merely confirms his predominantly spatial preoccupations. The past in the *Geography* is regularly demarcated with reference to either the Trojan war, the return of the Heraclidae, or the battle of Actium.[29] Each had serious implications for the way the world looked. The Trojan war led to a great series of heroic migrations and the establishment of new settlements around the Mediterranean (Str. 12.8.4); the return of the Heraclidae similarly resulted in mass migration and the relocation of the Greek peoples; and Actium led to the unification of the known world under the rule of one man. Notably, Strabo's methods for indicating time were dominated by his geographical interests, rather than by temporal considerations.

b. *Spatial Universality*

If Diodorus' project involved covering the vast scope of all memorable time, then his spatial range, 'the known regions of the inhabited world,' was no less ambitious. The huge spatial scope of the work is made clear right at the start in Diodorus' account of the earliest times known, those of gods and heroes, who wandered

[27] Alonso-Núñez (1987) notes the general absence of chronological references in the work and suggests that Pompeius may have simply adopted the chronologies offered by his sources, although this seems to contradict Justinus' claim that Trogus submitted his information to a chronological framework.

[28] He states, exceptionally, that C. Antonius founded one of the cities which made up the Tetrapolis of Cephalleneia when he went into exile 'after his consulship which he held with Cicero' (10.2.13).

[29] Trojan war: Str. 1.2.31, 1.3.2, 12.8.6, 13.1.22, 13.4.5, 17.1.25. Return of the Heraclidae: 8.4.1, 8.5.5, 8.6.15, 9.1.7, 13.1.3. Actium: 8.7.5, 10.5.3, 12.3.6, 17.1.11.

effortlessly around the world.[30] Indeed spatial universality pervades the work. Diodorus includes areas such as the Arabian Gulf and Britain which 'do not fall within the common knowledge of man.'[31] His account is full of leaders who wish to conquer the world, either intellectually or by might.[32] Darius had a longing for rule which was 'boundless' (ἀοριστός); Alexander the Great wished 'to reach the limit of India, subdue its inhabitants, and sail to the Ocean'; Roman officials were sent out by Scipio Africanus to carry out a survey of the empire, in the course of which they traversed 'the majority of the inhabited world.'[33] The sequence culminates with Pompey, whose achievements resulted in the extension of 'the frontiers of the empire to the limits of the earth' (D. S. 40.4). The obvious falsehood of this claim is conveniently ignored by Diodorus in his work as we know it. He simply fails to confront seriously the disparity between Roman ambitions and their fulfillment.[34]

Trogus' history too is pervaded by a sense of the unity of the world through conquest. According to the world-view which emerges from his work, the extent of Alexander's aspirations was in no doubt: 'The universe could not be guided by two suns, he said, nor could the countries of the world safely have two leaders' (P. T. 11.12.5). The rivalry of his namesake, Alexander of Epirus, who planned that they should share the world, one taking the East and the other the West, did nothing to dampen Alexander's enthusiasm. We hear that he went to India 'intending to establish the Ocean and the furthest limits of the Orient as the boundaries of his empire' (P. T. 12.7.4). When Alexander reached the Ocean itself, Trogus comments that 'he had established boundaries for his empire as far as the deserts would allow one to advance on land and as far as the sea could be navigated' (P. T. 12.10.5).

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[30] D. S. 1.19.6: Osiris traveled to the limits of the inhabited world; 1.24.1: Hercules visited a large part of the world; 1.28.1: Egyptian sources claimed that Egyptian colonists spread across the inhabited world.

[31] D. S. 3.38. The islands beyond the Straits of Gibraltar are included by Diodorus, but were undiscovered in antiquity 'because of their remoteness from the whole of the inhabited world' (D. S. 5.19 διὰ τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς ὅλης οἰκουμένης ἐκτοπισμόν).

[32] D. S. 2.2: Ninos; 4.60: Zeus; 4.73: Dionysus, son of Ammon.

[33] D. S. 10.13 and 10.19 for Darius; 17.93 and 17.86–9 for Alexander; 33.28b for Scipio.

[34] The unity of the world in Diodorus' work has been seen as motivated by Stoic thought by, for example, Farrington (1932). Alonso-Núñez (1994) 90 makes a similar point about the Stoic basis for Posidonius' unified history.

The universal aspirations of Rome also are a major theme for Trogus. He notes that the Romans, 'harboring the unconscionable ambition of dominating the whole world, were now at war with every monarch' (P. T. 29.2.2). However, the universalism of Roman aims is portrayed later in Trogus' account as remaining unfulfilled. Book 41 starts: 'Today the Parthians rule the East, the world being partitioned, as it were, between them and the Romans' (P. T. 41.1.1). Romans might model themselves on Alexander of Macedon,[35] but a disturbing undercurrent is evoked through the echoing of the earlier passage concerning the unfulfilled aspirations of Alexander of Epirus to share the world with Alexander of Macedon. Rome could not fight off its rival. This strikes a discordant note with Trogus' contemporary, Strabo, who generally makes clear the supremacy of Rome over Parthia and is able to summarize the world at the time of writing in terms that exclude Parthia altogether.[36]

The conclusion has been drawn that Pompeius was composing his work in direct opposition to Rome, minimizing its empire and denying its universality.[37] Certainly the Parthian question was very much a topical issue in the late first century and one that was not fully resolved, and Trogus might have been doing no more than acknowledging the present reality. However, the notion of opposition seems too much to draw from one sentence. The reference to Trogus' return 'home' to Roman history in Book 43 (*ad initia Romanae urbis Trogus veluti post longam peregrinationem domum revertitur*) and Rome's designation as his 'native land' (*patria*), in combination with his straightforward appreciation of Rome's increasing domination through the second and first centuries, seem to indicate that he was not engaged in actively opposing the idea of Rome as the dominant world power. Rome was simply the latest in a long series of such powers, with the Parthian question still to be resolved.

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[35] See Plut. *Caesar* 11, Plut. *Pompey* 45, and Sall. *Histories* 3.84 McGushin for such emulation.

[36] For example, at the end of the work, Strabo summarizes the world known to Rome with no reference to Parthia (Str. 17.3.24–5). The point is strengthened by the fact that Strabo elsewhere acknowledges conflict between Rome and Parthia, but in the climactic ending excludes Parthia which might have complicated the picture of complete Roman supremacy.

[37] Perhaps the most vehement supporter of this view is Alonso-Núñez (1982), who points to the anti-Roman sentiments expressed in the speeches of the Aetolians (28.2.1–13) and of Mithridates (38.4–7) as evidence of Trogus' own opposition to Rome—perhaps rather oversimplifying the situation.

If Diodorus' conception and presentation of space on a grand scale is less complex than his denotation of time, the opposite is, not surprisingly, true of his geographical counterpart, Strabo. Strabo's treatment of time, although on an enormous scale, is subordinated to spatial considerations. He does not construct a coherent chronological framework to match the use of magistracies by Diodorus. However, the varied manifestations of universalism in Diodorus' time are matched by Strabo's space. Just as Strabo's universalism makes him share to a large extent in the broad temporal scope of Diodorus' work, so too does Diodorus' task necessitate a broad, though correspondingly unsophisticated, spatial span. Just as Diodorus supplements the general temporal demands of any 'strongly' universal account with a more specific binding together of his historical version through a universal chronological system, so does Strabo not only fulfill the general requirement of spatial universality by covering as much of the known world as can be contained in 17 books, but he also draws these places together into a spatially coherent system centered around the city of Rome. Strabo agrees with authors such as Vitruvius in allotting to Rome the climatically privileged position at the center of the world.[38] But in addition, he describes other parts of the world in terms of their relationship with Rome, making that city the linchpin of his geographical conception. Envoys flocked to Rome, as did vast quantities of material resources.[39] Sicily was seen by Strabo as 'the treasury of Rome' as the island sent all its surplus produce to that city.[40] Not only material commodities, but also aspects of cultural or social life were drawn into the center.[41]

The sophistication of Strabo's treatment of space is exemplified by the way in which he deals with the disparity between the ambitions of the Romans and the extent of their rule. He includes in his account areas which were clearly not under direct rule, such as India, much of central Asia, and Britain. That these fell within Roman

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[38] Vitruvius, *De Architectura* 6.1.10–1; Str. 6.4.1 on Italy: ἐν μέσῳ δὲ... οὖσα... τῷ μὲν κρατιστεύειν ἐν ἀρετῇ τε καὶ μεγέθει... πρὸς ἡγεμονίαν εὐφυῶς ἔχει.

[39] For envoys, see Str. 4.3.2, 10.5.3, 14.1.26; meat along the river Arar 4.3.2, 4.4.3; textiles from Patavium 5.1.7; papyrus and reeds from the Tyrrhenian lakes 5.2.9; Falernian, Statanian, and Calenian wines from Campania 5.4.3; water along the Aqua Marcia 5.3.13.

[40] Str. 6.2.7 for Sicily as ταμεῖον τῆς 'Ρώμης.

[41] For the laws from Ephesus, see Str. 14.1.25; Etruria's contribution to Roman life 5.2.2; Apellicon's library 13.1.54; art treasures 6.3.1, 12.5.3, 13.1.19.

horizons and formed part of the Roman world-view is evident from their inclusion also in the *Res Gestae* of Augustus (31.1). Strabo's *Geography* was directed at ὁ πολιτικός, not the 'politician' interested solely in the workings of government and administration of the empire, but, as Bowersock has argued, the member of the cultured élite at Rome, educated in Greek φιλοσοφία, and to whom the whole known world was of concern.[42] However, Strabo carefully distinguishes, with a striking linguistic ploy, between the world he describes and the world the Romans actually had under their sway. The broad horizons of the first century form the basis of Strabo's work. His account of this lasts until the penultimate chapter of the whole seventeen volumes. This (μέν) was the world the Romans knew; and this (δέ), in the last two chapters, was the world over which they had come to power (Str. 17.3.24). The two worlds could not quite be equated; in the geographer's mind the disparity could be neither ignored nor denied.

c. *Weaving Narratives*

So far I have discussed the universality which stems from the temporal and spatial scopes of late first-century accounts of the world. Both scopes stretch continuously to the limits of human knowledge. But problems abound. The first, that of superabundance of material, is explicitly attacked by Diodorus by the application of a strict principle of brevity and due proportion (ἡ συμμετρία).[43] Occasions where he oversteps the mark, such as the digression on Polyclitus' claim to have seen Tellias' wine-cellar, are restricted lest he should 'miss out more important events' (D. S. 13.84). In order to measure out the whole of world history across space and time, the universal historian must keep close control over the progress of the narrative.

The principle of selectivity renders the claim to cover the whole spatial and temporal scope of world history an obvious conceit. It is quite clear that not all places in the world are treated by Diodorus, whereas time is dealt with far more extensively.[44] The reason lies in

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[42] Bowersock (1965) 128.

[43] See D. S. 1.9, 1.29, 1.41, 4.5, 4.68 for examples.

[44] A number of places of interest emerge: Greece, Asia Minor, Sicily, Carthage, and Italy dominate D. S.'s narrative.

the predominantly chronological arrangement of the work.[45] The account moves from year to year, rather than from place to place, and Diodorus maps out the work into sections, each covering a particular length of time. For example, at the start of the nineteenth book, he summarizes the scope of the work to date in temporal terms: 'In the preceding 18 books I have described as far as possible the events in the known parts of the world, from the most ancient times to the year before Agathocles' tyranny, up to which time is 866 years from the destruction of Troy' (D. S. 19.1). This process of defining the temporal limits of a book has its own specific and recurrent formulation, τοὺς χρόνους διορίζοντες (literally, 'demarcating the times'), implying that it is crucial to provide a comprehensive survey of all times, but not necessarily of all spaces.[46]

Diodorus' predominant concern with time leads to a recurring wish to return to the temporal thread of the 'continuity of the narrative' (τὸ συνεχὲς τῆς ἱστορίας). The image of the narrative thread and the notion of weaving a story are both important in Diodorus' account and lead back to the question of organization, the οἰκονομία of the text. In Diodorus' explicit formulation:

> We could censure the art of history because in life many actions happen at the same time, but those who record them must interrupt the narrative and parcel out different times to simultaneous events, contrary to nature, with the result that the written record mimics the events, but lacks the true arrangement. (D. S. 20.43–4)

Diodorus' solution is far from perfect and has been severely criticized by many of his readers.[47] His problem lies in the fact that, in spite of the continuous nature of the time and space which make his account universal, stretching out to the limits of these matrices,

[45] Diodorus also recognises the benefits of a topical arrangement and sees the ideal situation as being when the chronological ordering coincides with a complete topic, such as the exploits of a single monarch (Philip of Macedon in Book 16).

[46] Trogus too has a strong sense of what is appropriate for each book. He ends Book 1 with the news of Darius' invasion of Scythia, 'the history of which campaign will be recounted in the next volume.' The theater of action has moved on and a new book is a suitable marker. But note that here a spatial move, unlike Diodorus' temporal progress, marks the need for a new book. As I shall argue later, the organization of Trogus' work at times resembles that of Strabo's *Geography* more closely than that of Diodorus' *History*.

[47] Note Oldfather (1933–67) I. xviii: 'One mistake of method made it almost impossible for Diodorus to write either a readable story or an accurate history. So soon as he entered the period which allowed precise dating he became an annal-

a written version of the world must find some way of breaking up and then intertwining the two.

The most obvious form of narrative weaving involves the movement within a single year around the various theaters of importance. The narrative of any given place is fragmented and interwoven with events elsewhere. In his account of the year 314, for example, Diodorus starts with the operations of Antigonus and Cassander in Greece, and the capture of Cassander's army in Caria. 'These were events in Greece and Asia,' Diodorus concludes. He then announces a turn to Sicily, and proceeds to describe the conflict between Agathocles and the city of Acragas. Again he concludes, 'these were events in Sicily.' Finally he gives an update on what was happening in the other key area of the moment, Italy, where the Samnite war was still in progress (D. S. 19.66–72).[48] The ideal of arranging the narrative topically must, he argues, be compromised by the need to cover world events in chronological order (D. S. 17.1). After finishing his account of the Lamian war, Diodorus announces that he will turn to the war in Cyrene 'so that the course of the history may not deviate too much from chronological sequence.'[49]

One way in which the temporal is made to unite the spatial is through the interest in chronological coincidences. The whole project to write universal history takes on a certain validity when events across the world can be seen to happen in synchronization. So, Diodorus notes that the battle of Plataea takes place on the same day as that between Greeks and Persians at Mycale (D. S. 11.34). An even more striking example is his note that on the very same day, and at the same time on that day, the battles of Chaeronea and that between the Tarentines and Lucanians in Italy took place (D. S. 16.88).[50]

Trogus too draws together space across time by noting such coincidences of history. Plataea and Mycale are mentioned (P. T. 2.14.7),

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ist, or, in other words, he endeavoured to present under one year the events which took place in Greece, Sicily, Africa and Italy, to write a synchronic universal history.'

[48] Sometimes a single chapter moves through several scenes. D. S. 12.31 tells that in Italy the ἔθνος of the Campanians was formed; in Asia the Cimmerian Bosporus dynasty ruled for 42 years; and in Greece the Corinthian war was fought. 15.2–12 travels in quick succession from Cyprus to Sparta to Sicily to Cyprus and to Greece.

[49] D. S. 18.19 ἵνα μὴ μακρὰν τοῖς χρόνοις ἀποπλανῶμεν τὸ συνεχὲς τῆς ἱστορίας.

[50] See also D. S. 13.114. At 15.60 he notes the simultaneous deaths of three rulers, Amyntas of Macedon, Ageispolis of Sparta, and Jason of Pherae.

as are the conveniently synchronized events of 387/6: 'This year was noteworthy not just because peace suddenly fell over the whole of Greece, but also because it was at this time that the city of Rome was captured by the Gauls' (P. T. 6.6.5). At the end of his account of the year 405/4, the key events across the world are brought together: the death of Darius, king of Persia; the exile of the Sicilian tyrant, Dionysius; and the capture of Athens (P. T. 5.8.7). Much later in the work, world history is seen to coincide not only temporally, but also in its actual content. 'At about the same time [sc. 223–219] almost the whole world was experiencing changes in government as new kings succeeded old,' a statement which is followed by a list of all the regal successions (P. T. 29.1.1). The coincidence of deaths of prominent people is repeated a few books later. It was irresistible to an author trying to create a coherent account of world history that the same year claimed 'the three greatest generals in the world: Hannibal, Philopoemen, and Scipio Africanus' (P. T. 32.4.9).[51]

A variation on this theme in Trogus' work is his drawing attention to historical parallels. Events in different places might mirror each other, even if they do not happen in synchronism. Philip's imposition of Macedonian hegemony, like the yoke of slavery, on the shoulders of Greece and Asia could not but evoke an implicit comparison with Xerxes' attempt to yoke Europe (Herodotus 7.8c.3; P. T. 6.9.7). The use of parallels provides additional force when Rome's struggle with Macedon is set alongside its wars with Carthage (P. T. 33.1.1).[52] By drawing this comparison Trogus makes clear Rome's growing role as the linchpin of world history, just as Strabo does through his construction of world geography in a network focused on Rome, to which all places are conceptually and practically linked. The importance of individuals in Trogus' historical narrative is clear from his equation of Theban glory with the lifespan of Epaminondas, whose obituary notes that 'his country's period of glory was born and died with him' (P. T. 6.8.1–13).[53] The natural

[51] The coincidence, probably inaccurate, was so striking as to be mentioned by a whole list of writers: Polybius 23.12ff., Diodorus 29.18ff., and Livy 39.50.10f. For Polybius' predilection for this kind of coincidence, see also 2.71 on the deaths of Antigonus, Ptolemy Euergetes, and Seleucus in the 139th Olympiad (224–220), which recalls the deaths of Seleucus, Ptolemy, and Lysimachus in the 124th Olympiad (284–280).

[52] This provides further evidence against the 'opposition literature' argument.

[53] Another individual whose life dominated the narrative of a phase of history

consequence is that, just as parallel historical phases and events draw world history together, so too do parallel lives. Agesilaus of Sparta could be compared with Conon of Athens (P. T. 6.2.7–10); and Arsaces was to the Parthians what Cyrus was to the Persians, Alexander to the Macedonians, and Romulus to the Romans (P. T. 41.5.5).[54] Historiography need not necessarily observe spatial differentiation.

In Trogus' work, as in that of Diodorus, the sense of different theaters of action is strongly felt, but, as I shall argue, the relative dominance of the temporal and the spatial as motivators of the narrative lies somewhere between what we find in Diodorus and Strabo. A temporal framework underlies the work, the overall structure being a chronological sweep through from the Assyrian empire of Ninus to the Roman and Parthian empires of the first century. Often, as in Diodorus, the spatial element is subordinated to this temporal progression. Sometimes the whole narrative shifts to another area. In his account of the Peloponnesian war, Trogus notes such a move: 'It was as if the war in Greece had been transferred to Sicily' (P. T. 4.4.12).[55] But more often, Trogus has to sustain many different narratives in different locations. For example, after relating the dealings of Alexander of Epirus with the Tarentines against the Brutii, Trogus notes that while all this was going on in Italy, Zopyrion, left as governor of Pontus by Alexander the Great, launched a campaign against the Scythians (P. T. 12.2.16). The books covering the period of Alexander's successors are particularly prone to spatial fragmentation, as the world's history was quite clearly not running in unison. Trogus moves from the division of the East, to the struggle between the Athenians and the Aetolians (P. T. 13.5.1), to Egypt (P. T. 13.6.18), and then back to the various eastern monarchs and their varying fortunes. The problem formulated by Diodorus that 'in life many actions happen at the same time' is particularly relevant to Trogus' project here.

Against this subordination of the spatial to the temporal progression, however, is the need for universal historians to provide the

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was Agathocles of Sicily; Book 22 reads almost as his biography. Note also the obituary of Pyrrhus of Epirus (25.5.3).

[54] The notion of historical parallels is obviously most clearly exemplified by Plutarch's *Lives*. On *syncrisis* as a rhetorical exercise see Russell (1964) 111.

[55] Note also the shifting of the war against Demetrius of Seleucus, Ptolemy, and Lysimachus to Europe (P. T. 16.2.1).

background for events in a particular place.[56] Diodorus turns back the narrative clock to tell of Pelops, Tantalus, and Oenomaus; the main narrative is delayed again while he goes back in time for a detailed account of how the royal line of Gelon was overthrown; the story of the Seven against Thebes necessitates a return to the causes of the war and the Oedipus legend; the capture of Messene by Thebes in 369/8 elicits a recapitulation of the town's history from the very beginning; and the underlying reason for Theban hostility to Orchomenus takes Diodorus right back to the time of Hercules.[57]

The result of these leaps in time is a 'woven' narrative, an image used by Diodorus himself. Into what is essentially an account of Hercules, he inserts the narrative of the Argonautic expedition, in which Hercules was involved. This necessitates telling of Jason and Medea, and of Theseus, who emulated the deeds of Hercules. In order that at least one of the narrative threads might be cast off (ἵνα συντελέσωμεν τὰς τοῦ Θησέως πράξεις), Diodorus must tell of the Minotaur. But to do this, he must 'revert to earlier times and set forth the facts which are *interwoven* with this story, so that the whole narrative may be clear.'[58] Immediately after this, the same image is used again. Now Diodorus must tell of the rape of Helen and the wooing of Persephone by Perithous, 'for these events too are *interwoven* with those of Theseus' (D. S. 4.63).

The recapitulation of the history of a place, a description of its background, often includes geographical and ethnographical elements. Indeed a digression from the main chronological narrative might be primarily of this nature, rather than a look back in time. So, Diodorus often gives the events of his narrative a detailed spatial setting. The site of Acragas, for example, is described in great detail as it was the city most likely to bear the brunt of Carthaginian invasion in 406 (D. S. 13.81–4). Diodorus' account of the struggle for power between the successors of Alexander is prefaced with the following statement:

> Because of the nature of the events about to be narrated, we should set forth the causes of the revolt, and the situation of Asia as a whole,

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[56] Yet again a formula is used by Diodorus: ἀναγκαῖον δ' ἐστι προσαναδραμόντας τοῖς χρόνοις.

[57] D. S. 4.73; 11.67–8; 4.64; 15.61; 15.79.

[58] The narrative is at D. S. 4.40–61. See in particular 4.60 ἀναγκαῖον . . . τὰ <u>συμπεπλεγμένα</u> τούτοις διελθεῖν.

> and the size and peculiarities of its satrapies. For by placing in front of the readers' eyes the topography in general and the distances, I shall best make the narrative easy to follow. (D. S. 18.5)[59]

Elsewhere, the contents, tone, and language of passages in Diodorus' account are highly reminiscent of the fragmentary geographical texts which survive from the Hellenistic period.[60] A strong sense of travel is evoked in the description of Cyrus' expedition through Asia Minor in 401, and a rich ethnographical element is present. Some of the customs described are identical to those related by the ethnographers, such as the residence of the king at the top of a tower, also part of Pseudo-Scymnus' description of the Mosynoeci (D. S. 14.30).[61] Alexander's campaign against the Paropanisadae leads to a detailed description of their country and lifestyle, and Antiochus' campaign into Arabia in 312 is prefaced by the comment that 'for those who do not know, it will be useful to give in detail the customs of the Arabs called Nabateans.'[62] The vast spatial scope of universal accounts not only gives them a strong geographical aspect, but also necessitates that these little-known parts of the world, which now fell within the realm of the historical record, must be explained in terms of their landscape and inhabitants.

Diodorus' occasional subordination of temporal ordering to the need for *places* to be explained in terms of their past, in the way which is so dominant in Strabo's *Geography*, and the motivation of the narrative by space rather than by time, is even more prominent in Trogus' work as we know it. It may be, of course, that these vignettes of peoples and cities attracted the attention of the epitomator and resulted in their being disproportionately represented in the epitome as compared with their position in the original.[63] However, it seems from the additional and independent source on this text, the undated and anonymous *prologi* which outline the contents of the whole work, that the preponderance of flashback digressions, the *origines et situs* passages giving the early history and ethnographical

[59] Note the striking similarity to Polybius 3.36; 3.38 on the geography of Italy; 5.44.3–11 on Media.

[60] These can be found in Müller (1882), hereafter referred to as *GGM*.

[61] See Pseudo-Scymnus ll. 900ff. (*GGM* I).

[62] D. S. 17.82; 19.94–7.

[63] See the excellent article by Brunt (1980), arguing that epitomators and those who preserve fragments picked out 'highlight' selections, with the result that an epitome was not a 'faithful miniature of the original as a whole' (487).

details of peoples newly encountered in the narrative, is not over-represented in Justin's epitome; indeed, the *prologi* note many in addition to those which appear in the epitome.

We need look no further than the start of Trogus' second book to see an example of this phenomenon. The Scythians are brought into the narrative as the objects of an invasion by Darius. Trogus states that 'to give an account of the impressive and magnificent history of the Scythians, one must go back to their beginnings' (P. T. 2.1.1). What follows is a comprehensive ethnography and geography, expounding the competing claims to antiquity made by the Scythians and the Egyptians, factors of geographical determinism, the creation of the earth itself, the nature of the land, and the customs of its people. The aspirations of Scythia to empire eventually lead back to the reason for the digression, namely the conflict with Darius. But this receives only the briefest possible summary. Darius' retreat, the Ionian revolt, and his subsequent offensive against Athens lead in just a few sentences to a major excursus on Athenian origins from Codrus onwards. The result is that the 'main narrative' following in chronological order from Ninus to Augustus is completely swamped by a wealth of ethnographic, geographical, and mythological material, which is spatially motivated in so far as it is demanded by the arrival of the narrative at a new place.[64]

Other examples abound. The Peloponnesian war leads to a digression on Lycurgus and early Spartan history (3.2.1); the transference of this war to Sicily demands an extensive discussion of Sicilian geography and mythology (4.1.1); the narrative concerning Philip involves the relation of Macedonia's history from the period of the Trojan war onward (7.1.1–2.14); the Hellenistic kingdoms take Trogus to Egypt and to an elaborate account of the foundation of Cyrene (13.7.1–11). When Carthage comes fully into play, Trogus marks the shift with an extensive version of the *origo* and subsequent history of the city (18.3.1); Agathocles' struggle against Italy results in an account of Lucanian customs and the origins of the Bruttians (23.1). The succession of dominant powers which come through the work continually introduces new peoples in the form of subjects or conquerors. All must be described and their history and customs elucidated.

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[64] An interesting exception is Epirus, whose history is related only in Book 17, although the state has been introduced into the narrative on several previous occasions.

Antiochus III's conquest of the Jews leads Trogus to relate their *origo* as well as giving a detailed geographical account of the area (36.2). The increasing power of Rome brings into play yet more peoples. Rome's own origins are told at length and the work ends with an account of Spain, Augustus' latest conquest, heavily weighted towards its mythological origins, ethnography, and geography (44.1.3–44.5).

The interplay between history and geography is, of course, highly complex in any attempt to write a universal account. Trogus' account of Armenia, which provides a good example, prefaces the account of the war between Mithridates and Artoadistes, the Armenian king: 'We should not pass over in silence a great kingdom, which is bigger than all except Parthia' (42.2.6). The founder of the nation is named as Armenus and identified as a companion of Jason (which leads to a digression on the story of Jason and Medea), linking the foundation of Armenia with one of the most prominent Greek myths in literature surrounding the Pontic region. The city of Media was, by the same account, founded by Medus, after the death of his father, Jason, in honor of his mother. It is worth noting that, although this description of Armenia contains some strictly geographical information (on the course of the Tigris), the majority is concerned with early history and mythology. It is perhaps still more striking that the predominant result of the introduction of this historical/mythological material in the digression is paradoxically a spatial, rather than a temporal, definition. It is with reference to the earliest period in Armenian history that the region is defined geographically in the mind of the reader through the Greek mythological figures and their own geographical associations. Thus we find a complicated interaction of 'history' and 'geography.' The main narrative is historically motivated, and requires a geographical setting at this point. However, Trogus achieves this, not through a spatial description, but through another quasi-historical narrative, greatly distanced temporally from the main narrative. It is the geographical associations of this inserted narrative which result in the location of the main account.

For Trogus, the interwoven threads making up the overall narrative are often of great length. The spatial momentum of the work is sufficiently strong for it to take over from the apparently chronological ordering promised in Justin's preface. Trogus' belief in the importance of *situs et origines* for understanding each place drawn into the historical narrative results in large-scale abandonments of the main thread. The large number of theaters involved in the action

also means that, as Diodorus found, chronological continuity is hard to sustain. At the start of Book 24 Trogus returns to events in Greece after a remarkable gap of seven books spent on the western Mediterranean. In Book 32 he continues relating the fortunes of the Gauls, having last mentioned them in Book 24, when they were attacking Delphi under the leadership of Brennus. In spite of the initial similarity between Diodorus and Trogus in the predominantly chronological arrangement of their works, as opposed to Strabo's geographical ordering, Trogus' willingness to allow a place or a people and their history or ethnography to motivate sub-narratives of considerable proportions draws his work perhaps closer even to Strabo's *Geography*. Much has been written about the theory of the succession of empires and its role in structuring Trogus' work, in ways which seem to overplay this element.[65] However, in so far as this organizing principle stresses the movement of the narrative from people to people and place to place, at the same time as it moves broadly forwards through time, it reflects fairly accurately the οἰκονομία of the text.

The all-encompassing nature of the project to give an account of *all* space and *all* time implies a certain continuity in these matrices, but these break down into fragments which can be interwoven when the historian comes to create a narrative. As Diodorus points out, the written record can only mimic the events. It is worth mentioning that Strabo too, in his universal geography, employs weaving imagery in speaking of the history of the world which he describes: 'So much may be said of the Acarnanians specifically [ἰδίᾳ]; I shall now speak of their history in a general way [κοινῇ], in so far as their history is interwoven [ἐπιπλέκεται] with that of the Aetolians' (Str. 10.2.26).

A brief comparison with Polybius may strengthen the point. Polybius specifically limits his work in time to the period after which world history would move together as one, strikingly using the image of weaving. 'Previously world events were, in a way, dispersed [σποράδας], but since this date [sc. 218] history has been a corporate whole, and the affairs of Italy and Libya have been interwoven [συμπλέκεσθαι] with those of Asia and Greece, leading to one end' (Pol. 1.3.3–4). The turning point for historiography would be, for Polybius, when the great interweaving of events (ἡ συμπλοκὴ τῶν πράξεων) had taken

[65] Most notably by J. M. Alonso-Núñez, for whom the theory of the succession of empires as a means of structuring universal histories has become a specialism. See, for example, Alonso-Núñez (1983), (1984), (1984a), and (1995).

place, after which the historian could give a united account in chronological order (Pol. 4.28.2–6). This is what leads to the temporal restriction on his universalism. But Polybius' attempt to mirror the interweaving of events in reality does not, even so, result in a single narrative spanning vast areas. He states as his practice to relate 'separately the events in each country for each year' (Pol. 28.16.11), and repeats this principle towards the end of the work: 'Keeping distinct all the most important places in the world and the events that took place in each . . . I leave it open to the students to carry back their mind to the continuous narrative' (Pol. 38.6.5).

Polybius' notion of the woven narrative and the way in which it relates to the problem of universalism in time and space bears a strong similarity to that of Diodorus and of his contemporaries engaged in writing universal accounts, and encourages a further comparison which may help to illuminate their universalism. A recurring phrase in Polybius is the need to view the world 'both piecemeal and as a whole' (καὶ κατὰ μέρος καὶ καθόλου).[66] Universality in historiography involves both continuous and discrete conceptions of time and space. The harmonious combination of these two concepts is the task of both the universal historian and the universal geographer. The skill lies not just in the mechanics of controlling such a wealth of material, but also in the creation of an underlying coherence, which will make the result of the narrative-weaving more than simply a sum of the individual threads.

The universal works of Diodorus and his two near contemporaries, Strabo and Pompeius Trogus, are similar to each other in the extremity of their temporal and spatial range, but they manifest the union of these matrices in different ways. All three authors deal with the world 'as a whole' in so far as they stress the wide scope of their works in ways which evoke a continuous sense of space and time. All three also disentangle the unity of the world in order to be able to represent it in narrative form, by weaving the elements back together. For Diodorus the overriding organizational principle for this reconstruction of the world is time; for Strabo it is space; and for Trogus a broadly chronological progression is complicated by a desire to make his universal account one of separate nations, whose backgrounds form the basis of extensive sections of the narrative, and often themselves include lengthy chronological narratives.

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[66] Polybius 3.5.9, 5.31.7, 39.8.3.

The use of biography in each of these authors nicely illustrates their different and complementary ways of conceptualizing and ordering the world. For Diodorus the place for recording prominent individuals and their achievements is at the end of his account of a year.[67] For Strabo, similar biographical notes round off the account of a place.[68] But for Trogus, the life of an individual could be approximated to the life of an entire people. The very title of his work, the *Liber Historiarum Philippicarum*, indicates that it fell within the historiographical tradition which developed in the wake of Alexander's conquests and Theopompus' *Philippica*, in which history could be represented by and encapsulated in the life of an individual.[69] The ambiguous and complex relationship between time and space in his conception and portrayal of the world is reflected in the life being associated not with either time or space, but with the integrated time-space of a people. The description of these national portraits as accounts of *origines et situs* neatly encapsulates the fact that these were concerned with both the 'times' and the 'spaces' of the people concerned.[70]

Some Conclusions

According to Diodorus, the task faced by writers such as himself, Trogus, and Strabo could be summarized as follows: 'It has been the aspiration of these writers [sc. universal historians] to draw into one single order all men who, although united by kinship, are yet separated by space and time [τόποις καὶ χρόνοις διεστηκότας]' (D. S. 1.1). I have tried to show that the universal writers of the late first

[67] See, for example, the end of his account of 406 (13.103.3–5): 'These [sc. the preceding narrative] are pretty much the events that occurred this year. Philistus' first *History* of Sicily ended with this year and the siege of Acragas, treating 800 years in seven books; and this is the point at which he started his second *History*, written in four books. Sophocles, the tragedian, died now, aged 90.'

[68] See Str. 13.3.1, where he records that from Methymne came Terpander the poet, Hellanicus the historian, and Callias the interpreter of Sappho and Alcaeus.

[69] Note also Dicaearchus' *Life of Hellas*. Alonso-Núñez (1987) 58 argues also that most of the work dealt with the rise and fall of the Macedonian monarchy, thus explaining the title. This reading is not, however, supported by the text and its huge range of subjects.

[70] It is worth recalling that the full title of the work as we know it was *Liber historiarum philippicarum et totius mundi origines et situs*.

century went about this task with a certain degree of methodological uniformity. Their claims as to the scope of their works were extreme, and the problem of representing the whole world throughout all time set them an organizational task of immense proportions. Authors who attempted to write universal accounts would inevitably lay themselves open to criticism. The promise to include everything could never be delivered, and it would be safer not to make it. Indeed, such voluminous works as those written by Diodorus, Trogus, and Strabo have become distinctly unpopular in modern scholarship, and are often considered excessively derivative, long, and inaccurate. However, it is worth reflecting on the ambition of those who sought to encompass the entire world in a single work, and the almost insurmountable narrative difficulties with which they struggled. Diodorus puts forward his own defense of the value of his project:

> If a man would begin with the most ancient times and record to the best of his ability the affairs of the entire world down to his own day... he would have to undertake a great task, yet he would have composed a treatise of the utmost value to those who are inclined to study. (D. S. 1.3.6)

The great spatial scope of these works makes clear sense in the context of the period of writing. The ambitions for world conquest harbored by Pompey, Julius Caesar, and Augustus formed the continuous backdrop for the writing of this type of universal account. Polybius had written in the mid-second century about the expansion of a single power, Rome, towards its goal of taking over the world. However, authors in the latter half of the next century were actually seeing this goal near to being achieved, and it is this historical context which makes the universal writings of the Caesarian-Augustan period worthy of study as a distinct group. The fact that *all* historiography at this time was not universal in the strictest sense does not in the least weaken the connection between the historical reality of Rome's consolidated empire and the production of works which claim to cover all space and all time. We would not expect complete uniformity in the response of writers to a particular set of circumstances.

However, there is a parallel interest in the grand scale evident in productions such as the map of Agrippa, the *Res Gestae Divi Augusti*, or the coins from the period which stressed the global aspirations of the Romans. These cumulatively reflect the immensely extended horizons of the age. It would indeed be surprising if this shift towards

a universalizing world-view did not affect the historiography of the period, although not to the exclusion of non-universal forms. The interest in new conquests stimulated a development in universalism which involved not only having spatial horizons which incorporated the whole Roman world, but also looking back through time to see the evolution of the world into its present state. The histories of all the places now united by Rome, as well as the literary productions of their *alumni*, were undeniably making their contribution to the cultural melting-pot that was the Roman world of the first century.

In this context, the spatial limitations of Livy and Dionysius, and the temporal restrictions of Polybius could not satisfy all authors. Strabo introduces his 17-volume work with the mild claim, 'I may have something more to say than my predecessors' (Str. 1.2.1); Diodorus, with less modesty, saw himself as exceeding the scope of all other historians. Marincola neatly summarizes his position:

> The 'bigger is better' argument presupposes that more is, in fact, more, and that if one could combine Ephorus and Polybius and Posidonius *and* the writers of individual monographs, one would have a unique and all-embracing history that would, by its very completeness, supersede all others.[71]

This desire for an all-encompassing history was not, however, merely literary one-upmanship. It was the product of the aspirations of the age.

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GENRE, CONVENTION, AND INNOVATION IN GRECO-ROMAN HISTORIOGRAPHY*

John Marincola

The concept of genre and its place in the analysis of literature have been intensely studied over the past two decades, and the traditional notion of genre as a fixed and static category has given way to an appreciation of the more complex role that generic tradition and individual innovation play within literary composition.[1] Some critics have even suggested that the entire concept of genre ought to be eliminated as essentially unhelpful to the study of literary works.[2] This idea, while it may seem extreme, was actually suggested for the ancient world by Thomas Rosenmeyer who argued that ancient critics and writers were less interested in abstract concepts like genre or theories of generic composition, than in the practical emulation of individual writers. Indeed, he called into question the very existence of formal genres in the ancient world.[3]

Although we need not completely abandon the notion of genre, scholars of ancient historiography nevertheless continue to work with a static conception of genre as comprising a set of formal and rather inflexible rules that govern the creation of a work of history. Historical works both Greek and Latin are regularly categorized by modern systems that have a slender or no basis in the ancient evidence, and

* This article is part of a larger study on the nature of ancient historiography, and as such represents only an initial attempt to identify some important issues in current notions of how Greeks and Romans wrote history, and to point to some possible solutions for problems that have arisen from standard approaches. I am especially grateful to Christina Kraus who kindly invited me to contribute to the volume, awaited the result with patience, and made a host of worthwhile corrections, additions, and improvements. I am grateful also to Laurel Fulkerson who read an earlier version of this paper and suggested several improvements. I alone remain responsible for errors and omissions. All dates are BCE unless otherwise indicated.

[1] On ancient genres see Rossi (1971); Cairns (1972); Rosenmeyer (1985); Conte (1994).

[2] Against this notion see Todorov (1990) 13–26.

[3] Rosenmeyer (1985).

in some cases can be shown to be at odds with the way ancient critics and historians looked at their works.

In the present paper I wish to call attention to some problems that exist within the current taxonomies of ancient historical writing; to argue that innovation constantly modified traditional forms, so that it is dangerous to assume uniformity of treatment by authors writing in the same genre; and to apply to Greek and Roman historiography the view of genre advanced by Gian Biagio Conte for Latin poetry, namely that genre is not a static concept, functioning as a 'recipe' with a fixed set of ingredients that the work must contain, but rather is dynamic and should be seen as a 'strategy of literary composition.' Genre, according to Conte, cannot simply be based exclusively on formal characteristics—we would not, for example, consider all poems in the Aeolic dialect to be a genre—nor simply on contents and recurring *topoi*, since this would run 'the danger of never indicating the boundary between the general and the particular.' The value of genre lies instead in the relationship between the structures of content and the structures of expression:

> A genre is not characterized as a 'stuffing' of isolated fragments of content but as a totality of reciprocal structured relationships. The single element must enter into constellation with others if it is to be transvalued and redefined—until it, too, is able to connote, by its presence, the presence of a whole genre.[4]

In calling attention to some problems with current modern views, I will not attempt to establish a different master list of types of historiography in the Greco-Roman world, but will instead suggest that since ancient historiography constantly evolved, one must pay attention to the interplay between form, content, and context for each work individually, and that one must always make allowance for innovation within any generic category. In the final section I shall briefly look at the importance of innovation with some specific examples, and suggest how the view of genre as dynamic might help us better understand 'problematic' works.[5]

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[4] Conte (1994) 106–8.

[5] It will also be clear from my analysis that I do not believe one can make assumptions about the form, viewpoint, or purpose of lost works by invoking the belief that as a work in a particular category, it must have followed a set pattern that was at the basis of that category. For additional cautions on assumptions about lost and fragmentary works see Brunt (1980).

I

In a masterful article published in 1909, 'Über die Entwicklung der griechischen Historiographie und den Plan einer neuen Sammlung der Historikerfragmente,' Felix Jacoby set out with characteristic clarity and erudition his view of the development of the various forms of Greek historiography.[6] The article, as its title reveals, was an outgrowth of Jacoby's decision to provide a new edition of the fragments of the Greek historians that would replace the nineteenth-century edition of C. and F. Müller, which was by then some 60 years old.[7] Jacoby's work represented a revolutionary step, for he rejected an alphabetical, chronological, or regional arrangement, and decided that the most useful edition would be one in which the fragmentary authors were arranged according to their place in and within the historical development of Greek historiography ('die entwicklungsgeschichtliche Prinzip').[8] The article thus serves both as a guide to the use of Jacoby's incomparable collection, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*, and as a history of the development of Greek historiography.[9]

It is difficult to overstate the value and the influence of this article and Jacoby's arrangement of *FGrHist* according to these principles.[10] No one has ever come to the task with greater learning both

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[6] Jacoby (1909), cited from the 1956 republication and hereafter referred to by author's name only.

[7] Müller (1841–73). On earlier collections of fragments of Greek historians see Grafton (1997).

[8] Jacoby 17–20. Jacoby's collection (= *FGrHist*) can nonetheless be difficult to use because the basic arrangement is not by genre but by author within a specific genre, so that authors who wrote more than one type of history can still only be placed under a single rubric. Occasionally, an author whom Jacoby thought extremely important is found in more than one place; in the most extreme case, Hellanicus appears six times, as nos. 4, 323a, 601a, 608a, 645a, and 687a.

[9] There are ancient 'developmental' models for both Greek and Latin historiography, but these are based entirely on style and arrangement: see Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 5 with Gozzoli (1970–1) and Cicero, *de Orat.* 2.51–8 with Brunt (1980a) 188–204; Fornara (1983) 19; Woodman (1988) 76–8. Modern developmental theses, by contrast, proceed differently, with an eye much more on the developing historical consciousness of the Greeks and Romans.

[10] Schepens (1997) 164 notes that it 'not only constituted a turning-point for the research on fragmentary Greek historians, but left its mark on the methods now commonly used in the editing of fragments.' I do not understand Humphreys (1997) 213 that *FGrHist* 'has had little impact.' It provides the foundation for nearly every handbook on Greek historiography: see Brown (1972) 1–18; Fornara (1983) 1–46; Meister (1990) 199–200; Lendle (1992) 265–81; Hornblower (1994) 1–72.

in the fragmentary historians themselves and (no less significantly) in the knowledge of Greco-Roman literature. Even when one disagrees with or rejects Jacoby's views, one nevertheless remains indebted to this work for its many insights and understanding. The breadth of treatment, the complexity of the issues, the assured (often polemical) authorial voice, and the daunting prospect of replacing this model with another have all worked together to ensure that Jacoby's schema has become the accepted one. Although there have been adjustments, corrections, and differences of emphasis (some of which we shall examine below), there have been few explicit *Auseinandersetzungen* with Jacoby's work, and such adjustments have only modified the arrangement without in any way challenging its overarching structure or theoretical basis.[11] It is necessary, therefore, first to summarize briefly Jacoby's classification of the Greek historians as it is found in the 1909 article and in his subsequent writings, and then to examine the usual division of the Roman historians, which was influenced by Jacoby's work on the Greek side.

Jacoby divided the historical writing of the Greeks into five sub-genres, arranged according to the order in which he believed they developed: mythography or genealogy, ethnography, chronography, contemporary history (*Zeitgeschichte*), and horography or local history. The first, and in Jacoby's schema, earliest genre, mythography, sought to bring order, if not absolute consistency, to the complex tangle of

[11] The fullest exposition in English of Jacoby's views is Fornara (1983) 1–46, who for the most part follows Jacoby's arrangement. The major difference that Fornara has with Jacoby is the latter's refusal to accord the title of 'history' to any of his sub-genres. The closest Jacoby would come is to call one of the sub-genres 'Zeitgeschichte.' Fornara objects to this, saying that it is unfair to deprive the Greeks of the discipline they invented. He accords to *Zeitgeschichte* the title of 'history,' but this is not without its own problems. Jacoby, at least, practiced a certain consistency, since his sub-genres were all branches of historical writing. His refusal to call them 'history' was a result of his belief that the nineteenth-century concept of history as an independent *Wissenschaft* as practiced in his own day had never existed in Greece. But he never denied that the Greeks wrote history. Fornara, on the other hand, by calling contemporary history 'history' winds up denying that chronography and ethnography were history because they lacked the mimetic element (which he sees as defining history, 30–2) or else did not show the causes and interrelationships of events (see 14–16, 29). Herodotus is thus the first historian because he wrote a verisimilar account of a war, an account that looks for inspiration not to Hecataeus but to Homer. Except for the last part, this can hardly be right, since Hecataeus (see *FGrHist* 1 F 30) also employed mimesis. In this particular case, Jacoby's arrangement and nomenclature, whatever their shortcomings, are more consistent than Fornara's.

Greek traditions, and to write the history of mythical times.[12] The genre begins with Hecataeus of Miletus' *Genealogies*, but we do not know whether he or some other writer consciously and clearly delimited earlier times from later times, nor whether any mythographer commented upon the quality of the tradition or sought to elaborate a methodology for working out the problems of conflicting and/or fabulous traditions. Herodotus delineates a 'human era' from a mythical one, but did he himself establish this *spatium historicum* or had this already been marked out by Hecataeus?[13] Later writers, when speaking of earliest times, use terms such as *mythologein* and *genealogein*, indicating possibly a consciousness that the quality of the tradition was somehow different from that for later events.[14] In any case, as Jacoby points out, once the mythologists had done their job, later writers either passed over earliest history (as Ephorus did, who began with the return of the Heraclidae) or used it as the first part of a general history of Greece or the larger Mediterranean world (e.g., Diodorus).

In ethnography, we meet one of the most important sub-genres. Jacoby argues that as Hecataeus' *Genealogies* spawned mythography, so his *Circuit of the Earth* (*Periodos* or *Periegesis Ges*) contained within it the seeds of ethnography.[15] In the *Circuit*, Hecataeus progressed around the coastline of the Mediterranean and described the lands and the peoples therein. In Herodotus' work, one sees many substantial descriptions of people and lands that are almost independent entities, and these tend to treat the same rubrics: (i) the land itself (i.e., its geography); (ii) its history by a sequence of kings and dynasties; (iii) its marvels (*thaumata*); and its customs (*nomoi*), which embrace everything from public and social behavior to religious beliefs and cultural practices.[16] Jacoby decided, therefore, that between Hecataeus and Herodotus the individual brief accounts of non-Greek lands that Hecataeus had given became larger, more substantial, and, as it

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[12] Jacoby 23–4, followed by Fornara (1983) 4–12; Meister (1990) 24; Lendle (1992) 10–25.

[13] Herodotus 3.122; Jacoby 24 believed that Herodotus introduced the distinction between the mythical and historical time; Fornara (1983) 7 argues with more probability that Herodotus' words presuppose, rather than assert, the distinction. See also Asheri (1990) *ad loc.*

[14] Fornara (1983) 8; for 'distancing' techniques when narrating early events see Marincola (1997) 121 n. 299, 124–5.

[15] Jacoby 26–7.

[16] Jacoby 26 n. 28; see also Jacoby's pupil, Trüdinger (1918).

were, independent units focused on a single land. He considered that the oldest book of this genre was the *Persica* of Dionysius of Miletus, which arose from the Ionians' desire to know more about the power that had conquered and ruled them. In form, ethnography is a hybrid, containing both historical accounts (which could be lengthy) as well as descriptive accounts of the land and its people, such accounts being based on autopsy and oral inquiry. Since for Jacoby the genre was in origin descriptive, not narrative, he believed that the treatment of the land and its inhabitants' *nomoi* were the base and starting point, and that even when the historical element came more to the fore, the genre still retained its formal ethnographic character.[17] Certain ethnographies could, for Jacoby, approach contemporary history, the closest being the *Sicelica*, histories of Sicily that began with Antiochus of Syracuse in the mid-fifth century and ended with Timaeus of Tauromenium in the third. Most of these native authors wrote the history of their own times, but Jacoby argued that they could not be reckoned as writers of contemporary history because (i) each one began with the origins and early history of Sicily, thus differing from the (eastern) Greek historians, each of whom picked up where his predecessor had left off; (ii) the viewpoint is not panhellenic but rather focused on Sicily; and (iii) the Sicilian historians had strong 'antiquarian' interests, and this puts their work into the category of ethnography.[18]

The third sub-genre, chronography, begins with Hellanicus of Lesbos and his work, the *Priestesses of Hera at Argos*. Although chronography is usually linked to the development of local history (Jacoby's fifth sub-genre), it is formally separate. It shares with local history a style of dating by annual magistrates, in Hellanicus' case, the year of office of the chief priestess of Hera at Argos. Yet despite its 'local' dating system, which is necessary simply to keep track of in which year an event occurred, the *Priestesses* is panhellenic, embracing events throughout Greece.[19]

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[17] Jacoby 27–8.

[18] Jacoby 30–2; for criticisms of these criteria see below 298–9.

[19] Jacoby 24–5, esp. 25 n. 26 on the difference between using a 'local' system and narrating exclusively local events. Later writers use different local systems (Spartan kings, Athenian archons) but similarly include events from throughout Greece. Timaeus' system of Olympiads (the four-year unit beginning with the first Olympic games of 776) ultimately won out and proved especially valuable for the writing of universal history. In Rome, historians dated by the consular year or, as

The most important sub-genre of all for Jacoby was contemporary history (*Zeitgeschichte*), the writers of which he defined as 'those authors who without local restriction narrated the general Greek history of their own time or up to their own time.'[20] The distinguishing marks of *Zeitgeschichte* are: (i) a narrative mainly of the author's own time, irrespective of where it begins; (ii) a viewpoint from the Greek side; and (iii) a panhellenic treatment, i.e., embracing events of all the Greek city-states. The sub-genre is first glimpsed in Books VII–IX of Herodotus, for in Herodotus the descriptive element (the hallmark of ethnography) becomes subsumed within historical thought and within the search for historical causation. In the next generation Thucydides' work on the Peloponnesian War brings the sub-genre to full fruition. Jacoby thus saw a teleological line of development in historiography, namely Hecataeus—Herodotus—Thucydides.[21]

After Thucydides, writers of *Zeitgeschichte* chose either to write up individual wars, or to continue the chronicling of contemporary history now focused not on a particular event but rather on a chosen segment of time, as Xenophon did in the *Hellenica* and as the many serial continuators in Greek history attest.[22] Histories centered on individuals—Theopompus' *Philippica*, histories of Alexander or of his successors—also qualify, provided that they are not limited by a local focus. Thus contemporary history, itself a sub-genre, could have subcategories of its own: war monographs, perpetual or continuous histories, and individual-centered histories.

The final sub-genre for Jacoby was horography or local history. The origin, development, and nature of this particular type of historical writing consumed a great portion of his energies, in this article and especially in *Atthis*, his study of 40 years later, which was intended to serve as prolegomena to his commentary on the fragments of the Athenian local historians.[23] Jacoby maintained that local history—literary accounts of individual Greek city-states—did not exist

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with Livy, also from the founding of the city, and this system was adopted by Greek imperial writers.

[20] Jacoby 34. Thus, if Ephorus wrote events from ca. 1069 up to his time of the fourth century, he is reckoned as a writer of contemporary history.

[21] Jacoby 37–9.

[22] Jacoby 40; for a list of known Greek continuators see Marincola (1997) 289–90.

[23] Here he was primarily motivated to prove wrong the thesis of Wilamowitz (1893) that Athenian local history arose from a chronicle kept by the *exegetai*, or religious expounders, at Athens. For the place of *Atthis* in Jacoby's scholarship and for the background to its publication see Chambers (1990).

when Herodotus was collecting material for his history in the mid-fifth century. What we know of the publications of local chronicles, he maintains, suggests that they first appeared in the last quarter of the fifth century.[24] Amongst the distinguishing marks of horography were: (i) its fixed annalistic structure, with events strictly recorded year by year and even in order within the year, so that a series of conflicts between (e.g.) Athens and Aegina in the same year would be treated not all together but separately, depending on whether they happened at the beginning, middle, or end of the year; (ii) its inclusion of a variety of material in addition to political and military events, i.e., religious, cultic, and 'cultural' in its broadest sense; and (iii) its local focus, treating the city's history, and including other cities and states only in so far as they came into contact with or affected the city.[25]

Roman historiography, while not subject to the same type of developmental model, has nevertheless been influenced by Jacoby's schema for Greek writers. Indeed, since the first Roman historian, Q. Fabius Pictor, wrote in Greek, it seemed easy enough to suppose that he adopted Greek conventions, and Jacoby included him and his followers amongst the ethnographers/local historians.[26] Because Pictor is considered a local historian, he is then assumed to have written in chronicle fashion, and to have included the sorts of material much favored by local historians.

Since Roman historical works are routinely called *annales*, the term 'annalist' has been coined to describe both the writers and the tradition. There are several complicating factors, however. The first is the existence of the so-called *Annales Maximi* which were made up of the yearly *tabulae* kept by the pontifex maximus, and on which were recorded occurrences of each year.[27] Great controversy still surrounds nearly every aspect of both the *tabula apud pontificem* and the

[24] Jacoby believed (49) that it was in fact Herodotus' work that provided the spur to local history, as each city-state sought to (re)claim its proper place in the great struggle with Persia.

[25] Jacoby 49–52.

[26] These separate genres are actually collapsed in the collection under the title 'Geschichte von Städte und Völker.' For Fabius and his Hellenophone followers—Cincius Alimentus, C. Acilius, and Postumius Albinus—see *FGrHist* nos. 809–812. Cf. Lendle (1992) 273–4, who refers to them (rather bizarrely) as 'ethnographische Monographien.'

[27] The testimonia on the *Annales Maximi* and the *tabula apud pontificem* are in Frier (1979) 297–321; cf. Verbrugghe (1989) 195, 224–5; Chassignet (1996) VII–XIX.

Annales Maximi (and their relationship to each other), and no consensus is likely to be reached in the near future. It is not even certain what sorts of material were recorded on the priests' *tabula*. Servius says that they contained 'things worthy of memory' and many scholars have supposed that this meant historical material. But Cato, in criticizing the *tabula*, claimed that it contained notices of grain shortages and eclipses of sun and moon,[28] and he seems to have compared it unfavorably with the type of historical work that he was going to write. Even allowing for polemic and exaggeration, the few fragments of the *tabula* seem to bear him out.[29]

An issue closely related to the content of the *tabula* and the *Annales* is whether they served as an important source for the first Roman historians, and, more generally, to what extent their form and arrangement influenced subsequent Roman historiography. This is a hopelessly vexed problem complicated by the loss of all Roman historians before Sallust, and by the predominant position occupied by Livy, the characteristics of whose history are sometimes assumed to be exactly those of his predecessors. It is common today to separate out two groups of writers, those designated 'historians' and those known as 'annalists.' The former are considered to be 'serious' writers of political and military events, who emphasized contemporary history, either in a continuous history on the order of writers of *Hellenica* in the fourth century (Sisenna, Sallust in the *Histories*, Asinius Pollio) or in *bella*, individual wars (Sempronius Asellio's account of the Second Punic War, Sallust's *Catiline* and *Jugurtha*). Annalists, on the other hand, treated Roman history from its origins in a strict year-by-year manner dictated by the *Annales Maximi*, and gave, it seems, far more generous treatment to the events that the earliest Roman writers had treated briefly, i.e., the four and a half centuries from around 700 to the First Punic War. They are also presumed to have included much material designated as antiquarian, involving matters such as religion, cult, and culture, and, unlike the serious historians, to have filled out their histories with embellishments, fictions, and falsified traditions.[30] (Because of this last aspect, the term 'annalist' has come

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[28] Cato fr. 77 Peter = IV. 1 Chassignet.

[29] Kraus and Woodman (1997) 3–4; for the fragments see Chassignet (1996) 1–16, but her interpretation of the fragments is generous and should be used cautiously: see Kraus (1997).

[30] Wiseman (1979) 9–26. On the definition of antiquarian material, see below at n. 89.

to be pejorative.) Much of the discussion then centers around who was an 'historian' and who an 'annalist.' Fornara, following Gelzer, saw the first generation of historians (roughly from Fabius Pictor to Cato) succeeded by a series of authors, beginning with Cn. Gellius, who should be considered annalists.[31] Other scholars, however, continue to designate all Roman historians as annalists, running in an unbroken line from Fabius Pictor to the last and greatest annalist, Livy.[32] Nonetheless, it remains questionable whether the distinction between 'annalist' and 'historian' has validity, and some fundamental problems with such an assumption will be examined in the next section.

Just as in Jacoby's view of Greek historiography the genres develop rapidly and become fixed equally rapidly, so too in Roman historiography there is only a short time separating Fabius Pictor, the 'historian,' from Cn. Gellius, the first 'annalist.' And once this occurs, the genres, it is claimed, more or less maintain their established form. Although in many cases it is correct to assume that the Romans were following—indeed imitating—Greek models, nevertheless as with other genres borrowed from the Greeks, so too with historiography the Roman imitation is never merely an unimaginative copy of the original. Above all, Roman historiography, at least in Latin, is not always easily or profitably assimilated to Greek models, and certainly to designate it as 'ethnography' or 'local history' is insufficient and at times misleading.

II

Although Jacoby's categories have been widely accepted, there have nevertheless been criticisms directed against them. For all of its insight and value, his system does have some very serious problems that arise when one studies further the individual sub-genres.[33] These problems take several forms.

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[31] Fornara (1983) 25–28; Gelzer (1933), (1934), and (1954); cf. Wiseman (1979) 12–26.

[32] Pre-eminently Frier (1979), esp. 201–24; the belief is also evident in the bizarre remark of Conte (1994a): 68 'Previously [to Cato] there had not been even a genuine historiography, but only annals written in Greek, etc.'

[33] Cf. Humphreys (1997) 213: 'A critical examination of *FGrHist* must question not only its conception of the sub-genres of historical writing, but also its concep-

(1) The first shortcoming of Jacoby's system is its teleological view. It is clear from his sketch that he sees the early writers on the past as 'primitive,' and history as moving towards some certain form, which he determines to be the war monograph of Thucydides.[34] The 'peak' of historical writing is therefore put extremely early, and later writers are seen as declining from this high standard. Sally Humphreys has recently pointed out that Jacoby's lack of sympathy with historians after Thucydides is a product of the nineteenth-century belief in evolutionism, of the assumption of 'progress' from myth to science, and of his own age's imprisonment 'in a contradictory amalgam of romanticism and positivism.'[35] Indeed, Jacoby's remark that the last Greek historian was Posidonius and that if it were possible, he would end his collection of historians with the first century since that represented the end of Hellenism, shows quite clearly his unwillingness or inability to see history-writing as dynamic and responding always to the larger world around it.[36] In fact, it is the very notion of 'perfection' that renders us unable to see how historiography was constantly innovative, a response not only to the present (as it must always be) but also a competition with and reaction to the historian's own predecessors.

(2) Jacoby's individualization of the development of historiography represents the second difficulty with his model. As is well known, Jacoby equated the development of Herodotus with the development of Greek historiography: he saw Herodotus' (putative) 'progression' from geographer to ethnographer to composer of war monograph in Books VII–IX as the microcosm of the development of an entire genre and an entire people's historical consciousness.[37] In turn, Herodotus has a middle place in the progress of Greek historiography: Hecataeus represents the first steps towards the rational treatment of historical events (imperfectly applied in the *Genealogies*),

tion of the category "history".' The present article concerns itself only with the first part of Humphrey's statement.

[34] Jacoby 41. Note too how in Jacoby (1949) 116–17, Philochoros is similarly the culminating point of a line from Hellanicus through Androtion 'straight in the direction of history generally.'

[35] Humphreys (1997) 207–8, 211.

[36] Jacoby 46–7. Imperial historiography, for all its failings, represents both a unique response to the shifting of power and an impressive flexibility against great odds: Marincola (1997) 86–93.

[37] Jacoby (1913); so similarly Fornara (1971).

Herodotus then 'creates' history by subsuming the descriptive element within the rational search after causes, Hellanicus establishes the importance of chronology and the collection of local traditions, and finally Thucydides unites historical narrative and analysis in perfect equilibrium.[38] Robert Fowler, however, has expressed well the difficulties of this approach:

> A theory in which all the characteristics of the first stage of historiography are found in one author, Hekataios, and all the characteristics of the logical second stage in another, Herodotos, all of the logical third stage in another, Hellanikos, and all of the fourth stage, in another, Thukydides, all of whom fit together like ashlar blocks, squeezing out anyone caught in between, is inherently unlikely.[39]

Such an individualization of historiography's development limits the ability to see that historians (including these particular historians) were not the only ones engaged in the preservation, understanding, and establishment of the tradition of the past. In recent years, it has been established that historical epic and elegy were important in contributing to the Greeks' preservation and explanation of their past. Ewen Bowie's study of elegy and its contexts showed that archaic poets treated a great variety of historical themes, and the new Simonides fragments have made clear the existence of traditions and narratives before Herodotus on the Persian Wars.[40] Also to be included here are the many poetic treatments of foundations and ancient histories (*archaeologiae*) of the Greek city-states.[41] Hecataeus, Herodotus, and Thucydides were not just reacting *to* writers in other genres, they were in dialogue *with* them as well.[42]

(3) The third problem is the rigidity with which Jacoby has constructed his categories, and whether these do or do not cohere with ancient criticism and categories. Several questions on this score arise:

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[38] Jacoby 41: 'In dieser [sc. Thucydides] ist das Zeil erreicht: es herrscht der historische Gedanke und das erzählende Element in vollster Strenge; selbst die Beschreibungen und Reflexionen sind durch das Mittel der Rede zur Erzählung geworden.'

[39] Fowler (1996) 68.

[40] Bowie (1986) 27–34. On the new Simonides see Boedeker (1995).

[41] Schmid (1947); Dougherty (1994) denies the existence of a separate genre of foundation (κτίσις) poetry, but she shows nevertheless the great number of treatments given to these topics by the early poets.

[42] Note too how this historical myopia makes us read Thuc. 1.21 as concerned exclusively with Herodotus, although it is likely that other writers are also being criticized: see Marincola (1997) 21 n. 100.

(i) To what extent are Jacoby's categories representations of ancient ways of looking at works on the past rather than anachronistic constructs based on modern and inappropriate criteria? (ii) Are the elements that Jacoby sees as characteristic of a genre *essential* to that genre and do they somehow determine for the historian the form and nature of his treatment of the past? (This is a way of asking whether works in the same sub-genre always have more in common than not.) (iii) Does a genre, once established, determine the nature of all works written in that genre thereafter, or does response and innovation play a *substantive* role in ancient historiography?

Let us begin with the first question. When we look at what ancient critics of historical writing say, certain categories reappear with some frequency. There is, for example, a type of writing called *archaeologia*, which embraces the writings on early history: Plato has Hippias say that this type of writing has to do with 'the genealogies both of heroes and of men, and settlements, how cities long ago were founded.' Isocrates too refers to 'those writing the genealogies of heroes,' and later Polybius can scorn 'the genealogical type of history' as being the favorite of those who merely like a good story; he also refers to that type of history whose subject matter is 'colonies, foundations, descents.'[43] That this subject matter of mythography or genealogy was recognized as distinctive in some way is thus not to be doubted.

Similarly, there is a type of historical writing that focuses on individual wars: Isocrates refers to 'those writing ancient deeds and Hellenic wars,' and elsewhere classifies 'those who wished to write up deeds in wars' as a specific group; so too Dionysius refers to 'those writing wars,' and sees Thucydides as one 'who wrote not of one land or of Greeks and barbarians alike, but chose one war' for his subject.[44] But here we see 'wars' together with 'deeds' or contrasted with history of individual lands or places, such that wars must be seen as a smaller subgroup of narratives of deeds. And these narratives of deeds are defined either by area or by protagonist. So Polybius refers to the third type of history (after genealogy and early history of foundations and colonies) as 'history of deeds,' which consists of 'deeds of countries or cities or dynasts,' and Diodorus also

[43] Hippias, *FGrHist* 6 T 3 = Plato *Hipp. mai.* 285D; Isoc. *Antid.* 45; Pol. 9.1.1, with Walbank (1967) *ad loc.*

[44] Isoc. *Panath.* 1, *Antid.* 45; Dion. Hal. *A. R.* 1.8, *Thuc.* 6.

speaks of 'deeds of kings or cities self-contained [αὐτοτελεῖς] from beginning to end.'[45] The emphasis here seems to be on the subject matter—deeds—rather than on the form or orientation of the work, and there thus seems to be some slippage between Jacoby's categories and those of the ancients.

There is good evidence that 'chronicles' were recognized as a type of historical writing. Diodorus notes those works that are called 'yearly annals' and 'annals written year by year,' and Dionysius refers to 'chronicles such as published by those who wrote Athenian history (*Atthides*),' which he claims are monotonous in form.[46] There can be no doubt that they are describing a type of writing in which the events are strictly entered into the appropriate year. But as Kurt von Fritz has pointed out, Jacoby's conflation of 'chronicles' with 'local history' has caused all of the latter to be seen as a subspecies of the former, when in fact it should be the opposite.[47] While it is true that some local histories arranged their material annalistically, not all local history, at least from what the ancients have described, is necessarily local 'chronicles.' Dionysius refers several times to histories written 'by country and city' and contrasts it pointedly with the work of Herodotus, who wrote 'not of one city or one country but brought together many and different deeds from Europe and Asia into one single composition . . . [treating] all the distinguished deeds of Greeks and barbarians.' He notes specifically that historians before Thucydides divided their accounts either by place or by chronology; in the former he includes Herodotus and Hellanicus, while in the latter he gives no names, saying only that their chronology was based on the succession of kings or priests, or Olympiads, or annual magistrates.[48] There is no suggestion that local history required a specifically annalistic structure, and von Fritz has plausibly argued that the earliest Ionian local histories were not 'chronicles.'[49] In addition we must be cautious about these lost works, since, as Fowler has pointed out, early works referred to as *Horoi* were not necessarily given that title by their authors, and therefore conclusions about the work's structure cannot be drawn from the title.[50]

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[45] Pol. 9.1; Diod. 16.1.1.
[46] Diod. 1.26.5; Dion. Hal. *A. R.* 1.8.
[47] Von Fritz (1967) I. 97.
[48] Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 5.
[49] Von Fritz (1967) I. 94–7.
[50] Fowler (1996) 66 n. 28.

For neither of his two main genres, *Zeitgeschichte* and ethnography, can Jacoby find anything approaching a consistent and distinctive ancient terminology. The general word *historiae* can refer to various forms of historical writing, while terms such as *Hellenica*, *praxeis Hellenon*, or *perpetuae historiae* refer to only one of Jacoby's types of contemporary history.[51] Moreover, the generic ending -κά which is an extremely common way of naming a history, both Greek and non-Greek, corresponds to no single category of his. Jacoby, of course, realizes this point, but he minimizes it and never confronts it directly. He notes, for example, that the title *Macedonica* can correspond to 'contemporary history' (at least in the fourth century once Macedon comes to rule Greek affairs), although he claims that some *Macedonica* must be consigned to ethnography.[52] Ancient writers, he observes, do not in their terminology distinguish sharply between ethnography and horography, so works ending in *-ca* can also denote local history: some writers of *Boeotica* write local history, but if they write when Thebes is ascendant in Greek affairs in the fourth century, their works are *Zeitgeschichte*. So a work with an ethnic ending in *-ca* means that it might be any one of three of Jacoby's categories: ethnography, horography, or contemporary history—although as Momigliano has pointed out, it might also be a novel, since they too have that sort of title![53] The emphasis from ancient titles seems to be on the subject matter, not the form, yet if Jacoby's categories are fundamental, one must wonder why ancient historians did not trouble to distinguish their works more carefully.

Another important concern is the distinction between *Zeitgeschichte* and ethnography. The most important issue for Jacoby seems to be what narratologists call focalization, the point of view from which the history is told. If the focalization is that of mainland Greece and varies amongst all the important Greek states, then the work is *Zeitgeschichte*. If, however, the focalization is that of a single city-state or that of a non-Greek land, the work can no longer be considered *Zeitgeschichte* (*even* if it treats contemporary affairs) but must be relegated to ethnography or horography. The choice of viewpoints is potentially extremely important for understanding the nature of a

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51 Jacoby 34 n. 53.
52 Jacoby 44 n. 76.
53 Jacoby 44–5; Momigliano (1978) 375.

particular history; it might matter whether Ctesias, for example, presented the deliberations of the Greeks as well as the Persians, or whether Philochorus showed the Theban viewpoint when writing his Athenian history. But an important aspect is not necessarily a defining aspect, and it is uncertain that focalization should be *a* (much less *the*) determining factor in evaluating a history, since all history, even what the ancients called 'universal' history, is limited in its focus. The real question must be whether a particular focalization *determined* a consequent methodology and purpose, that is, whether someone writing *Zeitgeschichte* approached his task in a fundamentally different way from one writing ethnography or local history. From what we know of surviving and fragmentary works, we would be hard pressed to conclude that a similar 'form' entails a similar purpose, methodology, and interests.[54]

Nor is the identification and delineation of the sub-genre of ethnography of minor importance, for it plays a large role in Jacoby's explanation of the origin of Greek historiography in general and of Herodotus' role in that development in particular. Yet it is important to remember that only one independent work of 'ethnography' survives, the *Germania* of Tacitus, written five centuries after the genre's putative origins by a Roman writer in an imperial milieu.[55] Jacoby, however, confidently asserted that the genre was already in the fifth century fixed in terms of its elements, and he did so, as we noted above, not from any independently existing works (for there are none), but from the traces of it that he was certain he could determine in Herodotus' work. There is no doubt that portions of the surviving histories of certain authors can be described as 'ethnographic,' but the arrangement is by no means fixed, nor do all of the elements appear even in Herodotus in every treatment of a foreign land.[56] Not to mention Jacoby's assumption that somehow the 'ethnographies' in Herodotus are detachable from the 'historical' part,

[54] See Marincola (1997) 237–40 for the differences among ostensible continuators, and below, Section IV.

[55] Even Arrian's *Indica* will not qualify, since the majority of it is a narrative of Alexander's exploration of the Indian Ocean, the descriptive part taking up only about one-fourth (Chh. 1–17) of the work and distinctly identified as a digression (17. 7 ἐκβολὴ τοῦ λόγου). We can get some sense of Ctesias' *Indica* from Photius' summary (*Bibl.* 72, p. 133 Henry) but we must be careful not to infer the entire work from these excerpts: see Bigwood (1989).

[56] Van Paassen (1957) 151–211.

inferior for being 'only' descriptive and not explanatory, rather than being as much an explanatory part of the work as the recognizable historical narrative of Persian–Greek conflict.[57] Are we certain that Herodotus would have thought (as do some of his modern critics) that the narrative of Books VII–IX was his *maius opus*, the thing that he had been striving towards all along, rather than an equally important (if different) examination of the same things with which he was concerned throughout his work?[58] One must wonder whether treatments of a land's marvels and customs really indicate the existence of an independent genre between Hecataeus and Herodotus, or merely a continued interest in this type of subject matter from one generation to the next.

Moreover, by defining any work that treated a foreign land as 'ethnography,' Jacoby effectively avoided any challenge to his notion that Herodotus was the first historian. Jacoby does not deny that Dionysius of Miletus wrote a *Persica* in four books that was earlier than Herodotus' work. But because it was oriented towards Persia, the work could not qualify as history but only ethnography, even though three of the four surviving fragments contain material also treated by Herodotus.[59] It is not certain what Ephorus meant when he said that Xanthus of Lydia (whom Jacoby reckons an ethnographer) had given Herodotus his 'starting point,' but a categorically different work could not have been seen as inspirational to Herodotus.[60] Indeed, when Dionysius of Halicarnassus speaks of the early Greek historians (whether or not he is right about their dates) he speaks of the *arrangement* and *styles* of their histories, but he does not suggest that their works were of a fundamentally different kind from that of

[57] On the explanatory nature of the 'ethnographic' see Lateiner (1989) 145–62 and next n.

[58] Note the last 'ethnographical' chapter of the work, and its explanatory purpose: Moles (1996); Dewald (1997).

[59] Dionysius, *FGrHist* 687 F 1 ~ Hdt. 5.58; F 2 ~ Hdt. 3.61; F 4 ~ Hdt. 1.1.

[60] Xanthus, *FGrHist* 765 T 5. I am not unaware that Jacoby dated all of these authors after Herodotus, but his arguments rest on many untested assumptions: see Pearson (1939) 115–16 (Xanthus), 139–40 (Charon), and esp. Fowler (1996) 64–8. Anachronistic notions of publication assume that an author's work could only be known after the latest dated event in his work, but this is to assume that nothing could be known of a work until the very latest part was written. If, however, we consider the milieu of performance and competition, with authors giving oral performances of portions of their works, it is clear that the researches of these writers will have been known while they were being carried out.

Herodotus. And one can easily imagine a 'fragmentary' Herodotus by which we should judge him to have had little historical interest.[61]

To return to our main point: Jacoby clearly had difficulties explaining why certain histories of specific areas were not really history (or in his terms 'contemporary history') but rather ethnography. As we noted above, Jacoby saw the Sicilian historians as in some sense practitioners of *Zeitgeschichte*, since they did in fact write the history of their own times, and at least one of them continued a predecessor, thus linking works as the writers of *Hellenica* did.[62] But Jacoby retreats from the consequences of this by saying that the most important author of *Sicelica*, Timaeus of Tauromenium, begins his history with early times and writes with strong antiquarian interests, and so takes the genre with him into the realm of ethnography. Fornara, however, has shown the inadequacy of this single criterion (an historian's starting-point)[63] for the determination of genre, and has sensibly remarked that the *Sicelica* were the western Greek counterparts to *Hellenica*, and were thus history and not ethnography.[64] But Fornara is guilty of the same sort of method when speaking of Ctesias' *Persica*; he admits that the later books of Ctesias' work were 'indistinguishable from history,' yet he maintains that the work remains 'formally an ethnography . . . the description of a foreign land including, but not wholly consisting of, an account of the history of its rulers.'[65] This is assuredly not the image one gets of Ctesias' work from the summary given by Photius (where the work sounds short on description and long on historical narrative), or from the fragments (where it is clear that Ctesias is writing contemporary history).[66] Indeed, of what value can a category be that is 'indistinguishable' from another category? As Conte has pointed out, genres 'act in texts not *ante rem* or *post rem* but *in re*.'[67] Fornara, like Jacoby, has taken a single element—in this case that of focalization—and has made it the deter-

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[61] If, for example, the fates of Herodotus and Xanthus or Dionysius had been reversed.

[62] Athanis continued Philistus (*FGrHist* 562 T 20).

[63] Indeed, Jacoby himself (see above, n. 20) had defined writers of *Zeitgeschichte* as those who, regardless of where they began, saw their main task as their own times. He thus fails to be consistent even on his own terms.

[64] Fornara (1983) 37–8.

[65] Fornara (1983) 14.

[66] Phot. *Bibl.* 72.

[67] Conte (1994) 112.

mining criterion, although in his analysis of *Sicelica* he had rejected a similarly narrow criterion as being determinative for an entire series of works. It is fair to say that the perspective or focalization of writers of *Sicelica* and *Persica* is hardly the most important aspect of their work. Put differently, where an historian starts and from what point of view he tells the story are, of course, important elements of his work; but whether they can by themselves be considered essential aspects of an historical work determining everything else is far from certain.[68]

A counter-argument might be made in the realm of horography, since here one might better argue that focalization did in fact determine other, more important aspects of an historian's treatment of events. Jacoby's exhaustive study of Athenian horography showed that the Atthidographers did, more or less, follow a fixed pattern of narrative. They dated annalistically, beginning with the archon of the year; they narrated the whole history of Athens from its founding; and they gave events as they happened throughout the year, even if this meant breaking up the same event into several portions.[69] Yet as we shall see in Section IV, despite some similarities, the Atthidographers wrote works that differed greatly in character and focus.

(4) This brings us to a fourth aspect of the problems with Jacoby's system, its generally static notion of genre. Response, reaction, innovation, and the competition with predecessors are some of the most important elements of ancient literary creation, whether in historiography or in any other genre.[70] One of the primary goals of composition was to be both traditional and innovative, to follow the models of established excellence (some of which had existed for centuries) while making something slightly different, something that was one's own. Imitation was an accepted form of homage, but it was not to be simply a slavish copying of the model but the infusion of a new spirit into a traditional treatment. Whereas exact imitation was merely mechanical and/or decorative, the better writers were able to take something familiar and place it in a new context or

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[68] Cf. Fornara (1983) 37: 'an ethnographer . . . proceeds with unmistakable method. . . . The genre dictates the presentation, etc.'

[69] Jacoby (1949) 90–9.

[70] Here I summarize a topic treated in Marincola (1997) 12–19, where fuller discussion and additional references may be found.

frame not seen before. It is the openness to this aspect of historiography that seems to me most lacking in Jacoby's schema.

Moreover, the phenomenon of 'empty slots' that Conte has illuminated for Latin poetry, which he defines as ' "unoccupied" spaces, blanks created and delimited at the borders of already existing genres,' must also be considered valid in the writing of Greco-Roman historiography.[71] The ancient historians, many of whom wrote works in other genres as well, were keen to make a kind of work that had not been seen before, to survey what was available, and to try to compose something that would fill a gap as they saw it. Their claims of innovation ('nobody before me has . . .') sometimes strike us as naive or insubstantial, but such claims were a consequence of the effort to be different and to innovate, even on a small scale, within traditional generic expectations.[72]

(5) Finally, but related to everything above, Jacoby's system of pigeon-holes cannot assign specific places to certain works, which then become stigmatized as 'problematic' or 'violations' of the genre. As we shall see in Section IV, a more flexible notion of genre can assist us in understanding what the individual author may have been doing.

The residue of Jacoby's 'fixed' categories can also be seen in Roman historiography. Here too there is an assumption that a particular choice, especially that of writing annalistically, left little room for flexibility and innovation, and essentially obligated the author to follow a pattern established centuries before. Yet Gerald Verbrugghe, in a wide-ranging article with important consequences, has undermined these assumptions. He has shown that the distinction between 'annalist' and 'historian' cannot be found in the ancient authors, where 'scriptor annalium' or the like serves as a designation for all writers of history. Second, he notes that the Latin word *annales* means both history (in the aggregate and objective sense) as well as a particular history (the literary representation of that object). Third, citations of Roman historians refer indiscriminately to 'annales' and 'historia,' which suggests not only that the writers themselves did not assign any such title as 'annales' to their works, but also that there cannot have been a recognized sub-genre of *annales*, as Cichorius

[71] Conte (1994) 116–17. For a specific example see below, n. 125.

[72] Marincola (1997) ch. V *passim*.

had stated.[73] In terms of structure, there is, of course, no reason to doubt that Roman writers used the consular year, but this was a result, as Verbrugghe has argued, not of the supposed influence of the *Annales Maximi*, but rather 'from the structure of Roman state and society.'[74] Yet even here the annalistic year itself, as we shall see in Section IV, can be varied and manipulated in such a way that it forms little or no impediment to artistic arrangement or historiographical individuality.

III

The fact that the traditional categories for historiographical genres are problematic does not mean that others must be created in their stead. Indeed, such a construction would be antithetical to what was noted in the previous section, that scholars have tried to impose a specious unity on the forms of ancient historiography, which, like other literary genres in antiquity, were in a constant state of flux, of reaction and revision, of challenge and counter-challenge.[75] In place, then, of generic taxonomy, I suggest that one must consider five criteria when trying to analyze historical works. These criteria can, and often are, interrelated, but we should be wary of automatically assuming that any particular one necessarily determines

[73] Cichorius (1894) 2256. Verrius Flaccus' attempt (*apud* Gellius 5.18.1–2) to distinguish *annales* as non-contemporary, *historia* as contemporary history was not successful, if we judge by the way the words were actually used: Verbrugghe (1989) 216–18. Nor is Sempronius Asellio's distinction between the two (with which he began his history) to be taken as evidence that there was a unified and easily identifiable annalistic tradition (so Frier [1979] 219, *contra* Briscoe [1981]) but rather must be read in the exaggerative context of historiographical polemic, in which the writer tries to justify the superiority of his own work by criticizing that of his predecessors (Verbrugghe [1989] 219). Asellio's criticism is not about form or content, but about fullness of account, and examination of causes and attendant circumstances, as his comparison of *annales* to Greek diaries (ἐφημερίδες) shows. Note that he did not compare *annales* to local history (ὡρογραφία), thus the contrast cannot be between that and Asellio's pragmatic history (as Frier [1979] 219–20). For additional bibliography on Asellio's remark, see Chassignet (1996) XII n. 15.

[74] Verbrugghe (1979) *passim*; quotation from 214.

[75] In addition, as political or cultural events affected the society of the historian, his approach to the past could not help but be different from that of his predecessors, no matter how much he may have thought that he was closely imitating them.

other aspects of the work. Rather, it is necessary to look at the totality of an historical work before forming conclusions about its nature and purpose.

I. *Narrative or non-narrative?* An obvious first decision by the historian is whether he wishes to write an historical synchronic narrative or whether he prefers a more diachronic descriptive method, or indeed some combination of the two. Both can be historical, although pursuing different ends, and both can be concerned with causes and explanations. The former is more mimetic, and may be more or less 'adorned' and/or detailed. In some cases, narrative movement may be only latent, not obvious: chronography, for example, is differently structured from contemporary history, but it can also be seen as narrative in its own way, since the years, one after another, reveal a story-line that can be comprehended and read. As Hayden White has shown in his analysis of the bare and brief *Chronicle of St. Gall*, even a chronological list can have an underlying (if not always immediately apprehensible) narrative, and, paradoxically, with its *unconnected* and, at times, random events, a chronicle represents the world less fictively (or perhaps in a differently fictive way) than standard narrative history with its smooth connections and story-like structure of beginning, middle, and end.[76]

On the other hand, descriptions of the lands or customs of a people are usually diachronic and 'timeless' in that they are not primarily concerned to establish sequential narratives. These too can be concerned with causation and explanation, as seen most easily in Herodotus.[77] An historian might also use both, as we find in Polybius, whose Book VI is a diachronic examination of the Roman constitution (placed, as he says, at a crucial point in the narrative), and whose Book XXXIV was a systematic treatment of world geography as known in his day.[78] Another example is Arrian's *Indica*, which consists of a diachronic examination of the land and customs of India, followed by a narrative of Nearchus' voyage on the Indus.[79]

Herman Strasburger, in his discussion of ancient historiography, identified two types of historical writing, the 'kinetic,' which is the

[76] White (1987) 1–25.

[77] See above, nn. 57–8.

[78] Pol. 6.2.4–7 on the inclusion of the Roman constitution; 3.36, 57–9; 12.25e on the usefulness of geography in a history.

[79] See above, n. 55.

history of wars and events, and the 'static,' which concerns culture and civilization.[80] It is indeed the case that the choice of narrative might be affected by the writer's predilection for one or the other type of history, but this distinction cannot be absolute, for one could argue that Herodotus, Posidonius, and Livy actually fused the two in their works. Even in largely narrative histories, then, one must pay attention to the movement between narrative and non-narrative elements.

II. *Focalization*. The focus or orientation or point of view from which one tells the story is an important element of the history. The possibilities that present themselves range from that of an individual and his actions, one whom the author will argue determined events for his era (Philip, Alexander), to the deeds of a group (Xenophon's *Anabasis*, Caesar's *Gallic War*) to the nations of the whole known world (Diodorus, Pompeius Trogus), with increasing complexity as one treats more theaters and peoples. Some historians chose a single city-state, some a group of city-states (the *Hellenica*), some the events between nations, and some attempted a full history of all the known nations. We may represent it very schematically as follows:

individual's actions[81]	individual group	city-state	nation (group of city-states)	nation and nation	whole known world

Thus when an ancient writer talks of writing a 'war' (*polemos, bellum*) he essentially limits his perspective to that of the participants, although even here the war may be internecine (Sallust's *Catiline*), limited to a group within a recognized nation (Thucydides), or a war between one nation and another (Herodotus). Or the historian's focus may be on a city-state within a fixed period of time. This, of course, is the situation in Jacoby's local history, whether of city-states or nations.

Now it is certainly the case that some types of focalization will suggest a certain type of arrangement. For example, a local history

[80] Strasburger (1966), esp. 972ff.

[81] By individual's actions I mean within a historical context, since biography also focuses on an individual's actions. The main difference will be in chronological range (biography going from birth to death, history from accession to death or dethronement), subject matter (public deeds in history, public and private in biography [see Plut. *Alex.* 1], although this is easier to separate in theory than in fact), and in the relation of the individual to the group.

will most easily and appropriately be arranged according to the local magistrates, whereas an arrangement by Olympiads is conducive to a universal history. Yet even here, the choice of a certain focalization does not *ipso facto* entail a fixed corresponding arrangement: Hellanicus' *Priestesses of Hera at Argos* had a panhellenic focalization but a local dating system. Thucydides, on the other hand, used an internal dating system, by summers and winters within the years of the Peloponnesian War, although he was careful to anchor it to dates in the Spartan, Athenian, and Argive calendar.[82]

III. *Chronological Limits.* It is well known that in history it is impossible to begin at the beginning, and equally impossible to end at the ending. Nevertheless, the historian must choose where to start and where to end, and to what extent he wishes to 'emplot' his history. By this I mean what sort of shape as a story he gives to his work. Hayden White's well-known work, *Metahistory*, suggested that plots of histories follow one of four patterns, comedy, tragedy, romance, or satire. Even if we disagree with the categories and their exclusivity, nonetheless it cannot be denied that historians 'read' the events of their history in a certain way, and if, for example, an historian sees his subject as glorious, he might begin and end differently from one who saw the same events as comic or inglorious. We might compare Sallust's narrative of the Catilinarian conspiracy, written in what would be White's satiric mode (which everywhere sees duplicity and self-serving behavior under a cloak of noble professions) with the 'story' Cicero suggests to Lucceius of those same events, which he would have begin with the origin of the conspiracy and end with Cicero's return from exile (*Ad Fam.* 5.12.4), which would thus approximate romance (a drama of the triumph of good over evil). Note here too how focalization would affect the chronological limits.[83] Does he make his work self-contained (αὐτοτελής), does he begin from some canonical fixed point, or does he continue from where a predecessor left off?

These chronological limits can, again, be represented as a continuum:

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[82] Thuc. 2.2.1; Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 9 says that no one followed Thucydides in arrangement, but the historian of Oxyrhynchus did.

[83] See White (1973) 7–11 for the modes of emplotment.



—but even within the continuum there is the opportunity for variety in the way the historian adorns his account. It is generally the case that historians treated their own times more fully than earlier times, and the recent past more fully than the distant past, though a minority seem to have done the opposite. Some writers, of course, avoided earlier history entirely and composed the history only of their own times.

Now the choice of what time period to embrace carries with it consequences for the patterning of meaning produced by that work. What I mean is that one who chooses to write continuous history, either from the distant past or for his own era (picking up from a predecessor) has a more difficult time imposing on his material narrative and thematic unity (the illusion of a story with beginning, middle, and end) than one who breaks off, so to speak, a portion of history and invests that portion with a story-like plot, as we find it in Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War,[84] Xenophon's *Anabasis*, or Sallust's *Catiline* and *Jugurtha*. Cicero observed too that the choice of a separate theme allowed for greater adornment of the material, the very thing that Polybius found fault with in monographs.[85] The choice of chronological limits was important, therefore, not only for the investigative work required of the historian, but also for the imposition of meaning and the emplotment of the narrative.

IV. *Chronological arrangement.* The structure of the history is to some extent determined also by the chronological system underlying it. There is the common method of structuring events according to the year (κατ' ἔτος, *suum quaeque in annum referre*), which implies a more or less strictly annalistic pattern. One can also use kings or magistrates (κατ' ἄρχοντας καὶ βασιλέας) to give structure, especially where these rulers themselves are the instigators or subject of historical actions. In the latter case, arrangement and focalization are sometimes intimately connected. Another method of arrangement is to

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[84] Although here the story-line is unclear because of the lack of an ending: see Dion. Hal. *Pomp.* 3 (II. 376 Usher) for a suggestion how Thucydides might have emplotted his history.

[85] Cic. *Ad Fam.* 5.12.2; Pol. 7.7.6 (ἀναγκάζεσθαι τὰ μικρὰ μεγάλα ποιεῖν).

write according to area or category (κατὰ γένος), treating the events by theater of action within a multi-year time period before moving on to the next.

Certain types of history brought with them certain traditional forms of arrangement. The most obvious was the local history of Athens, where events were arranged strictly within each year, and in fact were broken up even within the year itself. Such an annalistic arrangement clearly worked well for histories with a single focalization. For large-scale histories, on the other hand, the arrangement by category, begun by Ephorus, was most useful. Using this system it was possible to treat events in one area in some detail and over several years, in order to assist the reader in understanding the events, before moving on to the next theater of action. Some chronological precision was sacrificed for greater comprehensibility. Here again, this latter method could be adopted even by those who wrote annalistically.

V. *Subject Matter.* That history comprised a recognizable entity in antiquity is hardly to be doubted. Yet already in the *pater historiae* there is a vast amount of information that does not congrue with modern notions of history. Herodotus' subject of *erga megala te kai thomasta* embraces the *erga* not only of deeds on the battlefield but also the works or monuments of various peoples, and, one might say, even their works that make up their lives and customs. It is not uncommon in modern treatments, however, to find a marked preference for the deeds of war as the 'proper' subject of history, such that historians of political and military events become the proper historians, and those who choose other subjects or treat them differently are relegated to an inferior status. The problem with this approach is that in an attempt to find precursors for primarily nineteenth-century notions of history, the vast variety of historiographical output in antiquity is overlooked and minimized. It might be argued that our 'great' historians treated political and military history, and that this type thus has a legitimate right to be considered history *par excellence.* But as Guido Schepens has pointed out, this type of history is over-represented in surviving works, and there is plenty of evidence that many (and some of the most important non-surviving) historians saw their task as embracing many things other than wars and political upheavals.[86] So what must first be established is the variety

[86] Schepens (1997) 146.

of approaches possible towards the past, and the past must here be seen in its greatest extent and totality.

That totality embraces many (and many different types of) subjects: there are, of course, political and military deeds, but there are also cultural events and activities; the religious life of a state and its people; the customs of a people, whether or not these are part of a formal religion; and even the lives and characters of a state's leaders, particularly important when a state is ruled by a single man or woman. Certain historians clearly preferred to work with the first of these categories exclusively. Others, however, included a greater variety of material. The works of the Hellenistic historians, such as Megasthenes, Berossus of Babylon, Manetho, Timaeus, and Posidonius, clearly included a large amount of material that did not concern itself with political and military affairs. The usual relegation of most of these writers to the category of 'ethnography' is a *petitio principii*, an assumption that such material is something different from and alien to history.[87]

Also to be avoided is the relegation of certain types of information to the category of 'antiquarianism.' This term is something of a catch-all, but it usually comprehends a type of learned research into origins, and in particular is concerned with names and etymologies, institutions, rituals, inscriptions or documents, monuments, and topography.[88] The whole notion of 'antiquarian' literature has recently been seen as problematic: Benedetto Bravo has demonstrated that Jacoby's category of 'philologic-antiquarian' works does not correspond to ancient notions but is rather based on the modern separation of philology and history, while Schepens has shown the enormous practical problems raised by the imposition of modern categories onto ancient works.[89] Nevertheless, we note that unlike historians, antiquarians did not usually write in narrative form, but rather in analytic treatises. But the general assumption that there was little commerce between the two is true only up to a point: that history remained largely narrative and eschewed analysis. It can

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[87] On the Hellenistic historians see Murray (1972).

[88] See Momigliano (1950); Rawson (1985) 233–49.

[89] See Bravo (1971). Schepens (1997) 159–64 observes also that antiquarian material is extraordinarily difficult to categorize, and that the rubrics established by Jacoby for the arrangement of *FGrHist* IV do not correspond in many cases to the ancient reality, and that this is not true simply because many of the works no longer exist.

hardly be denied that much of the same material of interest to antiquarians—rituals, topography, monuments, origins—found its way into histories, even if it was treated differently within an historical narrative. Cato, for example, in Books II and III of the *Origines* conducted what can only be considered 'antiquarian' research on the origins and customs of Rome's Italian subjects, and some other Roman historians followed suit.[90] Alternatively, in a more complex way, Livy's portrait of the Roman people comprehends not only their deeds at home and abroad, but also their religious observances, their character, and the physical monuments that make up the city itself. Humphreys has suggested that the early books of Livy contain a complex interplay of topography, monuments, and relics within the 'historical' narrative, and something very like this must have occurred in Hellenistic historians.[91]

Attempts, therefore, to distinguish 'annalists' from 'historians' by pointing to subject matter fail because they try to establish an artificial dividing line between what could and could not be included in a history. Other kinds of hard and fast distinctions create different problems. Sisenna, widely regarded as a serious 'historian,' included portents and discussion of customs that is seen as being somewhat at odds with serious historiography. His work is then relegated to 'rhetorical' or 'tragic' history (both problematic concepts), an evasion that assists in the devaluation of certain components deemed (by moderns) problematic.[92] It is not clear where we can draw the line. Emilio Gabba, for example, has pointed out that one category of marvels, *paradoxa*, were a subject of interest to many historians (not just writers of fiction), and Humphreys has insisted that the inclusion of these served the serious purpose of trying to understand 'events that were neither part of regular experience nor obviously fantastic.'[93]

Given such a situation, it seems best to abandon the traditional distinctions (i.e., serious pragmatic history could not include marvels, portents, etc.), look instead at all the things included by a specific historian, and then interpret the individual work on its own terms.

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[90] On Cato see Cicero, *Sen.* 21; Nepos, *Cato* 3.3; on Cassius Hemina and Piso Frugi see Rawson (1976) 251–5, 259–65.

[91] Humphreys (1997) 219–20.

[92] See, for example, Rawson (1979) 386, who characterizes Sisenna as one 'who seems to unite a number of perhaps somewhat ill-digested intellectual interests.'

[93] Gabba (1981); Humphreys (1997) 218.

This must be done not to assign an historical work to one or another group, but rather as a first step to understanding what the historian sees as relevant to the portrait of the past that he is attempting to create, and how the inclusion of such material in his work tries to mediate between that vision of the past and the present reality in which he finds himself. The form and content cannot be divorced from the context in which the work was produced, and the interplay of all of these factors must be considered in any evaluation of an historiographical work.[94] Such an approach, it seems to me, better reflects the way the ancients themselves viewed the materials and methods available for an inquiry into the past, and will make it much less likely that we force ancient works into modern categories.

IV

The understanding of the importance of innovation, together with the view of genre as dynamic, as constantly being remade, and as (in Conte's words) a 'strategy of literary composition' assists our analysis of historiographical works by considering both similarities and differences from one historian to the next; it both takes account of traditional forms of expression and acknowledges the gradual innovations made by individual writers, and thus provides a clear picture of the continuity and change of historical writing over time.

[94] Forsythe (1994) 71–2 has used the metaphor of a river to describe the Roman historiographical tradition, but his words apply equally well *mutatis mutandis* to any historiographical tradition that was well developed in antiquity: 'The historiographical tradition which culminates in Livy's history can be thought of in terms of a mighty river whose volume has resulted from many smaller tributaries. At the head waters stand the histories of Timaeus, Fabius Pictor, Cincius Alimentus, and the *Bellum Poenicum* of Naevius. The historical stream is then increased by Postumius Albinus, Ennius' *Annales*, Cato's *Origines*, and the history of C. Acilius. . . . [T]he *Annales Maximi* constitute a large lake whose waters feed into a few tributaries that flow directly into the mainstream. Soon after the annalistic tradition passes into the first century BCE, it quickly swells to a mighty river from receiving the massive works of Sempronius Asellio, Cn. Gellius, and others. In this model each tributary symbolizes the unique contribution which each author brought to his own historical writing and passed on to the evolving annalistic tradition, but an author's actual history is not the single tributary but some complex combination of that tributary with some portion of the waters with which the tributary merges.' We can well imagine that such a stream carried with it a vast variety of materials, including elements that might be thought of as 'antiquarian,' from which the historian could select.

Paradoxically, innovation, far from threatening genre, assures its continued existence, since like other things genre must adapt to survive.[95] In this final section, then, I want to give some examples of how a more dynamic view of genre throws light on the differences and similarities from author to author as well as what authors are doing in individual works; and to suggest some ways by which 'problematic' works can be better explained.

Let us begin with Xenophon's *Hellenica*, a contemporary history of Greek affairs from 411 (the end point of Thucydides' history) to 362, the indecisive battle of Mantinea. By joining his work to that of Thucydides,[96] Xenophon clearly suggests his belief in the value of contemporary history. Nevertheless, although continuing Thucydides, Xenophon clearly does not agree with Thucydides' evaluation (1.1.1) of the Peloponnesian War as the greatest and most significant upheaval in Greek history, for he continues his account past the end of the war with no discernible difference of emphasis.[97] In addition, when he concludes in 362, he notes that Mantinea decided nothing and that Greece was beset by more uncertainty and upheaval thereafter. Again, it is not uncommon to see Xenophon's work as a misunderstanding or failure of emulation of Thucydides. This is, of course, to beg the question, for it assumes that Xenophon wished to write a Thucydidean work. But a different approach is possible since Xenophon's aims, interests, and approach to history are different. In choosing to continue his narration of the deeds beyond the defeat of Athens in 404 at the end of the Peloponnesian War, Xenophon was inaugurating a fundamentally different conception of history from the 'closed' histories of Herodotus and Thucydides, the former unified by its reliance on the thread of Persian conquest, the latter by its choice of one war seen by its author as the greatest. By

[95] Cf. Nauta (1990) 119: 'Ein literarisches Werk wird immer innerhalb vorhandener Gattungserwartungen rezipiert, aber die Rezeption dieses Werkes verandert auch immer diese Gattungserwartungen—in geringfolgigem Masse, wenn das Werk traditionell ist, in radikalerem Sinne, wenn es sich von den bestehenden Vorstellungen absetzt; auf jeden Fall entsteht eine neue Gattungserwartung, usw.' The entire article, though dealing with a very different genre (pastoral poetry), is illuminating on changes of a genre over time and the importance of audience expectations in the development of genres.

[96] Emphatically, since he opens by writing, '*And* after these things' (μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα).

[97] For arguments that Xenophon was not Thucydides' continuator, see Henry (1969); for recent bibliography on the beginning of the *Hellenica*, see Dillery (1995) 9–11, 255 nn. 10–11.

concluding with the indecisive battle of Mantinea, Xenophon encourages the reader to form a conception of history as a continuous and open-ended series of events, each era of which, he seems to suggest, will deserve or call forth its own chronicler. Xenophon nowhere gives his reasons either for writing history or for writing the specific history that he has chosen,[98] but his beginning and end can be considered 'programmatic,' since they reflect Xenophon's basic belief that history is, so to speak, open-ended and inconclusive; his rejection of Thucydides' view about 'his' war constitutes therefore, in some sense, an important step in historical consciousness, and situates the historian differently from the events that he narrates. Moreover, Xenophon's explicit rejection in a later part of the *Hellenica* of the preponderant interest by his predecessors in the great states of Athens, Sparta, Thebes, and Corinth also helps to explain the constant shifts of focus in the work.[99] The result is contemporary history with a different focus, purpose, and orientation from those of Thucydides.

A look at three different 'universal' historians shows also the disparity between works that are all within a single sub-genre of history. First Polybius and Posidonius, whose works show some similarity of form. Both authors write historical narrative with diachronic digressions (our category I in Section III, above); both write universal history, that is, the Mediterranean world as it was then known to them, with a focus on Rome (II); both observe the chronological limits of their own day (III); and both write κατὰ γένος, within Olympiads (IV). Where they differ (and it is significant) is in category V, their subject matter, and what they see as relevant to an understanding of the world that their history explores and tries to explain. The strong interest that Posidonius has in peoples, customs, and natural phenomena is, we might say, a reaction and challenge to Polybius' world-view, with its narrow focus on military and political history. Posidonius, by contrast, tries to be 'universal' in subject matter as well, and attempts to write a different kind of universal history from that of Polybius, even while accepting much of Polybius' arrangement and argument about the importance of universal history.[100]

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[98] One can infer, however, some of his beliefs from his occasional statements on method and subject scattered throughout the work: see Breitenbach (1950).

[99] See *Hell.* 7.2.1 with Breitenbach (1950) 21–2.

[100] See Kidd (1989) on Posidonius' aims and methods. On universal history see further Clarke (this volume).

Diodorus represents yet a third approach: he follows a similar arrangement by topic, but his work is universal in scope (the known world) and time (origins to his own day), and his subject matter is correspondingly catholic, closer to that of Posidonius than of Polybius. Diodorus' work too is universal history, but he challenges both Polybius and Posidonius by seeing all of human history as of value for humans to contemplate and study.[101] Indeed, all three authors believe in a didactic purpose for their works, yet here too there are significant differences, such that one must be wary of imposing a unitary purpose on similar forms of history.

If we look at local history, we see that the classification by genre reveals only a part (and not necessarily the most important) of these works. The best studied and best known group is the Atthidographers. Yet they differ both in scale and focus. Phanodemus, writing in the 340s or the 330s, reached the end of the sixth century only in his ninth book, which indicates a strong interest in early Athenian history and a very full narrative of those events. Androtion, on the other hand, had reached the end of the fifth century by the third book, and his work then became fuller, precisely in the manner of contemporary historians.[102] Philochorus' work is different yet again from that of both Phanodemus and Androtion. His treatment of early Athenian history differed little from Androtion's although his scale was different. But from 360 on, Philochorus' work became expansive: Book VI treated about 50 years, Books VII–IX fewer than 20, and Books X–XVII 40 years. It is a fair question to what extent his later books were indistinguishable from *Zeitgeschichte*, though, as luck would have it, practically nothing from the later books survives. Yet a few clues suggest that he abandoned the exclusively 'local' focus that was supposedly essential to horography: he treated the early history of Thebes, possibly in a digression; he went outside the boundaries of Athens in narrating the Sacred War of 356–346 (although its importance to Athens is easily understood); and he included speeches, at least in the latter portions of his work.[103] All

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[101] For Diodorus' vying with his predecessors, see Marincola (1997) 241–4.

[102] As Harding (1994) 28 puts it, 'he felt that his predecessors had treated the early history well enough. He wanted to write about his own times, the things he knew about and had been involved in.'

[103] See Jacoby, *FGrHist* IIIB Suppl. I. 346–7, commenting on 328 F 69/70; note too that F 67, a verbatim quotation according to Dionysius, is in indirect speech.

this suggests a work that was not limited in scope nor in its treatment of contemporary times, and that had very little in common with the work of Phanodemus, also formally an *Atthis*.[104] P. J. Rhodes may be closer to the truth when he argues that Atthidography was not a uniform genre, and the interests of its authors differed strongly one from another.[105] Jacoby was in no way unaware of these facts, and he himself explicated the different manners and methods of the Atthidographers. But he seems always to retreat to a belief that the genre remains fixed in its 'essentials,' and that these essentials are an important part of grasping the nature of historical works. Even here, it may be a matter of emphasis. We need not necessarily believe that the Atthidographers wrote political tracts as part of a war with predecessors to believe that they were influenced by them and wrote their histories in emulation of or reaction (not necessarily political) to them. What seems essential is to examine both form and content and how they interact with each other.[106]

Jacoby specifically equated the Atthidographers as a group with the Roman Annalists, yet just as the Atthidographers form a group with different interests, aims, and purposes, so too the Roman writers *a Remo et Romulo* (a better designation than 'annalists' and more in keeping with ancient language)[107] cannot be assumed to have had a unified purpose or to have formed a unitary tradition. Their works varied widely in length and subject matter, and we cannot be certain that Livy's work is an accurate guide to any one of his predecessors, much less all of them. The history of Cassius Hemina, written probably in the 140s, treated from Roman origins to 146, was brief (four, possibly five books), and had an interest in monuments, topography, and aetiology. Cn. Calpurnius Piso Frugi wrote a history in

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Jacoby contradicts himself in his analysis of Philochorus: he says that the use of a digression, which he calls a 'transgression of the limits' of local historiography, is not surprising in a man who is not a historian but a politician. Eight pages later Philochorus is both a scholar and a historian. Again we see how Jacoby's rigid formal criteria are constantly in need of fine tuning and explanation of exceptions.

[104] Rhodes (1990) 81. To take an obvious example, Dionysius (*A. R.* 1.61.5 = *FGrHist* 325 T 6) could refer to Phanodemus' work as 'Athenian *archaeologia*'; this would have been completely inappropriate to Androtion or Philochorus.

[105] Jacoby, of course, saw their main difference as their political slant.

[106] In any case, this is very different from the problems of Jacoby's classification of 'ethnography,' where a work, simply because it does not concern itself with mainland Greece and contemporary events, falls into a category that only partially describes its contents.

[107] Kraus and Woodman (1997) 2–3.

seven books, the majority of which dealt with the middle Republic from 263 to 146. He may have first introduced a full annalistic framework, beginning each year with the name of the consuls. On the other hand, Cn. Gellius' history (written not long after the previous two) was voluminous, still treating the regal period in Book III, while Book XXXIII was still only at the Second Punic War. A vast variety of material, both Roman and non-Roman, was assimilated, and his work cannot be assumed to have had very much in common with Cassius' or Piso's history.[108] The first-century writers were yet different. Claudius Quadrigarius went from the Gallic sack to his own time in at least 23 books, but unlike the earlier writers, his work was predominantly the history of the recent past and contemporary history. So too with Valerius Antias, his contemporary. His history was far more voluminous, at least 75 books, and so perhaps three times the length of Claudius', yet like that one, predominantly a contemporary history.[109] As with the Atthidographers, focus, scale, and center of interest differed, with the result that it is very unlikely that these authors formed a unitary tradition.

Nor can the assumption of a single aspect of form be sufficient in the analysis of historical works. It has been noted that the Roman historians date annalistically and that this form imposes certain limitations on the treatment of events, particularly in the way that events over several years must be broken up.[110] Surely far too much has been made of this. Thucydides showed that a strict yearly account is not incompatible with dramatic effect, comprehensibility, and variation. Moreover, every genre has formal constraints: hexameter poetry automatically eliminates certain words and imposes strict rules of arrangement in the line much more we might say than a yearly unit does for an historian. Arrangement is one of the fictive elements present in all historical narrative, and different narrative forms represent 'reality' differently. For historiography is not *the* representation of the world, but *a* representation of it, which demands criteria not only of inclusion but of exclusion:

> The empirical world, in order to be perceived, must of necessity be translated into something it is not—into a model of reality, endowed

[108] On Hemina see Rawson (1976) 247–55 and Forsythe (1990); on Piso, Rawson (1976) 259–60 and Forsythe (1994); on Gellius, Rawson (1976) 269–71.
[109] Timpe (1979) 106.
[110] McDonald (1957) 155–9.

> with a meaning and therefore a form. Genre functions as a mediator, permitting such models of selected reality to enter into the language of literature; it gives them the possibility of being 'represented.'[111]

Thus the choice[112] of an annalistic form of dating is an agreement to work within a set of conventions, but it by no means precludes individual innovation. It has been argued that the Livian 'year,' for example, has a typical pattern that opens with the inauguration of the consuls, treats internal affairs, then foreign affairs, then returns to Rome to finish up internal affairs again.[113] Some scholars believe Livy is following standard annalistic practice. It goes against the general trend of literary creation in antiquity, however, to assume that Livy simply copied without any elaboration or alternation some 'standard' method of narrating a year's deeds and John Rich has recently demonstrated that this was not the method of Livy's predecessors, and that even Livy himself does not use this method in all the surviving portions of his history.[114] We can be fairly certain that Livy's arrangement could not possibly have been that of the *Annales Maximi*, since they incorporated events as they happened or became known at Rome (indeed if such historical material was included in them) and not in the framing and artistic arrangement chosen by Livy. Deaths, one presumes, would have been recorded as they occurred, not (as in Livy) at the end of the year.[115]

While it cannot be certain that Livy's arrangement was his own, it can be demonstrated that Tacitus' arrangement, while annalistic, is different from that of Livy. This is by no means minor, for it shows that the assumption of certain formal features does not necessarily carry with it the accompanying assumptions of content or purpose. As Ginsburg has shown, Tacitus' deployment of material within the year serves his thematic purposes, and from the abundance of material at his disposal he selects those events that repeat, emphasize, and foreground a select few interests and concerns. She has also shown how the annalistic form, contrary to the usual interpretation that it hinders and constricts, is actually used by the historian

[111] Conte (1994) 125.
[112] That it is a choice, see Ginsburg (1981) 96, 103 n. 11.
[113] McDonald (1957) 156.
[114] Rich (1997) Section 4. Livy's predecessor Claudius Quadrigarius seems to have employed a flexible annalistic scheme and occasionally kept together material from different years: Timpe (1979) 102; cf. Rich (1997) at nn. 54–5.
[115] Rich (1997).

for the structural repetition of themes, and that by chronological displacement within the year, a variety of effects can be achieved.[116] Moreover, Tacitus' assumption of the annalistic form seems to have been done not to indicate a similarity with Livy's history but rather as a foil to the content and themes of the work, so as to emphasize the utter lack of liberty and republican traditions for which an annalistic structure had served in the past.[117]

We turn finally to some 'problematic' works, in the belief that the dynamic view of genre may help in their explanation. Xenophon's *Anabasis* has been deemed history, memoir, autobiography, or even its own specific genre.[118] Yet using our criteria from Section III above, we see that the *Anabasis* is a narrative history of recent events, focalized around an individual group, which tells of the dangers, survival, and return against enormous odds and powerful foes. Here adopting the 'story' format eschewed in the *Hellenica*, Xenophon writes a contemporary account with a unity of plot, imposing a beginning and end on a set of events. Described in this way, an obvious precedent is the *Odyssey*, and some formal and verbal links make this clear.[119] So far as we can tell, there had been nothing like the *Anabasis* before, and Xenophon has fashioned from disparate but yet traditional elements a new form that was to have many imitators. The reason that the work has appeared formally problematic is that scholars have artificially limited their inquiry of possible models to previous narrative prose histories, even though few existed in Xenophon's time, and there was no obligation on him to consider only those models. Unaware that he ought only to have followed Herodotus or Thucydides, he was open to many influences, not least among them Homer.

Roman writers present some especially interesting works, and this may not be coincidental given Roman (especially Augustan) writers' obsession with and experimentation in genre.[120] So too Roman historians seem to have tried new and previously unseen works. Caesar,

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[116] Ginsburg (1981) 23–9, 80–96; the new *SC de Pisone patre* confirms that Tacitus practiced chronological displacement: see Woodman and Martin (1996) 67–77.

[117] Ginsburg (1981) 100.

[118] Cf. Breitenbach (1950) 43: 'in der Anabasis, durch die Xenophon am besten beweist, daß er, indem er sich nicht an die historiographische Regeln hält, dieses Werk als einer besonderen Gattung angehörend betrachtet, u.s.w.'

[119] Lossau (1990).

[120] This is a much treated subject; to the works cited in Conte (1994) 174 n. 1 and 176 n. 19, add Hinds (1987) and (1997).

for example, presented his *Gallic Wars* as *commentarii*, a genre that had been much favored by the Romans, particularly the *commentarius* on one's life (*de uita sua*) or magistracy (*de rebus gestis, de consulatu suo*). These works supposedly were unadorned accounts meant to be used as raw material for historians, yet a closer look reveals even here a great variety of treatments, aims, and approaches.[121] Even so, Caesar's *Gallic Wars* do not seem to follow a previous pattern. They are not about Caesar's upbringing, nor an account of his public career. They are not written in the first person as all previous Roman *commentarii* seem to have been,[122] nor are they focalized around the individual. Rather, they concentrate on a group, the Roman soldiers, and their leader. The closest model is Xenophon's *Anabasis*, which is similarly a self-contained narrative of a series of campaigns.[123] Caesar clearly wished to challenge audience expectations, and as the narrative progresses, it exploits a variety of scenes and conventions more often associated with full-scale history.[124] The generic expectations fostered by the term *commentarii* are increasingly frustrated by the work's multi-focalized narrative, for it is this, not less than the increasing adornment of the narrative, that probably also defied convention.

Velleius Paterculus' history is a work often relegated to the problem drawer. The loss of the beginning has robbed us of the author's view and presentation of his work and has made the judgment of scale difficult. Both its brevity (two books) and its scope (universal history) place it amongst several other shorter works of the late Republic and early Empire. But the work's scale increases significantly as the author approaches his own time: the narrative of Caesar's exploits comprises 10 Teubner pages, those of Augustus 18, and those of Tiberius 22 pages. In his treatment of the campaigns of Tiberius in the north in CE 4–12, in which Velleius himself was a participant, the author is writing contemporary history. The form, taken as a whole, is like no other, combining both Roman and non-Roman history.[125] It is precisely in the tension between the summary

[121] See Momigliano (1971) 93–5; Bates (1983).
[122] The evidence is not overwhelming but it is consistent: Marincola (1997) 196.
[123] Fornara (1983) 181–2.
[124] Eden (1962); Rüpke (1992).
[125] Starr (1985) is a thorough attempt to find precedents, but concludes that there is no single one; the work was designed for a new sort of reader (173–4), and in this way approaches Conte's notion of a work filling an 'empty slot' (above, n. 71);

form and the more expansive contemporary history that Velleius confounds expectations. The reader who followed a brisk pace on a narrow path suddenly stops to behold a wide vista on a spacious plain. Yet the Tiberian narrative is not a preposterous head stuck on a slender body, because the scale has been increasing since Caesar's exploits; the narrative of Tiberius' deeds simply continues that direction. Because these last are the climax of the work, the deeds of previous empires and dynasts (not just Romans), as well as earlier Roman history, must now be read against those of Tiberius and his men, as the work suggests the spectacular conquests of the Romans of places and nations heretofore unknown. In true Roman fashion, Tiberius' deeds are presented not as a break with the past, but rather as its culmination; and by metonymy, the achievements of the Roman people represent the pinnacle of the world history that has been summarized to this point.

We conclude with one of the most problematic works in Roman literature, Tacitus' *Agricola*. The work is usually classified a biography (not a history proper), yet what are seen as disparate elements—the praise of Agricola, an ethnographical section on Britain, detailed battle narratives, and multiple focalizations culminating in a full-dress speech for the British leader Calgacus—have led some to consider it panegyric, history, funeral oration, or something else.[126] One of the most striking things about the work is its strong interplay between individual and community, between public and private, already foreshadowed by its opening juxtaposition of *facta moresque*, 'deeds and character.'[127]

In both the preface and the postscript, Tacitus portrays not Agricola, but the senatorial community subjected to a despot: in the preface he recalls the communal result of the loss of freedom, while at the conclusion the mention of Agricola's death moves gradually into a portrait of the Senate at that time, stripped of its dignity, and unable or unwilling to stop the systematic extermination of their order by Domitian. Not least surprising here is the inclusion of the names of a whole host of distinguished men who perished in those days.[128]

Woodman (1975) 282–7 designates the work a 'summary universal history,' which is valid as a general description, but does not capture the peculiar structure of Velleius' history.

[126] On these designations see Ogilvie and Richmond (1967) 11–20.

[127] *Agr.* 1.1, modeled on the opening of Cato's *Origines* (fr. 2 Peter = I. 2 Chassignet).

[128] Tac. *Agr.* 1.1–3.3; 44.5–45.2; seven men are named at 45.1.

The life of Agricola is thus framed by the public arena of the Senate and the author's meditations on memory and freedom. In the narrative itself, aspects of Agricola's upbringing and personal life are interspersed with the larger world of Rome and Britain which will be the arena where his qualities will shine. Tacitus does not lose sight of either aspect,[129] as he moves rapidly to Britain, the apex of Agricola's career and the climax of the work. Britain's history and its people and customs are then sketched in a fullness that would seem at odds with the previous brevity and more than is needed for a biography (10–13.1). The campaigns of previous governors are narrated and analyzed (13.2–17.2) until finally Agricola arrives as commander for his six-year campaign (18.1). Each year is given individual treatment and the narrative builds (as in Caesar's *Gallic Wars*) to the final year and the great conflict with Calgacus.[130] After Britain the narrative moves to Agricola's recall and his inactivity under the suspicious and jealous Domitian. Though a triumph is declared, there is little celebration and Agricola returns to private life. His personal excellence is prohibited from further contributing to the commonwealth by the dominant autocracy (40–2).

Now we cannot here, as with Velleius, speak of the narrow path of biography opening out into a wide vista of history during Agricola's time in Britain, because Tacitus has kept the relationship between the individual and the polity constantly in focus. And it would only be partially true to talk here of a *Kreuzung der Gattungen* as 'history' and 'biography' intersect in the narrative of the British campaign.[131] Rather, we might here employ a type of explication used by Conte for Vergil's tenth *Eclogue*: whereas earlier scholars saw that work as a fusion of elegy and bucolic, Conte argues that 'bucolic does not renounce its own literary individuality by becoming contaminated in some way with elegy' but rather '[u]pon the limited terrain of a shared space, elegy and bucolic take on life and confront each other.' The eclogue is thus 'the exploration of the limits of one poetic genre (the bucolic) at the moment in which its specific and distinctive

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[129] The interplay between public and private is shown by the remark (7) that the death of Agricola's mother was caused by Otho's soldiers in the civil war, and that immediately after it Agricola took the side of Vespasian.

[130] *Agr.* 18.1–24.3 treats years one through five: note the assessments of character at 20.1, 21.1, 22.4. Year six begins at 25.1 and concludes at 38.4, approximately one-third of the work (ten OCT pages out of 32).

[131] On this idea, see Kroll (1924) 202–24 with the remarks of Conte (1994) 120.

features are defined, by a dialectical comparison, as bordering upon those of another genre.'[132]

Similarly in the *Agricola*, although biography and history are present, the two genres are not amalgamated, nor does the work ever abandon its biographical form—even the annual campaigns are mined for what they reveal about Agricola's character. But biography and history do confront each other in the work, in the conflict engendered by autocratic government and the matrix of relationships that developed from it. The real task for Agricola, and for Tacitus and every other noble, under the imperial system was how to make their mark on Roman affairs—how, precisely, their individual talents (biography) could, as it were, force their way into *res gestae* (history) when, almost by definition, *res gestae* were the prerogative of the emperor alone.[133] In the *Agricola*, as in the tenth *Eclogue*, two genres that border on each other play out their conflict 'upon the limited terrain of a shared space.' It is exactly this conflict and the effort involved in negotiating it that Tacitus sums up near the conclusion of the work (42.4): 'that men can be great even under bad emperors, and that submission and moderation, if industry and energy are also present, can attain to the same height of honor as those who have won fame through perilous courses and by a death ostentatious but of no use to the state.' Tacitus' work thus presents itself as an enactment inserting Agricola into the realm of history, just as the generic form of his work dramatizes the conflict between history and biography.

V

From these few brief examples, I hope to have shown that the historiographical genres of the Greeks and Romans were not static categories in which one writer merely followed all or most of the aspects of his predecessors, but rather that they were constantly dependent upon change and innovation and that they functioned, in Conte's words, as 'strategies of literary composition' which may have provided a framework for the historian's representation of the world,

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[132] Conte (1994) 121.

[133] Significantly, this was not a concern for the Greek imperial historians: see Toher (1990).

but in no way prescribed for him how things had to be done. Moreover, I hope that I have demonstrated that certain often-invoked categories are problematic and may obscure more than they illuminate. Further study of the categories that both ancients and moderns attach to the historical literature of the Greeks and Romans, as well as of its vast variety and multiform nature, is necessary before we can come to a clearer and more precise understanding of the ways in which the ancients approached the writing of history. Categorization can play some limited role in doing this, but it must not be permitted to serve as a substitute for analysis of individual works. Rather, our approach, like that of the ancients, must remain fluid and adaptable. In our attempts, Jacoby's collection will be both ally and antagonist. His 'generic' arrangement, however rigid it at times becomes, does allow us to examine the development of certain types of historiography over time, as he had intended. On the other hand, no scholar ever inscribed his own views so permanently onto a collection of fragments, and we will need both to overcome the spatial displacement brought about by the collection[134] and to keep a watchful eye that the works collected together do in fact belong with one another. Only by a process of comparison and an attempt to find the fluid border between convention and innovation will we come closer to an understanding of genre and the individual work that both comprehends and challenges it.

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[134] Fowler (1996) 68 points out that everyone after Volume I in Jacoby's collection is 'conceptually post-Herodotean.' One notes as well that Xanthus and Dionysius of Miletus come physically very late in the collection, though both are contemporaries of Herodotus.

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EPILOGUE*

Christopher Pelling

I. *Genre and Meaning*

Once upon a time, the *Starship Enterprise* boldly came upon a strange new vessel, manned by a people called Tamarians. The universal translator proved useless. The Tamarians responded to overtures by using single phrases, centered on proper names: 'Darmok and Jelad at Tenagra,' 'Shaka, when the walls fell,' 'Sokath, his eyes uncovered,' 'Temba, his arms wide.' Gradually, enlightenment steals over the *Enterprise*'s Captain Picard. The Tamarians 'communicate through narrative imagery': these are shorthand references to stories from their mythology, providing examples for the current predicament. Darmok was a mythical hunter who had joined with Jelad to fight a dangerous animal, and the union had harmonized their peoples: now Picard should join with the Tamarian leader Dathon to fight a new threatening beast. Now that incomprehension (on the model of Shaka) has given way to enlightenment (Sokath), Picard accepts the welcome (Temba), signaling acceptance by telling an Earth-born story of his own, 'Gilgamesh and Enkidu at Uruk.' But all goes wrong. Dathon dies, and the starship's destruction is imminent—until Picard uses his new narrative skills to persuade the Tamarians that his intentions had been good. A new story-example has been created: 'Picard and Dathon at Eladril,' muses a Tamarian. The episode ends with Picard thoughtfully studying his text of the Homeric Hymns.[1]

Stories are potent things: but, as the starship found, they are not simple to interpret, and can be incomprehensible to an audience without the right expectations. When stories are told in full (and not merely alluded to, Tamarian fashion), those expectations will cover

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* My thanks are due to the editor not merely for sharing a taste for *Star Trek* but for inviting me to contribute to this volume, for letting me loose on her contributors, and for frequent helpful discussion.

[1] 'Darmok': *Star Trek: The Next Generation* episode 102 (Fifth Season no. 2), first screened 1991.

shape and manner and register and length, and probably truth or falsity—or at least the level of truth which the author intended.[2] But, as the *Enterprise* example suggests, there also needs to be some understanding, even if provisional, of what a story is *for*. Stories typically (probably indeed universally) fit into a 'discursive exchange': they communicate, and respond to earlier communications. That is true of stories told over the dinner table or in the café; it was true of the stories summoned up by the Tamarians, both as they discussed among themselves how to respond to the overtures and as they tried to communicate with the outsiders; and in a more elaborate way it is true of the narratives of written historiography. Previous narratives have prepared readers and conditioned their expectations; even if those expectations go on to be revised, re-nuanced, even eventually frustrated, they provide the indispensable foothold to allow interpretation to begin. Our *Enterprise* example allows a further suggestion as well, the way in which a new production not only builds on previous generic expectations but also helps to revise those expectations for future productions. At the end of the episode 'Picard and Dathon at Eladril' has become an example in its own right, a point of reference for future Tamarians—not to mention the odd classical scholar.

The simplest sort of 'discursive exchange' comes when one text continues another, picking up where the first left off. Thus within the Greco-Roman tradition (and as a classicist I shall have to draw examples mainly from that tradition) various authors set out to continue Thucydides—Xenophon in *Hellenica*, Theopompus, *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, Cratippus; later Phylarchus continued Duris of Samos; the phenomenon is as early as Thucydides himself, picking up the narrative of the 'Pentecontaetia' at the point where Herodotus finished (at Sestos, 1.89). Continuation was even more frequent on the Roman side, with various writers establishing their place in a serial canon of Roman history—Sempronius Asellio (probably) continuing Polybius, Sisenna continuing Asellio, and Sallust's *Histories* continuing Sisenna; later Aufidius Bassus continued Livy, the elder Pliny began 'from

[2] Cf. Bolin 122 on the importance of authorial intent to generic designation: a work does not change genre if it is subsequently demonstrated to be less accurate than the author wished. But perhaps we should speak here not of authorial intent *tout court*, but of the reader's inference of that intent. What of a writer who sets out to write a spoof romantic novel and produces something which is indistinguishable from, and is read by the public as, the real thing? Generically, that writer has surely written a romantic novel.

the point where Aufidius Bassus left off' (not the raciest of titles), and eventually Ammianus continued Tacitus.[3] In such cases the reader's expectation would naturally be conditioned by the text which is being continued: in some cases, as with Xenophon's opening μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ('After these things'), the continuing text is incomprehensible without knowledge of the predecessor, in that case of the closing events of Thucydides.[4] One is reminded of spouses finishing one another's conversational sentences. But, again as with spouses, there is often an element of more or less tactful correction and redefinition, as well as an implication of bond and alliance: the continuation seldom goes on in quite the same way, and the audience's original assumptions are redefined. A serial history is typically a contribution to a continuing exchange and debate about how history should be written.

This redefinition can go in different directions. Thucydides begins by suggesting a substantial gap between his own style and that of Herodotus: some of his hits at previous writers (1.20–1) seem clearly aimed at Herodotus in particular,[5] and the parading of his own theme (1.23) as bigger, better, and bloodier than the Persian Wars targets Herodotus' subject just as the preceding chapters had targeted his text. Yet by the end of Book 1 we have had certain sections in more Herodotean style, not merely the Pausanias-Themistocles digression but also the early chapters of the 'Pentecontaetia' itself; and, as Rood (Ch. 7) argues, the later books of the history establish a connection with the great predecessor which is far more nuanced and constructive. On the other hand, Marincola (310–11) brings out that Xenophon's *Hellenica* ultimately proves a very different work from Thucydides, despite the initial explicit debt.[6] It becomes a collection of 'Greek affairs' rather than, as is so crucial for Thucydides, a work unified by a single war. Xenophon's narrative ends not with a resolution of such a dominant theme, but rather by a collapse into disorder: after the battle of Mantinea 'there was even more indeterminacy and confusion in Greece than before. Let that be the conclusion of my work; the things which happened afterwards (τὰ δὲ

[3] See the tables in Marincola (1997) 289–93 and his discussion at 237–57; Clarke, above, 259; Fornara (1983) 33, 45.

[4] Cf. Marincola 310 and n. 96.

[5] See Hornblower (1991) 57–8 on 1.20.3.

[6] And even the continuation itself is not wholly smooth, for there is a slight gap: cf. Hornblower (1994) 29 and (1995) 50 ('a mild distancing device').

μετὰ ταῦτα) will perhaps be the concern of someone else' (7.5.27). The echo of that opening 'after these things' (μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα) is expressive, as Xenophon looks forward to his own continuator; but it also brings out how far this narrative has come from Thucydides, with the theme now demarcated not by a 'single war' but simply by the end of a period where any order can be seen and a story can be told. That hypothetical later continuator, Xenophon may imply, will have the advantages of retrospect and might be able to tell the story of the sequel; but as yet it is too bewildering.

'It was typical,' then, 'for the whole of Greek historiography that each successor put himself into immediate contrast with his predecessor';[7] it is evident that any genre of historiography will be a shifting and cumulative thing, with the audience's expectations developing as the store of past works grew greater. As Alastair Fowler puts it, genre is 'much less of a pigeon-hole than a pigeon,'[8] not so much a set of pre-cast categories as something which itself continually moves and changes. In Greek and Roman historiography these developments sometimes simply created new norms; more often, as we shall see, they furnished a wider range of affiliations from which a new writer could select. For 'history' was always an extremely broad and capacious category, so broad indeed that it is a question how far should we think of a 'genre' of historiography at all. In his discussion of Mesopotamian material, Michalowski reasonably asks (73), 'How are we to evaluate texts in a culture in which there are no explicit rules, no explicit prescriptions, and no explicit literary debates?' Even within Greco-Roman historiography we may wonder how clear any rules, prescriptions, and expectations really were.

True, it may well be impossible to conceive communication without any generic expectations at all:[9] there must be some 'horizon of expectation' in the audience, even for the simplest material. If one has no prior understanding whether a note ('two pints today') is a milk-order, an invitation to the pub, or a coded love-letter, one will find oneself in difficulties, particularly if one is a milkman. But, when we move to literary rather than sub-literary texts, theorists have

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[7] Jacoby (1949) 381 n. 6.

[8] Fowler (1991) 34.

[9] Thus e.g., Conte (1986) 91, 'A work that had only original elements would be doomed to incomprehensibility'; Conte (1994) 154; Fowler (1991) 20–4; Burridge (1992) 12, 47, 53.

become increasingly wary of finding firm 'rules' which decisively mark out one genre from another. It may be tempting to assume that 'every genre can be thought of as having a set of primary or logically necessary elements which in combination distinguish that genre from every other genre,' in the words of Cairns (admittedly using 'genre' in a rather specialized sense);[10] but even for tragedy it is hard to define such 'primary or logically necessary elements,'[11] and for prose texts it is more difficult still.

It is better to think of a cluster of 'on-the-whole' expectations, what Dubrow calls a 'What if/then probably' rather than an 'if/then' approach: 'What if the genre of this work is the *Bildungsroman*? Then probably the hero will test out a series of alternative father figures, though of course this may just be one of the few *Bildungsromane* where that pattern does not operate.'[12] Thus, in an interesting analysis of the gospels and their relation to Greco-Roman literature, Burridge catalogued a number of expectations, none of which is a *sine qua non*. Some are 'external' such as length, scale, meter (or lack of it), some formal such as title or opening-words, some internal such as 'style, tone, mode, attitude, values and quality of the characterization,' some relate to occasion, intention, and purpose, some to subject-matter.[13] This proves a helpful tool for Burridge to argue (convincingly) that the gospels are as similar to Greco-Roman biographies as Greco-Roman biographies are to one another.[14] It also suggests how a reader's expectations can only be provisional: even after identifying

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[10] Cairns (1972) 6. Cairns meant by 'genre' something which might more usually be classified as 'sub-genres' or '(sub-)species,' poem or speech-types such as the *propemptikon* or *komos*: but even on his own terms the claim is vulnerable.

[11] Fowler (1991) 37–44, in criticism of Cairns.

[12] Dubrow (1982) 106–7. She interestingly suggests (7, 117) that psychological rather than the more usual physiological metaphors might be more appropriate for genres: a given personality type has a predilection to certain patterns, but there may still be very different ways in which (say) aggression can manifest itself.

[13] Burridge (1992); p. 111 conveniently lists his categories.

[14] Burridge (1992) 258. Edwards (1997) 228–34 objects that it is misleading to think of biography as a 'genre' at all, and we do better to explore 'the biographical' in different texts. The differences between his view and Burridge's are partly semantic, as Burridge too is concerned to emphasize that the links between biographical texts are loose and varied, and the distinctions between biography and its *genera proxima* (as he but not Edwards would put it) are blurred. My own view is that encomium and biography form a sufficiently identifiable tradition, even if insecurely demarcated, to influence audience expectations of any new 'life' they read; in that case, 'genre' is a useful shorthand.

a work's genre and predecessors and affinities, one is still uncertain which features are going to be important and which muted or absent.

Nor are generic expectations, even 'on-the-whole' ones, always similarly constituted or equally firm. Thus Geiger, discussing ancient biography, argued that generic rules were important for ancient poetry but much less so for prose.[15] Wider doubts too have been felt about Greco-Roman genres. Rosenmeyer suggested that *aemulatio* of particular models was always more important than genres: 'Instead of genre criticism, the ancients practiced model criticism.'[16] Conte reasonably responded by pointing out that any selection of a model involves a measure of generalization, picking out those features which can provide a matrix for one's own writing, and that this itself then constitutes a sort of genre.[17] It remains a question whether authors primarily copy models and generalize in this way from a particular 'father-figure' (as Rosenmeyer puts it), or follow wider 'genres' with such generalizations already inscribed: particularly in historiography, we need not answer that question in the same way for all authors and all periods.

By the Roman period the word *historia* would summon up a cluster of expectations in itself, without needing always to be narrowed down to particular writers:[18] Cicero could say in *De Oratore* 2 that *historia* was a branch of learning not yet equipped with rhetorical precepts, then do something to formalize those expectations himself (2.60–4); Quintilian and Pliny could similarly generalize about the nature of *historia*—close to the poets (Quint. 10.1.31), committed to truth (Plin. *Ep.* 7.33.10, 9.19.5), and so on; Menander Rhetor could talk generally about 'the historians' (οἱ συγγραφεῖς, Men. *Epid.* 2.373. 28–9).[19] When Seneca in *Apocolocyntosis* and Lucian in *True History* burlesque historical mannerisms, it is hard to think that they had particular models in mind rather than a genre as a whole. But it had not always been so easy to capture a bundle of expectations with

[15] Geiger (1985) 12–13.
[16] Rosenmeyer (1985) 81.
[17] Conte (1994) 173–4.
[18] *OLD* s.v. *historia* 2b, *TLL* s.v. *historia* 2835.65–2836.21.
[19] So also e.g. Dion. Hal. *Thuc.* 52, *Lys.* 3; cf. Russell (1964) on 'Longinus' 1.3. *Pace* LSJ, συγγραφεύς at Xen. *Hell.* 7.2.1 need not denote particularly 'historian' ('all συγγραφεῖς mention great cities when they have done something noble, but I will also . . .') rather than more generally '(prose) writer.'

a single word. As far as we can tell, Aristotle was the first to use ἱστορία and ἱστορικός to mean 'history' or 'historian' (*Poetics* 1450a36–51b11, 1459a21–4),[20] and those passages do not suggest any elaborate or sophisticated view of history as a genre in its own right rather than as a foil for poetry[21]—even though the author of the *Politics* was evidently well read in historical texts, and the author of the *Poetics* and the *Rhetoric* was very interested in genre. Any contemporary reader picking up Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, or even Polybius would have had much less firm expectations of the text, and with these writers we should follow Rosenmeyer's hint and talk of particular models rather than a 'genre' as a whole—just as with the eastern material Li explores the relationship of Sima Qian to the *Zuozhuan* and other texts, and Michalowski that of the first millennium *Gilgamesh* version to the 'Cuthean Legend of Naram-Sin' and to the parody of Bel-eṭir (Chs. 2, 4).

Often, too, the reader has to work hard to identify the nature of that relation to a model; 'genre' can be largely internally generated, with prior texts providing a series of possibilities, but the nature of the production only emerges as the reader proceeds—a 'principle of dynamic production,' as Todorov puts it.[22] That is clear enough with later texts, works like the *Historia Augusta* or Lucian's *True History* or Philostratus' *Life of Apollonius*; it would have already been true of Ctesias; and it must also be true of Xenophon, the most inventive and in many ways the most influential generic innovator. What sort of work is his *Cyropaedia*, with its fascinating exploitation of other genres[23] and its quizzical relationship to historical truth? What is his *Memorabilia*? Or even his *Anabasis*? In each case we have to work it out as we go along, and so surely did the original audience, feeding in whatever experience they could—independent knowledge, familiarity with previous texts, response to particular styles and registers.

Little though we know of Herodotus' predecessors, we can see that he too challenges his readers to define and redefine the nature of his text, in particular its relationship to its models. In his first five chapters he is probably doing something interesting with Hecataeus.

20 Hornblower (1987) 9–11.
21 See below, 348–9.
22 Todorov (1990) 20.
23 Gera (1993).

He ends this introduction by talking of his 'journeys among the cities of men, both great and small,' which aligns him with Hecataeus, his predecessor as traveler and geographer (as well as with his even greater predecessor Odysseus—more on this in a moment); but he immediately makes clear that the value of those travels has been to give him a *temporal* and *ethical* insight, 'for those which were once great have mostly become small, and the ones which were great in my own time had previously been small. Knowing therefore human prosperity always to be fleeting, I shall mention both equally' (1.5.4). This emphasis links Herodotus less with a cataloguer of places and curiosities for their own sake than with his sage Solon, whose 'philosophy' was so closely linked with that contemplation (θεωρίη) which had come with his travels (1.29.1, 30.1, 30.2).[24] Herodotus is probably signaling that he has gone beyond, and deeper than, Hecataeus.[25] But 'probably' is all we can say; Hecataeus too may well have been a good deal more than a cataloguer, and Herodotus' signaling may be one of respectful indebtedness as much as of rivalry.

We are on firmer grounds with his relation to an even more important model, Homer. As Moles and Marincola have recently stressed,[26] the end of this introduction aligns Herodotus with Odysseus, who so famously 'saw the cities of many men and came to know their minds' (*Od.* 1.3); the beginning had already heralded Herodotus' purpose in terms of the glory-driven world of the *Iliad* and Achilles, 'lest the things that originate from humans should become wiped out by time, and lest great and wonderful deeds, some displayed by Greeks and some by barbarians, should become lacking in fame

[24] For this parallel cf. e.g., Bischoff (1932) 39; Hellmann (1934), 38, 43–5; Drexler (1972), 25–8; Redfield (1985) 102; Moles (1996). Stahl (1975) 5, 7 goes so far as to describe Solon (misleadingly) as Herodotus' 'spokesman.'

[25] Some have also thought that the 'Persian version' of 1.1–4 was itself that given by Hecataeus (esp. Diels [1887]; Jacoby [1912]; Krischer [1965] 166–7; Drews [1973] 89); but nothing suggests that Hecataeus told these particular stories (von Fritz [1967] *Anm.* 117–21). It may however be that the determined rationalism of those chapters would be felt to be in Hecataeus' *manner*. In that case the brutal dismissiveness of 1.5.3 is a further distancing from Hecataeus: Herodotus has just shown he can outdo Hecataeus in his own manner, but chooses not to. If so, Herodotus' distancing from Hecataeus is again only provisional, just as we shall see with his treatment of Homer: Herodotus will not exclude the mythical so totally from the future text. Thucydides similarly outdoes Herodotus on his own ground in the 'Archaeology,' then moves on, and there too we have seen that the distancing is only provisional (above, 327).

[26] Moles (1993) 92–8; Marincola (1997a).

[ἀκλεᾶ] . . .' Even without the further assimilation of Herodotus' own 'display' (ἀπόδεξις in his first line) to the deeds 'displayed' (ἀποδεχθέντα) by his subjects, this is a proud beginning: it is to be a prose Homer. But soon the distancing from Homer begins. True, the proem includes material on the Trojan War, the obvious literary starting-point for antagonism between East and West: but only in a sequence of reciprocal abductions, and all in a long, two-and-a-half page passage of indirect speech, what 'the word-experts among the Persians say'—an astoundingly unengaged way to begin a text which will contain so many dramatic and absorbing narratives. Herodotus immediately goes on to cast the whole story into doubt by citing variants; he does not reject his earlier material completely,[27] but strikes his independent note by saying that he is not 'going to'[28] assert or deny the truth of such material, he will go on to the first person he *knows* began unjust acts towards the Greeks. And so, with a gigantic and probably unconventional[29] exclusion of more mythical material, he leaps down to the comparatively recent past and the story of Croesus.

We seem to have left the world of Homer far behind; we seem to have a programmatic distinction between (as the scholars put it)[30] *spatium mythicum* and *spatium historicum*. Or have we? As we read on, the giant leap forward to the recent past is abandoned: we see it was only provisional, and that to understand Croesus we first have to go

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[27] As often with the citation of variants, what is common ground in alternative versions is more expressive than what is disputed, and is given extra authority because of the parade of learning and scepticism. Here the 'Phoenicians' differ on the circumstances of Io's abduction, but agree on the fact, and also agree on demythologizing it (1.5.2).

[28] οὐκ ἔρχομαι ἐρέων: the 'going to' phrase is less natural in Greek than in English, and prepares for the 'journey' language later in the same sentence: he will 'go forward' (προβήσομαι) in his writing, 'going through' (ἐπεξιών) great and small cities alike (5.3), now in the text as earlier in his journeys (5.4). The interconnection of travel and text returns us to the tradition of Hecataeus—but, as we saw, probably with a difference.

[29] Hecataeus and the later Atthidographers (Harding [1994] 3–6) certainly included both the 'mythical' and the 'historical.' So indeed does Herodotus himself in his treatment of Egypt, where he claims independent and more reliable source-material: notice especially the treatment of Helen (2.112–20).

[30] E.g. Shimron (1975); Erbse (1979) 83; Fornara (1983) 7, all of them misleading. Knowledge begins at different points depending on the type of item (thus the first securely attested dedications, those of Gyges, come five generations before the first attested 'unjust deeds' of Croesus) or the type of source-material (thus the Egyptian *spatium historicum* goes much earlier than its Greek or Persian equivalent). Cf. von Leyden (1949/50). Humphreys (1997) 218 n. 46 is healthily sceptical about any firm distinction in the historians between 'myth' and 'history.'

back five further generations and understand Gyges. And the Gyges story itself sounds familiar. Once again as in the *Iliad* things start with a woman, this time Candaules' wife; or rather, with a man who is consumed with a woman's beauty and led by this to an arrogant assertion of his will. Once again, great and lasting consequences spring from this domestic start, and the bedroom leads to the battlefield and the blood of vengeance. Nor will Homer be far away in the narrative which follows and sets so much of the work's tone, the encounter of Solon and Croesus.[31]

What, too, of the gods? The initial programme had suggested a very human level of treatment: these will be τὰ γενόμενα ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, 'things originating from humans,'[32] some displayed by Greeks and some by barbarians—and no mention of any performed by the gods. The first four chapters, in that long passage of indirect speech, are similarly ostentatious in their demythologizing and rationalization. There are stories of Io, of Europa, of Medea, of Helen—but no divinely sent gadfly, no metamorphosis into a cow, no Zeus appearing as a bull, no judgment of goddesses, no golden fleece, no chariot of the sun; and the appended variant version of the 'Phoenicians' simply substitutes one highly human and disreputable version of Io's abduction for another.[33] This is not, it seems, to be the world of Homer, where gods exercise such influence over events. But again the programmatic assumption proves misleading. Within two pages the supernatural intervenes: enigmatically, 'it was necessary for things to turn out badly for Candaules' (1.8.2). Two pages more, and we have an appeal to Apollo and the introduction of divine vengeance: 'the Heracleidae will gain vengeance against Gyges' descendants in the fifth generation' (1.13.2). The gods and the supernatural *cannot* be left out, try though author or reader will; and the inevitability of a divine dimension is the clearer for the original attempt to avoid it.

So the reader, inevitably trying to define what sort of text this is, finds false leads and distractions: there are initial intimations, but redefinition is swiftly needed, and one element in this textual to-

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[31] Moles (1996) 265–6; cf. Marincola (1997a), text to n. 91.

[32] Not just 'the things done by men,' as it is often translated (or 'the traces of human events,' Waterfield: better 'human achievements,' de Sélincourt): the phrase, like the following ἔργα ... ἀποδεχθέντα, 'achievements ... displayed,' extends to physical ἔργα, monuments constructed by humans, as well as their 'deeds.'

[33] Above, n. 27.

and-fro is the shifting relationship to Homer. It is clear, too, that this is not just a casual game with the reader, not a playing with discourse for discourse's sake or to strike an original clever pose.[34] This is about meaning, how one can make sense of events. The text's dynamic draws the reader along: we may believe we can tell a thoroughly recent story without the distant past, or can explain wars without women, or can leave the gods out; but if for an instant we do think that way we are swiftly drawn to think differently. And in its way that is programmatic too, intimating that in this text historical explanation will be a very provisional, elusive, and challenging business.

II. *Readers and interpretation*

Such a reading of Herodotus echoes a theme of several papers in this collection, the role of the reader in generating meaning by continually putting questions to the narrative, continually redefining what sort of story it is. In this case, the 'sort of story' can best be identified by toying with its affinities to individual texts, Hecataeus and Homer; but even later, once the on-the-whole expectations of 'history' have become firmer and we can talk in terms of 'genre' as well as particular models, the same sort of progressive identification of genre and generic affinities can be important.

It may be a question of which 'on-the-whole' generic expectations are going to be met and which denied. By the second century CE the competent reader of Roman historiography knows that 'annalistic' arrangement is regular, with each year's events separated off and introduced by the consuls' names—though that reader will also have become accustomed to a certain flexibility, as we can see in Livy's varied practice.[35] In Tacitus' *Annals* that reader will find more tension, as imperial themes prove more recalcitrant to shaping within

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[34] As the language of even the best discourse analysts and genre theorists sometimes risks suggesting. Compare Conte (1994) 42: 'The elegiac poet's constitutional suffering, in short, is the response of a consciousness that discovers the cost of not yielding to a codified fusion of signifiers and signifieds or to the difficulties encountered by anyone unwilling to give up the whole preexisting semantic universe when he generates new discourses in the culture's language.' So this is love? A many-splendored thing, indeed.

[35] Rich (1997).

those yearly rhythms of the Republic.[36] By the end of the work that annalistic system is increasingly breaking down, and events over several years can be grouped together. That too reflects the subject: emperors' reigns, not consuls' magistracies, now dominate reality. The early years of Tiberius maintain a strained façade of republican practice, yet that only highlights how much has really changed. By the end of the *Annals* the world has come closer to acknowledging imperial realities, and the text does so too.

In that case the issue is simply which generic features will obtain, and how comfortably they will sit in the text. Elsewhere it is more a question of generic affinities, exploring how closely history presses on its boundaries with neighboring genres. Take Marincola's analysis, for instance, of Tacitus' *Agricola*, and the wavering of the narrative voice between biography and history (pp. 318–20). As he says, that confrontation of genres reflects a fundamental ethical issue of the work: what role remains for an individual under the principate, how much room is there to insert a private citizen's story within the overall pattern of an autocratic reign? A similar point could be made about Cassius Dio, and the way in which his history becomes more 'biographical' with the inception of the principate.[37] Will the personality of the emperor take over completely, as the strong characterizing introductions of each new emperor at the beginning of a reign may suggest? Or is there room for the historian to develop more overarching, trans-regnal themes? There is indeed, or so it can be argued,[38] and this emerges as the reigns go on; but the tension between the 'historical' and the 'biographical' is still felt, and the perpetual danger of history collapsing into biography is once again a point about the principate itself, not just about the way it is described. Even in Tacitus the same tension may be sensed. In some books there is a surprising amount of routine detail on figures other than the emperor himself. 'The reasons for Tacitus' procedure can be divined. Not merely the need for relief and variety but the constant effort to prevent the annals of imperial Rome from degenerating into a sequence of biographies.'[39] Not that in any of these cases the reader is ultimately uncertain about the generic designation of

[36] Ginsburg (1981).
[37] Questa (1957); Pelling (1997).
[38] Pelling (1997), where I develop the analysis which I here sketch.
[39] Syme (1974) 489–90.

the text, any more than we doubt whether *Eclogue* 10 remains pastoral or the *Aeneid* remains epic, for all the 'confrontation' with other genres;[40] the *Annals* and Dio remain history, the *Agricola* remains biography (or at least as much like other biographies as other biographies are like one another, to adapt Burridge's phrase),[41] the *Bellum Catilinae* remains a historical monograph even if Marincola is right to detect elements of satire (304). The identification of these as the *affinities*, that these rather than any other neighboring genres are the ones to confront, is still expressive, an important element in the way the text 'emplots' the story of the past.

'Emplots' is the word of Hayden White, whose analysis of nineteenth-century historiography has been so influential.[42] White's own four modes of emplotment, tragedy, comedy, satire, and romance, are geared particularly to the nineteenth century; he admits that there may be more,[43] and those particular four categories may not serve the ancient world well. Tempting though it is to classify (say) Livy as 'romance' (partly defined by White as 'a drama of the triumph of good over evil, of virtue over vice, of light over darkness . . .'[44]—not that Livy's lost later books would necessarily have supported that picture), or for that matter Sallust in terms of melodrama or Tacitus in those of savage farce,[45] there is naturally a methodological issue[46] involved in using generic labels unfamiliar to the author or original audience (cf. Bolin 123). Still, it is interesting that the 'tragic' has proved the most productive of White's modes in applying to Greco-Roman historiography; much less has been, and probably can be, said about the 'comic,' familiar though comedy would have been to historians and audiences. Parodies of historiography, such as Lucian's *True History* and Seneca's *Apocolocyntosis*, have much of the comic and the satirical, but form separate works, as in their different cultures do the Hittite 'Siege of Urshu' (Uchitel 61) and the Mesopotamian story of Bel-eṭir (Iba the Farter and all: Michalowski 84–5). When elements of the comic are found in Greco-Roman historiography—the travesty of a conspiracy in *Annals* 15

[40] Conte (1986) 142; (1994) 155.
[41] Burridge (1992) 258: above, 329.
[42] Esp. White (1973); (1978); (1987).
[43] White (1973) 7, specifying 'epic' in particular.
[44] White (1973) 9.
[45] Kraus (1994) 16 n. 65.
[46] Which is not to say that the approach is indefensible: cf. Todorov (1990) 17 and n. 9, generally cautious but justifying such anachronisms as a heuristic tool.

(with many dramatic suggestions),[47] Caesellius' dream at the beginning of the next book,[48] the revelers coming on Livy's Lucretia in a scene which is 'pure New Comedy,'[49] Plutarch's Antony playing the *miles gloriosus*,[50] even the off-key maladroitness or wit of a death-scene such as Cato's (Plut. *Cato minor* 70.8–10) or Petronius' (Tac. *Ann.* 16.18–20)—the settings are always too serious, usually indeed too deadly, for the comic intrusion to be anything but chilling. The flavor is less that of comedy itself, more of the comic elements which intrude into tragedy or epic: passages such as the dying Trojan who sinks head-first into the sand, legs in the air (Homer, *Il.* 5.585–9); or Patroclus' sardonic jest at Cebriones' death-tumble, 'so the Trojans have acrobats too' (*Il.* 16.745–50); or the burlesque parts of Euripides' *Helen*, where we never forget how many people have died. Historiography is simply too high and serious a tradition, and (like epic) too concerned with death and suffering, for the humorous to be anything other than an occasional and intrusive visitor.[51]

Sensitivity to 'emplotment' is therefore complex. In those cases the reader senses not merely the generic register to which historiography is playing 'host' but also that the registers do not easily mix, that the hospitality is strained. That too, of course, is a comment on the world described, not merely on the description itself: the world is awry when palaces and councils and great families become not merely deadly but comically so; just as it is awry when a dynast starts playing the besotted lover, like Livy's Antiochus or Josephus' Herod or (again) Plutarch's Antony or even his uxorious Pompey,[52] and history or biography is infected by the themes of elegy or the novel. Once again it is the reader's sensitivity to such mismatches which generates that interpretative effect.

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[47] See esp. Woodman (1993).

[48] *Ann.* 16.1–3: Pelling (1997a) 206.

[49] Livy 1.57–9: Ogilvie (1970) 219, 222.

[50] Esp. at *Ant.* 4: Pelling (1988) 35, 124–5, 182.

[51] Given that 'ordinary' people tend to be associated with a comic mode, this affords a further reason (beyond the obvious socio-political points) why Greco-Roman historiography so rarely generates an interest in the masses rather than the leading individuals, avoiding for instance the realities of life on campaign or the sufferings of bereaved or deprived common folk: contrast tragedy (Aesch. *Agam.* 427–55, 555–73) as well as comedy. Auerbach (1953) Ch. 2 has some brilliant remarks.

[52] Livy 36.11.1–4; Jos. *A. J.* 15.23–5, 66–87, 203–31; Plut. *Ant.* 10.5, 53, 58.4–59.1, 66.7, 84 (with Pelling [1988] *ad loc.*, but with a caution at 35 n. 109), *Pomp.* 55, 74–5.

That same sensitivity to mismatch and gradual remodulation of expectations can be important to particular episodes. Take, for instance, Livy's ambush, escape, and victory narrative discussed by Jaeger (7.34.1–37.3: above, 183–92). There are several thematic strands here which at first sight seem discordant. Many aspects of Decius' behavior reflect audience expectations of a good commander: above all, as Jaeger brings out, his insightful command of space, his thorough preparation, his instinct for opportunity, his inspiring leadership by example. Yet some of his tactics are less conventional. True, the good leader is always alert to the chance of stealing an advantage by stealth;[53] still, Decius' furtive night-time movements (7.34.15), his donning of an ordinary soldier's cloak (34.15 *sagulo gregali*), his plea for silence rather than shouts of support (35.2), and then his few-against-many coup, all again under the cover of darkness (35.9–36.2)—this is more redolent of an opportunist, usually foreign Black Hunter figure, full of derring-do,[54] than of a traditional Roman commander in the field. Compare the uneasy combination of skill and deceit which Kraus points in Jugurtha and Marius (pp. 224, 241); there it is indeed a foreigner, the Ligurian scout, who leads the furtive way at the Muluccha, and Marius' Romans follow (*BJ* 93–4).

Livy's Decius then puts his plan to the vote among his troops: 'those who approve, move silently to the right' (7.35.2, 12). That borrows a Roman custom, but an urban and civilian one, the taking of a vote in the Senate;[55] this exercise in military democracy is most strange, again suggesting a Black Hunter putting a cunning plan to his cronies rather than a commander giving orders. It works; and Decius celebrates with a 'triumph in the camp' (36.8 *castrensis triumphus*), again an unparalleled[56] mix of the urban and the military.

No wonder the Samnites are so disoriented by Decius' unexpected behavior (7.34.8–11, 36.2–4, 10–13); we find him disorienting too, hard to place in terms of Roman conventional expectations. The stylistic register reflects this, with poetic touches suggesting a world alien to the normal Roman battlefield.[57] Perhaps there is a particular model;

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[53] Wheeler (1988): cf. Kraus 224.
[54] Vidal-Naquet (1986) and (1986a).
[55] Jaeger 191; Oakley (1998) 341 on 7.35.2.
[56] Oakley (1998) 349 *ad loc.*
[57] Oakley (1998) 337 on *uadit* (7.34.7), 345–6 on several instances in 35.11–36.1, and 349 (hesitantly) on *interfante* (36.9). Cf. Kraus 224 (Sallust); Kraus (1997) 67–70

Oakley thinks of the Doloneia in *Iliad* 10, others have wondered whether Ennius described an episode in similar terms.[58] Perhaps there is simply a feeling of a man who does not fit readily into his expected setting, who blurs usual boundaries.

Yet the upshot is as Roman as can be. His night-time foray complete, Decius refuses to return to camp until daytime (7.36.5–6), where matters can once again become public and acclaimed; that is followed by a traditional open battle (7.36.10–13) where the Romans yet again rout an outmatched enemy, and the soldiers' enthusiastic cries, suppressed for Decius' night-time stealth (35.2), can at last be uttered and heard (37.3). This, then, really is the end, but there have been several earlier false closures: the Samnites may think the day's activities are over at 7.34.11, and so might we, for it looks at first as if the breakthrough has been a simple success; yet we soon discover that Decius' force is surrounded after all,[59] and more is needed. At 7.36.4 the sleepy Samnites have been slaughtered; by 7.36.8 the success is celebrated, and the congratulations and the consul's speech seem to be giving a closing cadence—but still there is more, and Decius (again most irregularly) interrupts his commanding officer to point out that this is the time for further decisive action. In terms of Jaeger's labyrinth, readers may think that every new turn will bring them to the exit, but every twist shows that the path winds on; the reader's surprise, and growing awareness that with a man like Decius every conclusion has to be provisional, mimics that of the participants.

This episode can be taken with Decius' other great moment, his *devotio* at 8.8.19–11.1. By then Decius is himself consul, so there is no question of his usurping another's role.[60] But he again has the chance of an individual exploit which secures victory for the whole army; he risked his life before, now he sacrifices it; once again the enemy are disoriented and terrified (8.9.11); once again an individual-

(Livy); Woodman (1997) 110–12 (Tacitus) for this technique of using stylistic variation to disorient and problematize.

[58] Oakley (1998) 338. The Ennius possibility was suggested by Aly (1936) 19. Oakley is sceptical.

[59] At 35.3, after 34.9–15 had left it unclear whether Decius and his men are surrounded. Cf. Oakley (1998) 338.

[60] Though there may well be a suggestion of a contest *between* the two consuls for glory, as Christina Kraus suggests to me; that is not necessarily negative (the competitive quest for glory is highly Roman), but the form it takes is still disquietingly unconventional.

istic start gives way to a more conventional open battle (8.9.13–10.7); each episode builds to appropriate wonder and honor, both from a consul (7.37.1, 8.10.1, 10) and from other more ordinary folk (7.37.2–3, 8.10.7). The earlier episode required furtive stealth, in a common cloak; this one requires conspicuous ostentation, in *cinctus Gabinus* (8.9.9). On one level it is extremely unconventional: a commander should not put himself in personal danger like this, nor should he divorce himself from his men and ride alone; the *devotio* itself requires both a *toga praetexta* and a weapon (8.9.5), another intrusive mix of the civilian and the military. But in another way Decius is as traditional as can be, putting state above self, showing trust in the gods, and adopting language to do so which is heavy with Roman religious archaism (8.9.4–8).

In the fighting itself, too, the style is not what one expects from a routine battle: Decius, 'somewhat more majestic than one would expect of human sight' (8.9.10), is surrounded by an aura of religious symbolism, and one is aware that forces beyond the personal and human are in play—that indeed Decius himself is by now blurring the most fundamental limits of all, between human and divine and between life and death.[61] Decius had talked about *fortuna* before (7.34.6, 35.8, 12): now the supernatural is more insistent. So despite the differences from the earlier episode we again see someone who presses on expected boundaries, yet all in the selfless service of Rome. It will be a further paradox that Decius, so unconventional a figure, will himself become one of the great *exempla* for the future[62]—something he almost foresees at 7.36.5, even if, by another paradox again, he applies the insight to the wrong battle.

So Decius belies expectations. Where do these expectations come from? In part, from Roman life: Livy's immediate audience will know what is senatorial behavior, where a triumph will normally be celebrated, how a prayer sounds, how a more traditional commander would behave. But in part they also come from previous literature: the expected stylistic register for a battle, or for an individualistic episode, or for an epiphany, or for a closure. Once again, though,

[61] Oakley (1998) 495 on 8.9.10, quoting Versnel (1981) 259: 'Decius, after his self-consecration, is, as *uir sacratus* or *sacer*, referred to the realm of the gods or the realm of death—in this case identical—but has as yet not completed his quest. He is "in between," in the no man's land between the society of the living and the world of their dead and their gods.'

[62] And in particular an *exemplum* for his own family: Kraus (1998) 271.

we are never brought to doubt the identification of this as 'history,' however much our on-the-whole expectations of the genre are unmet; by this stage of Roman historiography, and certainly by this stage of Livy's history, we know that the genre is capacious enough to accommodate different stylistic modes, and that Rome has grown to power through some versatility in the behavior of its great men. It still remains interpretatively important to see the ways in which the different strands create a paradoxical harmony of the conventional and the unexpected: it points the distinctive contribution of Decius to Roman history, his continuity with and difference from others in the canon of Roman heroes.

One last point about this episode. As Goodyear and Oakley observe,[63] the episode at 7.34–37.1 itself becomes an intertextual referent for Tacitus in his narrative at *Annals* 1.67.1. At that point Caecina is surrounded by Germans, and his situation is desperate. He encourages his troops in language which strongly recalls Decius' words (7.35). Caecina's men too are told to keep silent, are reminded of the surrounding *necessitas*, are told that their *una salus* is in arms and that they must *erumpere*: the similarity of vocabulary is more than can be explained by the similarity of the situation. What is the point? Not, I think, just 'clear reflexions of his long familiarity with Livy's writings, and perhaps no more than that' (Goodyear); better, 'by recalling the dangerous situation of Decius, Tacitus thereby added depth to his portrayal of Caecina' (Oakley); but it is worth attempting more precision on the nature of that 'depth.'

For many different pasts compete at that point of Tacitus' narrative. The loudest echo is that of Varus' disaster, just six years before: that has been prominent in the earlier narrative (1.55.2, 57.5, 58.2, and esp. 60.3–62), has figured in Caecina's dream (65.2) and in the German taunts (65.4); the probability that Caecina will replay Varus' fate is large. It is arguable, indeed, that Tacitus has retouched his topographical description here to make the circumstances of Varus' disaster closer to those of Caecina's predicament now.[64] That mention of Caecina's dream (65.2) had perhaps insinuated a further intertextual suggestion,[65] this time of Lucan's version of Pompey's

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[63] Goodyear (1981) 119; Oakley (1998) 341.

[64] Pelling (1990) 49 and n. 83; cf. also Woodman (1988) 174.

[65] Pelling (1997a) 204–5 (Lucan) and 207 (Caecina and the intertextuality). The crucial point is the odd phrase *dira quies* (Lucan 7.26–7, linking this dream to its

dream before Pharsalus (7.7–28). That was a happy dream, recalling Pompey's earlier triumphs, whereas this dream of Caecina is more ominous: he sees Varus beckoning him, and repels the invitation. Which role is Caecina to play? Will he be Varus, in catastrophe? Or will he be Decius, leading his men to safety? Will his dream be like that of Pompey, and if so how? In preceding a great disaster? Or in recalling past events which *contrast* with the present, for Pompey's happy dream had a most unhappy sequel? The suggestions pull in different directions, but that captures the tension and uncertainty of the moment. All that is clear is that a great moment is imminent, one which will somehow fit into the exemplary pattern of earlier Roman history—and that in its turn suits the thematic emphasis of so much of Germanicus' campaigning, where a constant preoccupation is the general's own relation to earlier times and styles.[66] This is again more than a literary game; the reader's uncertainties as to the most appropriate literary model are intrinsic to the meaning of the scene. They mirror Caecina's own uncertainties on the role he is to play, the part mapped out for him by, and in, Rome's 'exemplary history.'[67]

III. *Explaining things and ordering things*

Alan Dershowitz tells an American tale. A lawyer was once defending a client on a charge of murder. It looked hopeless, *Double Indemnity* all over again: the man had taken out life insurance on his partner only a week before she was killed by a professional hit-man, and the circumstantial evidence seemed decisive. As the lawyer pondered the case, his teenage daughter came into the room. 'The answer is Chekhov,' she said. She had been studying it in class. Chekhov had advised an aspiring dramatist that if there is a gun prominently on stage in the first act, then it had better be used in the third. Dramatic fiction is like that. But life is not so neat, there are coincidences, often what looks like a preparation is not one at all but something

mirroring sequel 7.760–84 and to *Ann.* 1.65.2): cf. Goodyear (1981) 113–14, often cautious but accepting that Lucan's phrase 'may have influenced Tacitus' expression here.'

[66] Pelling (1993).

[67] I borrow the phrase from Chaplin (2000).

random or irrelevant. He put the point to the jury: 'life is not a dramatic narrative.' How many of the jury had at some time taken out insurance on a loved one? And what would the neighbors think if that loved one had been murdered the following week? The lawyer must have been good: the man got off.[68]

There is an important point here. Juries, and readers, *are* more inclined to find a story plausible when it maps on to a pattern which is already familiar. These days those patterns often come from *LA Law* or *The Bill* (or even *Star Trek*); ancient readers might have dealt rather in patterns from Homer or *Gilgamesh* or the Old Testament. And, whatever else we say about Tacitus borrowing patterns from Livy, Herodotus from Homer, or Thucydides from Herodotus, we should not lose sight of that simple point: the story is simply more believable if it corresponds to the audience's expectations, more or less conscious, of how stories work.

But there is more. A recurrent theme of this collection is the balance and relation between the particular and the exemplary: some indeed make that the essential problem of history itself.[69] History is full of contingent details: in a specific case, how can we tell what is particular to that occasion and those circumstances, and what reflects a more universal and recurrent pattern? In the Chinese cases treated by Schaberg and Li, the point can be made explicit: 'Confucius said . . . ,' or 'the gentleman said . . . ,' or a wise maxim is embedded in the tale (10, 23, 40): all point, in Schaberg's words, to 'Confucian tenets which do not themselves change, but which explain all kinds of change in the world' (22). In the case of Darius' inscriptions, it is rather the vagueness ('there was one among these countries . . .'), as Sancisi-Weerdenburg brings out: 'How would one know that Atamaita's revolt was not to be imitated if the reader/listener was not named Atamaita and did not live in Elam? Elimination of specific details solved that problem' (109–10).

In many of the Greek and Roman historians, what is typical can be marked by the repetition of story patterns within the same text, often marked by verbal echoes. If history replays itself when Tiberius

[68] Dershowitz (1996).

[69] Von Fritz (1958) 127: 'Wie aber das καθόλου in der Geschichte durch das καθ' ἕκαστον hindurch am besten sichtbar zu machten sei, ist im Grunde *das* Grundproblem der Historiographie . . . .' Von Fritz is discussing how far Aristotle in the *Poetics* conceives the issue in the same way: on this see below, 348–9.

succeeds Augustus and when Nero succeeds Claudius (*Ann.* 1.5–6 ~ 12.67–13.1), then this is because the principate is like that, with the pressures of power imposing similar roles on each new princeps, each imperial widow and mother, and each first victim. Herodotus can present us with a series of Persian kings, each carried away by a run of success to go a step too far, each transgressing a natural boundary, and each failing. Not that they are stereotypes; in fact they are very different personalities. But that only serves to make the recurrent pattern of *action* all the more expressive.

Thucydides could not do that, or at least not so extensively and readily. He works with the single great example of the Peloponnesian War. It is central to his methodology that the thorough examination of this one theme can illustrate general patterns of human nature, patterns which will ensure that similar themes recur in different generations. But how is the audience to know what is part of that recurrent pattern and what is purely contingent? In some cases it may be clear enough. The reader is unlikely to think that history will repeat itself so precisely as to have, say, a battle of a Phormio in the Corinthian Gulf, or a Themistocles who decides the best way to win over his host is to seize his child and sit in supplication at his hearth.[70] Equally, readers will find it much clearer that the natural human tendency to aggression imposes recurrent large-scale patterns, that successful imperialist powers will repeat the cycle of over-expansion and self-destruction. But *why* is that much clearer? It is partly because Thucydides allows himself some generalizations on the underlying themes, and allows his speakers many more (though not all of those speakers' interpretations are acute). It is also partly because our own extra-textual experience predisposes us to find such patterns, noticing the recurrence in more recent history: more on this later. But it is also, very largely, because such exemplary patterns are programmed into the reader by previous texts. That can help us to understand why, if Rood is right in finding Herodotean modeling in Thucydides' Sicilian Expedition, that is most important: whereas Herodotus' own patterns are authenticated *within* his text, Thucydides

[70] Thuc. 2.83–92, 1.136. The second, incidentally, is an instance of historiography playing 'host' to tragedy: Euripides' *Telephus* famously told a very similar story. That again can be expressive, along with the 'Herodotean' tinge which many have found in those chapters (above, 327). History changes its style and register over 50 years, and Themistocles belongs in a very different world.

can graft his own analysis on to that same pattern, and we can sense the Herodotean sequence re-asserting itself—a more elaborate equivalent of the recurrent themes in separate Chinese anecdotes noted by Schaberg (22), where similar errors lead to similar consequences. Not that Thucydides' replaying of Herodotus is complete. Rood's closing words are suggestive: does Thucydides' remolding imply 'that Herodotean history was not adequate to convey the intensity of the suffering caused by the realization of the tensions Herodotus had so perceptively intimated' (166)? One paradox is that Thucydides' distinctive voice, smoothing away the supernatural and reducing matters to a human register, in many ways enacts the initial programme of Herodotus himself, with that insistence on the 'human' (above, 334). Thucydides now allows the programme to come true, after Herodotus had gone beyond it. Herodotus' false start becomes a Thucydidean keynote.

Intertextuality thus generates interpretation—and intelligibility. Why, after all, should history be so concerned to extract the exemplary from the specific? Partly to extract morals for the present ('Darmok and Jelad at Tenagra' once again); but partly also because of the frequent[71] interest in *explanation*. For to render a past action or phenomenon intelligible is to identify the salient conditions which obtained: what were the circumstances, what are the other parts of the story, which make us feel that the phenomenon fits comfortably into a larger pattern? It may be hard to believe that the same circumstances might have applied on any second occasion, but (on a strong view of historical causation, assimilating it to scientific causation) the implication is still there that, if they had, that action or phenomenon would predictably have recurred. Even on a weaker and more plausible view, historical explanation involves ordering events in a story-pattern which the reader will find plausibly familiar, whether that familiarity comes Dershowitz-like from *LA Law*, from musings on other periods of history, or simply from commonsense observation of everyday life.[72] All involve some recognition of recurrence. What is absolutely and in principle singular is absolutely and in principle unintelligible.

[71] But not universal: see below.

[72] This is obviously a vast topic: I hope to return to it elsewhere. On the particular problems of assimilating historical and scientific explanation see Mink (1987), esp. 61–88, 118–46.

Here however we need a capacious understanding of 'intelligible.' The breadth of material collected in this book may here be an eye-opener, reminding us how culture-specific 'explanation' may be. Categories that may seem to modern western eyes bland ('Confucius said, "There is a maxim from times long past: "To control oneself and to restore the rites is benevolence." Fine indeed! If King Ling of Chu had been able to do this, how could he ever have been shamed at Ganxi,' Schaberg 13–14), or even to be an abdication of explicability in normal terms (involving the miraculous, perhaps, or a random intervention of the will of God), can nevertheless be vital within a culture, locating a particular event within a familiar general pattern. And within the Greco-Roman world as well, there is more than one sort of 'intelligibility.' *We* tend to expect explanations in terms of origins, the conditions which precede and precipitate a particular event, and many Greco-Roman explanations indeed take that form. But there are also many passages which render events intelligible in a different way, by locating them against a more general pattern of human experience: such things happen, life is like that. Herodotus, like his Solon, stresses human mutability, and that pattern plays as large a part in rendering events intelligible as the search for their origins in particular stimuli; the same is true of Thucydides' insistence on the role of the paradoxical and unexpected in warfare, the importance (for instance) of unpredictable natural phenomena or coincidences.[73] Such naturalizing of challenging experiences is as old as the *Iliad*, particularly the exchanges of Achilles and Priam in the final book. These are the sorts of thing which can always happen, and once we have grasped that we have better understood history, and life.

Here too, then, recurrence is crucial, and intertextuality is therefore crucial too: in reading one historian we identify story-patterns which have occurred elsewhere. And naturally our two sorts of intelligibility interfuse: if Herodotus' wars and Homer's both go back to a crisis of honor and shame over a woman, then that pattern is itself suggested as 'something which happens': life, we infer, is indeed like that, and recurrently so. But it need not follow that such 'locatings' against a pattern of general experience—mutability, for instance—can always be phrased so neatly in terms of causality. When faced

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[73] See esp. Stahl (1966).

with a particular shift of fortune, we *might* be able to find a particular cause, perhaps in a particular human being's transgression, or in a pattern of reciprocity, or in a hostile god: we are certainly entitled to look and see, and we often find a good deal. But eventually it may be just as illuminating to say that such things happen: that this is a familiar feature of life for which no particular explanation is needed.

Perhaps, indeed, we concentrate too much on causal explanation, central to our own modern western historical explorations but not always so primary in the ancient world. This is not the only, perhaps not even the foremost, concern even of those Greco-Roman historians most typically associated with causal preoccupations. Fornara has rightly stressed that Herodotus is doing many other things, even in Books 7–9, than giving causal analysis,[74] and his interest in describing 'marvels' (θώματα) for their own sake is inescapably central. Thucydides seemed inimitable to Plutarch, but not because of his trenchant causal analysis or thoroughness or interpretative vigor: it was rather his artistic qualities, and in his Sicilian books 'he was at his most emotional, vivid, and varied' (*Nicias* 1). It is arguable that Plutarch himself, who when he wished could analyze personalities incisively and bring the reader to a close understanding of the make-up of (say) Coriolanus or Pompey or Antony, often chose not to do this. His *Alcibiades* is a marvelous portrayal, but not for its penetrating analysis of character, more for its delicate story-patterning and for the verve of its narrative of unpredictable strokes of behavior and shifts of fortune.[75]

Or, once again, take Aristotle's famous contrast of poetry and history (*Poetics* 1450a36–51b11). It is not meter, he says, which marks out poetry, because one could put Herodotus into verse and it would still be history; it is rather that the poet deals in the sorts of thing which might be expected to happen, the historian (ὁ ἱστορικός) in what did happen, such as what Alcibiades did or suffered. Poetry is therefore more philosophical and serious than 'history,' because poetry speaks more of universals (τὰ καθόλου), history more of particulars (τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον). Many have found this view of history puzzling and disappointing—perhaps more puzzling and disappointing than it is,

[74] Fornara (1983) 29–32, esp. 30.
[75] Pelling (1990a), esp. 231–5.

because Aristotle does not deny that history too deals in universals, he simply says that poetry deals 'more' with universals, history 'more' with particulars,[76] and (at least that far) he is absolutely right. It is still true that Aristotle's emphasis, here and in a second passage in the *Poetics*, does not suggest that he found the extracting of universal suggestions from contingent detail so central to historiography as we do: in that later passage (1459a21–4) he finds history typically lacking in unity of action, with its theme demarcated by temporal *termini* rather than by coherence of *praxis*.[77] Many have assumed that Thucydides is in Aristotle's mind when he mentions 'what Alcibiades did or suffered':[78] perhaps we should be cautious about that, for many an *Atthis* would have included such material as well; but in any case the most interesting point is the readiness with which Aristotle can include perhaps Thucydides and certainly Herodotus, the one historian he does name, in a general statement which applies best to a simpler type of record, something we would more naturally call a 'chronicle' than a 'history.' (Indeed, the lack of coherent emplotment and the demarcation by temporal *termini* are precisely the two categories which Hayden White used to define the chronicle as against 'proper history.'[79]) Yet it is that simpler type which seems to Aristotle most distinctively 'history.'

We might best regard causal explanation as only a sub-class of a wider phenomenon,[80] the attempt of historiography to impose *order*

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[76] The point is often ignored: it was seen clearly by von Fritz (1958) 116–17, in the course of a most sensitive discussion. So also Gribble (1999) 164.

[77] There is a problem about the text here, but it seems clear that Aristotle is contrasting tragic plots, ideally unified by *praxis*, with the temporal demarcations of 'histories.'

[78] Notably de Ste Croix (1975), arguing subtly but in an odd circle that Thucydides must have been in Aristotle's mind but that in that case Aristotle's point is unfair, sitting oddly with Aristotle's own philosophical categories developed elsewhere. Cf. Hornblower (1987) 10–11, with further bibliography. We should be cautious: Alcibiades may be chosen, not because Thucydides was the prime example of the great historian, but because Alcibiades' own actions were particularly unpredictable and individual, disrupting any general pattern and therefore challenging the extraction of universals. Thus Lucas (1968) *ad loc.*, and Gribble (1999) 159–60, 164–6.

[79] White (1987) 17.

[80] This is a further reason (see also Marincola 284) why Fornara's labeling of this particular sub-class as 'history' (as opposed to Jacoby's more careful *Zeitgeschichte*) is to be resisted. Contrast Jacoby (1909) 83, 'We must take "Greek historiography" in its wide ancient sense, because in antiquity there never existed a defined, independent field of study corresponding closely to our "History," concentrating on the investigation and depiction of historical events of the distant or recent past....'

on the past; one remembers again Xenophon's closing of the *Hellenica* at the point where history sinks into disorder. One sort of ordering is certainly this interest in causal patterns. But classification too is a way of bringing order into things, capturing them within a scheme with as much comprehensiveness as is feasible. Foucault brought out how the eighteenth-century taste for taxonomy and classification was driven partly by a preoccupation with structure, but partly also by a quest for the comprehensive enumeration of the instances which fell under each category.[81] A similar preoccupation helps to explain the project of Hecataeus, both in his Geography (the *Periodos Ges*, 'Journey around the World') and in the *Genealogies*. We can trace two ways there of classifying peoples as they came more firmly within the Greek experience, one by locating them geographically and another by a different sort of 'situating,' placing their pasts within the Greek genealogical tradition.

This interest persisted. Events and phenomena were catalogued for catalogue's sake, perhaps organized by theme as 'paradoxes' or (later) as 'virtuous women,' perhaps classified by space as 'the things about Lydia' or 'Persia,' perhaps ordered by time under a particular year ('horography' and 'chronography,' in the conventional labelings). Athens being what it was, the tradition of local accounts of Attica, the *Atthides*, was especially important. In more complex works chronological and spatial ordering principles could sometimes be combined, as already with Herodotus and, there is reason to believe, with Posidonius too.[82] Naturally, the simplest sort of chronological cataloguing swiftly encompasses some causal analysis, as *post hoc* can scarcely avoid implying *propter hoc*. Take the following passage from Dionysius of Halicarnassus, quoting Philochorus' *Atthis* (Dion. Hal. *Ad Amm.* 11 = Philochorus *FGrHist* 328 frs. 53–55a).

Those who criticize Jacoby for excessive schematism should also notice his impressively honest doubts about some secondary *schemata* as the work proceeded: his manuscript notes, published by Schepens (1997) 150–4, make fascinating reading.

[81] Foucault (1970), esp. 125–65: e.g., 126 on Linnaeus' optimistic view that the whole natural order could be brought into a comprehensive taxonomy. Organizing principles were not necessarily seen as capturing *schemata* inherent in the nature of things, and there are only intermittent hints of anything causal (e.g., 'quasi-evolutionism,' interpreted in several different ways); more often they are a matter of simple convenience for human comprehensibility (147).

[82] Clarke (1999) Ch. 3; cf. also her chapter in the present volume for the complex interrelationship of chronological and spatial systems in other authors.

> The grievances [or causes, *aitiai*], which led both sides to complain at each other's treatment and begin the war, and the date at which they broke the peace are set out precisely by Philochorus in the sixth book of his *Atthis*: I shall include the most pertinent passages. 'The year of Theophrastus of Halae [i.e., as eponymous archon: 340/39 BCE]. In this year Philip first put to sea and then attacked Perinthus; on failing there he then laid siege to Byzantium and brought up his siege-engines.' Then Philochorus goes through the complaints Philip laid against the Athenians and adds (I quote verbatim): 'the people heard the letter; Demosthenes encouraged them into the war and proposed a decree, and the people voted to take down the stele which recorded the peace and alliance with Philip, to man ships, and to take in hand the other things which war involved.'

We are left in no doubt about why Philip went on to Byzantium, what the Athenians were complaining about, and why they took down the stele. Dionysius is right to say that Philochorus explains the *aitiai* of the conflict. But it would be a mistake to think that the causal analysis is the most important aspect of Philochorus' enterprise. It is the temporal classification of the facts, for facts' sake, that matters most.[83]

So any historiography is an act of optimism, assuming that the past can be tamed into *some* sort of order. This usually implies the same for the present, either in the sense that it can be controlled and guided by active politicians, or at least that it may be brought under some sort of intellectual control, understood even if not directed. In Jaeger's analogy, *in retrospect* the historian's readers have the overview of the labyrinth that finally reveals a clear shape (183). A similar control is given *in prospect* by the omniscient Chinese predictors (Chs. 1–2), whose inspired pointers can, in the words of the *Zuozhuan* quoted by Schaberg 24), be seen as 'bringing order to a chaotic time and returning it to correctness.'

That affinity with order makes it striking that many of these papers have dwelt on the dangers of *dis*order, the moments when a history's control of its material is most precarious. It may be the difficulties acknowledged by universal historians in bringing so large

[83] Compare White (1987), esp. Chs. 1–2, on the ways in which the medieval chronicle shares features with, but also falls short of, the emplotments and encodings typical of narrative historiography. For a good introduction to 'Atthidography' see Harding (1994) 1–52, esp. 3–8. Things were importantly different at Rome, and any attempt to distinguish chronographic 'annals' from analytic 'histories' will fail: cf. Marincola 300.

a mass of material under their coherent schemes (Clarke 264); it may be the tension which a historian points in reconciling incompatible presentations of the same sequence or character (as with Sima Qian, Li 42–53); it may be the temporary bewilderment as a reader plots a path through the 'labyrinth' (Jaeger, Ch. 8); it may, as we have seen, be the difficulties of a historical narrative in articulating events within its own generic idiom, those moments when genre itself becomes (in Conte's word) 'unruly.'[84] Sometimes the disorder is less a matter of literary form, more a matter of the zanily paradoxical development of the events it describes: the morally destabilizing consequences of clearly articulated moral rhetoric (Levene, esp. 212–14); the unexpected importance of whether Xuanzi crossed the state border (Li 40–1); the strange ways by which the unconventional Decius becomes a canonical Roman hero (above, 339–43 with Jaeger 183–92). Most often of all it is both, as questions of disorderly form interact with questions of disorderly content: history becomes unwritable when the events become unreadable. That is seen most elaborately here in Kraus' analysis of *Bellum Iugurthinum* (Ch. 10), where the danger that *discordia* will overwhelm the structures of the Roman state finds its corollary in the disorder which threatens the narrative structure, and the doubt whether language itself can capture so inharmonious a world. Readers, Kraus argues, will not derive utility from the work unless they recognize that menacing messiness: so in that case the potential exemplarity of the work, something which depends on the possibility of recurrence and the discrimination of historical order, also requires alertness to that pattern's precariousness and the knife-edge which divides it from uncontrollable and uninterpretable disorder.

This critical taste for disorder is interesting. In part, of course it mirrors the texture of the histories themselves: wars, rebellions, suffering, disruption, collapse—such has always been the natural material of history. Orderly societies make dull reading. But it also corresponds to the texture of contemporary thinking, with the modern and post-modern distrust of clear-cut lines, firm solutions, and closed texts, and a preference for the open-ended and 'unruly' and fragmented. That correspondence is no surprise: it is a further post-modern commonplace that no critic can wholly escape his or her

[84] Conte (1994) 120.

cultural preconceptions. But Sima Qian could disarm previous interpretations by historicizing them, demonstrating that a reading or a custom was exactly what one would expect of a particular period (Li 52). Should we in turn be concerned if our own readings can be historicized like this—if, an unfriendly critic might say, they are situated in our particular *fin-de-siècle* disorientation and Angst?[85]

IV. *The past and the present*

The answer is 'no': such contemporary readings are not merely natural, they are thoroughly defensible. We have often spoken of the audience's 'horizon of expectation.' Yet the concept of an 'audience' is anything but easy, particularly for historians.[86] For historians were not simply concerned with their readers in the here and now but with posterity too, and audiences they could not yet know: Herodotus with his Homer-like interest in preserving the fame of wondrous achievements (above, 332–3); Thucydides writing a 'possession for ever more than a prize composition for immediate hearing,' and seeking to benefit those who wish to understand 'things which happened in the past and which will be the same or similar in the future, the human condition being what it is' (1.22.4, cf. 3.82.2); Tacitus pointing the advantages to society if potential heroes and villains have an eye to their reputation with future generations (3.65.1).[87]

Other genres too have a view to the future; epic and elegy are particularly strident on the subject; and one should not forget the grave epigram, where the future audience even becomes the addressee. Yet history—or at least some history, that most interested in the exemplary—affords unusual point to the particular, as yet unknowable historical circumstances of that future, as yet unknowable audience. For this exemplary function of history typically posits some relation between the past events described in the text and the present experiences of the reader. We typically, and justifiably, tend to

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[85] Compare the sharp words of Griffin (1998) 61 on contemporary criticism of Greek tragedy: 'The more exactly an ancient work seems to chime with our own most cherished notions . . . the more carefully we should look at our analysis, to see where we have gone wrong.'

[86] For some interesting preliminary reflections cf. Momigliano (1978).

[87] The passage is often misinterpreted and has difficulties: cf. Luce (1991); Woodman (1995); and the discussion of Woodman and Martin (1996) 451–6.

take this in terms of the text affording guidance for the future, either to avoid repeating past mistakes or at least to understand future trends and themes. There is also the sense in which the readers' own experience, as they sense those trends and themes recurring in their own politics, reinforces the texts' analysis of the past (rather as Hippocratic writers appeal to the experience of their doctor- and patient-readers to authenticate their own analyses).[88] Thucydides' interpretation of the Sicilian expedition, with an aggressive imperialist, even tyrannical democracy outreaching and destroying itself, is authenticated as universal not simply by the intertextuality with Herodotus, important though that is (above, 345–6): for us it is also authenticated by our predisposition to find it credible, and that predisposition is influenced by similar sequences in later history—by our knowledge of Napoleon or Hitler, perhaps, and the self-destroying outreachings into Russia of those other confident new ideologies. Thucydides could not foresee the specifics; but, with his confidence in historical recurrence, he might still be confident that something somewhere would vindicate his analysis. And it may well be that Herodotus, a less imperious and monologic writer who affords multiple readings and interpretations, could allow the possibility of alternative futures picking up alternative themes in his text, so that its full ethical implications were unknowable to its author but, he could anticipate, knowable to his readers.[89]

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[88] This is another vast area to which I intend to return elsewhere. For appeals to audience experience to authenticate analysis, cf. (from many examples) *On the Sacred Disease* 7 II. p. 154 J. = 4 VI. p. 368 L., supporting its view of air-circulation by appealing to the experience of numbness in the extremities when the circulation is cut off; or *On Ancient Medicine* 18 I. p. 46 J. = I. p. 614 L., appealing to audience memories of what it is like to have a cold: on this 'corroborative' style of argument cf. Lloyd (1979), esp. 146–69. More generally *On Ancient Medicine* insists on the value both of audience recollection of experience (2 I. p. 16 J. = I. pp. 572–4 L.) and of past medical discoveries building a common storehouse of knowledge, applied by practitioners and refined in the light of their own experience. The *Epidemics* collect case-studies for present and future study; they also advance provisional hypotheses, revisable in the light of the accumulation of similar cases (e.g., 2.2.24 V. pp. 96–8 L., 4.124 V. p. 168 L., 6.2.5 V. pp. 278–80 L.: for the value of accumulation, particularly 6.3.12 V. p. 298 L.).

[89] As suggested by Dewald (1997), with particular reference to the alternative futures, triumphant or disastrous, of the Athenian empire. For doubts about this approach cf. Moles (1996), arguing that Herodotus' text clearly implies the likelihood of Athenian failure: even if he is right, Dewald's reading strategy remains an exciting possibility for other texts and for other aspects of Herodotus. Cf. Conte (1994) 68 on the elder Pliny: 'Indeed, an encyclopedia is essentially a text whose

So it is natural to allow, as the historians themselves must have allowed, posterity to feed its own experience into interpretation. Those who wish can therefore find a justification in old-fashioned intentionalism for precisely the procedure we are here discussing, the alertness to and emphasis on those themes in the historians which map closely on to our contemporary thought-world. That can co-exist comfortably with an acknowledgment that such insights are only partial, that other generations might have the advantage in their sensitivity to equally valid strands. We might accept, for instance, that post-Second-World-War readers who are nervous about power and imperialism can be alert to the nuanced reservations in Thucydides' presentation of Periclean Athens, whereas earlier generations might be more robust and less embarrassed by the positive 'hymn to power' in the same material. Reception criticism can act as a control on contemporary modishness, suggesting alternative and further questions and responses; but there must be room for both.

What other contemporary modes and themes might a future critic identify in the present collection? In the eastern papers, there is naturally the concern to avoid misleading western labels and reinterpret the material in something like its own terms; but it is interesting how often that question begins by looking for a 'historiography' defined, more or less explicitly, in Thucydidean terms, then going on to explore how the texts do not articulate material in quite that way. Thus Schaberg (2) describes Chinese texts as 'hardly Thucydidean in their attitude toward implausible material . . .'; Uchitel (55) speaks of the 'Greek concept of *historia*, that is, a rational historical research' and goes on (66) to stress summers-and-winters dating (a Thucydidean hallmark); Sancisi-Weerdenburg (93) comments on the Behistun text which 'definitely looks like a historiographical account which gives causes, motives, events, names of people involved, places and times when and where things happened, as well as the final situation. . . . Events are linked in a causal chain which served as an explanation.' Bolin (Ch. 6) also characterizes the Biblical material as 'antiquarian,'[90] as opposed to a more familiar historiographic idiom

author cannot—and must not—foresee the totality of its possibility uses, an "open" totality of mechanisms that can be disassembled and rearranged differently according to the reader's needs.'

[90] Notice, however, that many classicists now have reservations about applying to their own material so firm a distinction between 'antiquarian' and 'historical' research: cf. Marincola 298, 307; Schepens (1997); Humphreys (1997).

which analyzed causes (124) and ordered events in a coherent, single linear scheme.

The critics' point in setting out these modern expectations is generally to deconstruct them: Sancisi-Weerdenburg, for instance, explains that 'historiography, as described here, was born in Greece in the fifth century and was a product of very specific circumstances' (99), and ends by explaining how the irregularly familiar look of the Behistun historical style is born of curiously individual historical circumstances. This recurrent style of argument remains revealing, as it so accurately captures the way in which the Thucydidean model still governs modern assumptions of what is normal. Yet that model was not the only one even in the Greco-Roman world, as Clarke and Marincola in particular bring out; some of the other styles, such as that of Philochorus (above, 351), may come closer to some eastern patterns.[91] That contact between East and West is not explored by the classicists in this volume, and that is perhaps odd, given that investigation of near-eastern parallels and influences has proved so productive in other Hellenic fields; perhaps this collection of material may stimulate further work in this direction. Classicists will be struck, for instance, by the first-millennium version of *Gilgamesh* cited by Michalowski (79): the proems of *Iliad* and *Odyssey* show parallels both with that *Gilgamesh* version and (as we saw) with the proem of Herodotus, but Herodotus is closer to *Gilgamesh* than either is to Homer: in *Gilgamesh* too, as in Herodotus (above, 332–3), it is spatial wandering which gives temporal insight.

Our future observer might also notice the absence of some themes which would have dominated a generation ago. There is not much interest, for instance, in relating historians' production to their own personal political experiences in the manner which Sir Ronald Syme made his own; there is more interest in the way that they develop a self-characterization, a personal voice, within the texts. Sima Qian is especially interesting here, with Li's emphasis on his rhetoric of uncertainty ('the anxiety of interpretation,' Li 38) as he confronts such discordant traditions: once again one notices the modern respect for the diffident and provisional rather than the decisive and imperious. There is a certain amount on style, but not analysis of stylis-

[91] Fornara (1983) 22 n. 45 brings this out well. Uchitel (60–1) similarly emphasizes the contact between Hittite chronicles and the Greek local historians.

tic development for its own sake, rather an emphasis on the integration of style with content: Kraus in particular brings out how discordant language, like inharmonious structure, reflects the nature of Sallust's theme (Ch. 10).

Above all, there is little on the historical accuracy of these writers, or on the balance they strike between any fidelity to the source-material and their own creative composition. The authors' extensive manipulation of their sources is taken as read by the critics, and does not provoke any surprise or indignation: the surprise comes rather when we find an unmanipulated and unsmoothed transmission of traditions, as Bolin suggests for the Hebrew Bible (Ch. 6). Anyone wishing to know about the historical Jugurtha will not be helped much by these essays; nor what really happened in the Great Harbor; nor how Darius behaved in the aftermath of Gaumata. We may occasionally find our skepticism reinforced about the possibility of knowing anything at all (witness, for instance, the irreconcilable gulf between the Egyptian and Greek versions of Cambyses: Sancisi-Weerdenburg 101); but, as far as 'what really happened' is concerned, not much more.

Some will find that frustrating; others may find the gains greater than the losses. After all, the emphases are themselves historically telling. Clarke brings out how the Augustan taste for universality in time and space illustrates contemporary mentality (Ch. 11); the confrontation of historiography and biography articulates the problems felt in living, or describing, a life under the principate (Marincola, and above, 336); the Sallustian preoccupation with discord (Kraus) or the Thucydidean alignment of Athenian and Persian imperialism (Rood) are similarly illuminating, and so are Darius' reasons for striking so unusually specific a note at Behistun (Sancisi-Weerdenburg). Attention may here have switched to historiography as reception rather than historiography as record, to what authors do with the material and what they find interesting rather than to reconstructing the original historical events. Of course historians must continue to do both; but both are vital.

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TLL *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*. 1898–. Stuttgart/Leipzig.

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